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Abstract 
 
This thesis is about state and society relations in Central Asia. It examines statehood comparatively 
in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Despite having made different political, economic, and 
institutional choices at independence in 1991, these countries arrived at the same outcome today: 
an incomplete state. In framing the problem as the incomplete state, this thesis shifts the 
conventional emphasis away from symptoms of state weakness toward those processes that 
contribute to it. It highlights the fact that the state can simultaneously be both strong and weak, 
omnipresent and absent. It is the blurring of the line between state and non-state, public and 
private, legal and illegal, formal and informal which matters for a better understanding of the 
state. Drawing from Charles Tilly and Michael Mann, this thesis suggests that these shadow areas 
generate processes of interstitial emergence that may either undermine or strengthen the state. 
The outcome generated by such processes is dependent on the balance between state autonomy 
and state embeddedness. The thesis argues that the incomplete state is a result of three sets of 
factors—historical, external, and local—that directly or indirectly produce processes that are 
counter-productive to the current state-building process. Specifically, it focuses on the societal 
legacy of the Soviet statehood, the strategies of state-building provided by external actors, and 
the balance of power between rival local elites. It demonstrates how each of these sets of factors 
contribute to the creation or development of sites of social resistance and the chasm between the 
state and society in each of the three given cases. Further, it identifies three important processes. 
Firstly, structural changes taken for granted following the dissolution of the Soviet Union have not 
necessarily altered cross-border societal interdependence at the grassroots. Secondly, the 
strategies pursued by external actors have indirectly created isolated pockets of land, empowered 
community-based civil activism and facilitated informal trade. Finally, while state elites 
strengthened the institution of the state, they turned it into a tool for legitimizing illicit revenues 
rather than a means to increase its infrastructural power. States and societies in the region have 
become isolated from one another. These states, empowered only in the institutional sense, have 
become empty shells. The societies, empowered without the state, have become captives within a 
game of survival. It seems that the state cannot be complete without becoming social.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The State as social practice: sources, resources and forces in Central Asia  
 
Déjà vu in the city of Osh, southern Kyrgyzstan: 2 am on 11 June 2010, an irregular azan (call to 
prayer) sounds from a few mosques, a warning for people to take cover. It was in response to 
growing tensions between Uzbek and Kyrgyz, which were deteriorating since the beginning of 
June.  On 10 June, an Uzbek crowd armed with sticks, stones and iron bars, awaited their Kyrgyz 
rivals at the Hotel Alai for yet another fight over perceived injustice. Police failed to prevent the 
outbreak of violence, and deployed military forces handed their weapons to crowds of rural Kyrgyz 
who had been gathering from the suburbs of Osh. As a result, up to 470 people were killed (74% 
Uzbek, 25% Kyrgyz, and 1% belong to other ethnic groups). 1900 people were injured. 2843 
buildings were damaged. 111 000 refugees fled to Uzbekistan. 300 000 were internally displaced 
(KIC 2010). Despite calls from the provisional government for international intervention, both 
regional and international partners declined to intervene. These tensions followed the April 2010 
uprising against President Bakiev, who came to power through a similar uprising in 2005. Similar 
events took place in 1990, when the autonomy of Osh province was being debated.  
The city of Andijan, Eastern Uzbekistan, May 13, 2005: having attacked several government 
buildings in Andijan, gunmen organized a jailbreak and released 23 men facing charges of religious 
extremism. Groups joined in a mass protest on the Babur Square. At around 5 pm, government 
forces sealed the square and hundreds of people were killed. Human Rights Watch called it one of 
the biggest massacres in Asia. Uzbekistan was internationally condemned for gross violations of 
human rights, torture, and dictatorship (HRW 2005; ICG 2005; FH 2005). However, regional 
security organizations, such as Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Collective Security 
Treaty Organization accepted the version of events presented by Uzbekistan: that the protest was 
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an instance of terrorism, organized by Islamist movements. Scholars noted the extremist character 
of the event, organized by the radical religious organizations (Babadjanov 2015).  
Dushanbe, Tajikistan: the political history of Tajikistan, since the end of the civil war in 
1997, seems to be a minefield, with a force-majeure situation every other year. The most vivid of 
these were the operations against extremism and drug trafficking in Rasht in 2010, following a 
jailbreak; in Hujand in 2010, there was a terrorist attack on a police station, for which 50 young 
men  were incarcerated subsequently following investigations in Hujand, Istaravshan and Isfara; 
there was a military operation in Badakhshan 2012; 5 October 2014 preemptive action was taken 
against an Opposition Rally by banning social media and SMS-services, as well as the banning of 
the opposition Group-24 as an extremist organization by the Supreme Court; on September 4, 
2015, raids were conducted on police stations in Vakhdat town, in the vicinity of Dushanbe, 
resulting in the death of 22 people and government operations against the Islamic Renaissance 
Party of Tajikistan, which was held responsible for the attacks.  
These events are examples of what conventional wisdom calls “failed states”, “fragile 
states” or “failing states”. Mass uprisings, Islamic extremism, terrorist attacks and ethnic conflicts 
are among conventional causes of state failure, as well as threats to democracy and international 
security (FSI 2015). At the same time, malign elites or despotic regimes have been seen as 
explanations for state failure.  
The epitome of this logic is the transitology approach to the state, which dominates 
debates on Central Asia since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Based on an assumption that the 
state is a result of the rationalization of social relations, this approach sets its research problem 
erroneously. Firstly, Central Asian states are not all the same. They have been treated as similar 
cases, due to their common Soviet past. However, this Soviet past itself seemed to be 
misunderstood. Specifically, transitology assumed a continuity of Soviet institutions, whereas each 
Central Asian state has made a distinct choice in their institutional setting at the outset of 
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independence. Secondly, it neglects that the multi-layered history of Central Asia, which made the 
state in Central Asia more a result of abrupt changes and social engineering rather than 
institutional continuity. Finally, transitology assumes that government decentralization and market 
liberalization are the key features of a well-functioning state.  
A variation on this approach is the good governance argument, which claims that a lack of 
democracy, violations of human rights, and a lack of civil society may cause violence which poses a 
threat to the state. However, it is debatable whether it is not in fact civil society networks using 
human rights rhetoric instead of malign elites which resulted in social mobilization, uprisings and 
violence. After all, it is local actors that seemed to resolve these issues, not regional or 
international actors, or civil society.  In order to bring some clarity on this ambiguous approach to 
the state, this thesis suggests reformulating the problem as one of incomplete states, generally 
defined as the partial presence of a state in some functional areas and territories and its partial 
absence in others.  
This thesis has chosen three Central Asian states which challenge these premises: 
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. As shown in the opening paragraphs, all three states in the 
second decade of sovereignty arrived at similar outcomes in the form of incomplete state-building 
process. These three states, however, initially chose different institutional, political, and economic 
paths, which were reflected in varying degrees of government centralization and 
institutionalization, different approaches to economic liberalization, as well as levels of openness 
to independent media and the externally-sponsored NGO sector, i.e. the formal civil society. These 
three countries can be viewed as being on a continuum from almost isolationist and highly 
centralized (Uzbekistan) to the extremely liberal and open (Kyrgyzstan) with Tajikistan having 
undergone a specific path of “shock therapy” (read: liberalization), due to the civil war that lasted 
between 1992 and 1997. In this light, this thesis asks: why have three states with different degrees 
of state centralization, market liberalization, and civil society all experienced a similar outcome?  
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The goal of this thesis is to identify structures and processes that may contribute to the 
incompleteness of the state and challenge the linear logic of the dominant transitology approach. 
Drawing heavily from Charles Tilly and Michael Mann, this thesis suggests that the conventional 
wisdom has been largely historically and societally blind. According to Michael Mann, 
“factionalized states are more dangerous *…+, than failed states” (Mann 2005, 23). Charles Tilly 
(1975) provides milestones to understand how the state can become factionalized or fragmented, 
both territorially and functionally. Finally, both scholars draw attention to history not in its linear 
sense, but in the sense of identifying patterns that explain state development, drawing attention 
to change rather than continuity in the history of the state. Departing from these points, this 
thesis suggests an exploration of how different state-making settings can produce similar results in 
different social contexts, which factors influence this. For instance, Michael Mann has 
demonstrated the “dark side of democracy” by showing how its civilizational mission can cause 
ethnic cleansing and violence; or how dense civil society networks can actually transmit radical 
causes and mobilize societies, rather than protect societies from manipulation by elites, as in the 
case of Serbs, Croats, Hutu nationalists, and Fascists in Germany (Mann 2005). Similarly, this thesis 
aims to explore whether state-building projects had features that have undermining effects. 
Furthermore, Central Asian states seem partially to integrate illicit parts of the economy 
and politics within official state-building. Tilly’s notion of the “state as organized crime” will help 
cast light on the political economy and history of the state, both in terms of its shadows and its 
formal pillars. Tilly’s approach will help avoid normative considerations and clichés, such as 
bandits or criminals, in order to focus on their creation and shaping instead. Finally, as the case of 
Osh illustrates, the elites are not always malevolent. It is sometimes the case that the elites and 
military are paralyzed by other structural conditions which lead to their political impotence.  
The thesis will examine three dimensions that may better reveal the abridged nature of the 
state in central Asia. Each of these dimensions can be seen as a state engineering scheme. The 
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dimensions are historical, external, and local: that is of the Soviet societal legacy, external actors’ 
strategies, and the local elites’ struggles for power. Using navigation patterns identified by Tilly 
and Mann, this thesis will check how the state-building efforts have actually paved the way for the 
incomplete state, specifically which processes were produced, which structures were set up, and 
what consequences were fostered by their interaction This will be examined through focusing on 
the societal consequences and human meaning of each of these grand schemes, in order to 
demonstrate that the incomplete state is the result of these schemes, rather than an obstacle to 
them.  
Thus, this thesis is about three different instances of the state-building process and three 
different states which all started independence with discrete institutional, political, and economic 
settings. Despite this, nearly 20 years later they have all ended up in a situation which, in the 
Chapter 2, we call the incomplete state. As this thesis suggests, this happened due to three sets of 
factors which fostered differing patterns of interaction or disruption of state-society relations. The 
sets of factors are the societal legacy of Soviet statehood; external actors’ strategies for organizing 
security, the economy, and society; and struggles for the balance of power between local elites. 
This thesis will examine how and where each of these sets complements and undermines one 
another, and, more importantly, whether they contribute to shaping or breaking of state-society 
relations and what form this takes.  
Organization of the thesis  
 
The framework of this study consists primarily of three sets of explanatory factors: 1) the Soviet 
legacy; 2) External actors; and 3) Local Elites. The three sets of factors are first outlined individually 
and are then structured with a focus on the transnational and national social patterns which they 
produced and which have persisted even though they were disrupted after the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union. Each set corresponds to its respective empirical chapter. The goal is not a mere 
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description of these three sets of factors, but rather to provide an outline of the reasoning behind 
them, and the societal resonances which follow. As each of these dimensions demonstrates an 
often mutually exclusive logic, the study shows how this mismatch contributes to sites of social 
resistance. The analysis strikes a balance between intrastate and interstate dimensions and 
highlights the points where transnational and national processes merge. To achieve this, the thesis 
is divided into five chapters.  
Chapter 1 depicts the conceptual framework, argument, and the main propositions of this 
thesis. It does so in three steps. First, in section 1.1 it addresses the dominant debate on the state 
in Central Asia. It demonstrates that a multitude of approaches narrating Central Asian state-
building can be gathered under a common denominator of transitology assumptions, i.e. that the 
state represents a rationalization of social relations, its history is linear, and one-size-fits-all- 
institution-building can bring the state to the happy endpoint in the form of liberal democracy. 
Section 1.2 introduces peculiarities of Central Asian states which represent a conceptual challenge 
to the dominant debate and the dominant state theories applied to Central Asia. Specifically, it 
identifies within their logic four dichotomies, challenging the logic of the transitology approaches, 
such as strong vs. weak state, rationality vs. irrationality of societal development, historical vs. 
institutional contextualization of statehoods, formal vs. informal areas of organizing social order. 
With the goal to resolve these dichotomies, this section provides an alternative cognitive map to 
shed a different light on state and society in Central Asia. This map is outlined in the thesis 
propositions which finalize section 1.2, and arrives at the thesis argument in section 1.3. The thesis 
argument is draws heavily on the writings of Charles Tilly and Michael Mann. Section 1.4 provides 
the methodological considerations of this thesis, such as comparative case study method, and case 
selection strategy. The methodology is based on non-efficient or non-linear causality and draws 
heavily on the Tilly’s call to tackle “big structures, big processes, big comparisons” in order to 
provide different visions of the state formation problem. For these reasons, the thesis’ main 
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“variables” are called sets of explanatory factors, within which one can find different correlations 
and patterns, the confluence of which provides an alternative explanation of the thesis’ main 
problem. 
Chapter 2 is about the thesis’ main research problem. Having demonstrated that 
measuring the state by the dichotomous categories used by the dominant state-building debate is 
slightly misleading, for they tell us the state has failed and at the same time that it is despotic. This 
chapter redefines the puzzle as a problem of incomplete state, which means that in some issues 
the state is omnipresent, and in others it is completely absent. The chapter achieves this in two 
steps. First, section 2.1 shows how the three cases in focus score on leading state measuring 
indices, mainly the Failed State Index. Secondly, section 2.2 shows what these indicators tell us, 
once applied to the four identified dichotomies and how it provides better understanding of the 
incompleteness of the state, potentially shifting misplaced emphases to issues which are more 
important for state – society relations.  
Chapter 3 is labeled Soviet legacy, defined here as the social legacy that emerged out of 
Soviet state construction. Specifically, the chapter is about cross-border socio-economic 
interdependence in the Fergana Valley fostered by specific resource management and state 
construction during the Soviet period. It addresses the roots of re-traditionalizating societal 
relations at the grassroots level, such as community-based water management. It does not say 
that community structures reemerge as the Soviet lid has finally been opened and people have 
consciously chosen a path which is more natural to them, as most literature presumes. Rather, it 
demonstrates what processes, patterns, and needs forced people to revive the pre-Soviet 
memories of community-based social order. The chapter achieves this goal in three steps. Firstly, 
section 3.1 introduces a brief overview of the pre-Soviet societal organization and patterns of 
social relations in order to see whether Soviet project was actually the aforementioned pressure 
cooker lid or whether it had been a state constructing and identity-building project. The chapter 
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challenges the assumption of the successful implementation of the structural reform by unfolding 
the internal and external restructuring of collective farms, i.e. their land (section 3.4.1) and non-
land assets (3.4.2). It claims that the macro-structure of societal interdependence with regards to 
key resources, especially the non-land assets, has not fully taken place, especially at the 
community-level. To illustrate this, the case of community-level water management around the 
Isfara river is addressed. In sum, this chapter provides a vivid picture of societal interdependence 
in the Fergana Valley and the emerging structures for self-governance resulting from the social 
struggles to manage resources, which had previously been managed by the collective farms.  
Chapter 4 addresses the second set of explanatory factors, i.e. the external actors’ 
strategies related to state-building in Central Asia. It focuses on how external actors have 
attempted to organize security, economy and society in Central Asia, with these being managed 
through borders, trade and resources, and the development of NGO sector, respectively. The 
three sections in this chapter show a paradoxical result: isolated communities, divided by now 
international borders, show a high potential for transnational collective action through their socio-
economic links and shared identity of resistance.  
Chapter 5 examines the third set of explanatory factors derived from the elites’ struggles 
for domination. It is organized according to the three countries in focus, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, 
and Kyrgyzstan: Tajikistan and the ruling elite’s strategy of elimination; Uzbekistan and the ruling 
elite’s strategy of accommodation; Kyrgyzstan and the ruling elite’s strategy of intermingling. Its 
goal is to understand why three different strategies led to the same outcome, i.e. incomplete 
state-building. It finds that the common variable was that in each of these cases, the ruling elite 
aimed at gaining economic resources and the state was used as the main vehicle for doing so, 
despite the different means employed to achieve this. It shows that in all three cases the 
infrastructural power of the state and its societal embeddeddness was neglected, which led to the 
increase of its despotic power or its omnipresence in some areas, and its absence in others, such 
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as some territorial domains, borderlands, and ideational sectors. In Tilly’s terms, the ruling elites 
achieved functional centralization and territorial fragmentation, which made their state 
reminiscent of their medieval counterparts. In confluence with the first two sets of factors, the 
suggestion is that it contributed to the increase of sites of societal resistance, thereby outsourcing 
the state’s political and ideological power.  
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CHAPTER 1:  Understanding state-building in Central Asia  
Introduction  
 
Central Asia provides an interesting laboratory for understanding the processes of state-building 
as it is difficult to distinguish at once where state ends and non-state begins in many of the 
region’s states. Its complex geography, with its fluid and porous borders on one hand, and wire 
fences and minefields on the other, challenge conventional views on territory, sovereignty, and 
state-society relations. Due to its multilayered history, societal interactions have become cross-
border in nature and various institutional architectures have come to overlap. Altogether, this 
challenges nation-based visions of statehood. At the same time, as with any new states, they have 
been obsessed with the Westphalian notion of sovereignty, while at the same their societies 
reveal features of both isolation and transnationalization. Central Asian states may begin within 
only a small fraction of their societies and end in exile, embodied in wider migrant communities 
abroad. This complexity can be analytically unpacked in order to understand the tipping points of 
state transformation in societally diverse regions.  
This complexity is unfolded here in three stages. Firstly, this chapter examines the parts of 
the current debate on state-building, and the main assumptions it draws upon. Secondly, it looks 
at the case of Central Asia and the associated state-building processes, particularly the way they 
pose a conceptual challenge to the dominant themes which inform the current debate. It will 
provide an alternative, modified cognitive map allowing for better understanding of the state and 
state-building in Central Asia. It will explore the proposition that state-building in CA has been 
shaped by three sets of powerful forces: the legacy of the past, external actors strategies, and the 
struggles for power among the local elites. Finally, it provides an overview of the methodology 
used to arrive at the empirical evidence, which is presented to support its conceptual claims.  
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1.1. The dominant debate: from the heartland- to the broken-state theory   
 
 “Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland;  
Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; 
Who rules the World-Island commands the world”   
 
Mackinder’s verse (1919; 1904) captured the logic of the Great Game played between the Russian 
and British Empires over Central Asia since the Russo-Persian Treaty of 1813 and the Anglo-
Russian Convention of 1907, for the region was a doorstep to India. Since Mackinder’s 
presentation of the theory of the Geographical Pivot of History, also known as the Heartland 
Theory, to the Royal Geographic Society in 1904, Central Asia has been perceived as a tabula rasa, 
a region without political agency beyond the interests of the Great Powers. The Heartland theory 
gained new life in Zbigbiew Brzezinski’s The Grand Chessboard, which referred to Central Asia as 
the “Global Balkans” and focused on conditions for “American primacy and its geostrategic 
imperatives” in Eurasia (Brzezinski 1998). The same theory was extended further to the “The 
Greater Middle East”, put forward after 9/11 with the aim of creating a common civil society 
across the Middle East and Central Asia.  
However, since the end of the Cold War, the tabula rasa assumption and primacy of this 
theory have been challenged. Scholars started searching for local agency or “local actorship” in 
Central Asia (Kavalski 2010), as well as developing the “sovereignty index” for then newly emerged 
states (Ghani and Lockard 2009). Both the Finding the local and the “Sovereignty index” missions 
operated under the overarching umbrella of the transitology or modernization approach. Their 
underlining assumption was that the state is a result of rationalization of social relations, where 
“rationalization” means liberalization and transition to democracy.  
According to the finding the local mission, the state’s failure was explained by two main 
variables: (1) the Soviet-minded elites and Soviet institutional legacy (Cummings 2011) or (2) the 
patrimonially-minded elites and the informal governance networks (Isaaks 2014). In both cases, 
these two states of backwardness or two types of path dependency were seen as obstacles to the 
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civilizational mission of the neo-liberal state-building (Cooley 2012). The arguments focusing on 
the “Soviet-mindedness” explain the state’s incapacity to organize its authority due to the colonial 
or the Soviet past. Also called “neo-colonialist theories”, these works focus on explanatory 
variables such as the peripheral role of the new sovereignties (Fortna 2011; Burgis 2011; 
Suyarkulova 2011; Cumming 2011); institutional and domestic weakness (Fawcett; Lewis in 
Cummings 2011); the clash between indigenous culture and Western liberalization in the post-
colonial period (Adams 2011); rentierism and the inherent dependency of the new sovereignties 
(Ostrowski 2011; Atkin 2011). Comparing the Middle East with Central Asia, these authors 
acknowledge the multi-layered history of Central Asia, by identifying several Imperial legacies—
Ottoman, British, French, Russian, and Soviet—as the main causes of the current state weakness 
(Cummings and Hinnebush 2011). All of these variables have little to do with the relations 
between the states and societies in Central Asia, but rather with imposed templates of societal 
development and the resultant path dependency. While the post-colonial literature is right to 
highlight the fact that history matters and that the state has largely been engineered by empires 
dominating Central Asia at different points in time, the direct link between the so-called colonial 
past and the state’s failure is weak for two reasons. Firstly, the Soviet (presumably “colonial”) past 
was a state-making, rather than state-breaking experience. Secondly, socio-economic relations 
created during the Soviet period have not yet been necessarily broken. It was the Soviet 
institutional architecture that was broken, not its societal fabric.  
The second camp in this box focused on the neo-patrimonial elite networks that make neo-
patrimonial governance possible. While the previous literature discussed focused on formalization 
and formal state institutions, neo-patrimonialism emerged as a theory trying to unveil the 
informal element of the state. More precisely, it focuses on the dichotomy between the formal 
and the informal  (Shiek and Hensell 2012; Peyrouse 2012; Radnitz 2011; McGlinchey 2011; 
Fumagalli 2007; Collins 2006; Shatz 2005). Even though it is seen as an alternative to transitology, 
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it is also largely based on the path-dependency assumption that informs transitology. Additionally, 
it demonstrates a degree of normativity, which it claims to challenge (McGlinchey 2011; Isaaks 
2014, 230). For example, its analysis of Central Asia and post-Soviet states evolved into an analysis 
of regime types and ended up blaming them for “dictatorial”, “autocratic”, “authoritarian” 
behaviors, as well as other malaises (McGlinchey 2011; Collins 2006; Shatz 2004). Instead of 
understanding how these states came to organize authority, these theorists offered a new causal 
line: authoritarianism and patrimonialism/informality (which they use interchangeably with the 
term “corruption”) cause the state’s failure. Even though they claim to be based on the Weberian 
notion of patrimonial authority, legitimized through charisma, they misread the classics and 
misuse the concept by omitting the process of legitimation from the analysis (Isaaks 2014, 230). 
According to Weber (1978, 1020), pre-bureaucratic patrimonial authority or domination is 
legitimate insofar as it is perceived to be grounded in tradition. Regions like Africa, Central Asia, 
the Caucasus and other ex-Soviet states were considered to be largely based on traditional social 
and power structures (Collins 2006; Anderson 1997; Gleason 1997; Huskey 1995; Theobald 1982; 
Eisenstadt 1973; Roth 1968). Based on this logic and on the observations of the early 1990s, the 
literature largely focused on presidents as power holders (Cummings 2002), political elites (Roy 
2000); clans, clientelism, regional networks and formal (party) political elites (Geiss 2012; Lewis 
2012; Ilkhamov 2007; Schatz 2005; Luong Jones 2004; Fierman 1991). Isaaks (2014) criticizes this 
overstretch of the Weberian concept and suggests the concept of “multiple modernities” 
developed by Fourie (2012), Wagner (2010), and Eisenstadt (2003).  
In sum, this approach describes the state as a complex set of tribal and kinship ties and 
illustrates this by cases of various African states (Collins 2006). Comparing Central Asian states to 
some African states, it shows the complexity of the ruling networks that are presumed to reflect 
states’ societal fabric. However, the unresolved puzzles arising from this literature is that if these 
states are so “patrimonial”, i.e. socially embedded, how come they fail to govern their societies 
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and face societal resistance and societal radicalization at all? In other words, their answers to not 
shed the light on the central question of this thesis: that is, why the state-building process in 
Central Asia seem incomplete.   
Irrespective of the seeming sense of society, this approach views power through the lens of 
realist indicators, such as access to resources and coercion (Ilkhamov 2007). While some of its 
proponents raise the issue of charismatic legitimacy as a source of power, they see it as being 
backed up by coercion.  As a result, the cause of the state’s incapacity to rule over a given territory 
is seen in terms of its failure to monopolize coercion, an important indicator of which is the 
existence of various non-state military groups (McGlinchey 2011). However, this take reveals 
certain flaws of the internal validity of this approach. If weak neo-patrimonial states back up their 
power by coercion, how is it that these presumably authoritarian and dictatorial countries fail to 
establish coercive power over their entire territory? Answers to this question also remain 
nebulous. For instance, in the case of Uzbekistan, the ruling elite’s network is supported by 
military power. However, this does not prevent the emergence of new elites in the remote 
provinces, whose presence prevents the consolidation of political power of the center over the 
entire territory. In the case of Tajikistan, the ruling elite first marginalized rival elites through 
coercion before eliminating them entirely through direct military intervention into their power 
domains. Finally, if it is true that Kyrgyzstani elites are in charge of resources that allow them to 
mobilize sections of society, how is it that the multiplicity of enclaves in the Fergana Valley 
remains largely beyond the control of the center? 
In sum, the existing body of literature seems to be confused as to what constitutes the 
dependent variable: whether it is the state or neo-liberal projects. If it is the former, then the 
explanation seems to be that states fail because of what they are: Soviet-minded and neo-
patrimonial. If it is the latter, then the explanation seems to be that neo-liberal state-building 
would succeed, were the locals not so backward and primitive. If we share the assumption that 
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Soviet past was an ‘evil colonial past’, then these states are simply the victims of its rule. However, 
were this to be the case, we would fail to find the local. Furthermore, both of these approaches 
seem to neglect the societal organization of Central Asia and its impact on state-building.  
The branch of path dependency explanations, paying more attention to societies, is 
represented by the so-called neo-traditionalist approach. It focuses on the indigenous social 
structures or communities which are, presumably, more natural expressions of social order than 
the state itself and, therefore, threaten the development of the modern state (Kandiyoti 2007; 
Atkin 1997; Akiner 2001). With this approach, path dependency is mainly defined through the 
empowerment of indigenous social structures as an unintended consequence of Soviet rule, which 
inhibited their development (Kandiyoti 2007). While this thesis also examines the role of 
communities, it questions the assumptions within the neo-traditionalist approach regarding the 
essential indigenousness of those communities and traditions. Rather, it follows the view of 
Clifford Geertz (1973), who highlighted that it is for social sources of power to choose the tradition 
among the multiplicity of their forms. Central Asia is about diversity; the question of which 
tradition will flourish depends on the context of existential social needs. Furthermore, presence of 
communities as such cannot be a sufficient and necessary variable to explain the incomplete state.  
The “sovereignty index” block is based on the assumption of neo-liberal institutionalism, 
i.e. that impartial, neutral institutions can best provide for society.  This approach is based on the 
so-called “1648 myth” (Heathershaw and Lambach 2008), which considers the possibility for the 
state to be a rational unitary actor. For this to happen, one needs a monolithic or standardized 
society, which is presumed to exist. This approach is less concerned with the interaction between 
state and society or between society and transnational processes. Instead, it assumes that the 
state is the only site of political power over a given territory, as expressed in the state’s 
sovereignty or “domestic sovereignty” (Krasner 1999).  
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To measure state power, this literature provides a clear-cut system based on several 
functions of the state: a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence; administrative control; 
management of public finances; investment in human capital; delineation of citizenship rights and 
duties; provision of infrastructure services; formation of the market; management of the state’s 
assets (including the environment, natural resources, and cultural assets); international relations 
(including entering into international contracts and public borrowing); and, finally, the rule of law 
(Ghani and Lockhart 2009). This “sovereignty index” is presumed to provide a better framework to 
compare different weak states (Ikenberry 2008). For this reason, it has been adopted by the World 
Bank and the United Nations to craft their state-building programs. As can be seen from the 
aforementioned indicators, this approach focuses on the state’s functions. The failed states 
approach is technocratic and functionalist, propagating the notion that “transition” may be 
provided by reforms, and these reforms are provided by liberal institutions. In other words, its 
vision of the state is rooted in the tradition of transitology, which sees the state as a vehicle for 
transition (and modernization) to a liberal democratic state (Lipset 1960; Rostow 1960). In 
practice, as we will see in Central Asia, such indicators helped establish a vast architecture for 
monitoring the NGO sector in compliance with these indicators. However, the capacity of these 
newly emerged states, still struggling to transform their histories, has not been taken into 
consideration. The external sponsors believed that building liberal institutions would inevitably 
lead to the transformation of societies into liberal actors.  
To achieve this “end point” in the history of the state, proponents of failed states theory 
prioritize the state institutions over its societal basis or as Mann (1993) calls it - state autonomy 
over state embeddedness. They promote the idea of an impartial bureaucracy, which is not 
necessarily socially grounded, to govern society (Rotberg 2003; Zartman 1995). In contrast, what 
can be interpreted as signs of existing links between the state and society, such as the integration 
of community based practices into the ways by which societies interact with states, are seen as 
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indicators of state failure. For instance, for Fearon and Laitin (2004, 6), the emergence of 
traditional social institutions is seen as a characteristic of a failed state. For Giustozzi (2010), the 
emergence of an alternative social order is a challenge to the state and indicator of state failure. 
More classical writers interpret this as a lack of citizens’ support for the state (Migdal 1988, 56) or 
simply a lack of state legitimacy, which represents a main pillar of state power.  
Among the explanations for why the state cannot organize its authority over a given 
territory, scholars point to the post-colonial legacy, multi-ethnic or religious conflicts, poverty, and 
socio-economic performance (Rabasa 2007). Liberal institutions, which are partially the product of 
external actors, are seen as the providers of transition as well as capacity to implement reforms. 
Path-dependency can be overcome by building a civil society (DFID 2005; WB 2003). However, this 
approach’s definition of civil society is limited to a neo-liberal, institutionalist interpretation, which 
excludes informal or parallel forms and types of civil activism. As the state is seen as an entity 
“replacing tribal social organization to exercise power over a given territory” (Hall and Ikenberry 
1989, 18), instances of radical social activism or social radicalization, including inter-ethnic 
conflicts, are seen as symptoms of state failure, not causes. The process of evolving from tribal 
organization into a fully-fledged state is defined as the “rationalization of social relations.” 
However, Central Asia still reveals both tribal and “rational” forms of social organization. 
Alternatively, it could be seen as different kinds of rationality, just as different versions of 
legitimacy exist in Weberian ideas. From this angle, radical social activism can be as much 
representative of the societal fabric as the formal NGO sector, which is commonly presented as 
the legitimate form of civil society in Central Asia.  
Thus, these approaches share the view that the state should be an autonomous institution, 
free from so-called patrimonial networks and connections (such as tribalism and kinship). State 
power is used interchangeably with domestic sovereignty and is defined similarly and outlined 
through the “sovereignty index” above. State-society relations do not seem to be the central point 
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of these theories, but establishing a link between the state and populace is seen as possible 
through organized civil society. Civil society is seen as the means to implement reforms and 
overcome the past (Shah 2006). However, this thesis claims that even the protagonists of formal 
civil society overlook the fact that society is subjected not only to those liberal and impartial state 
institutions which are put in place, but also to transnational processes which emanate from 
beyond those institutions.  
1.2. Central Asia as a “conceptual challenge” to the dominant debate on the state  
 
Central Asian states represent a conceptual challenge to the dominant state-building debate by 
revealing its paradoxes and dilemmas due to the mutual coexistence of traditionalism and 
modernity, nationalism and internationalism, state omnipresence and state absence, 
fragmentation and unification. Central Asian statehood is neither entirely traditional nor entirely 
modern: neither liberal nor dictatorial. It has its own meanings of freedom, justice, and reason. 
Their elites may have patrimonial features but their societies do not necessarily reflect them. 
Central Asia cannot be squeezed easily into any of the major categories of state making in the way 
they are currently perceived and promoted. Pluralist theories (Dahl 1961) or post-Marxist theories 
that underline the state as a space of contestation (Jessop 1990) have a point, since Central Asia is 
about diversity. The state is as much about contestation as it is about establishing “hegemony” 
(Gramsci 1971).  Furthermore, seeing the state as competing projects precludes us from seeing the 
efforts of state elites whose goal is to unify these societies, organize their authority, and govern 
over a given territory (Mann 1993).  
State formation in Central Asia dramatically challenges the transitology assumption on the 
evolution of societal relations that result in the state as organizational form, since it is a region 
that has been subjected to several empires across its history. The collective choices over the 
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course of history have been (re)negotiated or reconsidered a number of times.  Specifically, the 
dichotomies that the Central Asian states can shed a new light on are as follows:  
1. Strong vs. weak state; 
2. Rationality vs. irrationality of societal development;  
3. Historical vs. institutional contextualization of statehood; 
4. Formal vs. informal areas of organizing social order. 
More abstract points of contribution to state theories would include the view that the state is a 
space of contestation or ongoing negotiations vs. unification (centralization); the mutual 
exclusiveness of change and continuity, and the dichotomy between the domestic and 
international. Central Asia provides illustration for a more subtle and balanced analysis on state 
making.  
Strong vs. weak states  
 
State-making in Central Asia largely challenges the existing thinking on strong versus weak states, 
as Central Asian states have proved to be strong in some areas and weak in others, as well as  
omnipresent in some fields and absent in others (Reeves 2014; Adams 2010; Kandiyoti 2003). 
Central Asian states, as with all “Soviet-type states”, have been described as “omnipotent states 
lacking capacity to get things done” (Reeves 2014; Northrop 2004; Grant 1995). Despite habitual 
references to the region as “authoritarian”, it is not necessarily “overgoverned” (Starr 2011, xviii; 
Radnitz 2010, 28). Understanding these states through concepts of “stateness” or “hard states” 
(Zartman 1995, 8), which are essentially weak states resorting to violence due to their incapacity 
to use other methods, is also misleading due to that fact that even such coercion does not stretch 
across the entire territory. The last sections of each of the empirical chapters that follow in this 
thesis, focusing on societal consequences, demonstrate that there are areas that remain beyond 
the state’s authority or coercion: politically, economically, and culturally. These areas, such as 
 28 
 
enclaves and borderlands, have certain regions with different social institutions and social 
identities which lay the foundation for reproducing types of social relations and social order that, 
in the long run, may undermine the existing state designs. In this thesis, they are seen as the sites 
of social resistance, over which the state has little or no power.  
The assumption of strength or weakness is extended to studying elites. As Cooley (2013) 
demonstrated in his book “Great Games, Local Rules”, the narration of Central Asia as a “tabula 
rasa” by most international scholarship has been largely erroneous, as there have always been 
local elites and local structures of power that influenced decision-making. As he shows, the 
international image of Central Asia has been a stratagem utilized by local peoples to maneuver 
among the great powers (Cooley 2013). The new strand of scholars of the English School has been 
bluntly challenging the “tabula rasa” assumption (Costa Buranelli 2015; 2014). Hence, there are 
“places” where power is placed, and mainly these are ruling elites. However, the elites make 
particular choices of governing and reasoning about their choices. Once we examine relations 
between competing elites, their social organization, economic resources, and sources of 
legitimacy, the thesis of the state as the impartial bureaucracy largely advocated by transitology 
theories does not, in all probability, hold. This is not only because the bureaucracy has become the 
tool for the institutionalization of the state elites’ interests, but also because, in being technically 
“impartial”, the institutional architecture of the state becomes less socially embedded, i.e. 
develops fewer ties with social organization. In other words, the state becomes more 
autonomous. An extreme degree of state autonomy weakens the link between the state and 
society. On the one hand, the state is not a tabula rasa, but it is not an epitome of its societal 
composition either. It is a process and a practice that exists in parallel to other processes 
developing at the societal level. Hence, it seems that the state is neither a contestation space since 
the actors are unequal and overlapping (which is most vividly seen on the case on Kyrgyzstani 
elites), nor is it a hegemony. The former would imply an existing set of boundaries between the 
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interests of different contesting groups, whereas the latter would imply the ruling elite’s lines of 
reasoning and legitimation are appealing enough to establish ideational hegemony. However, 
none of these processes is happening in Central Asia.  
Rationality vs. irrationality  
 
When challenging the transitology assumption of the rationalization of social relations, 
anthropological studies of the state were more insightful and more successful in terms of 
providing new evidence. However, they slipped into another extreme, suggesting that the state is 
“an irrational outcome of dispersed imaginings” (Reeves 2014, 13; Aretxaga 2005c, 106; Navaro-
Yashin 2002, 121; 178-179). Some authors label Central Asian states as “awkward states” (Kavalski 
2010, 40). However, judging does not help understanding. While anthropologies of the state have 
also criticized the state-building debate for its underlying “rationality” assumptions, they in turn 
simply adopted assumptions of “irrationality”. The problem is not whether there is a rational or 
irrational way of organizing social order. Rather, it is that the meaning of rationality differs. 
The argument presented in this thesis suggests that understanding Central Asian statehood 
may cast some light on understanding the meaning of rationality of a collective actor, such as the 
state or a society. Sections dealing with societal consequences within each empirical chapter 
demonstrate societal rationality (for the lack of better term) from three different angles. And each 
of these reveals that two main pillars of societal reasoning are basic and simple: the need to 
survive and the need for a sense of community (Mann 1993). None of these pillars seem to be 
provided by the current set of state builders, the ruling elites and the external actors. Patterns of 
socio-economic interactions are often more difficult to change than institutions. For instance, the 
parallel civil society that is developing in Central Asia is largely based on socio-economic conditions 
created during the Soviet period and practices rooted in a community-based social order, which is 
itself experiencing a revival due to some external actors’ projects. However, the development of 
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this parallel civil society shows how societies have come about as entities open to the 
transnational flow of ideas and processes, as well as how powerful these processes are regardless 
of the borders that were solidified after the acquisition of sovereignty. The social diversity 
highlighted in this thesis also shows that society is not a single entity, but is rather a “mosaic” of 
social trajectories (Sayer 1971, 346-347). Hence, the assumption of the state “ruling over” society 
cannot hold completely true. The power of society can be seen in the rhetoric that has been used 
recently by civil activists, which utilizes bounded or affective rationality, appealing to the popular 
desire for a sense of community. One of the societal forces that operates this rationality and 
provide this service is the emerging (parallel) Islamic civil society.  
The resurgence of Islam, both within organized civil society as represented by Islamic NGOs 
and within the developing parallel civil society, suggests a certain kind of bounded rationality, i.e. 
the feeling of shared purpose with other Muslim societies in the world. Other groups of people 
based their reasoning on nationalist feelings. This connects not only concrete people of a concrete 
culture, but also with ancestors and the past in general. As Gullette and Heathershaw (2015) 
demonstrate, legitimation and accusation of the ruling circles (for example in the Kyrgyzstani 2010 
revolution) are largely based on the bounded rationality, which connects state sovereignty and 
emotive matters (Giullette and Heathershaw 2015, 123). Hence, affective rationality — as 
Anderson (2006, 735) calls it—is less concerned with the bureaucratic forms of state organization, 
but rather with attachment to the land, state symbols, and sense of hereditary entitlement 
(Gullete and Heathershaw 2015; Leavitt 1996). Other scholars use the term “affective 
management of history” to analyze state making (Oushakine 2013, 274). These scholars provide 
the example of President Akaev’s fascination with the theory of Lev Gumilev on ethnogenesis and 
the bio-sphere of the Earth, in which he explains social change and revolutions via a particular bio-
chemical and magnetic state of the Earth, which in turn influences social events. These events are 
seen as realized through “passionarii”, literally, extremely charismatic personalities who trigger 
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the change. This process in general is seen as responsible for formation and dissolution of nations 
and Empires (Gumilev 1993). Thus, bounded rationality has been used in Central Asia, both at the 
level of governments and by people themselves. Both nationalism and Islamization represent 
versions of bounded rationality.  
To sum up: the discussion above has shown that the state is not necessarily a natural 
outcome of the rationalization of social relations. However, this does not mean that 
understanding the state and society through the lens of the rationality-irrationality dichotomy 
provides a better understanding of the societal outcomes. This is because there are always 
multiple rationalities, and the puzzle of collective choice and social mobilization depends on which 
of them will take root and under what conditions it will do so.  
Institutional vs. historical contextualization of the state   
 
Perhaps the important role of history for Central Asian societies can be explained by the fact that 
the institutional architecture of the state has not truly reflected state-society relations. As this 
thesis shows, even the most vital issue, security of the state, has been largely indirectly designed 
by external actors. In particular, this has been done by fortifying borders and influencing security 
narratives which have become integrated into institutional designs of the security structures in the 
region. The institutional contextualization of the state (Hall 1986, 11) has missed the social 
component. Furthermore, having been achieved through the infamous “shock therapy”, this 
institutional design was an attempt to break with the past, or what state theory calls “historical 
contextualization” of political behavior and dynamics (Hall 1986, 11). This thesis argues that 
historical contextualization is important. The conventional view is that the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union is portrayed as the great structural change, since its successors were then subjected to 
“shock therapy” as prescribed by the Washington Consensus. However, this “therapy” was 
“shocking” only in that it succeeded in severing the ties between state and society, through the 
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creation of socially disconnected institutional settings.  As societies are not institutions and 
patterns of social relations are less tangible, this history has remained in situ through the 
continued interdependence of grassroots socio-economic relations.   
A range of scholars take the view that recalling the Soviet legacy for understanding state 
making in Central Asia is outdated. For example, Reeves (2014) calls references to the Soviet 
legacy “black box explanations”, i.e. explanations that do not suggest specific factors or conditions 
influencing an outcome However, these claims can be reasonable if one thinks of Soviet legacy 
either in institutional or in normative terms, i.e. is as a catalogue of the wrongs conducted by the 
Soviet Union. For instance, when one says Soviet legacy, one thinks of the suppression of local 
identities and religions (Benningsen and Wimbusch 1986), a centralized bureaucratic machine or 
institutional design (Luong Jones 2004), ecological disasters caused by Soviet agriculture, such as 
draining of the Aral Sea, uranium tailings, and dependency on the raw materials, and 
Machiavellian approaches to border delimitation such as “divide-and-rule” strategies, which 
seeded latent conflict in the Fergana Valley in order to make the area more governable  (The 
Economist 1998; Masell 1974; Kolarz 1964; Conquest 1962; Caroe 1954). The general flaw of these 
approaches is not necessarily the answers that they find, but the questions that they ask. For 
example, all of the above factors are used to explain the outcome of the state’s failure in Central 
Asia, neglecting the fact that the very architecture of the modern state, as well as nation, was 
brought about by the Soviet mission to civilize. Modern state-building only started with Soviet 
settlement projects, which turned nomadic tribes into sedentary populations.  
Arguments about the “suppression of the local cultures” narrate ethnic conflicts in Central 
Asia as expressions of rejection of the Soviet legacy or rebellion against it, comparing them to 
popular rebellions in Eastern Europe prior to perestroika (Olcott 1994; Suny 1993; Rumer 1992). 
However, these lines of reasoning neglect the fact that ethnic conflicts or nationalist movements 
were not directed against the Soviet state, they were directed against competing ethnic groups; 
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who were rivals for resources. The ethnic conflicts in the Fergana Valley were between Uzbeks and 
Kyrgyz for control over land and economic assets, redistribution of wealth and its sources. A 
similar situation was in the South Caucasus. It had little to do with the Soviet state, for these 
people themselves were the Soviet state.  
Soviet legacy has been equated with oppression of anything that was local. For instance, 
Islamic revival, radicalization, ethnic conflicts, state’s weakness have all been explained by the 
Soviet oppression of the local culture (Heathershaw 2008; Roy 2000). Scholars working within the 
framework of historical institutionalism interpret the post-Soviet institutional choices of the new 
states through a combination of Soviet legacy and the new strategic context created by external 
actors (Jones Luong 2004). Despite this, a combination of historical and external factors is seen as 
shaping society, rather than vice-versa.  
Soviet legacy literature observes history through the lens of institutions, assuming their 
continuity in the post-Soviet period, and overlooking the fact that, perhaps, all that remains are 
the names of those institutions and a mimicry of their political functions, rather than a system that 
may influence social and political outcomes.  
This thesis draws on the spirit of this literature by making both history and external actors 
matter. But, unlike these approaches, this thesis does not see them as institutional settings. It 
examines the patterns of cross-border social interaction and social interdependencies rooted in 
the Soviet statehood, as well as societal consequences of external actors’ solutions to state-
building. In other words, it is the social rather than the institutional legacy that matters.  
Formal vs. informal:   
 
Since the history of the state has been the history of power, the dichotomy of formal versus 
informal stems from state theorists’ debates on where state power resides. Elitist theories place 
power within the state elites. While power to rule over society can be distributed among different 
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elites, sovereignty is placed in the ruling elites (Mann 1993, 48). The state is, therefore, seen as “a 
unitary rational actor with its own preference and interests” (Poggi 1990: 97-9, 120 - 7). Other 
scholars expand the notion of elites beyond the state bureaucracy and note that elites could be 
“leaders of large bureaucratically structured organizations, whether those organizations are 
corporate, nonprofit, or governmental” (Domhoff 2002). The debate at the heart of state-centric 
theories is about the variations of elite power as such and elite power as provided or restricted by 
state institutions and other structural conditions (Skocpol 1979).  
A different view on formality and informality is provided by theories focusing on state 
making as process or a constellation of processes, such as penetration, standardization, 
participation and redistribution (Rokkan 1969, 66). Charles Tilly (1984) suggests that focus on large 
processes, such as urbanization, for example, sheds light on the interplay between the formal and 
informal. James Scott (1998) focuses on the process of “standardization” as one of the main 
process shaping the power of the state. Specifically, it is what the state can standardize that 
remains “formal” and governable, while non-standardized issues or areas remain “illegible”, that is 
almost invisible for the state and ungovernable by it (Scott 1998).Taking these two strands 
together, where the former tries to “place” state power and the latter tries to see what remains 
beyond, this thesis suggests that beyond the “illegible” areas”, there are spaces of connection, 
rather than contestation; of intermingling and mixing, something called “barzakh” in the 
anthropologist works on space (Mackenzie 2014, personal communication). The term is borrowed 
from Koranic verses and signifies the thin area between the parallel worlds of life and death, 
visible and invisible, legible and illegible. This is not to adopt the term, but to draw attention to the 
lack of concrete borders between the formal and informal. Managing such areas would mean 
either formalizing everything or learning to channel, direct and redirect processes stemming from 
both, and most importantly communicating with both. For example, the parallel civil society 
(Section 4.3.2.) and non-standard trade (Section 4.2.1) show the development of a parallel socio-
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economic and civil space. These spaces cannot be considered fully informal as they have been 
empowered through the neo-liberal programs of external actors such as World Bank Group 
(Chapter 4). Furthermore, as Central Asian borderlands illustrate, transnational processes can 
bypass states and bind societies to reasoning beyond the state borders. This observation slightly 
echoes the thesis of “complex globalization theories”, the main idea of which is that both state 
and society are exposed to effects of globalization and transnational networks (Dicken 2003; 
Scholte 2000; Breslin and Higgott 2000).  
Michael Mann (1993) help organize this strand of the literature by suggesting that there 
are transnational power networks towards which power may migrate. Power migration happens 
through processes of “interstitial emergence”, which occur beyond those institutions created to 
organize societies (Mann 1986, 16). This explains how, for example, it becomes possible that 
identity within geographically isolated areas such as the enclaves in the Fergana Valley is still 
shaped by the transnational ideas of those groups who are not represented in Central Asia in 
statistically significant numbers. Manuel Castells (1998) explains that transnational influence can 
shape “resistance identity” by those social groups who are “stigmatized or devalued by the logic of 
domination, thus building trenches of resistance and survival on the basis of principles different 
from, or opposed to, those permeating the institutions of society” (Castells 1998, 8). He also 
notices that such identities may create the “community of sentiment” and weaken the bond 
between the state and society (Castells 1998, 198).  
The paradox of isolated societies being bounded through reasoning and sentiments to 
transnational power networks in the Fergana Valley allows this thesis to suggest that state – 
society relations as a “big process”, to use Tilly’s term, is a source of social power in itself. The 
state will have to learn how to communicate with the societies in a given territory to appeal to the 
bounded or affective rationality of these societies, which have been largely left to their own 
strategies of survival.  
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Main propositions of the thesis: the Heartland gets stronger wherever it is 
broken   
 
Drawing on the existing debate on the state across political science, political sociology and 
anthropology of the state, the main propositions of this thesis are as follows. Firstly, overcoming 
the dichotomy of the state vs. society which implies several aspects addressed above, allows one 
to see the empowerment of the state as being within the bond between the state and society 
itself, as it provides for the bounded and affective rationality that may transform the state into a 
more permeating actor than it has been so far.  
Secondly, all disciplines recognize the problem of state autonomy and state embeddedness, 
in that they wonder how impartial and detached from its society the state institutions should and 
can be. Complete state autonomy undermines state – society relations, as ruling elites should be 
able to at least legitimize themselves to their societies. As democratic elections and the provision 
of public services are not always the main legitimating mechanisms in these societies, other ways 
of legitimation need to be found. State embeddedness can be seen as one of these means of 
legitimation.  
 For example, although strongmen or informal elites may enjoy legitimacy in the eyes of 
society, their role may not necessarily be conducive to the enhancement of statehood. At the 
same time, even if some of the criminal elites are legitimate in the eyes in the society, it does not 
necessarily mean that they are socially embedded. It may simply mean that people, while choosing 
between the state and these strongmen, chose the lesser of two evils or even just a more familiar 
one. In its turn, the state may be institutionally well-set, especially in the eyes of external actors, 
but may only serve the interests of a specific segment of society, fostering a societal 
fragmentation that may undermine the state over time. If elites come to reflect societal 
organization, their functional features may become secondary to their historical rootedness and 
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societal embeddeddness. For example, exercising the function of providing public goods does not 
guarantee state legitimacy (Lee 2014), for a sense of belonging and spiritual needs, which 
populations with bounded rationality use to reason and perceive, may override the material goods 
provided. In other words, if people do not feel connected to the state, none of the usual functions 
will be sufficient to glue state and society together.  
Another variation of this problem is raised by David Lake in a special issue of the journal 
Governance on Governance in the areas of limited statehood (2014). Specifically, it is noted that 
external state-building efforts may aim for a state with high capacity and high legitimacy. 
However, external actors also want key institutions and political actors to reflect their policy 
preferences, which do not necessarily resonate with those of the societies in question (Lake 2014). 
In other words, even technically democratic and “good” governance may be illegitimate in the 
eyes of these societies, for it may fail to become societally embedded. Furthermore, due to the 
principle of Westphalian sovereignty, any external action contributing to state-building would be 
limited in scope and duration, for it implies an intervention into the internal affairs of states, even 
ones which are deemed to have failed (Lake 2014). As a result, these external actors often 
strengthen state capacity by undermining state legitimacy. Notions of state capacity and state 
legitimacy may often be mutually exclusive.  
Thirdly, since the states examined here have been objects of “shock therapy” several times 
during their history, path dependency has been disrupted and transformation is not proven to be a 
linear transition from traditional to modern social order, it is important to focus on social patterns 
rather than social development. In other words, challenging path dependency does not mean 
negating the existence of a certain logic to the history of the state. There is an order to it, yet not 
in the form of a line from point A to the point B, but rather in the form of patterns, which can be 
manipulated and reshuffled, like a puzzle. Michael Mann (1993, ch.1) calls it “a patterned mess” or 
a “patterned chaos”, leaving space for both contestation and unification within the state. The 
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state in Central Asia represents the pieces of a broken glass of the past that can exist on equal 
terms in a state. What form the mosaic of these pieces will take depends on the state capacity to 
organize its relations with its societies. Hence, the state’s main function nowadays is not merely 
the provision of security and services, but rather it is this very capacity to channel and choose, 
provide reasons for and legitimize its choices, and, of course, provide the organizational capacity 
to implement them.  
In general, this thesis’s framework can be seen as a mixture of a neo-Weberian approach 
and Marxism. From them it borrows the idea that states must be linked to their societies and must 
embed themselves within their societies, for there is no history without people, and there are no 
states without societies However, it also suggests that an ideal “embeddeddness” can never be 
possible, due to the fact that societies are as much of the objects of transnational forces as the 
states are. The states can only increase their capacity to manipulate these processes at the right 
moments and in the right places, which are presented here as the sites of resistance or the sites of 
barzakh. Thus, the state is seen here as a three-dimensional entity: subnational, national, and 
transnational. The state is a practice, a memory, and a vision. Managing these three dimensions 
can be seen as the new “functions” of the state or the indicators measuring state’s capacity to 
influence social outcomes or create its own history.  
 
1.3. State as social practice 
 
“The tracks do not exist before the direction is chosen” 
(Mann 2012) 
 
This thesis argues that a diachronic analysis of state development may reveal which practices and 
structures undermine rather than sustain the process of mutual constitution of state and society. 
It suggests that the incompleteness of state-building in Central Asia can be understood through 
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three sets of explanatory factors — Soviet societal legacy, external actors’ strategies, and 
competition between local elites — all of which contribute to the creation of sites of resistance or 
what Michael Mann calls “processes of interstitial emergence” (Mann 1986, 15).  
The thesis draws on the definition of the state suggested by Michael Mann, which is based 
on his approach called “organizational materialism” (Mann 1993, 52). This approach represents a 
mixture of institutional statism (Tilly 1975; Skocpol 1979) and elitist theories (Poggi 1990). It 
focuses on patterns and factors that flow from discrete institutional settings, since each setting 
represents a constellation of structural conditions, allowing or precluding certain social 
trajectories. The main idea these authors share is that “states institutionalize present social 
conflicts, but institutionalized historic conflicts then exert considerable power over new conflicts” 
(Mann 1993, 52).  It is worth noting that organizing state – society relations does not necessarily 
mean institutionalizing them in the conventional sense. Institutionalization and institutions are 
about managing stability. The organization of state-society relations here means managing 
change. As derived from Mann (1986) and Tilly (1975), the history of social order is not about 
institutionalization, it is about constant competition and (re)negotiation. In the course of social 
interaction, people develop new networks or revive old ones which outpace the existing level of 
institutionalization: “this may happen as a direct challenge to existing institutions, or it may 
happen unintentionally and interstitially – between their interstices and around their edges – 
creating new relations and institutions that have unanticipated consequences for the old” (Mann 
1986, 15). Furthermore, since societies have never been “sufficiently institutionalized”, the 
processes of interstitial emergence continues to “challenge” institutions, according to the people’s 
goals (Mann 1986, 16). The importance of this idea of interstitial emergence, modified here into 
the idea of sites of social resistance, can be explained by the fact that these sites contain threads 
which may explain why similar institutional settings can produce extremely different outcomes.  
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 The three sets of explanatory variables chosen seem to give a certain flavor of historical 
institutionalism to this thesis. For instance, Thelen and Steinmo identify three variables, useful for 
comparative historical analysis, such as past institutional legacies, external environment, and shifts 
in the balance of political power (Thelen and Steinmo 1992). This thesis also focuses on historical 
context, strategies pursued by external actors, and elite struggles as organizers of the domestic 
balance of power. However, there are crucial differences. Firstly, this thesis focuses on the socio-
economic and societal rather than the institutional legacy of the past. Specifically, it examines the 
role of the natural strategies of survival, such as those organized around land, water, and trade for 
societal interdependence. In this regard, the thesis draws on the claim of Wittfogel in his “Oriental 
Despotism” (1957), that is, the idea that there are societies for which water has not only 
economic, but also social and spiritual meaning and, consequently, relations with regard to land 
and economic exchanges are organized accordingly. He calls them “hydraulic societies”. Following 
the water, this thesis identifies the cross-border social interactions that it demands, and redefines 
the term Soviet legacy as that of social interdependence which exists at the micro-level, but has 
macro-consequences. Secondly, in terms of external processes, this thesis is based on the 
assumption that the divide between the external and internal is largely blurred, that external 
narratives can easily become “internal” by being materialized in the form of a border, the 
minefield, a security apparatus, or a legal draft, as Central Asia illustrates. This interplay between 
material and ideational allows this thesis to show unintentionally created processes of interstitial 
emergence. Finally, the balance of power among the competing elites has often little to do with 
politics or the organization of political relations. Hence, this thesis does not look at it as an 
institution, but rather as a proxy for the broader structural conditions, originally both within and 
beyond the given countries. At the level of elites, it is often “business as usual”, i.e. the rent-
seeking, disregarding the concept of public good or collective interest. No matter how intriguing it 
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may be, such a power balance is not quite about politics and polity. Rather, it is about pursuing 
private affairs by public means.  
This thesis argues that the capacity to organize state and society relations depends on 
whether and how the bond between the state and society can be embedded within the state. The 
rationale is that state authority lies within the relations between the state and society, as this 
relationship provides the backbone of the state’s infrastructural power, or the power to organize 
itself on a given territory over time, without slipping into violence and coercion. To unfold this 
argument, it focuses on three sets of explanatory factors to depict which conditions have been 
embedded into the state, how this was achieved and the degree of autonomy and social 
embeddedness it was designed to have. State autonomy (domestically) refers to the degree of 
neutrality of state institutions towards different social groups over a given territory (Mann 1986). 
State embeddeddness is understood as the state’s capacity to reflect the societal organization of 
its societies and follow its dynamics (Mann 1986; Aron 1950). By showing which type of society 
each of the three sets of factors has fostered, this thesis examines whether and how the links 
between the local social trajectories and transnational power networks may become deeper than 
those between the societies and their states. The link between interest, state, territory, and 
societies changes depending on the type of society promoted.  
Understanding state-society relations has usually meant understanding the issues around 
which their relations are organized. For example, Marxists believe that economic relations 
structure state-society relations; Michael Mann presents a four-dimensional model of social 
sources of power: Ideological, Economic, Military, Political (IEMP). However, state-society relations 
may be structured differently at different points in time, depending on the problem, which 
sometimes can be political, sometimes economic, etc. (Luhmann 1997). For this reason it is the 
possibility of the link between state and society, and the mutual influence this link exerts, which 
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this thesis sees as the main source of statehood. This link is the one Tilly (1990, 103-106) describes 
as “direct rule”, as opposed to “indirect rule” which characterized earlier polities.  
This thesis unfolds three sets of explanatory factors (Soviet legacy; external actors’ 
strategies; and elites struggles) in order to see inductively what structural conditions been 
embedded or, what links they produce and, therefore, why state-building in Central Asia remains 
incomplete. It demonstrates that each of the three sets of factors conducive to a particular type of 
society, from the many theoretical alternatives. However, not all types of society may remain 
within the direct social contract with the state, but may instead be a part of a transnational power 
network beyond the state. As a result, the state becomes incapable of channeling the processes 
and societal trajectories stemming from this link between society and transnational power 
networks. The state, as a result, stops reproducing itself. The first set of factors is that of the socio-
economic legacy of the Soviet and partially pre-Soviet periods, yet not in their institutional forms, 
but in the form of cross-border social relations rooted in history and transforming into new forms 
and meanings under the current conditions. It puts the current situation of the state into a 
historical context to examine social patterns that have remained intact after the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union and which, under new structural conditions, contribute to a type of society which 
would not contribute to sustainability of the current state. A general characteristic derived from 
analysis of the Soviet project is societal interdependence. This refers to the perseverance of 
patterns of social interaction, including cross-border strategies of survival which are strongly tied 
to the basics of hydraulic societies, such as water and land (Wittfogel 1957). As this societal 
interdependence has not been well considered by the central state authorities, people have to 
rely on memories of community practices that existed before the Soviet state.  
The set of factors created by external actors, although seemingly liberal, has little to do 
with civil society as such. In fact, the term “civil society” only appears explicitly in international 
strategies towards Central Asia after 9/11, e.g. in the Bush doctrine on the Greater Middle East, 
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which aimed to create similar types of civil society across Central Asia, Xinxiang, Afghanistan-
Pakistan, and the Middle East. The EU mission was sold as “democracy promotion” to EU citizens 
and as empowering of sovereignty to citizens of Central Asia. However, this mission was in 
practice about security, borders, and even more security after the U.S. withdrawal from 
Afghanistan. Programs such as TACIS, BOMCA, CADAP, and other OSCE projects have mainly been 
focusing on borders, drug trafficking, and extremism. This agenda was legitimized by the narrative 
of the fight against transnational threats, such as drug trafficking and extremism. Regional security 
organizations, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Anti-Terrorism Center of the 
CIS, etc. have also reinforced this discourse. Hand in hand with the “war on terror” which has been 
waged since 9/11, national borders and security infrastructure, as well as sovereignties and 
national identities have been established in an environment of animosity, with the embedded 
conditions of conflict between the Central Asian states. This has had the effect of excluding the 
institutionalization of governing mechanisms for managing societal interdependence and shared 
social patterns that stem from the Soviet setting.  
In terms of institution building, the external actors’ concept of the state included a high 
degree of neutral bureaucracy, reflecting neither the contours of the existing societies, nor their 
perceptions of the common good and collective interest. The type of society that resulted from 
this approach was twofold: the empty architecture of the NGO sector, which quickly became 
incorporated into the elitist field linked with the ruling elite or a mere continuation of the foreign 
policies of external actors, sponsoring the NGOs. In late 2000, the search for “indigenous” civil 
activism led sponsors to redefine civil society in communal terms (Dadabaev 2012). Based on a 
normative condemnation of the civilizational missions of the Russian Empire (since the late 19th 
century) and the 70 years of the Soviet experience as simple colonization—which is presumed to 
have suppressed all that was natural, indigenous, and true to the region—the external actors 
started promoting non-standard (informal) and community-based socio-economic practices. This 
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was reflected in the World Bank programs on the promotion of cross-border non-standard trade. 
These policies resulted in the increase of the informal economy in the Fergana Valley. While 
freedom to return to pre-Soviet socioeconomic organization was provided, the logistics of 
organizing this freedom into any sort of accountable social order was not. Paradoxically, due to 
liberalization, the region was pushed back to its primordial state of economic and social affairs. 
The external actors’ institutionalization project accounted for neither the complexity of civil 
society, nor for globalization that permeates grassroots social patterns, bypassing the state. Thus, 
the potential of transnational power networks for structuring and outsourcing of the ideological 
power of the state from its societies has not been taken into consideration. The types of (civil) 
society that appeared as a result, such as the empty NGO sector, Islamic NGOs, and the parallel 
civil society are described here as well.  
The third set of factors, that is the organization of the state by the ruling elites, primarily 
includes pursuing their interests through the state’s institutions, which in turn is directly related to 
controlling national economic and financial assets. The means of managing local elites by the 
ruling elites include the strategies of elimination, accommodation, and intermingling, in Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan, respectively. Even where the ruling elite managed to eliminate or 
greatly marginalize its rivals, it fails to organize state authority over the entire territory or prevent 
social resistance. This thesis suggests that the main reason for this failure is that the balance 
between the state’s social embeddeddness and the state autonomy is understood differently by 
the external actors and by the ruling elites. The external actors desire an impartial and neutral 
bureaucracy. The ruling elites use the bureaucracy to embed their interests, and not be self-
reproducing and self-sustainable system, continuing itself regardless of elite change. This is 
especially seen on the case of Uzbekistan. It is unclear which direction the state of Uzbekistan will 
take, once the current ruling elite dissolves. To handle the marginal parts of their populations, 
ruling elites vastly use coercion or what Mann (1993) calls “despotic” power. However, the failure 
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to extend even coercion over the entire territory is most vividly evident in the case of Tajikistan. 
Despite the fact that these states are largely considered to be despotic, coercion does not diminish 
either social resistance or Islamic resistance in any of the three cases. On the contrary, Tajikistan is 
among the leading sources in Central Asia for the Islamic State to increase their supply of new 
recruits.1  
The three different strategies have led to the destruction of the institutions of the local 
elites if not the local elites themselves. This appears counter-productive for organizing state 
authority, because these institutions can be organized as a direct link between the central state 
and the grassroots. The neo-liberal candidate for this role – organized civil society (in the form of 
NGO sector) - has failed. Institutions of local elites, and the networks stemming from the 
cooperation between locals and ruling elites could make a solid ground for establishing the link 
between the state and society. In other words, the institution of local elites can be integrated into 
the state’s infrastructural power, defined as the power to permeate society without coercion, as 
well as allowing mechanisms for the society to influence the state (Mann 1988).   
Infrastructural power enables states to diffuse their power through or penetrate their 
societies (“power through”); the exercise of despotic power is by a state that has a degree 
of authoritative “power over” society. So states may be strong in either of two quite 
different ways. They can command anything they like of their citizens (despotic power) or 
they can actually get decisions implemented across their territories (infrastructural power) 
(Mann 2012, 13). 
 
The importance of state/ society relations for state-building can be explained by the fact 
that state authority can be organized in a non-violent way through processes of institutionalization 
of state – society relations, which itself contributes to the state’s infrastructural power.  
Analyzing the state-society conceptual couple, Poggi notes that society is possible only 
under the condition of the developed constitutional state: “a seriously disempowered state cannot 
guarantee an authentically civil society” (Poggi 2001, ch.4, 1). According to Michael Mann, “state 
                                                          
1
 The relationships between the Central Asian Islamist movements and the ISIS are not in the scope of this thesis, 
however, the recent developments show that there is an increase of connections between them.   
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infrastructural power derives from the social utility in any particular time and place of forms of 
territorial centralization, which cannot be provided by civil society groups themselves” (Mann 
1988, 126). Neither can the state function without the link to its society, as it may turn into highly 
militarized (fascist or Stalinist regime). However, it is important to see what kind of causal 
relations this link may develop. 
In sum, this thesis suggests examining the links between three sets of factors and the 
societies. It does so in two steps. First, it identifies societal consequences that stem from each of 
these sets of factors. Second, it examines what processes stem from the interaction among these 
three sets of factors, how they mutually reinforce their mistakes and whether it is the bond or the 
gap that they create between the state and society.   
1.4. Research design and methodology   
 
Answering the research question posed by this study requires qualitative methodology, as this 
accommodates richness, variation in the meanings and perceptions, as well as the dynamic nature 
of social patterns addressed. As discussed in the previous section, the focus on Central Asia 
presents a conceptual challenge to the dominant state-building debate and provides valuable 
insights on how its erroneous assumptions can be overcome. Since initial studies on Central Asia 
were designed primarily following the fall of the iron curtain, the region has been narrated in a 
particular way, one which did not reflect the realities, but rather the internal politics and battles of 
the academic debate prevalent at the time. Specifically, it was used to reproduce the biases of the 
democratization paradigm. Later studies have fallen into other extreme and present dichotomies 
no less restrictive for the better understanding both the region and the process of state making in 
general.  
Among this study’s main goals is the overcoming of several dichotomies discussed in the 
previous section, it aims to control for the processes both emanating from the states and the 
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transnational space, and which influences both the states and their societies. Grounded in this 
rationale, this study is designed as comparative case study and examines three Central Asian 
states: Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. On the one hand, these are three very different 
countries which can shed light on a similar outcome (that is state’s failure). On the other hand, 
they are all straddle a specific area in Central Asia, the Fergana Valley, which is commonly 
understood as an area of a latent conflict. As borders and state jurisdiction are weak in this region, 
it allows for the examination of the influence of transnational processes on national state making.  
Case study method: definitions, controversies, advantages  
 
The study of multiple cases is a frequently used method in political science (Gerring 2004, 341). 
The case study is defined as “an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a 
larger class of (similar) units” (Gerring 2004, 342) or as “the detailed examination of an aspect of a 
historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other 
events, in which rigorous deductive logic is used to develop both intuitive and counterintuitive 
hypotheses about the dynamics of causal mechanisms” (George and Bennett 2005, 5). The main 
controversy of the case study approach is generalizability, or the possibility of explaining a larger 
universe of similar cases (Campbell and Stanley in Flyvbjerg 2006, 219). Most critiques of case 
study generalizability are based on assumptions of statistical methods and formal modeling, since 
they have similar epistemological roots. Nevertheless, they are also based on different 
methodological logic and different lines of reasoning (George and Bennett 2005, 6).  
The generalizability of a case study depends on a range of case selection strategies. Case 
selection depends on the research problem and the goal of the research. The main asset of a case 
study approach is the possibility to keep “a spectrum of choices rather than dichotomy” (George 
and Bennett 2005, 31). Non-positivist scholars suggest that case studies may aim at “analytical 
generalizability, *…+ a reasoned judgment about the extent to which the findings of one study can 
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be used as a guide to what might occur in another situation” (Fourie 2012, 65; Kvale 1996, 262). 
The aim of this thesis is analytical generalizability or “contingent generalization” (Collier and 
Mahoney 1996, 56-91), which could be applied to other Central Asian countries, some post-Soviet 
states, as well as states with a high level of Islamic resistance and radicalization potential. Its goal 
is to identify generalizable historical, sociological, and political patterns, rather than independent 
variables which are solely responsible for an outcome. Most importantly, a case study method can 
“accommodate various forms of complex causality” (George and Bennett 2005, 5). A case study 
method, therefore, has two main advantages: 1) provision of tools for critical assessment of the 
dichotomies outlined in the previous section, which is particularly useful as this thesis claims to 
narrate Central Asia as a conceptual challenge to the existing theories; 2) accommodation of the 
three-dimensional causality of this thesis and allows explore a non-linear causality.  
Case selection strategies  
 
The cases of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan were chosen as they are “least similar cases” 
(George and Bennett 2005, 83) and “associated with a similar outcome” (Mill’s method of 
agreement in George and Bennett 2005, 153), which, in this study, is the state’s incapacity to 
organize its authority over a given territory. Specifically, all three cases had different starts to 
independence by having made distinct political, institutional, and economic choices, as well as 
possessing different attitudes towards civil society. However, in the second decade of 
independence they have all exhibited signs of an incomplete state-building process. To illustrate:  
Politically:  
In terms of political management, all three countries possessed the main Montesquieu’s 
attribute of a democratic state: separation of powers. In the Kyrgyz Republic, people have risen 
twice to dismiss Presidents who were perceived as having risen to power via election fraud. In 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, neither President has left office. After the uprising of 2010, Kyrgyzstan 
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turned into a Parliamentary Republic, significantly limiting the powers of the President. However, 
this shift did not make the state more democratic or more effective.  
Institutionally: 
Tajikistan possessed almost no control over its entire territory, and the authority of the 
official government hardly extended outside of the capital, Dushanbe. Kyrgyzstan emphasized 
decentralization and strengthened local governments in its provinces. It maintained much greater 
control over its territory, except in parts of the South. Uzbekistan pursued methods similar to that 
of the Soviet state and controlled its territory through large scale surveillance networks (Pomfret 
2003, 10).  
On the Institutional Quality Index (measuring the extent of democracy, government effectiveness, 
extent of regulation, rule of law and graft2), Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, for the period 1997-98, 
rank especially poorly; Kyrgyzstan performs relatively well, having scored above Kazakhstan and 
Russia (IMF World Outlook 2000, 155).  
Economically:  
In the first decade after independence, the three countries differed markedly in economic 
performance (Pomfret 2003, 11). The Kyrgyz Republic was the fastest reformer, introducing the 
most liberal reforms, and was the first post-Soviet state to join the WTO (Pomfret 2003). This rapid 
move towards a market economy earned Kyrgyzstan a reputation as an “island of democracy” in 
Central Asia. Uzbekistan was a more gradual reformer, completing small-scale privatization, but 
retaining state control over agricultural products and delaying large-scale privatization. In October 
1996 it re-introduced foreign exchange controls, to slow-down market liberalization. In general, 
Uzbekistan was reluctant to follow the instructions of international financial institutions. Distrust 
of international mediation and multilateral diplomacy has been one the pillars of its diplomacy and 
foreign policy in general (Pomfret 2003). Tajikistan experienced a civil war and started the IMF 
                                                          
2
 Weder’s Institutional Quality Index in Pomfret 2003 
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structural reforms only after 1997. Kyrgyzstan recovered after the deep recession of perestroika in 
1995-1997, before being hit by the Russian crisis in 1998. Tajikistan experienced the biggest 
decline in incomes and, despite some recovery in 1997; its living standards have fallen to levels 
associated with the least-developed countries (Pomfret 2003, 9). Uzbekistan was a puzzling case, 
for its “transitional recession was relatively shallow and its economic performance (measured by 
real GDP) has been best of all Soviet successor states. While Kyrgyzstan’s economy was opened up 
to the laws of the market, the Tajikistan economy destroyed by the civil war, the Uzbekistan 
economy was well-managed: in the sense of maintaining infrastructure, collecting taxes and 
keeping up expenditure on education and social security” (Pomfret 2003, 9). In terms of economic 
growth in 1989-2000, Uzbekistan performed at 94% (1989=100%), Kyrgyzstan at 63%, and 
Tajiksitan at 44% (EBRD 2001, 15).  
Environment for NGOs:  
In Kyrgyzstan, the 1991, the Law on Public Associations governing NGOs was adopted. 
Furthermore, the Tax Code (1996) and the Civil Code (1996) were enacted, creating the most 
beneficial environment for NGOs in the region. For example, according to the Tax Code, NGOs 
enjoy some forms of preferential tax treatment. Currently, there are 14,880 registered NGOs (ICNL 
2015a). Tajikistan was only able to focus on NGO freedoms after the end of the civil war. In May, 
1998 Tajikistan adopted the law on Public Associations (Unions). However, notions on freedom of 
associations have been postponed and were not immediately or fully integrated into the Civil Code 
section on "Legal Entities," addressing the provisions on non-commercial legal entities. There are 
about 3000 registered NGOs (ICNL 2015b). Uzbekistan also postponed discussion of legislation on 
the NGO sector until 1998. The first Government Resolution No.543 on Non-Governmental and 
Non-Commercial Entities dates to 2003. A Law on guarantees of non-state non-profit organizations 
was issued in 2007 and amended in 2008. Reportedly, there are about 6,000 CSO (civil society 
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organizations/including those based on local communities) in Uzbekistan. The number of formally 
registered NGOs is unknown (ICNL 2015c).  
In their second decade after independence, all three countries began to be reported as 
failing or crisis states (ICG 2001a/b/c; HRW 2005; KIC 2010; ICG 2012).  Although each started 
differently, all three countries are now in the High Warning section of the State Fragility Index 
today (2015). This begs the question as to why?  
As this study attempts to make “big comparisons of large processes and structures” (Tilly 
1984), it is designed as “equifinality”, “multiple causality” or “inefficient causality", the terms 
signifying the “problem of plurality of causes” (George and Bennett 2005, 157) meaning that “the 
same type of outcome can emerge in different cases via a different set of independent variables” 
(George and Bennett 2005, 157). As is shown in this study, while the set of causes might not 
necessarily differ, the sequence, combination or perceptions of them may vary, which may 
qualitatively change the set. However, this study still provides a degree of parsimony through 
identifying patterns—sociological, historical, and political—which can be seen as “sufficient and 
necessary” factors to condition the state’s failure, as well as providing existing variations of the 
perceptions of these factors.  
The suggested sets of factors are examined within three dimensions: historical, 
strategic/external, and local/political, the Soviet legacy, external actors, and local elites. This study 
attempts to conduct a focused and structured comparison of cases, which deal with “general 
research questions of the study *…+ and certain aspects of the historical cases examined” (George 
and Bennett 2005, 67). The general processes it focuses on include the processes of state making 
and social resistance to the state. In spite of the multiple overall causality, certain linear causal 
links are demonstrated within each of the dimensions and the critical points, where lines reverse 
or break are also identified. Specifically, each empirical chapter describes which form and meaning 
each of the dimensions took in each of the states, reveals the rationale behind them, and traces 
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societal consequences fostered as a result. In other words, by conducting structured and focused 
comparisons without offering a covering law-type of causality (Gerring 2007), it identifies precisely 
those gaps where political choices and social sources of power become crucial for future state 
making and social engineering. Comparing cases within three dimensions, this study identifies 
social patterns and political choices that led to the increase of societal resistance or, as it is known 
locally, the Islam of resistance.  
Data collection  
 
Data has been collected using the triangulation method, reliant on three pillars of information: 
secondary sources (literature), legal and other relevant documents, and interviews and focus 
groups. The first set of semi-structured face-to-face interviews, focus groups, and participant 
observations in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were conducted in the course of the fieldwork between 
March 2012 and September 2012. The findings of the first field research resulted in a serious 
modification of the conceptual framework of this study which changed from the framework based 
on securitization theory—claiming that the “threat of radicalization” is a mere social 
construction—to a more pragmatic framework searching for the practical mistakes leading to 
radicalization which, according to the findings, appeared to be much less than a “social 
construction”. Follow-up research was conducted between February 2014 and October 2014.  
Conclusion  
 
The dominant debate on state-building in Central Asia has been lost in the misconceptions of the 
nature of state-society relations within Central Asia. Specifically, key pillars of the state, such as 
capacity and legitimacy, may be mutually exclusive; state autonomy without state embeddedness 
may not necessarily guarantee inclusive statehood or an extension of state authority over its 
entire territory; and finally, between the sets of overlapping institutions there can be areas of 
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interstitial emergence, which may produce societal consequences or processes which are difficult 
to channel or (re)direct if one continues thinking in diachronic terms, as well as excluding societal 
interactions from the analysis of statehood.  
 Revising a variety of misconceptions, this chapter has suggested focusing on three of them. 
First of all, prejudices against the Soviet past as colonial legacy did not let regional studies see 
practical continuities and interdependencies at the societal level across the region. Instead, they 
have mistakenly focused on institutional skeletons or institutions which retained continuity in 
name only. Economic devastation has been also interpreted as part of the “Soviet legacy”, i.e. the 
Soviet heritage, while it is in fact was the result of its dissolution. Central Asian states were created 
by the Soviet state as inalienable parts of a single body, which is why the hysteresis over the result 
of its partition, that is, over the state failure is illogical. One could have predicted such outcome. 
This chapter suggested focusing on the societal heritage of Soviet rule and seeing whether 
grassroots societal interactions across borders still persist and how they matter for the state-
building process. Hence, the Soviet legacy has been chosen as the first set of explanatory factors 
to be tested in this thesis.  
Secondly, the conventional literature on the impact of external actors tend to operate 
within the framework of the Heartland theory, falling into the trap of assuming Central Asia is a 
tabula rasa, i.e. losing sight of local agency. While this thesis agrees that external actors matter, it 
shows that they matter in a different way. It shows that external actors’ strategies in the region 
produce a set of variables which foster, often indirectly, certain societal consequences, which then 
undermine the state-building efforts of these external actors. The end undermines the means. This 
chapter has suggested focusing on External Actors as a second set of factors that contribute to the 
incomplete state. However, it differs from the geostrategic approach in the sense that it is based 
on the premise that the seeds external actors sow fall onto a ground which has been already 
cultivated, but the results of that cultivation had been forgotten.  
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Thirdly, as this chapter has shown, the authoritative literature, especially in the post-Cold 
War period, has taken another extreme. Concerned with finding local agency, this literature 
started interpreting all outcomes via patrimonial structures, tribalism, kinship, informality, 
irrationality of politics, etc. In general, this chapter has highlighted four dichotomies which have 
been derived from this line of reasoning, such as formality vs. informality; rationality vs. 
irrationality; historical vs. societal contextualization of the state; and weak vs. strong state. The 
chapter has shown that a peculiarity of the Central Asian region lies in the fact that the line 
between these dichotomies is blurred. It is therefore difficult to see where the state ends and the 
non-state begins. However, agreeing that local agency has to be found and understood, this 
chapter has suggested examining Local Elites as the third set of factors.  
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CHAPTER 2.  The incomplete state: fifty shades of failure   
Introduction  
 
“While we know much about state-building, there is much we do not know, particularly about transferring 
strong institutions to developing countries. We know how to transfer resources, people, and technology, but 
well-functioning public institutions require habits of mind and operate in complex ways that resist being 
moved.”  
(Fukuyama 2004)  
 
The problem of the state’s failure, as applied to the Central Asian states, provides a distorted 
vision of reality of the state and society relations in Central Asia. The definition of a failed state is 
difficult to apply to these incipient states, which only realized their full sovereignty and 
independence after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. It is about the mismatch between the 
institutional structures and the societal organization of these states, as well as the new liberal 
values, old social patterns, and the existential social needs that often allow for the legitimation of 
the illegal and the informal. In conceptual terms, it is the mismatch between state autonomy and 
state embeddeddness, its scope and strength, its despotic and infrastructural power. If the state in 
Central Asia were to get this balance right, it could provide a precedent for the other regions in the 
world, not necessarily in terms of what institutions to transfer, but in terms of patterns and factors 
to consider which are crucial for state – society relations. In relying heavily on snapshot 
assessments of state fragility, we may register a myriad of factors that may or may not be 
conducive to state failure. In reality, both strength and vulnerability may spring from the same 
source. For the purpose of understanding why vulnerability overcomes strength, we need to 
consider sites of interstitial emergence where societal processes intermingle, amity becomes 
enmity, crime becomes survival, and religion becomes a source of revenue, for it is here where the 
change and rupture first emerge.  
In this light, this chapter suggests reformulating the problem in a way that may more 
accurately reflect the complex reality. It is the problem of incomplete state-building that is being 
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dealt with here. The state’s strength or despotic power in Central Asia is present, but its scope or 
its infrastructural power does not extend over the entire territory and/or society. The state cannot 
channel or direct the transnational processes which permeate its societies. It does not therefore 
possess much influence over the outcome of state-society relations. 
To simplify this complexity, this chapter proceeds in three steps. The first section maps the 
leading state fragility indexes that register symptoms of failure in Central Asian states. It sheds 
some light on the controversies and gaps within these frameworks. This section explains that in 
order to get different answers, we need to pose different questions, which is why it suggests 
reformulating the problem in a way that would better reflect the local context. The second section 
states the case for the incomplete state, by introducing areas of overlap between the weak and 
strong, formal and informal, transnational and local, criminal and legal, public and private 
spectrums of statehood. It begins by highlighting the complexity, but then simplifies it by 
operationalizing the processes of interstitial emergence through three indicators, these being 
transnationality, cross-sectionality, and entrysm. By providing examples to each of these 
indicators—such as cross-border trade for transnationality, the drug business and Islamist 
movements for cross-sectionality, and the infiltration of social structures by Islamist movements 
and organized crime networks for entrysm—it identifies the main social structures that matter for 
(re)organizing state-society relations, such as a mahalla and bazaar. In general, the chapter tries to 
explore a slightly different way of presenting the existing data on the state’s fragility, in order to 
pave the way for better understanding of the problem of the incomplete state.  
2.1. Indicators of failure: explananda or explicantia?  
 
The failed state is a powerful policy issue, as are its assessment frameworks. These can be divided 
roughly into three (partially overlapping) blocs, each according to a common denominator. These 
three are: functions-based frameworks, crisis/violence-based frameworks, and dynamic 
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frameworks. The leading functions-based frameworks currently in use include: the Fragile States 
Index developed by the Fund for Peace; the Freedom House assessment; Transparency 
International; Amnesty International; Human Rights Watch; UNODC; UNICRI; World Bank Group; 
USAID, the Brookings Institution and a range of independent think-tanks.  
The crisis-based maps include those produced by the CIA Political Instability Task Force, the 
British Department for International Development (DFID), the German Government’s Action Plan 
on Conflict Prevention and Conflict Resolution, London Based Forum on Early Warning and Early 
Response (FEWER), the LSE Center on the Crisis States Research, Conflict Research Unit of the 
Netherlands Institute of Foreign Affairs, the International Crisis Group (ICG). The thread that links 
the research of these organizations focuses on violence in its different forms.  
The dynamic frameworks include approaches that try to account for both the causes and 
the triggers of state failure, such as the Country Indicators for Foreign Policies, compiled by 
Carleton University. Robert Rotberg’s indicators also account for causes and suggest the dynamic 
approach by distinguishing between different stages of state failure, such as state collapse (as 
extreme version of failure), state failure, generic weakness and apparent distress, which are 
hallmarks of a failing state (Rotbert 2003; 2004).  
The functions-based matrixes as, for example, the Fragile States’ Index offered by the Fund 
for Peace, provides a systematic assessment of the state’s failure, illustrating it in its diagrams and 
maps. A quick glance of one such map reveals that it is only North America and Western Europe 
that are beyond the risk of failure. The rest of the map is colored in alarmingly red colors, 
signifying those “threats to international security” and creating the international political economy 
of war (Logan and Preble 2011, 379-396). Basically it is the entire non-Western world that needs 
to be fixed. Despite this, it is a functionalist cognitive map, which conceals a bigger problem that 
needs to be fixed.  Specifically, the Fragile States’ Index comprises social, economic, political and 
military indicators. Social indicators include demographic pressures, refugees and IDPs, group 
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grievances, human flight and brain drain. Economic indicators include uneven economic 
development poverty and economic decline. Political and military indicators include state 
legitimacy, public services, human rights and the rule of law, security apparatus, factionalized 
elites, external intervention (FSI 2015). Obviously, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan score 
high on this index.  
Freedom House stresses the following indicators: democratic governance, civil society and 
democracy. Scores of the cases in focus for 2015 are as follows: Kyrgyzstan – 5.93 (decline); 
Tajikistan: 6.39 (decline); Uzbekistan: 6.91 (unchanged). The situation of decline or the lack of 
change is demonstrated by the erosion of all the constituent indicators, such as electoral process, 
civil society, independent media, national democratic governance, local democratic governance, 
judicial framework and independence, corruption, democracy score. The civil society indicator 
“assesses the growth of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), their organizational capacity and 
financial sustainability, and the legal and political environment in which they function” (FH 2015, 
9). Local democratic governance, “considers the decentralization of power; the responsibilities, 
election, and capacity of local governmental bodies; and the transparency and accountability of 
local authorities” (FH 2015, 10). As one can see, this framework has a particular idea of civil society 
in mind, which may be difficult to transfer to the Central Asian context. The NGO sector has been 
developed to a significant extent, but as is shown in chapter 4, it failed in its own organizational 
capacity, and faced resistance both from the state and from other sectors of (civil) society which 
has different values and ideas to those disseminated by the liberal NGOs.  
Local democratic governance, implying a decentralization of power, is a problem 
highlighted by Fukuyama (2004, 1) as an artifact of the Reagan-Thatcher era. He explains that, 
“that agenda was critical in its time, for it was clear that the enormous growth of state sectors in 
the developed world in the 20th century had become economically harmful and socially stultifying” 
(Fukuyama 2004, 1). He also notes that the prescriptions, such as privatization, decentralization, 
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and deregulation have led to serious problems in both developed and developing world, as the 
examples of “the Enron, WorldCom and other auditing scandals or the privatization of railways in 
Britain or electricity in California have shown” (Fukuyama 2004, 1). Policies known as the 
Washington Consensus, promoted by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have 
provided the following results in many developing countries.  
Russia went from the state that controlled all aspects of the economy and civil society to 
one that could not collect taxes or protect its citizens from crime. Thailand liberalized its 
capital markets before it had an adequate bank regulation system; the result was the 
collapse of its currency during the Asian crisis of 1997. Elites in sub-Saharan Africa used 
IMF-mandated structural adjustment programs to cut core state functions while increasing 
the size of the patrimonial state (Fukuyama 2004, 2).  
 
Fukuyama (2004) highlights that these state-builders fail to see the institutional capacity of the 
developing states to implement liberal policies and draws attention to the notion that there is too 
little state these days, which is why it is necessary to reconsider the inertia of living in the Reagan-
Thatcher shadow. Referring to the importance of considering the state’s scope and strength, he 
notices that, for example, Central Asian states managed to be strong, “in all the wrong areas: they 
are good at jailing journalists or political opponents, but can’t process visas of business licences in 
less than six months” (Fukuyama 2004, 2). Thus, it is about different types of strengths and 
weaknesses that constitute the “failed state”, as well as the blurred distinction between public 
and private, criminal and legal, formal and informal in the state system in Central Asia.  
Other state failure assessment frameworks focus on the human dimension of the state, 
such as Human Rights Watch (HRW), and to a lesser degree Amnesty and Transparency 
International. Observing human rights violations in Central Asia, these organizations note the 
worsening rights record. For instance, the HRW World Report (2015) establishes that the 
government of Central Asian republics “failed to uphold and in some case further undermined 
their core human rights commitments” (HRW 2015, 341). Specifically, in Kyrgyzstan:  
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Members of parliament proposed legislation that would rank nongovernmental groups as 
“foreign agents” and initiated a blatantly discriminatory draft bill that would seriously 
restrict lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender rights. Activists were harassed and attacked 
and the rights defender Azimjon Askarov remains wrongfully imprisoned. Authorities have 
not held people accountable for violent courtroom attacks on defendants and their lawyers 
in one of the few ongoing cases related to the 2010 ethnic violence. Discrimination and 
violence against women and LGBT people are pervasive.  
 
While this observation is factually correct, the context within which these events have been 
developing suggests that there is a problem greater than the government’s opposition to LGBT 
rights and “foreign agents”. Rather, it concerns interpretations of human rights and civil society, 
the hierarchy of preferences as to what concerns social, political, and individual rights, as well as 
their connection to the social order and social utility. 
As for the ethnic violence of 2010, the process of identifying the organizers is ongoing. 
However, the views on victims and the perpetrators differ to such extent that going into that issue 
for the state could mean provoking further ethnic violence. This is not to claim that the problem of 
violation of human rights does not exist. It is to say that the government has not yet found the 
way to organize its relations with different social groups, having different approaches and 
worldviews on what constitutes justice, morality, social order, and law. Hence, the existing 
measurement systems of state failure do not reflect many realities in Kyrgyzstan, but rather point 
out that handling these realities requires a different angle on understanding the social context. 
The popular perceptions and reasoning on human rights in Central Asia expose a great connection 
to family and social order, rather than empowerment of an individual and her freedoms. In 
Tajikistan, the government’s human rights record is reported to be deteriorating, due to the 
limitations on the freedom of expression, the imprisonment of opposition leaders, and the arrests 
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of academic researchers3 on trumped-up espionage charges (HRW 2015, 341). Kyrgyzstan 
deported an ICG researcher on similar charges in 2012.4  
Uzbekistan, as the HRW reports, scored poorly on indicators such as the lack of the 
freedom of expression, pervasive security apparatus, limitations on the independent media and 
religious freedom, forced labor by both adults and children during the cotton harvest, and 
widespread torture in the criminal justice system with total impunity (HRW 2015, 341). The 
problem is that the states lack the infrastructural power to maintain order by using institutional 
means. Thus, the data shows that extreme stateness or despotic power is present, but 
infrastructural power is absent, which is why the state shifts problems it cannot solve into the field 
of security.  
The accusations of forced labor are usually perceived through references to tradition. Part 
of the reason for having several children in the rural areas in Central Asia is that they can help in 
the agricultural activity of the family. In Kyrgyzstan, children work in the bazaars, helping parents 
sell the harvest that they produce. For many children, it is a way to be self-sustainable and an 
opportunity to earn money for school books and pocket expenses. However, what human rights 
indicators do show is that the state lacks capacity to engage in lawful debate with its citizens and 
with the representatives of the international public in explaining the traditions, perceptions, and 
worldviews of its citizens, without marginalizing them; this capacity requires the expanding of the 
state’s scope and infrastructural power.  
                                                          
3
 The case of Alexander Sodikov, PhD student in Political Science, University of Toronto/University of Exeter.  The 
government’s version of this event is that Sodikov did not receive a permission to conduct interviews in GBAO 
(Khorog). This warning was ignored by the researcher and his supervisor, who, reportedly, was in Dushanbe at that 
time. From 2015 on, Kyrgyzstan also intensified control over researchers. Now all foreign researchers will have to ask 
for an official permission to conduct interview to be issued through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Previously, similar 
procedures existed, but were not enforced.  
4
 The ICG researcher was charged on the basis of Article 299 of the Criminal Code of the Kyrgyz Republic, prohibiting 
provocation of ethnic violence, which this researcher was perceived as doing by conducting interviews on inter-ethnic 
violence with local strongmen and civil activists.  
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The crisis-based frameworks track indicators related to violence, such as inter-ethnic or 
religious violence, political repression, civil wars, etc. Further, these frameworks consider the very 
presence of multiple minorities, as well as religious and ethnic diversity as a precondition for 
conflict, which is why Central Asian states, considering their multi-layered history and diverse 
societal fabric, are automatically viewed through a lens of crisis indicators. Most of the 
International Crisis Group reports provide vivid examples of such analysis (ICG reports). Political 
violence, and its modern forms, such as extremism and terrorism are seen mainly as challenges, 
threats, or causes of state failure (Di John 2008, 10). These accounts include insurgency centered 
approaches, such as those of Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Fearon and Laitin (2003). Crisis-based 
accounts have provided the springboard for the securitization debate, where, according to some 
parties, the Islamist revival in post-Soviet Central Asia is posited as the factor which threatens the 
state (Olcott 1994); and according to others, the securitization of Islam that has posed this threat 
(Heathershaw and Montgomery 2014) 
The dynamic approach is represented mainly by assessment frameworks which track 
events that illustrate instability, leading to state failure. Examples of these are the World Events 
Interaction Survey (WEIS), Local Information Networks, Integrated Data for Events Analysis (IDEA), 
Protocol of Assessment of Non-Violent Direct Action (PANDA), Virtual Research Associates (VRA), 
Early Recognition of Tensions and Fact Findings (FAST), Intergovernmental Authority for 
development (IGAD), Kansas Events Data System (KEDS), Third Side – incorporates communities 
and the stakeholders’ perspectives (Carleton 2010, 23). Carleton’s Country Indicators for Foreign 
Policy enhance this approach by suggesting a formula: root (structural) causes + dynamic events.  
The causal factors identified by this framework include: “background conditions that form 
the pre-conditions for crisis situations such as systematic political exclusion, inherent economic 
inequities, lack of adequate and responsive institutions, the presence of ethnic minorities, 
resource exhaustion, and over-dependence on international trade” (Carleton 2010, 14). According 
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to these indicators, Central Asian states are crisis states by default. Furthermore, this template 
suggests an emphasis on accelerators or events that can trigger the failure, such as system 
breakdown or basic changes in political causality. According to various theories, revolutions or 
mass protests can be considered as signs of the fragile states (Marshall, Gurr, and Harff 2010). 
Using these indicators, the case of Kyrgyzstan can be considered a failed state, given the two 
instances of inter-ethnic violence (in 1991 and 2010) and two revolutions (in 2005 and 2010). 
However, the same indicators can be used to show the state’s resilience, as the ethnic violence in 
2010 was quelled in three days (which is quite efficient for a failing state), and the revolutions 
were viewed as signifiers of democracy in Kyrgyzstan (Laruelle 2013). Hence, violence as such is 
not a sufficient indicator of state weakness. Rather, it can be seen as a competition or struggle for 
the balance of political power or the “dark side of democracy” (Mann 2005). While these 
indicators are useful for identifying a problem, to consider them as causes of state weakness 
would depend on social context.  
The general indicators used by all of the above templates, albeit to different extents and in 
different combinations, include state authority, capacity, and legitimacy. Authority is defined as 
the ability of the state to enact binding legislation; capacity refers to the power of the state to 
mobilize public resources; legitimacy refers to the ability of the state to generate public loyalty 
and acceptance of governance, through regime type, human rights and gender empowerment 
(Carleton 2010, 40). According to the ALC indicators, Tajikistan was among the 20 most fragile 
countries for 2006. The cluster includes indicators such as governance, economics, security and 
crime, human development, demography, environment (Carleton 2010, 40). Uzbekistan is on the 
list of the weak states due to the lack of the legitimacy of governance in 2006 (Carleton 2010, 41).   
As explained above, all of these indicators obtain a specific flavor in Central Asian social 
contexts. If, in Western settings, gender empowerment means strengthening a woman’s individual 
rights and position in leadership (UNIFEM), in Central Asia, it may mean the legalization of 
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polygamy, because in this way a large number of women would feel that their rights would be 
more protected (Aslanova 2014, personal communication). The capacity to mobilize resources 
could be seen in the revolutions, the building of Rogun power station, or sustaining the cotton 
economy, but would be lacking when the goals do not serve the interests of the ruling elites. 
Furthermore, while improving infrastructure is, technically, one of the conventional indicators of 
state capacity, as identified, for example, by Lee (2014), the societal consequences of such 
infrastructure-building may diminish state legitimacy. As discussed in Chapter 4, some 
infrastructure-building projects require a serious degree of internal displacement of local 
populations, which in turn fosters further infringements of state embeddedness. In other words, 
whether state capacity and state legitimacy appear to be complementary or mutually exclusive for 
the enhancement of state authority is dependent on what societal consequences flow from any 
increase in state capacity in a given social context.  
The USAID template measuring a country’s fragility focuses mainly on the degree of 
effectiveness and legitimacy. It shows that countries with both low legitimacy and high 
effectiveness, as well as countries with high legitimacy and low effectiveness can be considered 
highly vulnerable states (USAID 2005; 2007). Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan started their 
sovereignty with different levels of legitimacy and effectiveness, yet in their second decade of 
independence they all approached a point of state incompleteness.  
The next set of indicators is developed by RAND corporation include “governability” and 
“conduciveness to terrorism”. The innovation of RAND’s approach is that it challenged the Failed 
States’ Indexes assumption that poor socio-economic indicators lead to terrorism (Rabasa 2007). 
However, by establishing a link between ungovernability and terrorist presence, RAND assumes 
that radical Islamism or extremism is one of the causes of state’s failure, for it challenges the state. 
Ungovernability is defined as the state’s unwillingness or incapacity to perform its 
functions (Rabasa 2007, xv) or the situation when the structures of authority that do exist are not 
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related to the formal institutions of the state (Rabasa 2007, xvi). Indicators of governability 
include: 1) state penetration of society broken down to the state’s institutions, the prevalence of 
an informal economy, or social and cultural resistance to state penetration; 2) the extent to which 
the state has the monopoly on the use of force (illegal armed groups, criminal networks, 
populations with access to arms); 3) the extent to which the state controls its borders (lack of 
border controls); 4) whether the state is subject to the external intervention of other states 
(external interference) (Rabasa 2007, xvi) .  
The dimensions of conduciveness to terrorism, which overlap with the dimensions of 
ungovernability, comprise: 1) adequacy of infrastructure and operational access (transportation 
and communication; financial); 2) availability of sources of income; 3) favorable demographics 
(presence of extremist groups; supporting social norms; preexisting state of violence; presence of 
favorably disposed NGOs or social assistance programs open to exploitation; criminal syndicates 
available for hire); 4) invisibility (Rabasa 2007, xvi). While some of these indicators are present in 
Central Asia, it is not quite clear whether they describe the state or threats to the state. For 
example, informal economies, invisibility, supporting social norms, adequate infrastructure, 
presence of criminal networks for hiring, etc. are phenomena that have been registered in Central 
Asia. However, informal economies, especially non-standard trade, can be seen as the main pillar 
of societal survival strategies; invisibility of these activities can be related to both the restrictive 
government’s policies on individual entrepreneurship, like in Uzbekistan, or as incapacity of the 
state to organize adequate taxation system, like in the case of Kyrgyzstan. The infrastructure, such 
as transport routes, can be facilitated by formal external actors or bilateral institutional 
arrangements between the states. Even criminal networks have a dubious nature, considering that 
many of these strongmen represented local elites in their local domains, and became marginalized 
after the end of a civil war, as, for instance, in Tajikistan. Finally, decentralization and privatization 
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of national assets may lead to those networks conceived of as criminal gaining more access to 
political power.  
Hence, the above measurement frameworks miss important points about the state in 
Central Asia: 1) most of the socio-economic indicators of failure are practically difficult to achieve, 
due to the lack of infrastructural capacity of the state; 2) indicators dealing with the human rights 
dimension do not take into consideration people’s perceptions of what constitutes their rights, 
some of which are rooted in tradition or custom; 3) the indicators of ungovernability and 
conduciveness fail to understand the local peculiarities of those dichotomies upon which they are 
built, i.e. to the state’s political or to the people’s social choices. However, what these indicators 
do is highlight the sectors which the state has not been capable of managing systematically 
without resorting to violence.   
Existing failed states assessment frameworks tend to overlook the organizational part of 
state-society relations, which is crucial for both the state’s scope and strength. Furthermore, in 
practice, the goal of installing those functions of the state in the developing world have been 
rationalized through the democratization and liberalization rhetoric dealing with all issues in one-
size-fits-all package, rather than on a case by case basis. As a result, the implementation of state-
building policies in a concrete historical context and societal landscape make for ends that 
undermine their means.  
Furthermore, the existing frameworks on assessment of failed states tend to be more 
evocative than accurate, since they connect to other security categories, such as global threat, 
extremism, terrorism, etc. (Heathershaw and Montgomery 2014; Logan and Preble 2011). While 
describing the threat to the state, this study relies on a more neutral terminology borrowed from 
political sociology: instead of terrorism, the term radicalization and social resistance will be used. 
This is not a mere terminological game, but rather an attempt to shift the research focus back to 
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the social rather than security dimension. In this way, this study will provide a more accurate 
interpretation of state-building and its challenges in Central Asia.  
While the leading assessment frameworks identify symptoms well and provide a snapshot 
of the state, they do not help to understand why the practical meaning of these indicators in the 
local context differs. For instance, the state may have a significant monopoly over the legitimate 
(in the eyes of majority) use of violence. Yet, legitimacy may depend on the patronage structures 
of the ruling elite, which is visible in the case of elite intermingling in Kyrgyzstan, where the line 
between organized crime and the ruling elite is not always clear. State capacity, in the case of 
Uzbekistan, may be present due to the permeating surveillance system, and yet this may 
undermine rather than increase state authority in remote areas. Finally, economic growth and 
effectiveness may be misleading, if revenue from this economic growth is diverted into the 
pockets of the ruling elites. Furthermore, as with the case of Uzbekistan, that very economic 
growth that characterized “the Uzbek miracle” at the outset of independence, does not exclude 
the presence of rent-seeking, for it may work similarly to Olson’s theory of “the state as a 
stationary bandit”. The ruling elite, being confident in its long-term residence in power, is able to 
share rents and maximize economic utility (Olson 1993). The notion of authority may be partially 
realized in some territories and absent in others, or the state may exercise some of its functions 
successfully and fail (sometimes deliberately) in others.  
Finally, the notion of good governance and a flourishing civil society, which has a direct link 
to democracy, may turn this democracy to its dark side, as Michael Mann (2005) has shown, i.e. 
provide conditions for a parallel civil activism which is opposed to democracy. Examples of this 
include ethnic nationalism and radical Islamism, both of which are present in the Central Asian 
states. Hence, the problem is the blurring of the public and private spheres, as well as a lack of 
separation of private economic goals from the common good. In such a context, the classical 
pillars of statehood, such as capacity, legitimacy, and authority, measured by economic growth, 
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effectiveness, good governance, and the lack of political violence may acquire a completely 
different human meaning in different social contexts. This is why the “strong/weak state” linear 
continuum can be misleading for those who seek better understanding of the multi-dimensional 
and non-linear processes influencing state-society relations. Based on this rationale, we suggest 
reformulating the problem as that of the incomplete state.  
The term incomplete state differs from the term “ungoverned territories” developed by 
RAND (Rabasa 2007). This is because Central Asian states continue manage the security, economy, 
and society of these territories (or parts of them), even if they do so in a way different from that 
expected of them by external actors. Rather, this term is close to that of “limited statehood”, 
suggested by Krasner et.al. in the Special Issue on Governance (2014). Krasner emphasizes that 
“areas of limited statehood are not ungoverned spaces where anarchy and chaos prevail. The 
provision of collective goods and services is possible *…+” (Krasner 2014, 545). This thesis echoes 
this approach for, unlike the previously reviewed indexes of state failure, it focuses on the 
incomplete state as a dependent variable caused by three sets of factors, including external actors’ 
strategies, and not vice a versa. In other words, conventional accounts see fragile states as the 
explanatory variable for the failure of external actors’ state-building efforts. This thesis reverses 
this logic. The incomplete state is an outcome of, not an obstacle to, various state-building efforts. 
Finally, in contrast to conventional approaches, which see state legitimacy, capacity and authority 
as three variables at the same end, this thesis puts “authority” at the end of the outcome, i.e. it is 
included within the dependent variable – the “incomplete state”. Legitimacy and capacity, and 
their interplay, are seen as part of the explanation. In other words, while discussing the three sets 
of explanatory factors, this thesis will control for the impact that the processes fostered by those 
sets of factors have on state capacity and legitimacy.  
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2.2. The incomplete state: operationalizing the explanandum      
 
This section focuses on the shadow areas that signify state’s incompleteness. It outlines the 
processes and social structures that create the barzakh areas, or sites of interstitial emergence. It 
is the blurring between formality and the informality, the public and private spheres, and national 
and transnational that explains the nature of the state in Central Asia. This section shows the main 
points where these spheres intermingle and suggests lines of reasoning, through which the 
following empirical chapters will provide an interpretation of this complexity demonstrating links 
which shed more light on to this picture. Focusing on these shadow areas can provide a better 
understanding of how to create a bond between the state and society, through strengthening 
state infrastructural power in a way which could channel and direct societal processes (both local 
and transnational), rather than marginalize or securitize them. This complexity is simplified here 
through three indicators of state incompleteness, such as transnationality, cross-sectionality, and 
entrysm. Transnationality is defined here as processes beyond the state’s control which, 
nevertheless, influence society in a direct or indirect way. An example would be informal trade 
which is both informal and at the same time legitimate. Cross-sectionality is where a phenomenon 
possesses the attributes of different sectors, such as drug business, religion, or political opposition 
movements. Entrysm is defined here as the capacity of an organization or a movement to infiltrate 
social structures by merging with their routine practices or customs, in turn related to financial or 
social interactions.  
2.2.1. Transnationality: crime and survival  
 
There is a large space of informality registered by the main datasets on the state in Central Asia. 
According to the World Bank (2012), between 40 and 60% of the Central Asian economy is 
informal, and many, if not most, cross-border trade activities are not reported within foreign trade 
statistics (Kaminski 2012). On one hand, this situation hinders economic growth, one of the 
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indicators of state fragility. On the other hand, it is legitimate socially when it remains the only 
way of survival for parts of society. Informal trade persists due to the porous borders and 
unresolved territorial issues, which themselves also indicate the incompleteness of the state.  
Such shadow economic practices exist due to “favorable infrastructure”, as identified by RAND 
(Rabasa 2007). There are routes like the M-41, the Osh hub, and a network of other transit routes, 
which were originally established for the purposes of economic development by formal inter-
governmental agreements. Specifically, trade and transit trade routes connect Central Asia with 
Xinxiang, the Golden Crescent (Pakistan – Iran), and Afghanistan, through which the goods from 
those countries go to Russia, mostly through Kazakhstan (known as the “Northern Route” for 
heroin trafficking). Along these routes, there are strategic transit hubs, the biggest of which, in the 
Fergana Valley, is the Osh hub (Kyrgyzstan).5 The trade and transit trade agreements, concluded by 
Afghanistan with the bordering countries, create “regional highways and roads [that] lead via the 
Ring Road through Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and 
Turkmenistan” (UNODC 2012, 69).  
According to the UNODC (2012, 63), Afghan-Uzbek trade is mostly conducted either by road or 
by rail, via the Termez – Hairatan line, and occasionally by riverine traffic. The end points of this 
trade network include the Navoi International Logistics Center (ILC) and the Free Industrial 
Economic Zone (FIEZ).  A significant part of the transit goods pass through Tajikistan to Kyrgyzstan 
and goes further to Kazakhstan (“Korday” Border Check Point6) and to Russia. Specifically, 
according to the UNODC (2012, 71) there are five such routes:   
                                                          
5 “The Western and Central Asia transportation network consists of 16 inland waterway routes, seven roads and nine 
railway lines. The entire network connects 18 countries in the region, 10 of which are landlocked. Since 2002, the road 
infrastructure in Afghanistan has developed significantly. The Afghan Ring Road lies at the heart of the regional 
transport system, linking Kabul, Pol-e-Khormi, Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat, and Khandagar” and further through the Ring 
Road with Central Asia and the Northern route to the Russian Federation (UNODC 2012, 69).  
6
 This BCP was closed on 12 August 2015, as part of the Kyrgyzstan’s accession to the Eurasian Union.  
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1. Panj7 district  Kurgantube City  Dushanbe City  Khujand City  Isfara  Batken (Kyrgyzstan) 
 Osh city  
2. Shurabad district  Kulyab City  Dushanbe City  Khujand City  Isfara  Batken (KG)  Osh 
city 
3. Shughnon  Murghab  Sary Tash City (KG)  Osh city  
4. Darvaz  Murghab  Sary Tash City (KG)  Osh city  
5. Shurabad  Kulyab  Dushanbe  Garm  Batken  Osh city  
6. Panj  Kurgantube city  Dushanbe City  Uzbekistan  
 
 
As one can see, Osh city and Batken figure as the main hubs on most routes. And, as will be 
described later in the empirical chapters, this is the area with the greatest constellation of 
enclaves and disputed territories. Cities, such as Isfara, Khujand, Istaravshan, enclaves Vorukh, 
                                                          
7
 GBAO (Khorog)  
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Sokh, Shahimardan (addressed later in the thesis), among others, all compose the peculiar social 
landscape of the Fergana Valley, which is why its social, economic, and ideational landscape, as 
well as local power brokers, all operate on a thin line with the illicit transit trade.  
Drug trafficking is the most vivid example of illicit trafficking along these routes, flowing 
through “informal” channels, but indirectly facilitated by formal institutions. There are a number 
of formal inter-governmental agreements that increase Central Asia’s role as a transit region.8 For 
example, agreements on trade between Central Asia and its neighboring regions, such as the 
Afghanistan-Tajikistan Joint Economic, Social, and Business Agreement”, the “Afghanistan-
Uzbekistan Trade Transit Agreement” (2004), the “Afghanistan-Turkmenistan Transit Agreement”, 
and the “Afghanistan-Kazakhstan Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation” (2004). 
According to the UNODC (2012), following the conclusion of the above mentioned bilateral 
agreements, drug seizures in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan decreased. UNODC (2012) statistical 
research shows that, in theory, drug seizures should have increased.  
Nevertheless, informal cross-border trade represents part of the survival strategies of the 
local populations (Kaminski 2012) and drug trade makes up significant part of the GDP of the 
countries involved (ICG 2012). Hence, this blurring between formality and informality, illegal and 
legal practices represents a site for processes of interstitial emergence, which may lead to further 
outsourcing of the state’s power. The processes channeled through these sites contribute to 
decentralization of the state which, according to the leading assessment frameworks in Section 
2.1, is a prerequisite of good governance, and therefore a legitimate state. However, within the 
context of developing states, this decentralization has the following consequences: 1) blurring and 
overlap of public and private sphere, and the shift of the official structures of power into the 
“occult structures” of power or control (Bayart and Ellis 1997, 42); 2) criminalization of economic 
                                                          
8
 This creates an interdependent logistics belt across and beyond Central Asia. For example, transit trade routes 
connect Central Asia to the Golden Crescent (Pakistan-Iran) with Afghanistan, the transit goods through Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan flow to Russia and further. For detailed maps of logistics hubs and the transit routes, see UNODC report 
(2012).  
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activities (Leander 2003, 10); 3) dismantled institutional capacity, the state is trapped in the last 
report – violence or despotic power (Leander 2003, 11). Being present in Central Asia, these 
consequences have been fostered by different sets of factors than those suggested by the leading 
assessment frameworks.   
2.2.2. Cross-sectionality: drugs for “hearts and minds”   
 
The presence of radical non-state actors, or so-called “favorable demographics”, an indicator 
suggested by the RAND (2007) assessment framework, takes on a new twist in the context of 
Central Asia. An example would be the analysis of radical Islamist movements, such as Hizb-ut-
Tahrir and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. It is not the presence of these groups as such that 
contributes an assessment suggesting the state’s failure. It is their capacity to infiltrate societies 
and build upon the natural social structures which indicates their importance. The IMU is a vivid 
example of what is considered to be a radical religious movement, a political movement born in 
opposition to the President of Uzbekistan, and a drug trafficking vehicle meant to create the 
necessary disorder in the Fergana Valley in 1991 to facilitate the establishing of routes and 
mechanisms for the drug business (Karagiannis 2005; Olcott and Udalova 2000). The IMU straddles 
three sections: politics, crime, and religion.  
While most of the academic debate is shaped by the question of whether similar types of 
movements represent a real or socially constructed threat to the state (Heathershaw and 
Montgomery 2014; Peyrouse 2012), this thesis takes their presence as one of the indicators of 
incomplete state-building, representing a vivid example of shadow areas maneuvering between 
both transnational and local practices. This thesis emphasizes that Islamist movements in Central 
Asia are mere instances of general social resistance. They are important not because they are 
radical, for social conflict is at the heart of social relations. They are important in that they are 
cross-sectional, i.e. both political and criminal, utilizing a “transcendent ideology” of resistance, 
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i.e. the capacity to influence the transformation of the existing power networks if structural 
conditions allow (Mann 1993). While the map of radical Islamism in Central Asia is complex, a brief 
example of their cross-sectionality, transnationality, and entrysm of such movements is provided 
below.  
IMU as a political opposition, drug dealers, and Islamist movements  
 
The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan is a continuation of a previous group known as Islam 
Lashkorlary (the Warriors of Islam), a sort of community police operating in Uzbekistan during the 
perestroika that aimed to protect entrepreneurs from racketeering and was financed through the 
system of ushr—i.e., voluntary public donations from private persons and mosques (Abashin 2011; 
Babadzhanov 2011).  An active member of this group was Tohir Yuldashev, who in the 1990s, 
together with the former Soviet paratrooper Juma Namangani, organized the Islamic Movement 
of Uzbekistan. After the Presidential elections of 1992, state authorities started persecution of the 
IMU's members. At this point, Yuldashev (who was then a member of Uzbekistani political 
opposition) escaped with his supporters to Tajikistan and Afghanistan, where civil war was in full 
swing. There they established special training camps and created contacts with the Taliban and, 
consequently, with Al-Qaeda (Abashin 2011; ICG 2001c). The drug trade from Afghanistan became 
their main activity and their new source of financing. There were also connections between Juma 
Namangani and Mullo Abdullo in Tajikistan during the civil war. The first of the IMU’s political 
protests against Uzbekistani government was organized in Tashkent in 1991 (Babajanov 1999). 
This illustrates the mixed nature of this movement.  
The IMU incursions into the Batken area in the Fergana Valley in the late 1990s shifted 
attention from their criminal and political nature to their extremist/Islamist character. Reportedly, 
the IMU invasion of Southern Kyrgyzstan in the late 1990s was mainly due to the need “to escape 
from the prosecution of the authoritarian Uzbek government” (IMU member 1, personal 
 75 
 
communication 2012). According to this view, concerning the use of hostages “*they+ did not plan 
that, it was the last resort, because *they+ needed a guaranteed passage through the border” 
(Ibidem). This information connects to what Heathershaw and Montgomery (2014) argue - that the 
IMU has been securitized by the government of Uzbekistan, due to the fact that a number of its 
members come from groups constituting the opposition to the President of Uzbekistan (Shirin 
Akiner 2005 quoted in Heathershaw and Montgomery 2014, 10).  
A different story about the IMU is told by the officials of the Drug Control Agency (DCA) in 
Bishkek. According to the data, the DCA has been collecting since the beginning of the 1991, [the 
IMU incursions into Batken] were simply a way to double-check the situation on the ground in 
order to maintain existing drug trafficking routes and create new ones: “some roads are just 
narrow mountainous roads, with some caves equipped with all essentials for possible inhabitation. 
Since some of them were spotted by officials, they needed to pave new pathways. Also, some 
border guards have changed since the time the IMU first got involved into trafficking. So they 
needed to create connections with the new ones” (A senior Drug Control Agency official, personal 
communication 2012). Indeed, according to interviewed members of the IMU, drug trafficking is 
still one of the main sources of revenue of this organization: as a consequence, the IMU’s 
maintenance of its networks on the territory of the Fergana Valley remains of the foremost 
importance, since money transactions are mostly done in cash through reliable people (IMU 
members 1 and 2, personal communications 2012). From interviews carried out with the general 
population in Kyrgyzstan and in Tajikistan, it is safe to say that the IMU can rely on a large social 
network in the mahallas and in home-based mosques, as well as on connections with the law-
enforcement officers and border-guards (respectively in Osh and Jalal-Abad in 2012, and in 
Hujand, Istaravshan, and Isfara in 2012). To sum up, the IMU stands on three pillars: drug 
networks, mutual trust networks, and local strongmen.   
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2.2.3. Entrysm: mutual trust networks, their stakeholders and social structures  
 
This indicator identifies the points of infiltration of society by organized crime, including some 
Islamist movements.  Entrysm is concerned not with quantitative indicators, such as the number of 
followers and sympathizers, but rather with in qualitative indicators, such as the capacity of non-
state actors to infiltrate societal mutual trust networks, thereby making their social organization 
partially overlap with the societal organization at the grassroots. Specifically, such mutual trust 
networks can be infiltrated through customary community practices, such as zakyat, ashar, and 
ushr, signifying a voluntary charity tax, mutual help in the form of money or labor or merely 
organization of communally meaningful festivities or events. Grassroots social structures that can 
be seen as mutual trust networks in case of Central Asia include mahallas (as a social unit) and 
bazaars (as an economic unit).9 It is worth noting that this idea should not be understood literally, 
i.e. simply equating mahallas or bazaars with organized crime and the “black economy” (UNODC 
2007, 54) or radical Islamism (HRW 2013). Rather, it is here to draw attention to the fact that these 
social units are important for organizing state-society relations, for they partially represent the 
spaces beyond the reach of the state’s infrastructural power, which is why their marginalization in 
the state-building process may lead to them connecting to non-state power networks instead. It 
highlights how factors that are often seen as causes of state fragility, such as radical Islam, can be 
seen as signs of state incompleteness. Moreover, considering the cross-sectionality of people’s 
survival strategies, entrysm blurs the line between legal and illegal, contributing to the creation of 
parallel social orders and complicating the state-building process.  
To show the complex nature of these social units in Central Asia, it would be useful to 
explain some of the terms used: the mahalla is a social structure, a space of common memories, a 
community of trust, and, in part, the smallest administrative unit of the state system (Dadabaev 
                                                          
9
 In some cases, one can also include mosques, for a mahalla is often centered on a mosque or another holy site.  
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2013; Liu 2012). Mahallas usually have sites that provide spiritual services, which can range from 
mosques and prayer rooms to holy sites. A bazaar or market is an economic unit, vital for trade, 
both formal and informal (Nasritdinov 2006). These two units have historically sustained at least 
the memories if not practices of trust-based customs, such as kashar (or ashar), ushr, zakyat. These 
three interrelated practices can be regarded as a traditional welfare system – “a means of taking 
care of the needy in society, and of achieving some measure of income redistribution; although in 
theory constituting a voluntary armsgiving, it could be assimilated to a religious tax” (Warde 2000, 
144-145). Ashar (kashar) and ushr are similar concepts, more typical for Central Asia and Adat 
customary law. It is literally community help to a family in need. They differ from zakyat in their 
non-systematic character, which is dependent on the needs of the members of a community. The 
help is provided not necessarily in terms of money, i.e. the duty-in-kind. As such, all these customs 
can be seen as related to the Islamic moral economy: “the idea is to integrate the poor in the 
economy. Self-help and self-reliance are at the center of the system. [Unlike in the conventional 
banking system], rather than looking for credit-worthy customers and basing lending decisions on 
credit history and collateral, MFIs lend small amounts of money to people with no resources, as a 
means of integrating them in the productive economy” (Warde 2000, 146). Central Asian 
customary law was not strictly similar to Islamic law. However, since the revival of communities in 
the post-Soviet period and the need to become self-governed and self-organized, isolated 
communities, especially in the enclave zones, started reviving memories and practices of zakyat 
and similar micro-financing. These practices have been placed at the core of current mutual trust 
systems in Central Asia (Falkenburg 2013; Faith 2011). For instance, analysis of the dominant 
position of Uzbek communities in the bazaars in the Southern Kyrgyzstan reveals that a key role 
was played by a large use of zakyat and ashar, micro-financing and self-help by members of 
communities to one another (Uzbek businesspersons and informal leaders, personal 
communication 2012). Field research has shown that these practices were the main entry points 
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for the Islamist infiltration.  Groups such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir, are, by all reports, well-known for 
participating in zakyat, ashars, and organizing festivities and traditional gatherings, (such as gap, 
toi, ash, and chaikhanas/tea houses) as well as funerals (Taarnby 2012). Hizb-ut-Tahrir 
involvement in these practices was observed in all three parts of the Fergana Valley (personal 
fieldnotes 2012; 2014). Hence, given this infiltration of social structures by HuT, the debate about 
its organizational structure, which many authors use as proof of “securitization of Islam” 
(Heathershaw and Montgomery 2014), loses its allure in terms of understanding state-building. It 
is the societal organization and not the organizational structure of the Islamist movement - and the 
criminal networks created by them through infiltration of social structures and routines as well as 
people’s survival strategies and self-governance practices – which is what really matters for 
understanding the problem of the incomplete state in Central Asia.  
The irony is that these methods are not new, having also been used by international 
organizations both past and present. For instance, the OSCE office in Dushanbe organizes similar 
festivities around the country, in order to reach out to the grassroots communities (participant 
observation, OSCE Tajikistan). Similarly, some of the micro-businesses in the bazaars in Osh were 
established with the help of HuT, local racketeers and drug barons, who are considered to be a 
“mafia-like grouping” by official accounts (UNODC 2009, 2012). Similarly, the Soviet NKVD 
(People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs) was required to engage in public discussions within 
mahallas and their public gatherings (Abramson 1998, 71). These so-called “red corners” were 
organized in tea- houses in order to spread Soviet propaganda among the common people 
(Abramson 1998, 72). The power of the community, mahalla, which characterized societal 
organization in Western Turkestan in the times prior to incorporation within the Russian Empire in 
the 1860s, was acknowledged during the Soviet period in an attempt to gradually formalize these 
communities, starting in 1960s. Its importance for state-building is related to the fact that this 
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social structure lies between grassroots civil society and state institutions.10  
There is a block of literature that conceptualized the mahalla as part of civil society 
(Dadabaev 2012). Others claim that it is a state institution, since it has been formalized since 1960s 
(Troschke 2012; Kandiyoti 2007). Some authors emphasize that, regardless of formalization, 
mahallas were not included within the Soviet system of governance, which is why they represent 
grassroots social structures which are, nevertheless, of vital importance for state-society relations 
and the organization of relations between private and public sectors (Dadabaev 2013; Shlapentokh 
1999). Finally, social anthropologists continue to emphasise the trust-based nature of mahallas, 
and highlight the fact that at the level of individuals the line where the formalized mahallas ends 
and the moral community starts is clear-cut (Liu 2012). 
In Uzbekistan, mahallas were officially institutionalised in the 1961 law on “Mahalla 
Committees” by the Supreme Council of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic (Dadabaev 2012). 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union they maintained an institutional role, to the point that in 
1999 a mahalla posboni (neighborhood watch) system was established to look out for social 
resistance movements in the communities. On 15 March 2013, a new law on the mahalla 
committees was issued in Uzbekistan: this new regulation widens their competence to create, 
recognise, control, and eliminate local entrepreneurial activities. In Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, 
mahallas, as official administrative units, have different formal names, but the same community 
meaning. Indeed, according to the Law of the Local Self-Governance of Republic of Tajikistan and 
the similar Law of the Kyrgyz Republic, the smallest official administrative unit of local self-
                                                          
10
 Using mahallas structures as the basis for surveillance build on the Soviet practice of confronting social resistance 
movements in the 1920s.These community-based practices have been used by the Soviet authorities to confront the 
indigenous social resistance movements (the “basmachi”) and disseminate Soviet propaganda. For instance, the Soviet 
authorities created the so-called “Red Corners” in the chaikhonas, the Neighborhood Watch, and the Comrades Court. 
All three institutions were installed into the community routines to watch, monitor, and convert them into 
“responsible communists” (Memorandums of 1922, 1924, 1932, 1938). In the 1959, after the famous Khruschev’s 
campaign of “reevaluation of history”, additional power was granted to the mahalla. The Supreme Court of the Uzbek 
Soviet Socialist Republic issues a law about “Mahalla Committees” (1961), it did not expand much the rights and roles 
played by “unofficial mahallas” (Dadabaev 2012, 163).  
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governance is the jamoat (territorial committee), a local community, which de facto is formed by 
several neighbourhood communities, mahallas (ICNL 2015a,b,c). In fact, however, jamoats in 
Tajikistan resemble mahallas in Uzbekistan. As concerns Kyrgyzstan, the term jamoats instead 
refers to a form of local self-governance which can be based on a community (a mahalla) or 
represent an association of several communities or an association of elected members of these 
communities. This administrative unit formally enjoys wider freedom as economic and social 
subjects, which has eased the creation of informal economies in the region, according to Art. 1 of 
the Law on jamaats. In all these countries mahallas epitomize a socialization site, whose 
institutional hierarchies have been organized in relation to the use of natural resources (water and 
land) and means of production (Dadabaev 2012). The nature of these hierarchies is not about 
power as coercion, but rather about the moral obligations of mutual support and respect.  
The post-Soviet attempts to institutionalize mahallas as surveillance structures has been 
widely practiced in Uzbekistan, and to a lesser degree in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Furthermore, in 
Kyrgyzstan, a solution was found to reorganize the urban space in high-rise blocks of flats without 
properly compensating people for their houses, and displacing some residents of mahallas to the 
more mountainous and wild areas of the borderlands. This kind of urbanization implied a series of 
internal displacements of the Uzbek population to the suburbs or to the mountainous areas 
neighbouring Osh oblast'. This urban re-engineering intends to replace “monoethnic districts” with 
ethnically-mixed ones (The head of department on district committees of Osh Mayoralty, personal 
communication 2012; See also Liu 2012).  These new city designs facilitate the creation of a 
surveillance system, a sort of Panopticon, but without supporting it with power infrastructures and 
without providing people with other means to survive. In this way, however, the state strategies 
have paradoxically provoked a return to more traditional ways of organizing resources and 
economic activities, as well as turning mahallas into increasingly informal networks “based on 
voluntary mutual aid system and customary law” (Dadabaev 2012, 154).   
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The number of such communities has grown in the post-Soviet period. For example, there 
are approximately 10,000 mahallas currently registered in Uzbekistan (Dadabaev 2013, 185). In 
contrast, in 1961, there were approximately 270 mahallas in Tashkent, 131 in Samarkand, 48 in 
Kokand (Kotler 1961, 33), 45 in Nukus, 42 in Namangan and 41 in Andijan (Kamilov 1961, 59-60). In 
Tajikistan, the number of official jamoats is about 401 (Ilolov and Khudoiyev 2014, Ch.11). 
However, these numbers include only official local self-government administrative units which are 
regulated by the Law on Local Self-government in Towns and Villages, which does not include 
“other grassroots institutions of local self-governance that are currently active, such as makhalla, 
micro-rayion councils, housing block committees or other village (kishlak) organizations” (Ilolov 
and Khudoiyev 2014). In Kyrgyzstan, the state does not think in terms of mahallas or jamoats, “for 
they are associated with an Uzbek social organization” (The head of department on district 
committees of Osh Mayoralty, personal communication 2012). After the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, these communities have been called “district committees” (kravtal’nye komitety), and have 
been combined under village or town committees (aiyl okmottu), of which there are about 460 
around the country (Mirzaev et al. 2012). However, these committees, especially in the south of 
the country, include a range of mahallas and jamoats operating both formally and informally, in the 
form of an NGO or local self-governance structure. Official statistics omit mahallas in an effort to 
standardize self-governance, but such communities remain active informally. Communities matter, 
for they still represent repositories of communal trust, as much ethnographic research 
demonstrates (Liu 2012). 
Furthermore, surveys on mahallas and jamoats in Tajikistan show that communities enjoy 
more trust among people than central governments, international and non-governmental 
organizations in Central Asia. This means that people see communities as social institutions to a 
greater extent than the state.  Surveys show that in terms of trust, people’s main points of 
reference are mosques, local communities, their families, and friends (Taarnby 2012). According to 
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the latest surveys on trust among populations, it was found that 3.6% of respondents in the Kyrgyz 
part of the Fergana Valley would turn to formal religious leaders among available figures or 
institutions that people for advice if faced with a problem. The figure for trust communities (the 
informal part of mahallas or jamoats) and family networks is about 36 per cent (M-Vector 
unpublished data, consulted in 2012). The figure for trust to a clan11 leader is 22 percent, the 
highest among the republics in focus (M-Vector data). A similar finding on the shifting of trust 
from formal institutions and leaders to closer circles of friends, families and trust communities is 
demonstrated by a large-scale OSCE study on radicalization in Tajikistan and a Human Rights 
Council study on the trust among the population (Taarnby 2012). Expert data on Uzbekistan shows 
a high degree of suspicion toward formal law enforcement institutions and a growing role for 
communities (Babadzhanov 2015).  
In Kyrgyzstan, mahallas have more ambiguous meaning than in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, 
for official state figures tend to define them as an “Uzbek phenomenon” (The dead of department 
on district committees of Osh Mayoralty, personal communication 2012).12 For this reason, even 
though they admit the important role of these communities for social life, they give them negative 
emotional connotations and suggest that they should be standardised. The Mayoralty of Osh city 
insisted on calling them “territorial committees” and declined to provide exact numbers for them, 
claiming that, formally, there are 16 or 18 of territorial committees (Ibid.). However, each of these 
territorial units also has informal communities within formal committees, who do not report to 
the Mayoralty. However, it is the mutual trust networks and similar customs that make these 
communities important, regardless of whether they are acknowledged as such by the formal 
states.  
                                                          
11
 Clan leader in this case means an informal leader of the closest community, rather than clan in its classical historical 
meaning.  In Kyrgyzstan, clan lost its historical meaning as a category connecting to economic or political resources. It 
is the matter of how M-Vector researchers formulated their questions. They prefer using the category of clan, because 
it is simpler for the respondents to understand.  
12
 Many officials in Kyrgyzstan are of the same opinion.  
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Reportedly, the grassroots communities have multiplied in all parts of the Fergana Valley, 
but the central state authority does not always extend to their territories. Violence among 
communities as an indicator of state’s fragility is also present in Central Asia. Its famed citadel is 
the Fergana Valley, which is composed of a myriad of enclaves, porous borders, and disputed 
territories. Its population has habitually lived according to two main principles: “actual use of 
lands”, i.e. one could cross the border to use pastures and water freely, and the shared use of 
water. With the introduction of international borders between the republics, such usage of land 
and water started triggering tension. This is because it has been formally illegal to cross the 
technically international borders since 1991. The main areas for conflicts over water are the 
enclaves and disputed territories southwest of the towns of Batken and Isfara, specifically the Tajik 
jamoats of Chorkhu, Vorukh, and Surkh (surrounded by Kyrgyz territories), and the western part of 
Batken district in Kyrgyzstan with Aksai, Samarkanbek ad Ak-Tatyr communities. Experts call them 
the “hotspot areas for inter-ethnic tensions” (Passon and Temirkulov 2004, 43-44).  
However, research on the negotiations that took place during the conflicts reveal that the 
main issues brought to the table were water, access to canals, rehabilitation of canal 
infrastructure, and detour routes. The outbreak of conflicts have been registered yearly or every 
other year since 200013, with land, water, and canals, as well as attempts on remote border posts 
(in 2003). The necessity for the actual use of lands and water, as well as population growth, 
fostered the phenomenon of “creeping migration” (polzuchaya migratsiya). This is where people 
within the Tajik enclaves were gradually encroaching onto Kyrgyzstani land, by means of planting 
tree saplings, building temporary-cum-permanent houses, as well as buying or renting houses and 
land from departing residents of Kyrgyzstan (Bichsel 2009, 114; Passon and Temirkulov 2004).  
                                                          
13
 Since 2000 the border controls were severed, due to the invasion of the IMU in the Batken zone in 1999-2000  
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In general, there were about a dozen conflicts in this area which took place between 2000 
and 2015.14 Some of these conflicts were resolved through inter-communal cooperation on canal 
rehabilitation or building detour-routes, allowing freer movement of people across the new 
borders (Bichsel 2009, Ch.7). The “lack of linkage between the indigenous informal institutions and 
the governments”, inspired a range of international organizations15 to establish community-
empowerment and decentralization projects in the Fergana Valley (Bichsel 2009, 5). Reportedly, 
there were a number of successful cases where communities agreed terms without the 
intervention of the central governments (ACTED 2014). The literature on fragile states and conflict 
transformation claims that such violence leads to state failure. This thesis suggests that 
communities matter, but not necessarily because they “threaten violence” as such, but rather 
because where they are empowered and decentralized in the historically fragmented territory of 
the Fergana Valley, they simultaneously become sites of alternative self-governance and the sites 
of insterstitial emergence, channeling new stakeholders and connecting to new power-networks, 
some of which are outlined above. Hence, these sites, once empowered, can become either the 
sites of social resistance or the building-blocks of the state-society relations. Which of these 
directions has more chance to develop depends on how they are managed and organized and 
under what sets of factors.  
As for the grassroots economic unit, the bazaar, its role in state-building is illustrated by 
the ethnic tensions in Osh, which resulted in the reshuffling of power in the Osh bazaar. This 
bazaar is significant because it is the biggest economic power domain in the South, where both 
formal and informal power holders intermingle. Before the ethnic conflict in 2010, most of the 
                                                          
14
 Conflicts over lands and water between the communities during the Soviet time: 1936-1938 in Vorukh, Bedek, 
Kapchygai; 1969 in Kapchygai and Vorukh; 1970 – Üch-Döbö, Ak-Tatyr, Chorku; 1975 – Kapchygai, Vorukh; 1989 – Üch-
Döbö, Khodjai Alo, Aksai, Kapchygai, Vorukh. Conflicts over land and water in the post-Soviet period: 2000 – Kök-Tash, 
Chorku; 2002 – Kök-Tash, Somonion; 2003 – Jakka-Oruk, Kök-Terek; 2003 – Ming-Bulak, Surkh; 2004 – Chorkhu, Kök-
Tash; 2006 – Ming-Bulak, Surkh; 2007 – Surkh; 2008 – Khodjai-Alo. For specifics, see Christine Bichsel 2009, pp. 109 
and 116.  
15
 Such as: UNDP, ADB, WB, Mercy Corps, ACTED, USAID, SDA, GIZ etc. Almost all international organizations 
participate in the decentralization and community-empowerment projects.  
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places in the bazaar were occupied by Uzbeks (Nasritdinov 2006). Thereafter, the bazaar was 
organized differently and the previous owners lost their domains (ICG 2010). Furthermore, bazaars 
were also the main fora for the dissemination of radical propaganda (Epkenhans 2010). Bazaars 
matter for they provide the space for propaganda, economic survival, and political networking. 
Some scholars conceptualize them as a source of conflict in Central Asia (Temirkulov 2013). The 
Osh ethnic violence in 2010 was a vivid example of this. The conflict in July 2010 resulted in a 
redistribution of power over the main bazaar. This allows one to conclude that the bazaar is seen 
as an economic resource, important for nation-building, which is why control was redistributed in 
favor of ethnic Kyrgyz. The Editor-in-Chief of the Fifth Channel Southern division stated: “Yes, we, 
the Kyrgyz, were wrong in starting the physical attacks in July 2010 first, but we were right in 
finally doing justice to Uzbeks who did not leave us any access to bazaars in our own motherland” 
(Adaev 2012, personal communication). Osh bazaar and Kara-Suu bazaar are crucial for doing 
business in Southern Kyrgyzstan. They are also crucial hubs for re-exported Chinese goods, which 
were the key “economic advantage” of Kyrgyzstan vis-à-vis other Central Asian countries. 
Furthermore, drug deals are conducted through networks related to these bazaars. Hence, taking 
over the bazaars meant re-connecting the Kyrgyz with one of the main resources of the state.  
However, the Fergana Valley is comprised of a myriad of enclaves, each surviving on cross-
border trade. In this context, there are many more bazaars which can be considered to be sites of 
interstitial emergence or through which shadow trade flows. Furthermore, the exact number of 
enclaves is not specified, for some of the territories do not exist on official maps (Merkulova 
2013). Therefore, bazaars—especially those located in the geographically remote areas and on the 
disputed territories of the Fergana Valley—can be seen as important economic units for organizing 
state and society relations. One should remember that bazaars (especially those of Osh and Kara-
Suu in Kyrgyzstan) at the beginning of the 1990s were under the “protection” of racketeers who 
later became “criminals-in-law”, such as Bayaman, Aibek the Black and other such individuals. 
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Some of these individuals were elevated to the Mayoralty of Osh, such as Mayor Myrzakmatov. 
While their professions may have changed, their networks and desirable resources remained the 
same. As the violence in July 2010 illustrated, the ethnic component of these “inter-ethnic” 
tensions could be resolved in three days even within a weak state, as long as the resources were 
reshuffled in a desirable way. In Uzbekistan, the IMU movement and one of its leaders was also 
the offspring of a racketeering band of athletes “providing public protection” at that point of time. 
What all of this means is that the problem of the incomplete state remains. While names and 
figures have changed, shadow sites and sources of power have remained the same and need to be 
addressed in order to understand how to (re)organize state-society relations and determine what 
resources matter for statehood.   
Conclusion  
 
The conventional wisdom measures the failure of a state through violence, democracy, and chaos. 
The triggers of this failure vary from revolutionary protests to inter-ethnic violence. Further, the 
causes of conflict are rooted in ethnic, religious, and cultural diversity. Legitimacy, capacity, and 
authority are seen as the three main pillars of the state.  
The Central Asian realities suggest that violence can be seen as a side-effect of democracy; 
a chaotic Parliament may be representative of its society; and revolutions, civil wars, and inter-
ethnic conflicts may be used as the tools to reorganize something as basic as access to land, water, 
bazaars, trade routes and state institutions, all of which are perceived locally as sources of power. 
Many elements within the societies in the rural areas perceive criminals-in-law or warlords as 
legitimate figures. They may prioritize order and stability over pluralism of opinions and freedom, 
and they may label their governments rather than the non-state Islamist movements as 
extremists. This shows that legitimacy may not be tied to democracy; and capacity may not be tied 
to security. Rather, it is the sense of belonging and survival strategies which seem to be two main 
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aspects taken into consideration. It is not that there is “too much of the state” which bothers 
people. It is, perhaps, that there is “too little” of it which is the issue, especially when we talk 
about people who used to live in a socialist state during the Soviet period, when lives were 
planned, jobs secure, and education free. Hence, the main problem is that the state’s authority 
does not extend to its entire territory, at times due to the lack of legitimacy, at time to the lack of 
capacity. This results in a feeling of alienation and forces people to look for alternative ways of 
survival and alternative networks to belong to.  
While the leading assessment frameworks highlight the problem of criminalization, 
informality, shadow economies, non-state actors, ungoverned territories as the indicators of 
state’s fragility, they overlook the fact that these same factors may often constitute the state’s 
strength in Central Asia. Both failure and strength seem to be made of the same constituent parts. 
For instance, it is the blurriness between the formal and informal, legal and illegal, private and 
public, local and transnational processes which can be used as both state-weakening and state-
strengthening tools. Therefore, it is very important to see the concrete social and economic 
structures where these dimensions meet: as the previous chapter called them, the areas of 
barzakh or processes of interstitial emergence. Specifically, the focus is on two of these: the 
mahalla, the grassroots community of trust and the bazaar, the grassroots economic unit. Bear in 
mind that these areas are taken here as spaces for potential (re)connection between the state and 
society, not as the causes of state’s weakness as such, for it depends not on whether they are 
present at all, but on what we do with them. These sites of resistance indicate that the state is 
incomplete, but they can be turned into the sites of the state empowerment  
 Having examined the barzakh areas through the lenses of three indicators, i.e. 
transnationality, cross-sectionality and entrysm, we have simplified the complexity around the 
grassroots socio-economic structures, by highlighting main stakeholders, resources, and 
mechanisms competing for dominance over these spaces, and therefore for the hearts and minds 
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of the people and the directions of the societal processes. In doing so, we have shown that these 
areas are vulnerable to different types of power and influence, which is why it is not these spaces 
as such that lead to the state’s incompleteness, but rather what powerful actors do with them, 
how they organize their relations with them, and the balance which is struck (if at all) between the 
formal and informal, legal and illegal, transnational and local. As to why, this is explained in the 
empirical chapters that follow.   
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CHAPTER 3. Follow the water: resources and state construction   
Introduction  
 
This chapter addresses the first of three elements explaining the incompleteness of the state in 
Central Asia. It is about a social legacy constructed by the Soviet state which persists long after the 
demise of the Soviet Union. This refers to cross-border social interdependence in the field of water 
and land management. It claims that the breakup of the Soviet state signified the rupture of state 
formation, as the policies of building the state have taken radically opposite directions, such as the 
shift from centralization to decentralization. Specifically, it shows that neo-liberal policies have in 
practice contributed to the empowerment of communities and creation of empty shell states 
without societies to fill them in.  
It proceeds along the following steps. Firstly, section 3.1 provides an overview of pre-Soviet 
social organization and social patterns in Central Asia. In doing so, it shows that Central Asian 
history used to be about diversity, flux and liquidity, just as the waters that its societies had 
followed. Secondly, section 3.2 depicts how the new reality of nations and ethnicities under the 
Soviet state (1924 – 1936) was constructed, and how the existing resources were linked to the 
newly created categories of nationality. The creation of nations was the first step towards further 
sovietization and the creation of a more encompassing identity based on collective interest, 
manufactured through the process of collectivization, as shown in section 3.3. Collectivization was 
the culmination of a process of creating cross-border societal interdependence in the Fergana 
Valley that did not necessarily coincide with previous social relations and patterns. Section 3.4. 
addresses the collapse of the Soviet Union and the de-collectivization project, rationalized by the 
new sponsors of statehood applying templates devised with reference to the Washington 
Consensus. This section shows that privatization did not lead to the dismantling of social 
interdependence, because it failed to create the neo-liberal institution of private property. 
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Instead, it has fostered an unintended consequence of creating an institution of property based on 
communities, rather than centered on an individual. It demonstrates this by addressing the 
restructuring of land and water as the main assets of the societies of the Fergana Valley, shown in 
sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2, respectively. Finally, section 3.5 provides an illustration of the above 
mentioned claims through the case of the Isfara river.  
3.1. Pre-Societ societal organization and patterns of social relations   
 
In the mid-nineteenth century, the territory of present day Central Asia was divided into three 
polities – the Khanates of Bukhara, Khiva and Kokand, roughly comprising the historic Sogdiana, 
Baktria, and Margiana of Alexander, fed by the waters of Oxus (Amu-Darya) and Jaxartes (Syr-
Darya). These polities divided the territories now occupied by present-day Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, 
and southern Kyrgyzstan. The plateau occupied by present day northern Kyrgyzstan and 
Kazakhstan was called Western Turkestan, a term which later referred to all of Central Asia 
stretching from the Kazakh-Russian border to what is now Chinese Xinxiang (Eastern Turkestan). 
At the risk of oversimplification, this territory can be said to comprise three Khanates which were 
surrounded by nomadic or semi-nomadic Kazakh and Kyrgyz tribes (See the maps below). We use 
the term Russian Turkestan here for this latter version that stretches from the Russo-Kazakh 
border to Xinxiang.  
The Emirates of Bukhara and Khiva were the rivals of the infamous Kokand Khanate (1799 – 
1875), which was subjected to the Russian Empire in 1868 via a Treaty in which Kokand agreed to 
become a Russian vassal state. In general, the Tsarist rule in Russian Turkestan lasted from 1876 – 
1917. The Three Khanates – Khiva, Bukhara, and Kokand, which had strained relations both 
towards each other and the neighboring nomad populations (Abashin 2011; Geiss 2004). 
Populations within these latter states were mostly sedentary or semi-sedentary. 
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The Khanate of Kokand was abolished in March 1876 by Tsar Alexander II, who claimed to be 
following and protecting “the wishes of the Kokand people to become Russian subjects” (Abashin 
2011). In this way, the Kokand Khanate was incorporated into the Fergana Province of Russian 
Turkestan (Abashin 2011).  
At the time, Russian Turkestan comprised a variety of ethnic groups or tribes, which the 
Soviet ethnographic commission decided later to combine into more encompassing categories of 
nationalities or ethnicities. However, ethnos was not seen as the key organizing principle of these 
polities at that time, nor was a level of national self-consciousness highly developed (Hirsch 2000). 
Instead, a typical Central Asian person would be the product of a diverse background (Barthold 
1894). Due to the nomadic or semi-nomadic lifestyles, people of Turkestan, Bukhara and Khiva did 
not define themselves in national terms: “ethnic, linguistic, religious, clan, and economic divisions 
often did not coincide, and people subscribed to several identities at once” (Barthold 1894). 
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Furthermore, as a recent work of Tajik historian Kamoluddin Abdullaev (2010) has shown, the 
history of Central Asia is the history of migration, which facilitated cultural diversity and social 
fragmentation rather than conventional accounts of nation and ethnicity.  
At the grassroots, these societies were fragmented social organizations, possessing kinship, 
tribal, or mixed identities. The socio-economic order was based on communities, the main 
institutions of which were religious, that is madrassahs, mosques, and shariah courts. The basis of 
the economy was mainly agriculture and trade (for Bukhara and Khiva), as exercised through 
bazaars within the broader infrastructure of the Silk Road, and, for the Kazakh and Kirghiz nomads, 
pastoralism and animal husbandry. The exact data on cultural diversity of Central Asia as it was 
then is hard to establish, due to the absence of data by which we measure diversity today, such as 
ethnicity, nation, class, state boundary, etc.  
There are different stories told and yet to be told. According to Geiss (2004), “ethnographic 
accounts differ considerably regarding the names, boundaries and peculiarities of the Central 
Asian “peoples” who were organized along different lines” (Geiss 2004, 13).16  Hirsch (2005) 
provides a detailed analysis of the disputes between the Russian ethnographic authorities during 
the process of creating the existing categories of ethnicity (Hirsch 2005, ch.3). In general, the 
Soviet ethnographers identified so-called “small” or “weak” narodnosti (nationalities) and “larger” 
and “more-developed” glavnye narodnosti (main nationalities). As the next section will show, 
through the politics of the “Great Break”, the Soviet authorities decided to amalgamate the small 
nationalities into the main ones, “first on paper and then through its land and language policies” 
(Hirsch 2005, 137). According to the volumes of census data published at the beginning of 1928, 
there were 166 nationalities; 4 subgroups, and 6 “provisional nationalities” (Hirsch 1997). 
However, later on the Commission for the Study of the Tribal Composition of the Population of 
                                                          
16
 For a comprehensive analysis of different versions of historiography and ethnography of Central Asia, see Georg 
Geiss (2004).  
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Russia (Komissiya po izucheniju plemennnogo sostava naseleniya Rossii *KIPS+) “expressed their 
misgivings about the statistical and actual consolidation of narodnosti. In correspondence with 
government and party institutions, the ethnographers argued that without a complete statistical 
analysis of all available data it would be impossible to compose accurate ethnographic maps, 
which had been requested by government committees to settle border disputes” (PFR RAN f.135, 
op.I,d.79, l.8, quoted in Hirsch 2005, 137-138).  
The evidence suggests that the nationalities which existed in the pre-Soviet period did not 
coincide with those of today. Furthermore, nationalities did not exist before the borders were 
drawn and the links between land and ethnicity had been established. For example “In Fergana 
communities of people called themselves “Kirgiz-Kipchak” or “Uzbek-Kipchak”, *and+ until the 
national-territorial delimitation of Central Asia in 1924, the terms Uzbek, Kirgiz, and Kipchak 
typically denoted linguistic or kinship affiliations, not nationality” (Hirsh 2005, 113). In Bukhara, 
the ethnographers responsible for mapping Central Asian nationalities faced the problem that 
local people could not straightforwardly answer questions around their nationalities. The 
ethnographer and Turkologist, Ivan Zarubin, suggested introducing “control questions about the 
native language, conversational language, religion, and kinship group in order to ascertain 
whether they had given “correct” responses to the question about nationality: to differentiate 
between Iranians and Tajiks, Zarubin recommended that census takers pay attention to the 
religion of the subject; he noted that in Bukhara and Khorezm most Iranians are Shiites and Tajiks 
are Sunni” (Hirsch 2005, 112). However, defining nationality on the basis of religion was not 
necessarily accurate. Some scholars argue that the Three Khanates had been a space of “Islamic 
diversity” (Mirsaitov 2004) with kalam, that is critical Islam (Abashin 2011), being the core 
principle of understanding Islam. In other words, these notions have always been contested, 
especially by sufi and later by jadidist (reformist) Islam (Khalid 1998). Bukhara, especially, had 
been considered the place where Sufism has always been widespread (Hoji Akbar Turajonzoda, 
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interview 2012). That is why this thesis emphasizes the understanding of Central Asian history as 
one of diversity, migration, and displacement, especially in the pre-tsarist, tsarist, and the Soviet 
periods. Whereas it is outside of the scope of this thesis to reconcile differing historiographical 
accounts on Central Asia, this conflict only emphasizes that the nature of conflict in pre-Soviet 
Central Asia was mainly about resources, since socio-political organization was organized around 
water and resources, fought over by the nomadic populations and the peoples of the oasis polities 
comprising the Three Khanates.  
The flux and diversity of the Turkestani population can be seen through its formation 
processes, such as migration, and dynamic community structures. The migration routes analyzed 
by Abdullaev (2010) and Paul Georg Geiss (2004) provide evidence for that the socio-political 
order of Turkestan’s societies was in constant flux, even those of the oasis states and the Three 
Khanates. Geiss (2004) also shows that it was based either on tribal systems (when referring to 
nomads) or a patrimonial one, which was also not constant since its subjects could move from the 
domain of one strongman to another and so on. This was especially true in the Tsarist period (i.e. 
the period of the Three Khanates). At the same time, it would not be accurate to describe pre-
Tsarist Turkestan in the nineteenth-century as organized strictly in a tribal or non-tribal way. Geiss 
(2004) also notices that, due to the fact that Central Asian history is the one of frequent 
disruptions, it is more accurate to view pre-tsarist Turkestan in terms of community structures and 
their interactions, because even “tribal communal commitment was established in Central Asia in 
dissimilar ways. [Political communities are seen] as evolved from the communal interpenetration 
and changing communal commitment structures” (Geiss 2004, 2). In a semi-arid region, those who 
control water have the greatest power. Agricultural systems were based around the main rivers, 
the Amu-Darya and Syr-Darya.  Water also has social and spiritual meaning. Some authors see the 
importance of water systems being rooted in the Zoroastrian views of the centrality of water for 
the social order. For example, “ancient Zoroastrians offered up daily prayers to water, and people 
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who worked on the irrigation network and reclaimed land from the desert were held in very high 
esteem” (McGovern 1939 quoted in O’Hara 2000, 372). In pre-Tsarist Central Asia, water was 
central to the social, economic, and political organization of the settlements (Le Strange 1905). 
When Tsarist Russia intervened, the region still had a sophisticated irrigation system, based on 
communities and governed by custom.  
In Central Asia, according to Barthold (1914), a century-old agricultural culture [was] based 
on artificial irrigation (Barthold 1914, 1). In the ancient sources about Central Asia – among them 
Greek, Arabic, Chinese, Turkish and Russian - there is no evidence as to when the artificial 
irrigation system was engineered. Bartol’d suggests that this system was created during the Greco-
Bactrian period. Sogdiana17 was part of Greco-Bactrian Empire at the time. Information about later 
Central Asian history is mostly found in Chinese sources, which also note a highly developed 
agriculture and artificial irrigation system in the Fergana Valley. However, these sources also did 
not note the time of its outset (Barthold 1914, 11). During the long Persian rule of the Sasanid 
dynasty, the irrigation system was improved and strengthened, based on recent technological 
achievements in the Roman Empire. At that time, the word “rivalis” appeared in the Central Asian 
languages. It meant literally “the neighbor along the channel/river” (Zelinskij 1903, 34).  
During the period of the Kokhand Khanate, the highest water authority in the Fergana 
Valley was the mirab bashi who was paid in kind by the dekhhans. The Khan himself was seen as a 
“steward of water rights for Allah” (Barthold 1914). The smaller-scale water authorities were the 
mirabs and aryq amins, who were elected by the dekhhans. The system of water distribution was 
called peikal.18 The mobilization of labor and material for irrigation was done according to the 
                                                          
17
 The area between the grandest Central Asian rivers Amu-Daria and Syr-Daria, partially within the modern Fergana 
Valley 
18
 “The community-based irrigation system [in the Fergana Valley] consisted of big channels with 144 suv (water 
rights) which implied that 144 land-owners had the right to use the water. The time for which every land-owner was 
allowed to use the water was calculated by dividing the number of minutes in 24 hours (1440) into the number of 
land-owners (144). As an outcome of such calculation, theoretically, each land-owner was allocated 10 minutes of 
water flow into their land every day. However, in practical terms, it was very difficult to divide people into users per 
 96 
 
system of hashar (ashar), a voluntarily tax or, in lieu of money, labor contribution to the 
community (Barthold 1914). In effect, this was a tax which “linked benefits to duty” (O’Hara 2000, 
373). At the beginning of Tsarist rule19, the Central Asian water system was left to pre-Tsarist 
customary management. These relations were managed according to customary law, which is why 
many sources conceive of property rights as being tied to religious institutions such as madrassahs 
and mosques (Geiss 2004). However, the synthesis of ancient historical sources provided in the 
Ethnographic Report on Turkestan by Barthold (1914) provides that:  
According to all historical sources on ancient and Medieval Central Asia, this area 
impressed its conquerors with a complex artificial irrigation system. However, the issue of 
water management was first addressed by the Arab conquerors, because of many disputes 
on the ground of water sharing. In spite of the fact that all relations had to be regulated by 
Shariah law, the books on fikh did not say a word about water management. Hence, a new 
book on water management, which was called “Kitab al kuni” was created by all the fakikh 
(the experts on religious law, some of whom were also invited from the ancient 
Babylon/Iraq). However, the sources do not say whether the norms of the local customary 
law were taken into consideration, when this book was compiled (historians Gardiki and 
Abu-Abdullah Horezmi in Barthold 1914, 24-25). 
 
This suggests that water and land were central to the social order across all layers of Central Asian 
history, and that such conflicts as had appeared concerned water management rather than 
differences in identities; first and foremost because the peoples of Turkestan possessed multiple 
and overlapping identities and the awareness of the link between resources and ethnicity had 
been absent (Hirsch 2000; Barthold 1914).  
Changes to the irrigation system based on custom were introduced when the Tsarist 
regime decided to “end the Russian reliance on the American cotton (especially after the American 
Civil War, when supplies almost ceased) [as it has realized Central Asian potential in cotton 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
hours because of the large number of such users. Therefore, the villagers or community-members were divided into 
several groups, with each group being allocated water for one day (24 hours). Each group waited for its turn in the 
line. Such lining up was referred to as “peikal”” (Logofet’s description quoted in Dadabaev 2012, 160). 
19
 The expansion of the Russian Empire to Central Asia started from the late 16
th
 century, when the strongest state in 
the region, the Kokand Khanate fell into a crisis. These territories were later inherited by the Soviet Union, after the 
Soviet revolution of the 1918. For a comprehensive analysis of the crisis of the Three Khanates in Central Asia prior to 
the Russian expansion, see Sergey Abashin (2011).  
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cultivation+” (O’Hara 2000, 374). As an incentive for cotton cultivation, the Tsarist administration 
transferred lands to local entrepreneurs for 99-year use and introduced state subsidies for cotton 
cultivation (O’Hara 2000, 374). However, as cotton required large-scale land and water 
management systems, which were absent, this only increased competition between landlords20 
(bais); nonetheless, increased cotton cultivation had significantly reduced Russian dependency on 
the American cotton by the time of the Bolshevik revolution (Thurman 1997; Lipovsky 1995).   
 Each polity or “oasis city” represented a self-sufficient economic system. The conflicts 
between the landlords or the tribes were mainly organized around the axis of city vs. hinterland 
(i.e. the surrounding countryside). As the oasis cities possessed more coercive powers, the 
peripheral surrounding areas were required to pay tribute to the cities’ feudal rulers. Tributes and 
rivalry over access to land and water were at the center of these conflicts (Olcott 1981). The 
ownership of lands in Bukhara and Kokhand were linked to religious institutions, such as 
madrassahs and mosques. This allowed land to be used for communal purposes according to the 
principles of ashar.21 This type of land ownership was called a waqf land holding and essentially 
represented community-based land organization in the settled parts of the region (Barthold 1914). 
As religious leaders of each community held legitimate decision-making powers, land assets were 
perceived as safe under such an authority. Furthermore, there were also religious courts (Shariah 
based), to deal with irreconcilable disputes. The partial reliance on religious customs for organizing 
the socio-economic order in the oasis cities fostered the myth of Central Asia being a citadel of 
Islamic culture. This narrative of Central Asia, however, pays little attention to the social 
fragmentation of both social and religious life. If it was an oasis of Islam, it also was one of “Islamic 
diversity”, where different Islamic ideologies competed along Adam Smith’s lines of “religious 
competition” (Mirsaitov 2004). The map of Islamic diversity is described as being represented by 
                                                          
20
 It was the competition which during the Soviet era would be called as the inter-tribal conflicts.  
21
 As described elsewhere in the thesis: the system of taxation paid either in money or in kind (depending on a family’s 
economic opportunities) and connected to a moral duty to contribute to the resolution of the community’s needs.  
 98 
 
various Islamic mashabs such as Sunnism, Sufism, Wahhabism, Jadidism, etc. (Peyrouse 2007; 
Khalid 1998). All these groups lived mixed within different communities and belonging to a specific 
religious group was not necessarily tied to a set of resources (Barthold 1914). Although there was 
the link between the religious institutions and resource-management, these institutions did not 
promote a particular mashab. This link between the religious institutions and resources was not 
one between ethnicity and land (as after the establishment of the Soviet rule). It was there in 
order to create order and manage resources through constant negotiations, rather than by-default 
connection between the ethnic belonging and resources. The “rules” of this competition were 
reminiscent of Socrates and the stoics, with “critical Islam” being the cornerstone of religious 
education (Abashin 2011). Shariah rule and the link between religious institutions and land was a 
means to create a system of coercion, where the role of sanctions would be used via “moral duty” 
before the community (Liu 2012; Geiss 2004). 
 However, the nomadic populations of Turkestan were organized around customary law 
(Adat and ürp Adat) rather than Shariah law. Justice was provided by a tribal elder (bij/baj) and by 
a judge (qazi) or elders (aksakals – “white beards”, wise elders who gained most respect across 
communities for their personal and leadership qualities) through the reference to Adat (Bichsel 
2009, 71-76; Beyer 2006, 159-160; Thurman 1999).  
These insights suggest that the narrative of the region as Muslim or as “an important part 
of the Islamic civilization since the middle ages” under-estimates the importance of social diversity 
(Olcott 1981, 353). The Russian Empire left the Turkestani socio-economic system almost intact 
and was able to ensure the co-existence of the Muslim and Russian parts of Turkestan (Olcott 
1981, 353). While these views have their rationale, it is also important to remember that Central 
Asia has been ruled by many different empires (Liu 2012). Even though the memories and vicinity 
to the Muslims of India and Afghanistan persisted, this does not make Turkestan indisputably a 
“Muslim civilization” to the same extent as Middle Eastern polities. Furthermore, there has been 
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as much negotiation between the state and religious authorities and discussion about the 
separation of state and religion within Islamic Empires as Christian European Empires (Barthold 
1914). Hence, Islam can be seen as neither the only explanation of societal choices on the ground, 
nor as its only identity. Its importance, however, is significant when one thinks of the link between 
Shariah-rooted customs, community-based social order, and the organization of land and water. In 
other words, the customs provided specific patterns of socio-economic interactions, which were 
later restructured by the Soviet authorities. Rather than being organized around ethnic, religious, 
or nation-centered categories, these societies can be better described as being “hydraulic 
societies”, that is societies that base their social organization around water (Wittfogel 1957) 
through the community social structures of moral commitment or trust (Geiss 2004).  
The social organization of pre-Soviet Central Asia was around tribal communities (in the 
case of nomads) and religious communities (in the case of the oasis cities). The main resource was 
access to water and lands (as mentioned above), both for the goals of agriculture (sedentary 
populations) and pastoralism (nomadic populations). Management and constant negotiation of 
water was central to the way in which the social and political hierarchy of settlements operated 
(Mukaddasi, Al-Biruni, Yakut in Le Strange 1905).  Since water also had spiritual meaning, it played 
a more significant role for social organization of these communities than any other categories of 
segregation that became important at the later stages of history.  
3.2. State-making: ethnicities, resources, nations  
  
According to the conventional wisdom, Soviet nation-making in Central Asia represented a “divide-
and-rule” strategy aimed at planting the seeds of eternal conflict into the region (The Economist 
1998; Masell 1974; Conquest 1962; Caroe 1954). But, as the previous section described, the 
Central Asian plateau was a constellation of fragmented socio-political units that were in the 
constant state of conflict over land and water (Barthold 1914). This section provides an alternative 
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view, which argues that nation-making was instead a tactic to combine the then fragmented 
communities of Central Asia into a broader framework of belonging. It was about constructing 
identities that would alter the previous patterns of societal relations.  
The process that re-engineered polities of Russian Turkestan into five national republics (or 
nation-states) was called national-territorial delimitation (natsional’no-territorial’noe 
razmezhevanie). The literal translation of this term implies a striking connection between 
nationalities22 and the territories to which they have been allocated.23 The idea of “nation”, 
defined in terms of ethnicity, common language, and connected to material resources, was alien 
to the nomadic and semi-nomadic peoples of Western Turkestan, for they used to define 
themselves in terms of their connection to their social or geographic communities. In terms of 
language, these were bilingual (Iranic and Turkic) tribes (Bregel 2003, 94). There was confusion 
over the sedentary populations, too. For instance, the most ancient sedentary population of the 
region, the Tajiks, were initially almost entirely forgotten, a large group of Sarts or Chagatay was 
confused with Uzbeks and assimilated accordingly (Bregel 2003, 94).  
Initially, the first republics that emerged in formerly Russian Central Asia were not based 
on national principles. At first, the Tashkent Governorate-General offered a draft Constitution and 
proclaimed the advent of the Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, or ASSR (as a part 
of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, RSFSR) in April 1918. Moscow rejected this 
constitution. 
                                                          
22
 This is why “nationality” in the Soviet terms means “ethnicity”, rather than “citizenship” as in the Western sense of 
the term.  
23
 The term “razmezhevanie” is the closest by the meaning to the term “parceling out” rather than “delimitation” as 
such. 
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In August 1920, the Kirgiz ASSR, with its capital in Orenburg (comprising parts of present-day 
Northern Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and parts of Russia bordering Kazakhstan) was established, as 
Kazaks were confused with Kirgiz. Present-day Kyrgyzstan was first constructed as the Kara-Kirgiz 
Autonomous Oblast’ in 1924. In 1926, the Kirgiz ASSR was renamed the Kazakh ASSR; while the 
Kara-Kirgiz Autonomous Oblast’ was renamed the Kirgiz Autonomous Oblast’ and in February 1926 
became the Kirgiz ASSR. In September 1924 Bukharan Soviet Socialist Republic, including parts of 
present-day Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, became the Uzbek ASSR, with Tajikistan being incorporated 
within. Territories of the former Bukhara Khanate, particularly cities such as Bukhara and 
Samarkand, were disputed between these emergent administrative regions. The Tajik Soviet 
Socialist Republic was separated from Uzbekistan in December 1929. At this point Bukhara and 
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Samarkand were left within Uzbekistan. This decision has been a source of animosity between 
Uzbeks and Tajiks to the present day. The Fergana Valley was also a point of disputes, but was 
eventually was divided between Tajik, Kirgiz, and Uzbek SSR, according to the principle of 
functionality. In 1936, both the Kazakh and Kirgiz Autonomous Republics were elevated to the 
status of Soviet Socialist Republics (Bregel 2003, 94). Borders in the region were disputed at later 
points, too, but essentially these borders formed the core state composition which remained to 
into the present. The existing Arabic script for the Persian and Turkic languages in the region was 
first replaced by Latin in 1929-1930, followed in 1940-1941 by a modified form of the Cyrillic 
alphabet (Bregel 2003, 94). 
The key institutions that were responsible for this process were the People’s Commissariat 
for the Affairs of the Nationalities (Narkomsnats) and the State Planning Commission (Gosplan). 
Their initial aim was to “win the non-Russian population to the side of the bolshevik revolution” 
and do it in a way distinct from that of the Western colonizers, where the center exploited the 
periphery (Hirsch 2005, 65). The idea was to even the level of economic development of the 
national republics in order to then include them all into a single economic space of the socialist 
union.  
Initially, Narkomsnats and Gosplan were two competing institutions, each promoting 
different approaches to nation-making. Narkomnats promoted an ethnographic approach, the 
main idea of which was the empowerment of regional ethnicities in order to gain support of these 
non-Russian populations for the Bolshevik revolution. Matching the uneven economic 
development of the developed peoples (of the Soviet center) and the “backward people” who 
were still in the “feudal era” (of the Soviet periphery) was the main justification of the expanding 
Soviet state.24 On the other hand, Gosplan insisted on a centralized economic plan that would 
encompass all the new peoples of the Soviet state (Nove 1989). A compromise was agreed to 
                                                          
24
 Lenin’s program.  
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combine both tasks into a two-step process of social engineering: nationalization and 
sovietization. Hirsch (2000, 203) calls this process as “dual assimilation” (national + soviet) which 
implied both colonization (in the Soviet sense) and nation-building. The creation of nationalities 
was based on research on the Asian tribes by the Ethnographic Commission for the study of the 
Tribal Composition of the Population of Russia (Ethnographic Commission).25 Eventually, both 
Narkomsnats and Gosplan agreed upon the supremacy of equal economic development and 
creation of an overarching system which would encompass those nationalities to then make them 
gradually melt into a socialist union. When necessary, the process of assimilation was 
accompanied by the coercive displacement of groups of people (pereselenie) from their native 
regions to the regions remote from their homes, in order to deprive the local elites from their 
wealth (de-kulakization) and dismantle the pre-existing relationships of power (GARF26, Moscow, 
f.6984, d. 1. op. 211, II, 50, 52, 76). Nationality, as a new framework of belonging, was to bring 
some order to these fragmented societies, to then turn them into economically interdependent 
units by means of collectivization, which is described in section 3.3.  
 The rationale behind this two-dimensional approach was the need to present the new 
Soviet state as different from the Western or Russian Empires, and to prevent potential peasant 
uprisings. The integration of the peripheral territories of the former Russian Empire was to be 
based on the Marxist idea of stages of human development, with the stage of nation-building 
coming prior to that of socialist union. In other words, this process was the “state-sponsored 
                                                          
25
 Additionally, in April 1922, the State Colonization Research Institute (Goskolonit) was established. Its goal was to 
develop a philosophical basis for the Soviet colonization, as opposed to the Western colonization. The Goskolonit 
came up with two concepts “colonization” (kolonizatsia) and “colonial exploitation” (kolonizatorstvo). The latter term 
was applied to the Soviet policy and was based on the redefinition of the relationships between the colonizer and the 
colonized (“the local indigenous populations”, defined as the “most valuable resource of the Soviet state”). The Soviet 
colonization had been rationalized through the concept of pereselenie (which in practice was internal displacement of 
people), justified by the “better matching of the needs of the peoples” (On colonization and pereselenie see: Iamzin, 
Iarilov, G.Gins, Willard Sunderland).  
26
 Gosudarstvennyj Arhiv Rossijskoj Federatsii, State Archive of the Russian Federation, Moscow.  
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evolutionism”27 with the state being epiphenomenal to societal development (Hirsch 2000, 203). 
National-territorial delimitation created identities broader than tribal or kinship identities 
organized around communities or the polities similar to city-states. This created greater chances 
for better social standardization and human engineering. To make the new identities more 
appealing, these “official nationalities” were linked to the right to monopolize land and resources 
(Hirsch 2000, 206).  
Some ethnographers of Turkestan saw the process of nationality creation, which was being 
pursued according to the West European historical tradition, as unnatural to the region. They 
believed that, in reality, it created inequality between the titular nationalities and local minorities 
(Barthold, 1894). Archival information from the period could be interpreted twofold. Firstly, the 
petitions from the villagers from to the Soviet authorities are usually interpreted as the evidence 
of the malevolent intention of the Soviet state to construct national identities, without proper 
investigation of their primordial connotations. Most of the central Asian scholars organize their 
arguments around this evidence. The goal of this group of scholars was to prove that the Soviet 
nation-making followed the “divide-and-rule” strategy in order to “seed the conflict among the 
Central Asian nations” (The Economist 1998; Massel28 1974). It is with this interpretation that 
these scholars explain the current problems of border delimitation and the inter-ethnic conflicts. 
This allows national politicians to construct their narratives of strengthening national sovereignty.  
The second camp provides a more nuanced interpretation of the local petitions to 
Moscow, by emphasizing the link between national identity, land, water and other resources 
                                                          
27
 Slezkine (1994) suggests the term “compensatory nation-building”. These concepts seem to be at the center of the 
historians’ debate about the nature of the Soviet empire since they reflect the views on the main question of this 
debate which is whether there was a clash between the Soviet empire and the incipient nationalities. The debate is 
divided into two main camps: first one propagates the empirial/colonial (in the Western classical sense of the term) 
nature of the Soviet state (See: Suny, Zaslavsky, Barkey, von Hagen); the second camp looks at the Soviet state as a 
double-level governance, with the category of nationality meant to unite the fragmented tribal populations and with 
the category of the homo sovieticus being a supra-national frame of reference to de-nationalize the peoples at the 
later stages of the socialist evolution (See: Hirsch, Motyl, Armstrong.).  
28
 The idea of the “tactical nation states”  
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(Hirsch 2005; 2000). However, the archival research on the petitions suggests also that the 
narratives could be divided into two types along the timeline between the 1920s and 1950s. In the 
early 1920s, the language of the petitions was less culturally flavored and lacked the usage of 
words “ethnicity” or “nationality”. Instead, the people said: 
We found out that according to the latest delimitation of borders, the lands that we have 
been using for our pastoral activities in the summer have been given away to Uzbek SSR. 
Furthermore, on that side of the mountain, there is a river which was useful for our 
husbandry, too. We wonder how we are supposed to use those meadows from now on.  
 
(Petitions from the local communities to the Commission about the use of land and water. GARF, op. P-
6985, d.1. l.142)  
 
This was one of the first petitions, written in Persian. Here, the “we” can be interpreted in many 
different ways, for example, as kinship or tribal identity, or both. The later letters were written in 
Russian or both languages. And the latter petitions suggest that the category of “ethnicity” 
appears more often and the letters are structured around this category (GARF. f. 3316, op. 16a, d. 
189, II, 2-329; GARF. f. 3316, op.64, d. 411, 1. 930). Hirsch (2000) provides a detailed analysis of 
these petitions and highlights the fact that “the petitioners did not question the official 
assumption that “national identity” was linked to land, water, and other resources” (Hirsh 2000, 
216). 
However, once local elites realized that nationality provided them exclusive rights over a 
particular territory, they quickly adopted the language of these categories. The letters of the local 
strongmen to the Soviet government reveal the usage of the language (Hirsch 2000; 2005). 
Furthermore, since the category of nationality implied a concrete number of people, some of the 
letters from the local elites claim that the people they represented should not be moved to the 
territories of other nationalities. This was the way the then local elites were defending their social 
base or the social organization backing them up. Reportedly, “the titular nationalities tried to use 
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 For the petitions of Kazakhs who ended up in the territory of the Uzbek ASSR 
30
 For the petitions of Uzbeks who ended up in the territory of the Kazakh SSR  
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coercion and deception to increase the number of their nationalities to gain access to more land 
and resources” (Hirsch 2000, 214).  
As a result, the awareness of the link between nationality and territory was raised, as well 
as the elites’ knowledge of how to manipulate these categories.  This connection between national 
identity, political power, and economic resources has remained one of the key social legacies 
revived by the local elites in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. This is not 
necessarily to say that this was a pure construction of nations that had happened, but “a 
construction of new history that establishes a “memory” shared by all socialized individuals in the 
collectivity” (Armstrong 1992, 3). This was a memory competing with the one of the tribal and 
community-based social organization, both of which would be revived in their own ways in the 
post-Soviet era, as discussed in chapters four and five. Other scholars interpret the Soviet state as 
“institutionalized multinationality” and the national-territorial delimitation as a “constitutive 
*rather than constraining+ of the state, society, and individual”, of both “the actors” and “their 
interests” (Brubaker 1984, 48; Meyer 1987). The category of nationality fostered two societal 
consequences: the changing patterns of power relations and the new myths of their 
rationalization. However, nationality, even if given a particular territory, was engineered as a part 
of a single whole, in this case the regional economy of the Fergana Valley. Hence, not all processes 
and social relations resided within a nation-state, but possessed trans-border or “transnational” 
features.  
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 3.3. Collectivization: social resistance and collective interest 
  
The second step towards the socialist union was the destruction of the community-based socio-
economic order, which was achieved by two means: collectivization31 of lands and the elimination 
of social resistance movements. Collectivization, as part of a strategy to enable the “Great 
Break”32, entailed the creation of an all-encompassing frame of reference, i.e. bringing all 
community holdings into the ownership of collective farms belonging to the state. In this way, 
community-based agriculture was ended. It subjected all nationalities to a common economic goal 
and engineered a common social order. Its main feature was that it turned administrative borders 
between the republics into arbitrary borders, since most processes were trans-border and most 
resources were shared by the single economic union. This created the legacy of social 
interdependence, with people connected to the collective farms (kolkhozes) or state farms 
(sovkhozes)33 in the way they were connected to their communities previously. Thus, central 
planning of the Soviet economy constructed interdependence across nationalities it had just 
created. Borrowing Tilly’s terms: it created a large structure which fosters large processes, the 
transnational nature of which made these nationalities interdependent.  
The rationale behind dismantling community-based agriculture was utilitarian, an outcome 
of the prevailing soviet ideology. The landowners (bai) were perceived as enemies of the people 
and the elements of oppressive Tsarist rule (GARF f. 6987). Social organization in Central Asia was 
perceived in terms of tribe and kinship networks, which were again presented as a source of 
inequality, which the Soviet authorities were determined to uproot. Furthermore, community-
based agriculture and the land holdings (belonging to the religious institutions) in the newly 
                                                          
31
 According to the Decree of Politburo TsK VKP(b), from 20 February 1930 (as part of the collectivization Decrees of 
November 1929 – December 1930).  
32
 “Velikij Perelom”: a Soviet ideological concept, introducing industrialization and collectivization to break past 
patterns of social relations.  
33
 Both referred to as “collectives” in the following text.  
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introduced New Economic Politics (NEP)34, strengthened the peasantry. More evidence of this 
empowered peasantry was the social resistance that Bolsheviks faced across different regions of 
their expansion. In Turkestan, it was represented by the basmachi movement (1918-1931) against 
the Bolshevik rule.35 It emerged during the Russian empire as a prototype of organized crime 
networks. Later on, its social composition was enriched both by elements of the peasantry who 
were against collectivization and local elites who did not want to give up their power. Reportedly, 
the movement was a religious, Islamic movement. Often, in the literature, it is considered to be an 
“indigenous” prototype of the current jihadist movements, or “freedom fighters” (Ritter 1985; 
Olcott 1981). The movement’s leadership included traditional chiefs, the kurbashi, religious 
figures, mullahs or ishans36, or bandits with popular support37, representatives of the local elites, 
khans, begs, or tribal chiefs38, or minor local notables39, former jadidis leaders40, or Turkish 
officers41 (Roy 1999, 46).  
While the movement was indeed an expression of a wide resistance to the Bolsheviks, both 
its Islamic cause and its “indigenousness” are arguable. The reason it is cast as an Islamic 
movement is because it promoted itself behind the Islamic principles and defended the socio-
economic organization that existed prior to the Bolshevik revolution, i.e. based on communities 
with the ownership rights linked to the religious institutions (Ritter 1985). However, it is crucial to 
remember that Turkestan was a complex composition of nomad and sedentary people, with views 
as wide and fragmented as Zoroastrian and Muslim, with the latter being fragmented into dozens 
of Islamic sects and schools (Mirsaitov 2004). For instance, the narratives of Islam at the time were 
                                                          
34 The idea of which was based on allowing the peasants to enrich themselves and substitution of the unbearable tax 
(prodrazverstka) by a much lower tax (prodnalog) which was defined before the sowing period (so that the peasants 
could include the tax into their calculations to increase the profit).  
35
 GARF, Moscow, f. 6987: On liquidation of basmachi movements 
36
 eg. Khal Khodja in the Fergana  
37
 Irgash in the Fergana Valley  
38
 Jomud Junaid Khan in Khorezm and part of Turkmen territories and Lokai Ibragim Beg in Gissar, Vakhsh, Dushanbe  
39
 Madamin Beg in Fergana  
40
 Zeki Velidi Togan 
41
 Enver Pasha  
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dominated by jadidism, a reformist Islamic movement which encompassed the views of salafi who 
were against nation-building and the Russian empire, and reformists who prioritized socio-
economic modernization over religion, i.e. integrating Islamic lifestyles into the framework of the 
Russian empire (Baldauf 2001). With the advent of the Bolshevik revolution, jadidists joined both 
the Bolsheviks (modernization cause) and the basmachi movement (social order based on 
communities) (Roy 1999, 36).  
The “indigenousness” of the movement or their “national roots” noted by many historians 
is contestable for two reasons. Firstly, the movement, in its initial stage, could only technically be 
called “indigenous” and was mostly a prototype of organized crime, made up of street bandits 
who would make a living by robbing traders (Roy 1999). Secondly, the “nationalist” character of 
the movement is arguable as there was little in the way of ethnic or national-consciousness in the 
region prior to the national-territorial delimitation as described in section 3.2. Furthermore, 
Islamic identity was not linked to nationality. A vivid example of this is the Muslim government of 
Kokand in Transoxania (November 1917 – February 1918), which, under the influence of the Jadidi 
interpretation of Islam, called for an “autonomous, rather than independent Turkestan and gave it 
a Kazakh as a president (Chokaev), suggesting that they were far from thinking in ethnic-
nationalist terms” (Roy 1999, 37). Finally, at the stage of the most successful time for the 
basmachi, the movement was under the strong influence of pan-Turkism due to the external 
assistance of the Young Turks, in particular Enver Pasha42 and the Afghani Muslims. Both 
influencers were exploiting the basmachi of Central Asia for their strategic location. For the 
Afghani resistance movements, this was a chance to unite with the Muslims of India before and to 
undermine the rule of the British Empire.43 For the Young Turks, this was revenge against the 
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 Died in 1922  
43
 Reportedly, the Afghani and the Young Turk supports of basmachi asked for help from the British Embassy, which 
denied to help them for their fear of that the Muslims of India and of Turkestan could unite which would weaken the 
British influence in India.  
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Bolsheviks, who first supported them in their fight against the Kemalists44 and then betrayed 
them45, as well as the chance to collect insurgent forces to oppose the new Turkish government 
(Sonyel 1990).46  
Furthermore, at different stages, some parts of the movement came to terms with the 
Bolsheviks or waged small wars against their rival tribes (Roy 1999, 46-49). The complexity of the 
social organization of the movement and pragmatism of its political choices suggest that it was the 
fight for the existing patterns of social order and power relations and resistance to the new 
patterns created by the national-territorial delimitation and, at the later stages, to collectivization. 
But collectivization itself largely can be seen as a means of suppressing this resistance by 
coercively reorganizing its societal basis. This movement contributed to the schism within the 
Soviet elite, which was split between defending gradual change from NEP to centralization 
(Bukharin) and those propagating radical change (Trotsky and Stalin). According to the latter, the 
peasantry had to be managed as it was seen as a potential basis for a new revolution, especially in 
the light of similar social resistance elsewhere in the Soviet space. NEP reached its goal and 
allowed the peasantry to accumulate more wealth. This contributed to the arguments of the 
radical camp among the Soviet elite, which had seen NEP as a tool for creating a capitalist and 
unequal society. As a result, collectivization was launched officially in 1929. It resulted in the 
centralization of agricultural planning, land and water management, as well as collective 
ownership of these assets. The lands linked to nationalities or communities were gradually 
transformed into collective farms.47  
                                                          
44
 Mustafa Kemal Atatürk modernization movement.  
45
 The relations between Russia and Turkey roots back to the balance of powers during the First World War, which 
rationalized the support of one or another Turkish government by the Russian Empire and Bolsheviks subsequently.  
46
 Some Russian sources highlight the role of the external capital in the formation of the basmachi movement. See for 
example: Zevelev et.al. 1981   
47
 The centralization of water management implied also the change of the courses of the rivers (GARF. f.6892. 
Bulletins No. 15,16,17,21).  The so-called agricultural-and household zoning (raiyonirovanie/division into districts) in 
Kara-Kyrgyz autonomous zone was comprised of the “zoning of the Commission under Gos. Plan with additions and 
corrections”, additional material was based on the materials of zoning of the Commission, the statistical yearbook 
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The interdependence constructed during the Soviet era mainly concerned the 
centralization of production and, related to that, economic and social practice. The change from 
this communal social order to a more radically centralized one was undertaken after the Bolshevik 
revolution, through forced collectivization and the subjection of the social order to the logic of 
utilitarian economic rationality. In this new system, the role of communities remained only 
functional, in those matters which could not be achieved through central management. 
Collectivization in Central Asia was a social engineering strategy that forcefully changed the 
practices and survival strategies of peasants across the Soviet Union into standardized social 
practices. It made the small farms of nomadic and semi-sedentary populations of Central Asia 
“give up their property in favor of the collective farms” (kolkhozes) (Lerman 2004, 26). The 
destruction of the small household farms in favor of the collectives is the distinguishing feature of 
the collectivization process in Central Asia. This is in contrast to China, where cooperative farming 
was based on communities of twenty to forty households (Mann 2013, 220). The communities in 
Central Asia lost their decision-making power. They remained only as the logistical tool for the 
implementation of the central plan at the grassroots level.  
Collectivization in Central Asia had two functions: organizing agriculture around cotton 
cultivation as utilitarian logic dictated, and preventing social resistance by subjecting the 
peasantry to the overarching structure of collectives, without which they would not survive. In its 
later stages, collectivization required such processes as reorganizing water management and social 
welfare. In addition to the agricultural goals, the collectives were responsible for distribution of 
social welfare in the rural areas. Specifically, they built and maintained social infrastructure such 
as schools, buildings, hospitals, shops, and other public facilities. “Housing, power, water, and heat 
were provided in the villages by local farm enterprises, generally free of charge to the workers. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
1917-1923, volumes 1 and 2, the tables of “perepis’” of 1917-19120s and the tables of the preliminary results of 1917s 
along the Dzhetysuj area (GARF 1921 – 1927, f.6984, op.1, No. 204., No.247). 
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The costs of maintaining the social sphere in the village were generally absorbed into the overall 
production and operation costs” (Lerman 2004, 28).  
As a result, the pattern of “connecting between the nationality, political power and 
economic resources” noted in section 3.2., was transformed into the relations between farm and 
peasant “mass”. To achieve this, the central government rationalized a specific type of “zoning” 
(rayonirovanie), mapping and unmapping the territories of the Central Asian states (GARF f. 6892, 
Op. I, d. 42, l. 21). This was achieved through “zoning” (rayonirovanie), which was rationalized 
according to their functions in the “general direction of economy” (GARF, f.6984, op.1, No. 204, 
No.247):  
1. Irrigation  
2. Direction of farming 
3. Direction of field-crop cultivation 
4. Direction of animal-husbandry  
 
The fallout over this kind of mapping has been continuously re-emerging, which is why in 1954, it 
was decided to map the territories according to the “actual use of lands” (Protocol 1955). These 
two parallel processes resulted in a patchwork of fragmented societies becoming united under the 
umbrella of collective farming and the related resource sharing schemes; moreover, the Decree on 
the Actual Use of Lands created societal interactions beyond the newly parceled out national 
states.   
Most notably the above pattern can be illustrated through the Soviet water-sharing 
schemes, which represents the second pillar of creating interdependence. The entire region 
depends on two main river systems, the Amudarya (Oxus) and Syrdarya (Jaxartes). The cotton-
based economy created for Central Asia since the time of the Russian Empire dictated a radical 
change in managing water during the Soviet era. In 1923 the task of water management was 
moved from the traditional councils of elders to the government bodies or collectives to distribute 
water according to a central plan (O’Hara 2000, 357). Small-scale irrigation systems were 
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integrated into a centralized system, which supplied irrigation water over considerable distances48 
(O’Hara 2000, 375). For example, the upstream republics (Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan) supplied the 
downstream (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan) countries with water. Upstream 
countries had lower quotas on their water than downstream countries, for cotton cultivation, 
which countries downstream were responsible for, was of strategic importance.  
In the institutional design of this system irrigation needs and norms were calculated 
according to hydro-modules. Each country was divided into hydrologic regions, based on soil type 
and local climate, as well as different crop types. There were special brigades (for each 50-100 ha 
of land), who collected data on the water requirements for their specific region. This data was 
then passed to the farm’s hydro-technician, who compiled data for the entire farm (O’Hara 2000, 
375). This data was then sent to the local (oblast) and the national (republic) offices, which then 
transferred the data to Tashkent “where water requirements for the whole Central Asia were 
collated” (O’Hara 2000, 375). Once the data was compiled, water distribution went through a 
three-tier system, which means the following. Firstly, various specialized agencies distributed 
water from grand canals into various networks. Secondly, once water passed into the secondary 
network, it became the remit of Regional Directorates of the Ministry of Land Reclamation and 
Water Management. Third, once water arrived at the farm gate, its distribution beyond this point 
was the solely responsibility of the farm (O’Hara 2000, 376). Communication between the regional 
Ministries and agencies was rarely direct, and often the information had to go through Moscow, 
which would impact the timing of water distribution and lead to its inefficient use which later 
caused ecological disasters (Kornilov and Timoshinka 1975; Smith 1992).  
For a long time, maintenance of the water infrastructure was shared between the 
government agencies and the workers of the collectives, such as dredging canals and ensuring the 
                                                          
48
 The Kara-Kum Canal, for example, which transfers 12,9 km3 of water from Amu-Darya along its 1400 km length 
every year and irrigates an area of c.1 million (Hannan & O’Hara 1998).  
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water canals were clean. Communal maintenance continued at the local level “in many rural areas 
and villagers continued (and still do) to gather each year to clean and build new irrigation canals 
that fed small household plots” (O’Hara 2000, 376). These common practices allowed communal 
ties to be maintained without contradicting the centralized system. In 1960, the centralized 
system was developed into the United Power System (UPS) of Central Asia, located in Tashkent 
(Pomfret 2006, 161). Based on a barter agreement, the system’s goal was to coordinate the needs 
of the upstream with the downstream countries. For instance, the lack of focus on hydroelectricity 
generation for the population was compensated for by shipments of gas from Uzbekistan and coal 
from Kazakhstan (Pomfret 2006, 161).  As this resource exchange was undertaken according to 
central planning rather than market forces, this caused serious issues once countries obtained 
sovereignty and started their transition to a market economy.  
At the societal level, however, the main result was that the communal water management 
system deteriorated. As the institute of mirabs and elders was abandoned, traditional know-how 
was partially lost and decision-making and associated processes of their legitimation interrupted. 
Crops that were not required by the central plan were abandoned. And cotton could not be grown 
by anybody without state subsidies and demand. Therefore, peoples’ survival strategies became 
closely tied to this centralized system of land and water management.  
3.4. De-collectivization: from collective to private property    
 
The creation of the institution of private property is considered to be the cornerstone of 
privatization, with individual interest being its basic element. However, the shift from an 
engineered collective interest to an individual interest in realm of land and water management in 
the Fergana Valley has resulted in the development of a different type of institution of private 
property, centered on community, rather than on the individual.  
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The collapse of the Soviet Union is seen as having marked the end of collective agriculture 
as implemented through land reform and farm restructuring. The goal of these reforms was the 
transition from central planning to a free market and from collective to private property. In 
general, this process was rationalized through the logic of privatization and decentralization. In the 
agricultural sector, these projects were centered on the concept of “local self-governance” 
(Bichsel 2009). Privatization of land means that “state and collective farmland is distributed to 
individuals” (USAID 2003, 1). In general terms, “private refers to a form of ownership not by the 
state, but by individuals or groups” (Bichsel et al. 2010, 256). Specifically, the institution of private 
property requires an individual at the center of social organization and exclusive private ownership 
represents the cornerstone of democratic politics and market economies (Roy 2005; Verdery 
2004; Hann 1998). Furthermore, as many scholars note, the concept of private property has 
ideological implications (Bichsel et al. 2010). And this shift from a socialist to a capitalist 
understanding of private property in the context of Central Asia acquired features of its own, due 
to the fact that Central Asian societies have largely been organized around land and water. Hence, 
changes in the property rights may imply changes in social order, for property relations are also 
defined as “a specific form of social and cultural relations among humans with respect to natural 
resources” (Bichsel 2010, 259; Humphrey and Verdery 2004; Hann 1998;).  
The neo-liberal meaning of the institution of private property implies the entrepreneurial 
nature of peasant activities, as well as the existence of the “peasant farmer” as a concept, for 
“transfer of political power and delegation of authority are only possible on the ground of the 
peasant farmer’s conceptual existence” (Bichsel 2010, 259). For people in the Fergana Valley, 
these relations are more about survival than profit maximization. With the devastation of industry, 
the agricultural sector has continued to play a pivotal role for economies of Central Asia. Central 
Asia is the region with the highest proportion of agricultural population in the Community of 
Independent States (CIS), with 20.3 percent, amounting to 12.6 million people with more than 50 
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percent of the population living in rural areas (FAO 2014, 6). This illustrates the important of 
agriculture not only for economic survival, but also for social order in Central Asia. The Fergana 
Valley49 is the heart of the region’s agriculture: “comprising only about 1% of Central Asia’s 
territory, it is home to about 18% of the population or about 11 million people, making it one of 
the region’s most densely populated areas. More than a quarter of the populations of Uzbekistan 
and Tajikistan, and more than half of the Kyrgyz Republic’s population live in the valley” (ADB 
2010). 
 In Uzbekistan, which has the greatest amount of the arable lands, this sector still employs 
44% of 15 million people active in the national workforce” (Peyrouse 2009, 5). In Tajikistan, with 
only 21% of arable land, agriculture “accounts for 30% of the country’s GDP and employs more 
than two-thirds (67%) of its workforce” (Peyrouse 2009, 5). In Kyrgyzstan, agriculture constitutes 
32% of GDP, industry accounts for 18% and services for 49%; of about 2.7 million people active in 
workforce nearly half (48 %) work in the agricultural sector (Peyrouse 2009, 5). Kyrgyzstan 
possesses the smallest amount of arable land (Jones 2003, 262). Irrigated land is “limited to 10,700 
square km and regional disparities in agricultural terms are extremely high. The north has 887,000 
hectares of arable land, used mainly for growing wheat, but the south has less than half of that 
area, only 415,000 hectares, for more than half of the population. The ratio of land per person is 
0.19 hectares in the south, compared to 0.53 hectares in the north” (Peyrouse 2009, 5).  
This data shows why understanding the transformations related to the organization of land 
and water is crucial for understanding social patterns. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union and 
the adoption of many of the policies associated with the Washington Consensus, privatization 
became the way to reorganize the use of lands and resources. However, it has not become the 
                                                          
49
 “Fergana Valley’s rich land and central location have attracted people for millennia. It is much a center for the 
region’s agriculture as it is for its industry and cultural history.  Topographically, it is an enormous depression spanning 
22,000 square kilometers between the mountain ranges of the Tien Shan in the north and the Gissar-Alai in the south. 
Approximately 300 km long and up to 70 km wide, it lies in eastern Uzbekistan, northern Tajikistan and the southern 
Kyrgyzstan” (ADB 2010).  
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driver of structural reforms in Central Asian countries; at least, not in the way that many had 
hoped.  The creation of the institution of private property has empowered communities, not 
individuals, and therefore, maintained the social patterns of interdependence created during the 
Soviet period. Despite the fact that, in general, the process of privatization is reported to be 
relatively successful by the USAID and the World Bank, recent case-by-case ethnographic research 
suggests that old social patterns related to organization of lands and water have persisted (Liu 
2012; Eriksson 2006). The following sections draw on these findings by engaging with legal 
frameworks and social practices of restructuring of land and water in three given countries.  
Lerman (2004) explains similar findings by that the process of farm restructuring has not 
fully undergone both external and internal restructuring. The legislation on privatization was 
responsible for external restructuring only. According to Lerman (2004), external restructuring 
constitutes the “re-registration of the collective farm in a new legal form accompanied by transfer 
of ownership to individuals (whether in the form of physical assets or paper certificates of 
entitlement)” (Lerman 2004, 135). Internal restructuring implies that “the direct responsibility for 
management functions should shift from central collective management to the new groups and 
subdivisions created through regrouping and reconfiguration” (Ibid., 136).  
External restructuring has been reflected in land reforms in each of the countries, 
manifested in legislation concerning land reform. In general, in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan this 
entailed nationalization of collective lands with a variety of possibilities for leasing of this land. In 
Kyrgyzstan, collective lands could be privatized; however, there was moratorium on selling them, 
which was lifted in 2001 (Lerman 2009a; 2009b). The prevalent new form of farming appears to be 
the individual farm, which in practice is usually a household or family farm, a group of which could 
collaborate to organize a cooperative farm (Spoor 2004).  
The forms of external restructuring were often simply changes of name, often “just a 
fashion” (Ilkhamov 1998, 546). The essence of land reform, as Lerman (2004) notes, depends also 
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on the internal restructuring of farms, which requires changes in property rights, as well as land 
and non-land asset use patterns (Lerman 2004, 61). Non-land assets include mainly water-sharing, 
a large part of which was conducted by the collectives. Today, this element of water distribution to 
agriculture is debated amongst the states themselves, on one hand, and between states and 
international donors, on the other. The international donors suggest the idea of community 
management, transferring direct responsibility for water distribution to the water users 
associations (Abdullaev 2010). The states remain skeptical and maintain the centralized 
management of the land and non-land assets of the farms (Lerman 2004). Centralized 
management framework influences land use patterns with “the functional subdivisions *such as 
general assembly of member-workers and shareholders] have only token autonomy beyond 
general production planning” (Lerman 2004, 137-138).  
3.4.1. Land: new legal frameworks, old social patterns  
 
Kyrgyzstan, following the World Bank blueprint for transition, was among the first Central Asian 
states to privatize collective farms (Spoor and Visser 2001). The following legislation on de-
collectivization was implemented: the Law on Peasant Farms (Feb 1991), Law of Land Reform 
(Apr.1991), Land Code (June 1991), Measures for Continuing Implementation of Land and Agrarian 
Reform (Dec.1992), New Constitution (May 1993), Measures on Deepening Land and Agrarian 
Reform (Feb.1994), Referendum (June 1998), Presidential Decree on Private Land Ownership 
(Oct.1998), Land Code (June 1999), Lifting the Moratorium on Land Sales (March 2001). These 
legal instruments obliged all farms to allocate former collective lands to individual farmers. Those 
who did so were entitled to state subsidies for fertilizer, machinery, marketing plans, etc. (Bloch & 
Rasmussen 1998, 116-7). Land use rights were obtained for ninety-nine years. At the same time, a 
moratorium on selling land was introduced, and was lifted again in 2001 (Law on Lifting the 
Moratorium on Land Sales 2001). The process of land privatization has been described by 
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international donors as extremely successful. Reportedly, the proportion of individually owned 
farms increased to 75% by 2009 (Lerman and Sedik 2009; USAID 2011; World Bank 2009). 
However, it is important to consider that 85% of agricultural land in Kyrgyzstan is comprised of 
pastures, meaning that arable land accounts for the remaining 15%. Pastures have not been 
subjected to privatization and ownership remains with the state. However, due to the ongoing 
process of border delimitation, pasture lands have often remained within the scope of the 
disputed borders. Furthermore, land reform targets 75% of arable land for privatization, with the 
remaining 25% being held in a State Land Redistribution Reserve (Ministry of Agriculture and 
Gosregistr KG). This is a significantly small portion of the lands which have actually been privatized. 
Constitutionally, the private ownership of the lands was introduced only after the referendum of 
1998 (Constitution 1998, Article 4, para. 2 and 3).  The types of farms that have been created 
include both household farms, as well as the possibility of creating farming associations or 
organizing on a communal basis through creating a Jamaat (Law on Jamaats 1995).  
The privatization of lands was a sort of wealth redistribution, which is why it was one of the 
factors aggravating the confrontation between Kyrgyz and Uzbek communities in Osh in 1990 
(Peyrouse 2009, 5). In terms of creating the institution of private property rights, Kyrgyzstan is 
considered “the only country in the region that has resolutely embarked on the conversion of 
large Soviet farms, guaranteeing the right to private property and creating the legal conditions for 
an open land market” (Peyrouse 2009, 5). However, just as in the other two cases, this did not 
help to overcome the legacy of social interdependence in terms of land and water sharing, as the 
last section of this chapter shows.   
In Uzbekistan, land reform legislation is comprised of the following laws: on Allocation of 
Lands for Subsidiary Household Plots (Aug.1989), Land Law (June 1990; May 1993), Law of 
Property (Oct.1990; May 1993), Law of Entrepreneurship (Feb.1991), Law of Cooperatives (June 
1991, Dec.1993), Further Strengthening of Peasant Farms (Nov.1991), Law of Peasant Farms (July 
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1992), Land Code (April 1998).  Uzbekistan has chosen a model of dual-ownership of farms, with 
some features similar to the Chinese one50, that is, the community farms existing within the 
system of collective farm belonging to the state (Pomfret 2000). The household farms were the 
intra-collective-farms, which were leased to families, workers, or groups of families (Land Law 
1990).  
The Land Code of April 1998 reaffirmed the exclusive state ownership of farms, which 
maintained a centralized management of agriculture, especially of cotton-production. However, 
the Law on Peasant Farms of 1992 allowed farmers to exit from collectives with their own share of 
land and assets. Between 1990 to 1997, family holdings accounted for less than 3% of agricultural 
land and collective farms continued to dominate the agricultural sector (Pomfret 2006; 2000). 
Between 1997 and 2007 there was an increase in the household farms from 3 to 30%, but most of 
them still remained within intra-collective-units (Lerman 2014, 2008). According to the USAID 
(2003): “in 1998, there were 1,043 kolkhozes, 444 shirkats, 288 sovkhozes, and 270 livestock-
breeding joint stock companies; by 2003 there were 1,809 shirkats, most of which were created in 
2000. Together with other large farm enterprises, shirkats occupy some 3.5 millions hectares of 
land, averaging around 1,600 ha per farm” (USAID 2003, 24).  
According to the USAID (2003), the following farm forms are found in Uzbekistan: 
cooperatives (shirkat) and independent peasant (dekhan) farms. The latter may be organized as 
leasehold farms (internal leasing within the cooperative is allowed), with their owners called the 
“leasehold dekhans, the patriarchal based farms averaging about 15 ha. *…+ that did not have to 
register with district government until a law of 1998, that required them to register as the means 
of control” (USAID 2003, 27). Besides these, there are private livestock farms and smallholder 
household farms (USAID 2003, 27): 
                                                          
50
 On the differences between them see Richard Pomfret (2000) “Agrarian Reform in Uzbekistan: Why the Chinese 
Model Failed to Deliver.”  
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Household farms have permanent leases of land that are inheritable. They comprise about 
24 percent of the rural population but only 13 percent of arable land. Their number and 
total land occupied have been growing rapidly from 2.5 million in 1993 to 2.9 million in 
1998. They accounted for 160 000 hectares of cultivated land in 1960, 250 000 hectares in 
1988, 491, 000 hectares in 1993, 500 000 hectares in 1996 and 650 000 hectares in 1998. 
Private household farms are limited by law to 0.25 hectares of land. Private livestock farms 
are the most independent farms in Uzbekistan. They do not depend on collective/state 
farms for irrigation and other essential inputs. They occupy an average of 65 hectares and 
possess an average of 400 head of livestock (USAID 2003, 27).  
 
According to this data, Uzbekistan is the most reluctant to privatize, and even those farms that are 
considered as being private are in practice subjected to state planning and old social patterns 
concerning land and water.  
In social terms, the reluctance to proceed with rapid privatization like in Kyrgyzstan can be 
explained by the concern of the government of Uzbekistan about the fact that “privatization will 
lead to massive unemployment, [which has] paralyzed any reform; no non-agricultural 
compensatory economy seems to be developed in rural areas” (Peyrouse 2009, 5).Hence, in 
Uzbekistan, the agricultural sector remains largely in state hands.  The farmers do not own the 
land they operate. However, as Trevisani (2007) shows, the notion of all-encompassing state can 
be challenged if one considers the unintended consequences of de-collectivization. Specifically, he 
identifies “local struggles and local forms of coping” that uncover “mechanisms through which 
new inequalities are created, [as well as] some unsuspected dynamics that create challenges and 
resistance to state control” (Trevisani 2007, 86). The author claims that: 
[Despite centralized control] power politics never ceased to also have local expression, 
manifested in local struggles around the distribution of resources and in the shaping of 
community life. In this respect the coping and expropriation strategies adopted by the rural 
communities vis-à-vis the centrally set political frame should be considered as surrogate, 
albeit opaque and indirect, form of participation, which so far the central government 
contained successfully (Trevisani 2007, 86).   
 
Similarly, Ilkhamov (2004) explains that state-society relations in Uzbekistan are “based on 
continuous negotiations between layers of the state” (Ilkhamov 2004, 162).  Trevisani (2007) adds 
that these negotiations do not consider individual interests and therefore society beyond the 
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public governance institutions. He demonstrated this claim through his analysis of “invisible farm 
sponsoring” in an Uzbekistani province and the different forms of resistance developing within the 
seemingly stable and overarching state system. We will discuss forms of resistance in detail in 
Chapter 5; it is an element that suggests link between the unfinished process of decollectivization 
and the revival of the community-based self-governance.  
Reportedly, in all three cases, “the best lands have generally been awarded to the former 
party elite or former directors of collective farms” (Peyrouse 2009, 5). Futhermore, as was noted 
in the previous section, collective farms had the function of providing social benefits, such as social 
and health services, observing transportation infrastructure, undertaking the collective 
management of expensive equipment and inputs. The new (partially) privatized institution of 
property rights did not include the provision of such services. This led to the reluctance of some 
farmers in rural areas to engage with privatization, for collective structures have been “the 
symbols of some minimal assistance” (Peyrouse 2009, 5).  
In Tajikistan, land reform started in 1995, despite the fact that the first Presidential decree 
on land reform was issued in 1992. The reason for the delay was the civil war, which was partially 
about resources and their redistribution. The legislation on de-collectivization included: the Law 
on Property (Dec.1990), Land Code (Dec.1996, amended 1999), New Constitution (Nov.1994). As a 
result, there are two main types of farms in Tajikistan: collective dekhan farms and household 
farms. The former are, de facto, the Soviet era kolkhozes and sovkhozes, albeit with new names. 
At the outset of land reform in 1995, the household farms comprised about 6% of arable lands. By 
2007, the household farms increased to 60%. Their share of the agricultural land is about 45% and 
the share in the arable land is about 60% (Agency for Surveying, Cartography and Land Use 2008 
quoted in Asadov 2013). There has been no significant change registered since (Tajstats 2013 
quoted in Asadov 2013). Similar to Uzbekistan, “farm reorganization occurs without the 
knowledge or understanding of the members, and farms are reorganized only by name (changed 
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to cooperative or joint stock company for example) but with no other changes to management or 
operations” (USAID 2004, 2). The farms have been ““privatized” with little change in the farm 
management structure” (USAID 2004, 2), just as in other two cases. State control over the farmer 
persists through several obligations that the farmers take upon themselves once they are willing 
to privatize. Such obligations, according to the USAID report (2004) include:  
1) The necessity to take-on a portion of the debt accrued by the former or state collective 
farm which is often hundreds of dollars per hectare;  
2)  While in theory farmers have the right to establish family farms by withdrawing from 
the former collective farms with long-term use rights to land and some non-land property, 
the process is inequitable; not transparent in terms of location, quality, and size of the land 
plots assigned; and made expensive through the imposition of informal costs; 
3) To withdraw from farm, a farmer needs permission from a number of local government 
officials and the Land Committee, which is difficult to obtain, due to the desire to maintain 
rent-seeking activity; etc. (USAID 2004, 2).  
 
The debts of kolkhozes are repaid through local investors, known as futures companies (USAID 
2003, 2). The futures are often set up by the local or the ruling elites, which makes the individual 
farmers vulnerable and dependent on the state in an informal way. Privatization of land in 
Tajikistan differed according to whether a province grew cotton or not. GBAO, a province which is 
highly mountainous and less agriculturally important, as well as not cotton-oriented, had the 
opportunity for an almost equal distribution of land (USAID 2004, 2). Individual land use rights are 
distributed through the land certificates. In the first quarter of 2004, only 5, 665 sub-certificates 
(to individual families) were issued (FAO data quoted in USAID 2004, 5). The monitoring of the 
land use rights is granted to the jamoats (a formal administrative body at the community level). 
Reportedly, it is not executed properly (USAID 2004, 5).  
As Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are more cotton-oriented economies, state control of farming 
in these cases is higher than in Kyrgyzstan. However, all cases reveal conditions conducive for 
community-based farming, as well as property rights tied to a household rather than individuals as 
well as social patterns organizing the agricultural activity tied to collective practices, rather than 
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individuals. It is worth noting that the Soviet farming system did not preclude communities. In fact, 
as mentioned in the previous section, kolkhozes (collective farms) technically belonged to 
communities, while sovkhozes (state farms) technically belonged to the state. Furthermore, “the 
concept of “local self-governance” has its origin in the Soviet law” (Bichsel 2009, 264). However, 
the revival of communities that privatization and decentralization has fostered does not mean the 
revival of the exactly the same communities embraced by the collectives, due to the fact that 
states are now limited by their sovereign borders. Rather, it is the revival of the community as a 
dynamic social space or, as Beyer (2006) puts it, “re-traditionalization” of land and water 
management. However, the “tradition” has been modified. And what kind of tradition will be 
reinvented depends on political power.  
In general, all three cases reveal different levels of formal privatization, but all of them are 
based on the principle of re-distribution, rather than restitution. As Bichsel (2009, 264) insightfully 
notices: “*de-collectivization in Central Asia] did not aim to restore pre-Soviet individual or group 
rights to natural resources which had to be relinquished in the socialist collectivization process. 
Rather it took residential and professional affiliation during the last Soviet period as a baseline.” 
However, restoring pre-Soviet “individual rights” would be implausible, due to the fact that 
property rights were tied to religious institutions and communities in the Khanates of Khiva, 
Bukhara, and Kokhand, which were mostly left intact by the governance of the Russian Empire. 
And for the nomad tribes of Turkestan, surrounding these three Khanates, obviously, the 
relationships with property had been in a constant flux. Furthermore, assuming the possibility of 
restitution would mean resuming the existence of the nation-states prior to the Soviet time or at 
least polities that could be comparable to those of the post-Soviet period. Since this is not the case 
in Central Asia, one cannot say that the institution of property rights was destroyed by the Soviet 
state. One can only say that Soviet social engineering substituted the link between land and 
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religious institutions (or non-religious, but governed accordingly) with the link between the 
ethnicity (the nationality in the Soviet sense of the term) and land.  
3.4.2. Water: restructuring non-land assets – empowering communities?  
 
The second pillar of de-collectivization is about restructuring non-land assets, the central of which 
is water. Post-Soviet water management faced a major challenge in the form of borders between 
the new sovereign states. Soviet borders were quite arbitrary and did not, in practical terms, exist 
as both the land and water were used according to the Law on the de-facto use of land. Soviet 
social practices in the Fergana Valley followed the water while post-Soviet social practices had to 
respect the national borders of the states. Trans-boundary management with corresponding trans-
boundary mechanisms has not yet been fully developed. Since 1991, the governments of Central 
Asia have “scaled down the agencies that formerly controlled irrigation and drainage 
infrastructure” which also resulted in the lack of the frequently updated data on the amount of 
water in the river basins in order to adjust water distribution (Maselli et al. 2010, 256).  
The management of non-land assets could be described as being exercised at two levels: 
the inter-state level and societal level, represented by the Interstate Coordinating Water 
Commission (ICWC); and the framework of participatory water management, promoted by the 
international donors in the form of the Water Users’ Associations. The water ministers51 of the 
Central Asian states signed an Agreement on Cooperation in the Management of the Use and 
Protection of Water Resources from Interstate Sources.  
The Agreement is based on two pillars: Soviet water quotas and barter schemes. These 
exemplify the ongoing interdependence in terms of water usage across borders in the Fergana 
                                                          
51
 Ministries in charge: The Water Resources Committee of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental 
Protection (Kazakhstan), the Ministry of Reclamation and Water Management (Tajikistan), the Ministry of Water 
Management and Agriculture (Uzbekistan), the Ministry of Water Management and Agriculture (Kyrgyzstan) and the 
Ministry of Reclamation and Water Management (Turkmenistan).  
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Valley, and the states’ aspirations to strengthen their sovereignty. The clash between the societal 
interdependence and external sovereignty has not been fully resolved.  
The ICWC executive bodies include: 
 Secretariat; 
 Basin water organization “Amudarya” (BWO “Amudarya”); 
 Basin water organization “Syrdarya” (BWO “Syrdarya”); 
 Scientific Information Center for water related problems (SIC) and its national branches; 
 Coordination Metrological Center (CMC) and national organizations; 
 Training Center (TC) and its branches  
(ICWC Statute, Article 5.1)  
 
This exemplifies the fact that the ICWC’s joint jurisdiction are the basins or the two main rivers on 
the first- and (partially) second-tier52 of the distribution. 
The Agreement maintained the Soviet scheme of allocation of water, which was based on 
the Soviet Barter Agreements and the Quota Agreements. In general, the quotas were distributed 
as follows: Uzbekistan uses 51 per cent and Kazakhstan 37 per cent of water from Syr Darya 
whereas most Amu Darya water is consumed by Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan (ICG 2002, 12). To 
implement the Agreement, the Interstate Coordinating Water Commission (ICWC) with the 
Secretariat in Khujand (Tajikistan) was established. In procedural terms, the decisions on quotas 
and their adjustments had to be made with the consensus of the five member states. The task of 
the research brigades responsible for data collection on how much water was needed for each 50-
100 ha was partially transferred to the ICWC Scientific Information Center (SIC). 
The SIC focused on training water officials, organizing courses and round tables, operating 
a database to be assessed by the member countries, rather than on collecting the field data from 
each of the sectors of territory, as was done during the Soviet period. Basically, the ICWC can be 
seen as exercising the functions of the first tier of the three-tier Soviet system of water 
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 Because the second-tier is already within the national jurisdictions of the states; conducted by respective local 
authorities.  
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management. It took decisions on quotas, while its “executive bodies - the Basin Water 
Management Association (BWA) Syr Darya and [BWA] Amu Darya – monitor their 
implementation”, located in Tashkent and Urgench (Uzbekistan), respectively  (ICG 2002, 7).  
These associations have “a right to adjust the quotas up or down to as much as 15 per cent” (ICG 
2002, 7).  As these bodies basically work under the consensus of water ministries of each state, the 
conflict of interest is embedded in the institutional design of the ICWC.   
The third-tier distribution network, that is the water distribution hubs, which came within 
the competence of the collective farms, was left “unattended by the de-collectivization process”. 
There are several practical issues which have spawned as a result. As there are no research 
brigades or hydrological specialists regularly watching the flow of water from Syr Darya and Amu 
Darya53 or monitoring the needs of each parcel of land, the distribution of water in the first two 
tiers is done blindly, without knowing how much water there is to distribute. This causes water 
excess in some cases and water deficit in others, which exacerbates the conflicts between 
countries (ICG 2002). Furthermore, as the decision-making is made by consensus, it often results in 
the “paralysis of the interests of the countries” (ICG 2002, 8). The second-tier distribution 
network, the staff at the BWA Syr Darya, have expressed concerns about conflicts with the local 
policy and tax officials, who blame them for exceeding the water quotas fixed by the ICWC. The 
BWA officials, however, claim that it is people who exceed the water quotas. The officials, 
distributing water have little to do with this (ICG 2002, 9). This shows an inconsistency between 
the three-tiers of the water management system.  
The third-tier distribution networks were neither privatized, nor was any formal 
organization put in place for them to be properly managed (Abdullaev 2009, 322). The problem is 
that beyond the farm gates, there are now hundreds of individual farmers or water users, who are 
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 As the flow of water varies from year to year, even if it is known that on average the water flow in Amu Darya is 75 
cubic kilometers and 36 – in Syr Darya.  
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cultivating different types of crops, requiring irrigation of differing methods and intensity. The 
local administration is not capable of reconciling the needs of the individual farmers fully, without 
creating conflicts over water scarcity (Abdullaev 2009, 323).  In order to solve the problems of 
water distribution among the individual farmers and communities, a range of international donors 
started implementing programs, based on the concept of Integrated Water Management (IWM).  
The difference between the concept of water management as envisaged by the ICWC and 
the IWM was that the latter was based on a centralized idea of management and the former on 
decentralized water management, supported by the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and 
the United Nations Development Program (Maselli et al. 2010, 227). Specifically, the concept 
promoted by international donors was the idea of “Irrigation Management Transfer”, specifically 
by the Swiss Development Cooperation Organization, was to include the water users in the 
decision-making and water management from the tertiary canal to the main canal (Maselli et al. 
2010).  This idea was first opposed by the SIC ICWC, as these state agencies insisted on more 
centralized water distribution and the promotion of mainly technical improvements, such as 
infrastructure, automation of water distribution, etc.  (Maselli et al. 2010). The SDC mediated the 
development of a joint concept of water management between the SIC ICWC and the IWMI. 
Ultimately, this joint concept of the IWMI still reserved an important role for the state agencies, 
but acknowledged the cross-border character of water management in the Fergana Valley, 
allowed more participatory irrigation management (PIM). This compromise approach was 
implemented during the mutual management of The South Fergana Canal54, which has comprised 
three canals on each side of the Valley. Each state’s national water agencies, three pilot studies 
were initiated in 2002: Aravan-Akbura main canal (Kyrgyz part of the Valley); Khodja Bakirgan main 
canal (Tajik part); South Fergana Main canal (Uzbekistan) (Abdullaev 2009, 324). The management 
comprised a new body, called Union of Water Users, which included federation of WUAs and 
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 Shared by three states; built during the Soviet period.  
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water users from different hydrounits (environmental NGOs, industries, urban water suppliers, 
etc) along the pilot canals (Abdullaev 2009, 324). An attempt was made to implement this type of 
the management and integrate the water users associations into the management of the Southern 
Fergana Canal. However, individual farmers were reluctant to participate in the Union. As the 
assessment surveys55 have shown, this new framework did not provide considerable 
improvements in the water distribution among the households (Abdullaev 2009, 328).  
Hence, this architecture composed of the Water Uses’ Associations (WUAs) and the NGOs 
sponsoring them would be seen as the third tier of the water management system, if the direct 
responsibility were granted to the farm units. However, there is a resistance to participation in the 
WUAs because of a lack of maps, unclear land ownership and property rights have not been 
institutionalized. The WUAs were established in each country. In general, this has been done by 
delegating the responsibility to on-farm water distribution to individual farmers, but without any 
institutional framework accounting for competition over these water resources. In the Fergana 
Valley, “the WUAs were created along the South Fergana Main Canal during the last 10 years” 
(Molchanova 2014, 1). Recent quantitative research shows that these WUAs score between 145 
and 219 on the 6 indicators of efficiency, such as water supply, technical conditions, economic 
conditions, social and cultural conditions, organizational and information conditions, which show 
quite different levels of their performance (Mochalova 2014, 1). Data from ACTED, the main NGO 
involved in the support of the WUAs in the Fergana Valley, illustrate that most local people 
conceive of water management as one of the key conditions for peaceful coexistence with the 
neighboring communities.56  
Kyrgyzstan was the first country to delegate rights of water distribution to individual users, 
initially through Village Councils. Reportedly, in 2000, the WUAs “already managed about one 
                                                          
55 Baseline surveys: randomly selected number of water users (60-90) within each WUA were surveyed  on the existing 
situation of agricultural production, water use and their contribution into the operation and maintenance of the 
irrigation systems (Nizamedinkhodjaeva 2007).  
56
 See ACTED interactive maps http://www.acted.org/en/world-map-acted-2014  
 130 
 
quarter of the total irrigated land, amounting to 232, 800 ha; in 2003, 300 additional WUAs raised 
this figure to 450,000 ha, amounting to 40% of the total irrigated area (Maselli et al. 2010, 227; 
Schaarp et al 2004).According to the Government Decree of March 1994 on “Measures to 
maintain and finance public irrigation infrastructure”, the Ministry of Water Resources had to 
transfer on-farm Irrigation and Distribution (I&D) schemes to Village Councils57, remaining 
collective farms, and incipient farm enterprises (GR/113/1995).  Gradually, these functions were 
transferred from Village Councils to the water users themselves (GR/284/1994). This provided 
incentives for the farmers to create water users associations: the first one was organized in June 
1995 (GR/226/1995), the second in 1997 (GR/473/1997). Although participatory on paper, the first 
WUAs were in fact a continuation of centralized decision making with a few of the associated 
internal problems, such as a top-down system of decision making (by the Chair of the WUA), no 
access for farmers to an independent audit commission or access to financial accounts. In 
addition, while membership fees were supposed to cover the water distribution costs, water 
transportation costs were overlooked and not included in the calculations. Finally, the electoral 
and voting systems were not specified; hence, this system became a platform for more powerful 
stakeholders to dominate the poorer farmers (Alymbaeva 2004, 21-30). Since this framework has 
provoked competition for water and conflicts among communities, the Resolution (1997) 
improved it by encouraging the establishment of WUAs within hydraulic boundaries, rather than 
within administrative borders (Alymbaeva 2004). Finally, Government Resolution (35/2002) 
addressed the decision-making system of the WUAs to increase equality, transparency, 
information-sharing, and electoral processes within the associations, as well as establishing a 
framework of sanctions for breach of these rules (Alymbaeva 2004, 30).  
                                                          
57
 The function of maintenance of social infrastructure (which used to be in the competence of the collective farms), 
such as the rural schools, clinics, roads, and water drinking systems was delegated to the Village Councils as well.  
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While the organizational performance reveals room for improvement, the infrastructural 
performance shows its results. For example, ACTED, with the support of USAID, and the EU, 
managed to support the rehabilitation of two canals in the irrigation system of the 1st May Village, 
in the Nookat district of the Alai region, Southern Kyrgyzstan (neighboring Batken) (USAID 2013). 
This village is downstream, the last on the canal, which is why it had been usually left without 
water. The same initiatives were involved in the rehabilitation of infrastructure in the borderlands 
and disputed territories between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan (ACTED 2014). However, as most 
research shows, the infrastructure is the least of the problems of water management, with the 
main issue being organizational or “institutional gap” (Mochalova 2014; Alymbaeva 2004).  
In Tajikistan, 93% of the total fresh water is used for agriculture and only 83% of it reaches 
the fields (UNEP/GRID 2002). This wasteful water use is one of the main reasons for empowering 
community self-governance or formation of WUAs. Furthermore, due to post-Soviet 
transformation, cultivated irrigated land significantly decreased and caused further economic 
losses. Civil war has aggravated this situation (Rabejanova 2008; Maselli 2010). Government 
Decree (No.281/1996) on “Fee Collection for Water Delivery Service” gave a formal start to the 
legal creation of the WUAs. The Water Code of Tajikistan (2000) expanded the conditions for WUA 
formation. Since 2004, international donors, such as USAID and Winrock International 
(implementation) started supporting this framework. Since 2006 the “Law on Water Users 
Associations” defines WUAs as non-commercial organizations. Within this legal framework, WUAs 
in Tajikistan are based upon hydrological boundaries, rather than administrative borders and 
function according to a bottom-up approach involving community-based decision-making.  
In Uzbekistan, the Water Users Associations were established in 1999, by the Decree of 
Cabinet Ministers. Thousands of WUAs were registered within the first few months. However, they 
are not yet in a position to take water management responsibility at the former farm level 
(Abdullaev 2009, 323). As mentioned above, most WUAs were established along the South 
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Fergana Magistral Canal (SFMC) in the Fergana Valley, divided into 10 hydrounits, 6 of which are 
located in Andijan province and 4 in Fergana Province (Mochalova 2014, 3). Fergana province 
experiences more problems with water, similar to the provinces of Tajikistani and Kyrgyzstani 
parts of the Fergana Valley, located downstream of the Canals. As in the other two cases, the 
WUAs in Uzbekistan reveal the following problems:  
1. The lack of rules and regulations and sanction systems for breaking these rules; 
2. The necessity to reintegrate the institution of elders (aksakals), indigenous social structures and 
the kashar system; 
3. The lack of transparent system of water allocation; 
4. The lack of professionalism of the WUAs staff 
(Mochalova 2014, 7-8). 
 
There are common problems shared by WUAs within all 3 countries and been identified by field 
research conducted with farmers by different scholars at different points of time. There is an 
absence of clear rules, water scarcity, schedule problems, lack of infrastructure and the capacity to 
improve and maintain existing channels (Liu 2012; Eriksson 2006; Alymbaeva 2004).  In other 
words, the responsibility was delegated to the individual farmers and communities, but the 
capacity to create the institutional system and monitor the infrastructure and logistics of water 
management are still dependent on the decision making apparatus of the first two-tiers of the 
water distribution network, which depends on the decisions at national level. National boundaries 
do not coincide with hydraulic boundaries, and these nation states have proven to be reluctant to 
loosen control of their their administrative borders. And while the infrastructural problems along 
the main canals are being gradually addressed, the organizational issues remain intact, which is 
especially evident in the cases of small rivers. In fact, these projects empower communities by 
increasing social mobilization with regards to water management and therefore increasing 
potential for self-governed collective action.  
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3.5. Community level water management: the case of Isfara river  
 
As it has been shown, participatory water management has not yet proven itself to be successful. 
The NGO sector and independent experts emphasize the necessity to empower informal 
leadership and indigenous knowledge at the level of the communities for better resource 
management (Mochalova 2014; Temirkulov 2013). Temirkulov (2013) has highlighted a wide 
network of informal institutions in the Fergana Valley (meetings of aksakals, ashar tax, etc.) and 
has suggested that they be included into the water-sharing schemes within local communities. In 
this way, it is hoped, transparency in water-sharing would increase for the farmers (Mochalova 
2014).  
While the case of the Big Fergana Canal (BFC) sheds the light on water-sharing from the 
most important rivers in Central Asia, as well as the first two tiers of the water-sharing scheme, 
there are hundreds of smaller river basins that highlight greater problems of water distribution 
and hydro-interdependence at the grassroots level. The case of the Isfara River is representative of 
this problem, as it is located in the Fergana Valley and flows through the borderlands and enclaves 
that are discussed in the following chapters from other societal perspectives.  Following this river 
may shed some light on the cross-border activities along the disputed territories on the communal 
level, as well as the potential contribution of informal ties and communities to water governance.  
The Isfara River58 is one of the 30 transnational tributaries to the Syr Darya, located on the 
western slope of the Fergana Valley. The river flows through Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and 
Uzbekistan. The source of the river is in Kyrgyzstan and flows towards Syr Darya, passing through 
the Tajik enclave of Vorukh, re-entering Kyrgyzstan at Batken and back again to Tajikistan’s Isfara 
province. At the contested border between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, it gets diverted into the 
Toktogul reservoir59 (Kyrgyzstan), which has two main outflow canals. One diverts water to Batken 
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 Average annual flow is 0,4 km3.  
59
 Constructed in 1971, began operation in 1975  
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district (Kyrgyzstan); the other one – back to Isfara district. On its way there are two metering 
water allocation stations: one is located in Tangi Vorukh (enclave Vorukh) and the other in Rovot 
(located at the administrative boundary of two Tajik districts, in the buffer zone between 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan). At Rovot, the water is allocated to Tajikistan (Kanibodom province) and 
Uzbekistan (Besharyk province) by means of diversion into the BFC.60 However, some of the water 
is utilized before this diversion (Pak et al. 2014, 232 – 234).  
A recent analysis of the agreements on water-sharing along the small rivers demonstrated 
that these basins have been contested as far back as the 1960s and 1970s (Pak et. al 2014; 
Wegerich et. al. 2012b; Matveev 1988). According to the initial water-sharing protocol for the 
area, approved by the Kyrgyz SSR, the latter was entitled to 2% of the Isfara water, Tajikistan was 
entitled to 50% and Uzbekistan 48% (Protocol61 of 1946 and 1958). In 1969, the USSR Ministry of 
Water Resources increased Kyrgyzstan’s share to 26.7% (Matveev 1988). As these shares have 
been constantly contested between the parties, the solution was to build more reservoirs in the 
Fergana Valley during the 1960s and 1970s (Matveev 1988). To compensate for the increase of the 
Kyrgyzstani share in the Isfara, numerous additional pump stations62 were built. The competition 
was the reason for Moscow’s increased involvement in determining the annual water allocations 
on the Isfara. It was then decided that operations would be handed to the BWO Syr Darya (Pak et 
al. 2014, 240). This last development explains why community-level water management failed to 
develop from this point. 
The Isfara River has often been a part of single package negotiations over water-sharing, 
which included other reservoirs and canals, such as Toktogul Reservoir and the Kanibodom Canal 
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 The Isfara is the last tributary contributing to flow in the BFC, the implication being that some of the flow of the 
Isfara River will re-enter Tajikistan through the BFC channel (Pak et.al 2014, 232-234).  
61
 In total, there were 6 Protocols before independence: 1946, 1958, April 1980, June 1980, 1982, 1991.  
62
 In the Kirov (now Besharyk) province of the Uzbek SSR, four pump stations – Uzbekistan (completed in 1972, lift 35 
m, irrigated area 250 ha) Rapkon 2 (1974), Rapkon 2 (1980) and Bahmal (1984); additional pump station in Besharyk 
(in 1978). In the Tajik Khanibodom district, three pump stations were constructed: Mahram (1975), Shurkul (1980), 
and Poymennaya (1983) (Pak et.al.2014).  
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in Tajikistan. While negotiations at the state level are ongoing, at the local level the role of 
informal agreements increases. For example, as Tajikistan was excluded from other water-sharing 
packages, it started diverting water and preventing it from flowing to the Kanibodom canal. This 
canal feeds the BFC and, further downstream, flows to Uzbekistan. According to the field research 
data of Pak et al. (2014), their informants would explain this situation as follows: “*The reaction of 
the Uzbek side is] peaceful silence as Uzbeks do not provide our limits in the BFC – we do not 
complain, we do not provide their share from Isfara – they do not complain” (Pak et al. 2014). 
These kinds of diversions often happen without the awareness of the formal local water 
authorities who in principle have the ability to determine the flow (Pak et al. 2014, 240).  
As the protocols on water allocation have been perceived as “irrelevant” since 
independence, there are agreements between district communities on water exchange. For 
example, Kanibodom district and Besharyk district have a gentlemen’s agreement wherein 
Kanibodom would discharge all the Isfara water allocation to the BFC in Besharyk. In exchange, the 
latter would provide an uninterrupted flow to the BFC from Uzbekistan to Tajikistan (Pak et al. 
2014). While in the main agreements Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are both seen as upstream 
countries, by the terms of these small informal agreements, the relations of upstream and 
downstream are defined according to the river in the scale of a province. Hence, Tajikistan 
becomes a downstream country, that is, the receiver, rather than a supplier. This has made these 
agreements more flexible and efficient. Reportedly, “the administration at the province level in 
both republics was aware of the informal gentlemen’s agreements between the districts, and in a 
way was satisfied with their solution” (Pak et.al 2014, 238).  
As the political situation around border delimitation deteriorated, the official authorities 
were not always able to travel and take joint measurements of water flow in this area (Wegerich 
2006). As mentioned above, the main flow measuring units are located in Vorukh and Rovot 
(Protocol 1980a, 1980b, 2010). As chapter 4 shows, Vorukh is one of the most isolated societies of 
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Tajikistan, near a zone, which is reportedly considered a “citadel of extremists/IMU”, Isfara town. 
Rovot itself is located in the buffer zone between the two states, the site of a minefield laid by 
Uzbekistan (Dadabaev 2013). Hence, the zone remains less reachable for formal authorities, while 
water needs remain acute and interdependence persists. The increase of gentlemen’s agreements, 
especially in light of international donors’ support for community-driven governance, has the 
potential to increase grassroots societal ties across borders.  
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has shown that the legacy of the Soviet Union has persisted in the aftermath of its 
dissolution in the form of social patterns and social interdependence across borders, which is 
particularly evident in social relations towards water and land. Firstly, it addressed the pre-Soviet 
social organization of the societies in the Three Khanates and the neighboring nomadic tribes. It 
has shown the lack of categories in terms of ethnicity or nationality, as well as the lack of any link 
between such categories and the available resources. The history of Central Asia has been the one 
of constant migration and displacement, which contributed to its social diversity. At the same 
time, this diversity has been managed through communities of commitment or trust. Secondly, it 
addressed Soviet policies of nationalities creation, which created a new type of actor – an ethnos 
connected to the land and its resources. However, creating nationalities was one of two steps 
taken to create a collective interest and an idea of the common good, which had been achieved by 
means of collectivization. Furthermore, the realization of this collective interest in the field of land 
and water-sharing has been undertaken across borders, which is why this legacy is called social 
interdependence here.  
Thirdly, the chapter has shown that with the dissolution of the Soviet state, the social 
legacy has not dissolved, instead the projects of managing it have been changed from highly 
centralized ones to those based on decentralization, as promoted by international actors. 
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However, while these projects have addressed the rehabilitation of infrastructure, the 
organizational structure has not been created by joint interstate action. This resulted in a type of 
incomplete centralization, for the Inter-State Water Commission has been focused only on the first 
two-tiers of the irrigation system, leaving out the level of households, since these used to be 
governed by the kolkhozes.  
In sum, social interdependence has persisted and communities have revived even though 
the state system is not based on communities and does not have links to these communities; thus 
creating the likelihood of increased societal resistance to modern state-building projects. The 
revival of self-governance based on communities is illustrated by the case of the Isfara river, which 
is a smaller river which runs through the Fergana Valley enclaves and the shell societies of 
strategically important social spaces, in which the revival of community social structures might 
mean connecting to transnational transcendent ideologies which support power networks 
different from those of the states.  
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CHAPTER 4. The impact of external actors on states and societies  
Introduction 
 
External actors have been a part of the Central Asian story for centuries, represented by the 
period of the Great Game. As a result, foreign policy analyses of Central Asia have been conducted 
either through the lens of the tabula rasa (Mackinder 1904) or the great chessboard (Brzezinski 
1997). The English school of International Relations has challenged this paradigm by focusing on 
the impact of domestic factors and historical developments, the political choices of elites and 
regime specificities to explain the failures of external actors’ policies. However, this approach has 
yet to strike the subtle balance between granting these states the attributes of agency and falling 
into the trap of the failed state theory, which also sees threats emerging locally as the cause of 
transnational threats.  
Since this thesis aims to reverse this causality, the chapter argues that the strategies 
pursued by external actors contribute to the incompleteness of the state. How exactly? This 
causality is drawn from Tilly’s and Mann’s propositions on the analysis of external actors’ 
strategies. Specifically, these external actors are providers of models of development (Tilly 1975, 
604-621) and, secondly, these models can engineer certain conditions conducive to certain 
political outcomes (Mann 1986). This chapter argues that the very same conditions may lead to a 
diametrically opposite outcome given a specific geographical, social, and historical context.  
According to Tilly (1975, Ch.9), the external actors’ models contain the following features: 
institutional solutions, modernization paths, economic development, and political or civil 
participation. In practice, however, institutional solutions do not mean building social institutions. 
Modernization may imply some form of a return to tradition or “re-traditionalization” and reliance 
on traditional economic practices. And civil participation may drawn in radical civil activists, which 
may have emerged as part of a society. The fact that external actors’ models take liberal values 
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and the rationale of liberalization for granted make them blind to diametrically opposed realities 
or “side-effects” coming to fore as a result. Finally, strengthening security may appear to have 
more to do with strengthening the social and ideological sources of power, rather than the 
military.  
Based on this rationale, this chapter examines the external actors’ strategies of organizing 
security, economy, and society. Specifically, it focuses on the engineering of borders, a common 
economic space, and civil society. It argues that the external actors’ strategies created conditions 
conducive to three important societal consequences: (1) isolated land pockets; (2) the 
development of informal economies and strategies of survival; (3) the identity of resistance and 
parallel civil societies.  This argument is unfolded in three steps, corresponding to the respective 
sections.  Step one and section 4.1 focus on the construction of security. Specifically, through an 
examination of the post-1991 border-reengineering programs—such as BOMCA and CADAP—it 
depicts the process, actors, and rationale of border-management. Borders are important for two 
reasons: they are the manifestation of the prevailing international narrative of transnational 
threats, and they are tools to carve territories and, therefore, sovereignties.  
The following section continues this thread by showing how a material construct, i.e. the 
border, in turn contributes to the increase of the narrative of threat, supported by different 
international and regional organizations, including Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Anti-Terrorist Central of the CIS (ATC 
CIS), and the extent to which this narrative manifests within national security structures in these 
states. This interplay between the material structures and narratives in conjunction fosters the 
creation of land pockets from the constellation of enclaves in the Fergana Valley. This societal 
consequence is illustrated by three cases, each representing a different side of the Fergana Valley, 
such as that of Batken zone (Kyrgyzstan), enclaves Sokh and Shahimardan (Uzbekistan), and the 
enclave Vorukh (Tajikistan).  
 140 
 
For step two, section 4.2 examines external actors’ strategies to organize the economy. It 
focuses on two projects: the Central Asian Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) and the 
Central Asia South Asia (CASA-1000) resource-sharing scheme. The section on CASA-1000 
demonstrates how building new transmission lines connecting Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan with 
Afghanistan and Pakistan promotes internal population displacement, thereby breaching these 
populations’ social patterns, routines, trust and power networks. In the absence of better 
conditions for displaced people and communities, these people will share the identity of 
resistance to the state in progress. For step three, section 4.3 examines the strategy of 
empowering civil society or the NGO sector, which has become a process for outsourcing power 
over identity creation from the state to non-state actors. Specifically, it shows how organized civil 
society loses its appeal vis-à-vis a parallel civil society, which possesses significant ideological 
power, regardless of a lack of structure or organization, due to having infiltrated pre-existing social 
structures and influencing the hearts and minds of young politico-religious activists.  
4.1. Organizing Security  
4.1.1. Border management: materializing symbolic borders and the idea of threat  
 
The Border Management in Central Asia (BOMCA) and Central Asian Drug Action Program (CADAP) 
are the two main pillars of the border management framework initiated by the European Union 
and implemented in partnership with the UNDP. The regional headquarters of both BOMCA and 
CADAP are located in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, with country offices in the respective four other Central 
Asian countries. CADAP and BOMCA were initiated in 2001 and 2002, respectively; reportedly, as a 
response to “the IMU invasion” into the Fergana Valley in 1999 – 2001 (EC/99/2000, 24). In 
practice, implementation of BOMCA by the UNDP started in 2003. Its total budget from 2003 until 
2014 amounted to over €33.5 million (UNDP 2013). Institutionally, both programs form part of the 
EU Foreign and Security Policy. In legal terms, both programs are based on the EU Strategy 
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towards Central Asia, accepted in 2002, which was renewed in the “Strategy for a new enhanced 
partnership with Central Asia” in June 2007. It outlines the EU’s strategic goals and the rationale 
behind EU policy choices towards Central Asia up to 2013 (EC/1905/2006, Art.8; EC/99/2000). In 
November 2013 the EU Commissioner for Development announced that EU had made available €1 
billion for its Central Asian projects for the years 2014 – 2020 (EC/PR 2013). This funding will cover 
both bilateral and multilateral initiatives, as well as the entire package of EU-Central Asian affairs, 
with security and the border management being one of these.  
The main goal of BOMCA was the provision of security and stability to the Fergana Valley. 
In practice, it was launched during a period of serious border crisis which went hand in hand with 
issues such as the crisis of the system of interdependent usage of resources and the economy of 
sufficiency established during the Soviet period. The IMU incursion was one of the incidents 
contributing to the complexity of the on-going state-building processes within the states in the 
region, which coincided with the international agenda of the post-9/11 “global war on terror” 
(Megoran 2012, 475). To this end, the EU Strategy paper towards Central Asia 2002-2006 
integrated the international agenda of the fight against drug trafficking and the “global war on 
terror” among the world’s “common problems and shared challenges” (EC/99/2000, 4) The CADAP 
project, therefore, focuses on drug trafficking, since the main hub of the heroin trade between 
Afghanistan and Western Europe is located in Osh and Jalalabat (Kyrgyzstan) (EC/99/2000). Central 
Asia has been identified as part of the global network in the fight against transnational threats, 
mainly terrorism and drug trafficking. BOMCA provided logistics for these goals by means of 
building 52 border crossing points, 6 training centers, 14 drug profiling centers, and other facilities 
(UNDP 2013). During the period between 2001 and 2013, €20.7 million was allocated for the 
CADAP project, the official goal of which is the targeting of  “demand on drug trafficking in Central 
Asia”, as well as “providing assistance to the drug-dependent persons” (ICD 2013). The program’s 
beneficiaries include border guards, customs administration, ministries of interior, health and 
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agriculture and phyto-sanitary, veterinary and quarantine services. To address demand and the 
drug addiction problem in the region, the program at its later stages started including multiple 
partners such as state drug control bodies, ministries of health and justice, narcological centres 
and treatment units in prisons and rehabilitation centres (ICD 2013).   
According to the new “Strategy for a new enhanced partnership with Central Asia”, 
adopted by the European Council in June 2007, Central Asia has become part of the European 
Neighborhood Policy as a region closely related to the EU’s external relations with Russia (EU-CA 
Strategy 2007). This shift increased the EU’s close partnership with regional anti-drug trafficking 
organizations, the Central Asian Regional Information Center (CARICC), based in Almaty, as well as 
with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (EU-CA Strategy 2007, 29). This paper implies that a 
shift towards bi-lateral cooperation took place between EU member states and the Central Asian 
states, within the framework of the Integrated Border Management (IBM).This suggests the 
sharing of information on drug trafficking issues and on the associated supply chain across 
regional and international agencies (EU-CA Strategy 2007). The IBM approach also implies closer 
cooperation with other international organizations which are present in the region in order to 
coordinate issues related to border management, such as trade, logistics, transit, movement of 
people, etc. Thus, BOMCA and CADAP are currently coordinating with international partners such 
as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), USAID and GIZ (ICD 2013). 
The rationale behind the border fortification in Central Asia is presented through the 
paradigm of integrated border management, which implies the harmonization of border 
regulations across different regions through the creation of a multilateral border management 
system and the introduction of compatible procedures and systems within national 
administrations and across borders (ICD 2013; EC/99/2000). Specifically, it pursues goals such as:  
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1) Improvement of security, reducing smuggling and human trafficking, and facilitating the 
movement of people across non-EU borders, particularly along the Pan-European Transport 
Corridors and TRACECA (Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia);  
2) Helping partners develop IBM strategies, align border management rules and adopt best 
practices in line with EU standards;  
3) Enhancing multilateral cooperation and networking among partners, candidate 
countries and EUMS (ICD 2013). 
Even though IBM has been a part of the European Commission’s strategy on external relations, it 
was only officially introduced in Central Asia in 2010, seven years after the initiation of BOMCA 
and CADAP. Hence, the concept of the IBM cannot be seen as the sole or primary rationale behind 
the border management framework.  
Some authors point out that BOMCA and CADAP aimed to increase border security in 
Central Asia by combating those threats associated with the situation in Afghanistan. Referred to 
as “border securitization projects”, these programs have been tailored specifically to securitize 
three issues: extremism/terrorism, drug trafficking and the trafficking weapons and radioactive 
materials (Laruelle 2013, 62; Gavrilis 2009). Considering that there had been almost no external 
involvement in border management between 1991 and 2002 when the region was suffering its 
worst bloodshed, for example the civil war in Tajikistan and inter-ethnic violence in the Fergana 
Valley, and considering further that the trigger for establishing of such borders was the IMU 
invasion, the “global war on terror” could be considered the main rationale behind securitization 
of borders.  The entire regional discourse was directed against non-traditional threats such as 
separatism, extremism and terrorism.  
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These threats were prioritized in the main agreements of regional security organizations 
such as the Collective Security Treaty (CST)63, which was signed in 1992 in Kishinev (CSTO 2014). 
According to the Articles 2 and 4 of the Treaty, the member states maintain their security on 
collective basis, providing each other necessary assistance, including military. Initially, the Treaty 
focused on providing the conditions for the creation of national military forces. However in 1996 
and 1998, due to deterioration of the situation in Afghanistan, it shifted its focus to the threat of 
extremism, as well as potential external threats to the regional security.64 Aiming at creating a 
common security complex, in 1999 the member states adopted a plan to create common coalition 
forces in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia (CSTO 2014). The IMU invasion of 
Southern Kyrgyzstan in 1999 was a test of this Treaty. Member-states, with participation of 
Uzbekistan, managed to work jointly against this extremist threat.  
The operation directed against the IMU invasion in 1999-2001 is considered to be one of its 
successful military operations (CSTO 2014).65 As a result, Collective Rapid Deployment Forces of 
Central Asian Region were created in 2001. In parallel, the process of developing CST bodies was 
ongoing, transforming the Treaty into the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). The 
Agreements66 on transforming the Treaty into an international organization (CSTO) officially came 
into force in 2003. Changes to the main agreements were also sped up after 9/11 and reflected 
the wider global agenda against terrorism. The CSTO established collective military forces in 2009. 
                                                          
63
Initially it was called the Collective Security Treaty (the CST) signed by the governments of Armenia, Belorussia, 
Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan in 1992 and registered by the UN Secretariat in 1995. At the later 
stages, in the 1992 and 1993 Uzbekistan, Georgia, and Azerbaijan have been joining and leaving, depending on the 
level of the presumed threat to sovereignty springing from this organization, dominated by the foreign policy interests 
of the Russian Federation. 
64
 The Treaty came into force in 1994. In 1995, the member states adopted “Declaration of Member States of the 
CST”, “The Concept of collective security of Member States of the CST”, “Basic directions of deepening military 
cooperation”.  
65
 However, the operation was mainly conducted by the military forces of Uzbekistan.  
66
 CSTO Charter and Agreement on Legal Status of the CSTO (signed on 7 October 2002; came into force on September 
18, 2003), establishment of the CSTO Standing Council, Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the Council of Ministers 
of Defense, the Committee of Secretaries or the Security Council.  
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However, this has not yet been activated in practice. Basically, the CSTO is seen by the 
governments of its member states as the platform through which Russia promotes its foreign 
policy interests and through which Russia has lobbied for the establishment of military bases in 
northern Kyrgyzstan and, potentially, in Osh, the southern capital of Kyrgyzstan (Laruelle 2013).  
Another crucial organization for the regional security has been the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO), the purpose of which is similar to the CSTO: to fight against non-traditional 
threats such as separatism, extremism, and terrorism. This has been mainly the platform for 
Chinese political interests, motivated by the Chinese fear of Uighur separatism in the Xinjiang 
province bordering the Fergana Valley. From the Chinese side, the Fergana Valley is seen as a hub 
of terrorism and extremism which can potentially spill over into the Xinjiang, a region which has 
historically exerted a significant degree of separatism (Starr 2004).  
Religious extremism, terrorism, separatism and drug trafficking represent the main concerns 
of both organizations. For both Russia and China, these threats are of specific significance due to 
the situations in Chechnya and Xinjiang, respectively. We will see below how the security agenda 
set by these organizations, backed up by international discourse on the threat of terrorism 
influenced the Central Asian states’ security infrastructure. The narrative provided by these 
organizations at this point exemplified both the rationale behind and the context within which the 
border management framework developed. Simply speaking, border management endeavors did 
not pay much attention to the necessity of addressing the legacy of the Soviet national 
delimitation of 1924-1927. Neither did they consider the necessity to address the delimitation 
according to the “factual use of lands” (“fakticheskoe zemlepol’zovanie) of 1955, as well as the 
resource-sharing schemes and economy of sufficiency prior to fortification of borders. Instead, it 
followed the logic of threat, without knowing exactly where this threat originated from. As shown 
above, each of the actors considered the IMU to be a product of their neighbor’s policies and 
reacted to them using the tools of defensive realpolitik directed against neighboring states. 
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However, the IMU is a phenomenon which originates at the societal level, as chapter 2 has shown. 
It would, therefore be difficult to address this phenomenon without addressing the above 
mentioned societal problems, rather than following the traditional logic of security, based on fear 
and threats.  
The rationale which informed border management in the region manifested itself in the 
following outcomes. In 2004 BOMCA replaced the Russian 201st Motorized Rifle Division, which 
had been observing the border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan between 1991 and 2004.  The 
responsibility for monitoring the border was split between BOMCA and the U.S forces at this time. 
The former became responsible for observing the eastern part of the border, along the Tajikistan’s 
Nagorno-Badakhshan autonomous province; the latter was responsible for the western part of the 
border (Gavrilis 2009). This contributed to the deterioration of relations between Tajikistan and 
Russia, which continues to be reflected in issues such as legislation by the Russian authorities 
towards Tajik labor migrants working in Russia, of which there are more than a million. The Tajik 
economy is, reportedly, based on two main pillars: remittances from Tajik labor migrants in Russia 
and drug trafficking (ICG 2009).  
Most importantly, the border management strategies of the external actors meant that 
new border control points were built, roads created by locals in places where crossing the border 
was easier were dug up, and bridges demolished (Megoran 2012). These border control points 
appeared in the Fergana Valley, the area most susceptible to drug trafficking but also the most 
economically and socially interdependent area of Central Asia. The Government of Uzbekistan, 
sponsored by the United States, who at that time had a military base in Karshi-Khanabad (2001-
2005) and had invested a great deal in the military infrastructure of Uzbekistan, mined the 
“chessboard borders” of the Fergana Valley and introduced a visa regime, a contravention of the 
visa-free zone created by the Minsk Declarations establishing the CIS in 1991 (Reeves 2014). The 
roads which connected the three countries and which crisscrossed their territories multiple times 
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due to the numerous enclaves in the area were suspended, and people from the borderlands 
working in factories or fields in neighboring states became jobless (Megoran 2012). Gas and 
electricity supplies, which became subject to market prices when the resource-sharing scheme 
was dismantled (as discussed in Chapter 3), failed to deliver, which affected negatively people 
living in the borderlands  (Mezon 1999).  The daily lives of people were hampered by the 
interruption of bus services that used to crisscross the enclaves. In fact, the EU Strategy Paper 
pointed to this aggravation of the economic situation and the related problems of poverty within 
the enclaves of Batken area (Kyrgyzstan), Vorukh (Tajikistan), Sokh and Shahimardan (Uzbekistan), 
which the current Strategy aimed to integrate into the “multifaceted and complex” BOMCA 
program (EC/99/2000, 29). Despite the later integration of social and economic problems into its 
“multifaceted” framework, one concrete outcome of BOMCA’s actions can be seen: the symbolic 
boundaries of the Soviet period, neglected due to the utilitarian logic of economy sufficiency 
which organized social and economic practices transnationally, materialized into a series of check-
points, visa regimes, wire fences, and minefields. Although the EU Strategy Paper identifies the 
problem in inter-state relations (EC/99/2000, 29), the fact is that financial and logistical support 
for building the fences and closing the borders was provided by external actors through the 
BOMCA project.  
In summary, states, external actors, and societies involved appeared to be three 
interdependent actors trapped between the different logics of two competing paradigms. There is 
the complex regional paradigm which followed the logic of dismantling the Soviet legacy, 
specifically the national delimitation of 1924-1927 and 1954, and dealing with the economy of 
sufficiency and interdependent resource-sharing schemes, as described in chapter three. In 
contrast, there is the international paradigm as dictated by the narrative of global war on terror 
and transnational threats, which fails to take into account that establishing material borders may 
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isolate physical territories, but do not prevent the flow of ideas perceived as radical or leading to 
terrorism. 
4.1.2. Materialized borders: standardizing national security infrastructures 
 
In order to understand the impact of the materialization of borders on the state power, we should 
begin by considering the domestic context of establishing the security structures of the states in 
the region. This is because the process of border materialization and the establishment of national 
security infrastructures coincided, which is why there has been a significant impact on the 
functions, institutional design, and practical peculiarities of security infrastructure by external 
actors. To a degree, the international security agenda has become internalized by the national 
security structures. For example, the goals of combating drug trafficking and terrorism, as well as 
establishing surveillance mechanisms to control social movements have defined the sharing of 
competences, functions and spheres of influence among different security structures. However, as 
we will see below, at a certain point these designs went beyond the control of their designers, 
favoring state elites but diminishing the connection between the state and society. The 
distribution of functions started with the sharing of control over the border, and thus access to 
control over drug trafficking, while neglecting those areas and populations of the Valley where 
continued interdependence forced common people to look for their own ways to organize their 
survival, routines and order.  
Control over the borders appeared not only to be the means to define territorial  and 
domestic sovereignty, but also a means to guarantee access to important avenues of political 
influence for the Central Asian elites, such as controlling the drug trade. However, the border as a 
concept ceased to have much involvement with the direction of identity creation. The hysteria 
surrounding control over drug trafficking and extremism was supported by regional state actors, 
as this was one of the types of discourse they learned to invoke to hide the “local rules” behind 
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the “great game”, i.e. trying to adjust to the international parlance and discourse of threat in order 
to acquire the profits from international financial support, while keeping the true meaning of 
these processes at the local level (Colley 2013).  
The process of establishing the military infrastructure in Kyrgyzstan exemplifies how the 
international security agenda has been internalized by the national structures. Military 
infrastructure in Kyrgyzstan was not established until the IMU incursion into Batken in 1999. 
Specifically, the functions of Ministry of Interior, Law Enforcement offices, Border Guards, and the 
National Security Service (NSS, the former KGB) had not been delineated. The structuring of the 
state security infrastructure in Kyrgyzstan involved the division of functions and responsibility for 
maintaining control over some of the most vulnerable (and for traffickers and their clients/patrons 
within the establishment, most profitable) border areas. This involved a degree of inter-agency 
infighting which decreased the overall efficiency of the state in maintaining control over its 
borders whilst these issues persisted.  
The process of creating the military and security infrastructure in Kyrgyzstan has 
undergone several stages, where the functions and responsibilities of the Interior Ministry, Border 
Control Service, and the NSS were the subject of power struggles among top state officials, as 
these were assigned and then re-assigned following rounds of top level inter-agency negotiations. 
These rounds of structuring and restructuring lasted until 2002, when the division of powers and 
areas of responsibility of each of the three security structures was finally settled. The cause for the 
inter-agency infighting had been the issue of controlling borders, in particular the control of drug 
trafficking. Each agency was keen to establish and assert control over this profitable trade for itself 
(Gen. Mamytov, interview 2014). BOMCA and CADAP funding directed toward supporting 
institutional reform had also indirectly been perceived as a source of power, and capturing this 
power led to internal competition between different factions within the elites.  
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With this background, as a response to the incursion by the IMU in 1999, Uzbekistan 
started laying minefields along its border with Tajikistan, as well that with Kyrgyzstan, specifically 
in the areas bordering the Uzbek enclaves of Sokh and Shahimardan. Uzbekistan’s rationale was to 
protect the population of these enclaves, because they were the easy targets for the terrorists 
(Dadabaev 2012). The maps of the minefields were classified as a state secret by the Uzbek 
government and were not disclosed to Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan for fear that they might end up in 
the hands of terrorists (Dadabaev 2012). As a result, about 154 people are reported to have fallen 
victim to landmines, 70 of whom were killed or died of their wounds (Matveev 2008).  
Tajikistan, meanwhile, was perceived as one of the main sources of threat due to its 
ongoing civil war, its common border with Afghanistan with its large Tajik community living, and 
the M-41 route, which is one of the main drug trafficking routes in the world (UNODC World Drug 
Report 2013). Since the secular Tajik government (the Rakhmonov regime) was perceived to be 
“trying to get rid of its Islamists”, the IMU invasion into the Uzbekistani and Kyrgyzstani part of the 
Fergana Valley was seen as the intended outcome of the Rakhmonov government. At the very 
least, it was believed that Tajikistan was “turning a blind eye to their (IMU) operations in Eastern 
Tajikistan” (ICG 2001c). However, in interviews with several Tajik security officials, it was 
confirmed that Tajikistan’s official position has been that in fact it was Uzbekistan which had 
developed the covert relationship with the IMU in order to support the United Tajik Opposition 
and further destabilize Tajikistan (Senior security official, Ministry of Interior of Tajikistan, personal 
communication 2012). Kyrgyzstan also holds to the view that the IMU is a proxy for another 
external actor67 (Senior security official, NSS KG, personal communication 2012).  
Thus, since each of the states views the IMU as the proxy of the neighboring state, the 
threat posed by the IMU has become the primary force behind the external actors’ fortification of 
borders in the region. The mutual suspicion of the three states complemented the interests of the 
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 One of the neighboring states or Afghanistan  
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external actors in fortifying borders. In practice, again, this fortification and the lack of inter-state 
cooperation led to the creation of defense infrastructure aimed at one another, regardless of the 
discourse directed against non-state military groups. This lack of cooperation is exemplified by the 
refusal of the Uzbekistani government to share the maps of its minefields with its neighbors, 
regardless of the human loss caused by mines, as well as the refusal to implement the EU IBM 
initiative in 2010 by the Uzbekistani government which suggested information sharing between 
the national states (Dadabaev 2012; Gavrilis 2009).  
The IMU invasion triggered the internalization of the international “global war on terror” 
within the national security agendas and practices of the state. For example, since its formation in 
2002, the CSTO was used to provide training for Central Asian officers in Russian military 
academies, as well as to provide on the ground training during operations such as “Rubezh” 
(Frontier) and “Kanal” (Channel), as well as to share both Soviet era and modern equipment68 
(Frost 2009). Kanal is the annual “region wide drug interception operation” (Frost 2009, 174). The 
permanent CSTO establishments include the Anti-Terror Center of the CIS countries (the ATC CIS) 
in Bishkek, the Russian airbase at Kant, Kyrgyzstan and the Russian 201st Motor Rifle Division in 
Kulyab in Tajikistan.69 The latter played a crucial role in ending the civil war in Tajikistan and 
establishing the power of the President Rakhmonov.  
However, the CSTO’s mandate extends much further than anti-terror projects, to the 
political, military and economic security of the region (Bordiuzha 2005). Besides military 
equipment and the troop deployments in Central Asia70, the CSTO created a joint staff and 
command structure: “all the CSTO military exercises are proposed and planned by the ATC in 
Bishkek, which is officially supervised by the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) director” 
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 The Soviet equipment, however, is considered the material legacy of the Soviet Union and was proportionally 
divided between all the successor states (according to the Minsk and Almaty Agreements).  
69
 Both  bases  are  referred  to  by  Russia  as  CSTO  installations  though  both  are  formally registered as part of the 
Volga-Ural military district  
70
  With the Russian airbase at Kant in Kyrgyzstan  now  the most  effective  airbase  in  the  region  with  over  80 
aircraft,  and  with  over  6,000  troops  of  the  201
st
 motor  rifle  division  at Kulyab  in  Tajikistan. 
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(Gleason 2005). On a command staff level, in 2004, the dispersed CSTO staff was integrated with 
the Russian General Staff in order to improve efficiency of command (Wilhelmsen and Flikke 
2005). Formally, the CSTO troops had been placed under the Russian command during the 2002’s 
South Anti-Terror exercise when the Collective Rapid Reaction Force (CRRF) was established 
(Wilhelmsen and Flikke 2005).71 This potential institutional merger between the Russian security 
services and those of the member states was one of the main causes of the Uzbekistani retreat 
from the organization. 
In addition to the infiltration of the regional states’ security services, the Russian FSB exerts a 
certain degree of control over several media companies in Kyrgyzstan. This permits Russia “to 
spread its propaganda and lead its informational wars against its Great Game rivals” (Lojnikov 
2014, interview). State officials connected to the security services also complain about the 
problem of Russian omnipresence in the information realm (High-ranked officer of the NSS KG 
counter-espionage unit, personal communication 2014).  
It is important to note that security services in Central Asia have a web of surveillance over 
the most important institutions in their countries. Almost every political, educational, or media 
institution has covert agents who work both for the respective institution and for the security 
service. Some of these officers can report both to the national security services and to the ATC CIS, 
i.e. to the Russian command. This also contributes to the degree to which different regional 
security services are interlinked (High-ranked officer of the NSS KG counter-espionage unit, 
personal communication 2014). Hence, the principles of omniscient state surveillance and 
fortification of borders still remain two pillars of organizing security in the region, arguably 
reflective of the continuing legacy of the Soviet period.  
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“Soon  after  its  creation  in  2004,  the  CSTO  joint staff  was  made  up  of  55  officers,  half  of  which  were  
Russian  and  half from  the  other  member  states” (DuMont 2004; double-checked at the CSTO website). 
 
 153 
 
In contrast to the interdependence of the national and Russian security services, 
surveillance has also been part of the police reforms sponsored by the OSCE. Its main idea was 
that of building trust between law enforcement and society. In practice, the OSCE has also played 
a role of an information gatherer, as well as sharing information with grassroots society about new 
reforms and liberal democracy.  In other words, the OSCE set out to build trust between law 
enforcement officers and grassroots civil society based on information-sharing about transnational 
threats, or the so-called “awareness-raising” among the population (Taarnby 2012). However, 
considering that the previously mentioned policies, such as the materialization of borders, have 
disrupted the lives of large parts of the population, they have not succeeded in creating effective 
management mechanisms through establishing this type of trust. Instead, it indirectly contributed 
to reinforcement of a different form of trust-building, rooted in communities and their shared 
memories, since these have provided more suitable survival kits and self-governance strategies. 
Specifically, the project of trust-building between the law enforcement and civil society included 
within its orbit the grassroots indigenous communities, such as mahallas or jamoats, which were 
discussed in chapter two. The states in the region exercised a different degree of surveillance upon 
the mahallas, depending on each state’s perception of the threat emanating from these social 
structures. In practice, this resulted in the formalization of mahallas as part of the state local 
governance structures, which historically represented moral communities of trust (Liu 2012).  
While the external actors use the inclusive approach and try to involve community activists 
within community policing projects, state authorities in the region establish surveillance by means 
of formal local government institutions, which are called “local self-government”.72For example, 
the organization of surveillance in Uzbekistan is based on appointing elites who are loyal to the 
central authorities in peripheral areas and communities. Uzbekistan was the first to recognize the 
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 In this thesis, the term self-government refers only to the informal institutions, not the formal structures of the 
state apparatus. 
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role of traditional communities in managing societies. Mahallas, as the traditional moral 
communities were to a great extent formalized to serve the interests of the central state and 
became an extension of it (Troschke 2012; Kandiyoti 2007).  
Consequently, this initiative resulted in sowing suspicion and distrust toward those people 
who cooperate with their state with the support of external actors. In other words, there was a 
clash between two types of the trust systems: the trust system based on shared information and 
the trust system based on common memories. The systems based on trust rooted in common 
memories appear to be more durable in the long-term (Fukuyama 2014). As several surveys have 
shown, after the community policing was introduced, the trust among people shifted to the 
families, local religious leaders, and home-based religious circles (Taarnby 2012).  
The attempt of external actors to establish trust-building mechanisms between the formal 
authorities and traditional communities indirectly and unintentionally support the regimes’ 
attempts to secure their own interests. In practice, this should have facilitated centralization of 
the monopoly over the legitimate use of violence. However, the legitimacy and loyalty of these 
societies instead tended to shift to different types of power networks, Islamist in this case. The 
concentration of coercion in the central state’s hands served to diminish the state’s ideological 
and political power to a great extent. 
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4.1.3. Societal consequences of borders: creating the “island pockets” 
Cases of Batken zone, enclaves Vorukh, Sokh, and Shahimardan  
 
“Cities will take over”73 
 
 
Source: Maria Merkulova (2013) 
 
Materialized borders made the phenomenon of enclaves in the Fergana Valley more serious. 
Enclaves that used to house interdependent social lives have become isolated from each other by 
check-points, minefields and wire fences. The paradox of the materialization of borders, however, 
lies in the fact that a border could not prevent ideas and routine practices from flowing through it. 
Instead, these practices moved to a “parallel” social realm, that is, people have found other ways 
and means of continuing the routine practices which constitute their survival strategies.  
Since the enclaves’ physical isolation hinders the extent of state authority over a particular 
territory, the state may not be able to influence the ideological, social, and economic development 
in such areas. Social relations in these areas are examined below, through the cases of enclaves 
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 Margaret  MacKenzie, personal communication, 2014 
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such as Batken zone (formally Kyrgyzstani), Sokh and Shamimardan enclaves (formally Uzbekistani 
surrounded mainly by the Kyrgyzstani Batken and partially by territories of Tajikistan), and Vorukh 
enclave (a Tajikistani “island pocket” surrounded by Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan). These territories 
are hardly accessible without having to pass through the territory of a neighboring state at least 
three times within a two-hour trip. Some detour routes are still under construction and are seldom 
accessible for the locals. Since Chapter 3 depicted social relations in these areas during the Soviet 
period, here we focus on the social relations after the fortification of borders, that is, in the period 
from 2002 to 2014. 
Case 1: Batken zone (Kyrgyzstan) 
The confluence of winds  
 
Batken is the capital town of Batken oblast in southern Kyrgyzstan, surrounded by Tajik and Uzbek 
territory. Batken zone is not an enclave itself. However, it contains several of them and represents 
an area through which most cross-border movements happen. Its name from both Tajik (Persian) 
and Kyrgyz (Turkic) languages translates as the “confluence of winds”. Its significance proves to be 
the confluence of social activities of societies of three different states, the Tajik, the Kyrgyz, and 
the Uzbek. This province is surrounded by both Tajik and Uzbek territories and has Kyrgyz, Tajik, 
and Uzbek ethnic groups living side by side. Since it is on a plateau between the River Sokh in the 
east to the Isfara River in the west, the “water” acts as the natural border for the local people 
(Reeves 2014). Prior to the Soviet modernization, the area had been covered by traditional 
irrigation systems, composed of “concrete waterways  crisscrossing this landscape, running 
alongside roads and fanning through a complex network of mud channels that serve as irrigation 
ditches (aryks) under walls and into gardens” (Reeves 2014, 41). This irrigation system existed 
before the expansion of the Russian Empire into Central Asia. The Tsarist irrigation authorities 
continued to use the traditional irrigation systems, regulated on a customary basis (Turman 1999). 
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However, during the Soviet era, the old irrigation systems could not serve the needs of the large 
collective and state farms. Due to the development of collectivization and centrally-planned 
agriculture, the communities of this area and of the Fergana Valley in general, received substantial 
financial support to introduce a grandiose new irrigation system, extending the availability of 
water for irrigation beyond the area of its natural watershed, such as hills and mountainous 
terrains (Barthold 1914). This irrigation adversely affected the eco-system of the region, but, most 
importantly, it crossed the politically determined boundaries between the respective republics.  
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, management of agriculture was again restored to 
the private sector. Households which were at the higher elevations in mountainous areas were 
moved to more “economically productive” areas in the lower-altitude zones (Reeves 2014; 
Ferrando 2011). These zones operate based on community support and mutual trust systems. 
Since the roads, canals and grazing lands were built and situated “ignoring the administrative 
boundary lines between the Union republics”, they continued to be used by ordinary people and 
therefore provide the forum for intensive social relations at the grassroots and daily movements 
across borders (Reeves 2014, 144; Thorez 2008).  
In order to travel from the mainland of the respective states to their enclaves, one needs 
to cross the enclaves of the neighboring states. Batken is usually the place most frequently 
crossed, since this is the territory with greatest number of “backdoors” which allow people to 
cross the border using man-made detour routes, such as canals, and a border market (Reeves 
2014). People use these “backdoors” because the materialization of borders initiated by the 
external actors and the formal states created the so-called “double-bind” system of border 
control, i.e. the checkpoints of all three states that people have to cross one after another due to 
the constellation of enclave pockets in this area (Comaroff and Comaroff 2005, 129 quoted in 
Reeves 2014). Oftentimes, to travel to a nearby village, one has to cross “no less than six different 
border and customs posts within a distance of around twenty kilometers” (Reeves 2014). 
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The proof of transnationalism of this area in terms of grassroots social interactions is trade, 
as realized through the traditional markets, the bazaars. For example, this area is close to such 
strategically important (for this region) markets as Aravan, Bazar-Kurgan, Naukat, Suzak, Kara-Suu 
and Uzgen (Malabaev 2001). All these bazaars are located in the Kyrgyzstani part of the Fergana 
Valley, Osh oblast, which borders Batken, which means that all goods passing through to the 
territories of neighboring states pass through Batken oblast in any event. Batken zone “backdoors” 
are the entrances through which most of the unreported economic activity is undertaken. This 
informal or “parallel economy” as different sources call it, is an integral part of the local socio-
economic order, rather than marginal to it, since it constitutes the core of the people’s survival 
strategies (Thorez 2008; Rasanayagam 2002, 108-111; Seabright 2000).  These “backdoors” lead to 
the formally nonexistent roads, unmarked by the conventional cartography (Reeves 2014). These 
roads are key in “the distribution of aluminum and base metals to China, Uzbek cotton for illegal 
processing in Osh, and Afghan opium from Tajikistan to Osh, Bishkek, and Russia” (Reeves 2014, 
148). However, several of “the “detour roads” have been renovated as part of a World Bank-
sponsored program to assist Kyrgyzstan in becoming “transport independent” by bypassing the 
enclaves of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan” (World Bank 2009). This has contributed to the increase of 
the share of the informal trade in the local economies (Kaminski 2012).  
Finally, Julien Thorez describes the enlisted bazaars as units of the global trade routes and 
most of them are crossing the Fergana Valley74 (Thorez 2008). The highest number of the so-called 
“backdoors” is located next to the Kara-Suu market, between Osh and Batken. Although people 
manage to organize their small-scale trade, which is then integrated into existing global trade 
routes, people living in these areas tell stories of “entrapment”, complaining, for example, that 
they (as Tajik or Kyrgyz citizens) need visas to enter Uzbekistan, “including for the fifteen-
                                                          
74
For a thorough discussion of the phenomenon of “mondialisation par la bas” and the integration of the Fergana 
Valley bazaars and the grassroots trade routes into the global trade chains, see Julien Thorez, PhD Dissertation 2008. 
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kilometer stretch of road that passes through the Sokh enclave, administratively part of 
Uzbekistan”75 (Reeves 2014, 148). 
As Reeves writes, “border” is experienced as a place of both limits and gaps: a site of 
barbed wire and invisible landmines, but also a place of vigorous exchange, of friendship and 
intimacy, a site of connections and opportunities as well as of threat” (Reeves 2014, 144). This 
multiplicity of meanings76 of the border, in geographic terms leaves the enclaves’ inhabitants to 
their own systems of management and order, which is why also the sources of social power get 
redirected towards the local leaders, rather than to the state’s authorities. As the incursion in 
1999 – 2000 by the IMU demonstrated, people helped the Islamists to hide from the military 
authorities and wanted the state officials to explain to them why they thought these people were 
terrorists (Gen.Mamytov, interview 2014). This high ranking state military official had to justify his 
decisions to a local religious leader and his followers.  Furthermore, the general concluded that if 
there is one non-state power that the state should befriend, it is the local religious leaders in 
Batken, because people put a lot of trust in them (Gen. Mamytov, interview 2014).   
Finally, from the geographic point of view, Batken is one of the most complex peripheral 
areas. It is connected to Tajikistani provinces of Tavildara and Karategin, which are among the 
most problematic zones in Tajikistan due to their connection with the Afghan Darvaz. Secondly, 
Batken is connected with the Sogd province and the city of Hujand, which has been in latent 
opposition to the central authorities in Dushanbe (Knyazev 2012). Southern Kyrgyzstan and the 
northern Tajikistan therefore experience more social and economic relations with each other than 
with the centres of their respective states and organize an invisible area with non-standard 
economic activities, as the section 4.2 shall demonstrate. 
                                                          
75
For a rich variety of oral histories from this area, see Madeleine Reeves (2014) “Border Work”.  
76
 An interesting concept, best describing this place could be the one of “barzakh” which in Quaranic verses describes 
the state of things with unclear boundaries and borders in between legal and illegal, legible and illegible, material and 
ideational (Margaret McKenzie 2014; Scott 1997). 
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Case 2: Sokh and Shahimardan (Uzbekistan) 
 
 
Source: Maria Merkulova (2013) 
 
Examples of another type of isolation can be found in the enclaves of Sokh (nearly 60,000 
residents) and Shahimardan (6,000 inhabitants), which are administered by Uzbekistan (Khamidov 
2009). 
The population of the enclave of Sokh identifies as Tajik. In this, they reveal their ties with 
the cities of northern Tajikistan (Reeves 2014). Reportedly, “the majority of local government 
officials are ethnic Uzbeks” and “the authorities in Tashkent have long viewed the Tajik-populated 
enclave with suspicion” (Khamidov 2009). In 1999-2000, this area was the first to be infiltrated by 
the IMU. In response, the Uzbek authorities planted landmines around these enclaves, which have 
since been responsible for killing “at least dozen local residents” (Khamidov 2009).  
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Source: Maria Merkulova (2013)  
 
 Sokh is the biggest enclave in the Fergana Valley. It is located at the river Sokh, providing 
its irrigation and agriculture. In order to pass from one part of territory of Kyrgyzstan to the other 
in Batken oblast, one has to pass through Sokh. Due to multiple conflicts over border delimitation 
between the states involved, this road was closed in 2013, leaving the local population without 
food supplies for a month (Merkulova 2013). This demonstrates the vital dependence of enclaves’ 
societies on their neighbors. In terms of local governance, some authors call it a “unique case” due 
to the fact that it has all necessary institutions of local governance (khokimyat) located in Ravan, 
as well as medical institutions and schools. Administratively, “it belongs to Sokhskiy raion 
(administrative unit of Fergana oblast of Uzbekistan) which also includes both of the North and 
South Sokh, which are connected by a small neck of land and create an hour-glass shape” 
(Merkulova 2013).  
However, the Sokh valley in general also contains Kyrgyz villages such as Sogment, 
Charbak, and Khush’iar. They are located at the southern end of the Sokh valley. Sogment 
comprises 360 families, identifying themselves as Kyrgyz. Charbak has 86 families, identified as 
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Kyrgyz. The agricultural lands that the Sogment villagers use are located further away from the 
village itself, towards Batken town. Charbak is connected to Sogment through a road that initially 
constitutes a border and then enters into Uzbekistan. Administratively, Sogment and Charbak are 
part of the Kyshtut municipality of Kyrgyzstan (Bichsel 2009, Ch.2). The villagers also depend on a 
shared irrigation system, similar to the one on the Isfara River, as described in Chapter 3. 
However, the sources of water here include rivers such as Sokh or Kara Daria (originating in the 
Alai mountain range), Ak-Suu, and Kara-Suu. Water distribution is conducted by the residents 
themselves, while the pump stations are operated by the Shirkat with the support of international 
NGOs (Bichsel 2009, Ch.2). There are frequent tensions over the allocation of water.77 Water 
allocation deeper into the Sokh is even more complex and “ungoverned”.  State authority in the 
Sokh valley is largely limited. In addition to the sense of alienation from the “mainland” due to the 
exclusion from formal local governance structures, the enclave has been physically isolated by the 
building of a barbed wire fence by the Kyrgyz authorities, in response to several border incidents 
in 2010 and 2013 (Ivashenko 2013).78  
Shakhimardan has mainly been a tourist attraction, which has formed a part of the local 
survival strategy. Additionally, several Islamic sacred sites are located on its territory, which 
remain an attraction for pilgrims. For example, there is a local belief that the tombs of the “fourth 
Caliph” Ali is located here (Merkulova 2013; Khamidov 2009). It is located close to the Alay 
mountains (Kyrgyzstan). Administratively, it belongs to the Ferganskiy district of Uzbekistan. The 
only formal authorities present are the border guards and customs officers. Today, crossing the 
border, even for pilgrimage, is expensive, due to the multiple border checkpoints. Different 
sources note that there are two Shakhimardans – south and north, with the village of Qalacha (or 
Chon-Gara) being the south, and Djangail being the “Upper Sokh” or “northern Shahimardan”. 
                                                          
77
 On the specifics of conflicts, see Bichsel (2009), Chapter 2.  
78
 The wire was installed on the undisputed or resolved parts of the border. The practice of building such fences along 
the borders has been used by both Uzbek and Kyrgyz sides.  
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Furthermore, there is a small village of Tayan, to which there is only one reference in the sources, 
which is located nearby southern end of Sokh. However, there are no maps showing Tayan’s 
presence, even as “disputable land” (Merkulova 2013).  
In 2007 and 2008 the local residents organized several protests in front of the local 
government buildings in order to attract attention to their social and economic problems 
(Khamidov 2009). In terms of agriculture, the scarcity of arable land and pastures is the main 
problem being raised by the local people. After the materialization of international borders, the 
locals are no longer able to easily cross the border and use the pastures in neighboring Kyrgyzstan. 
Since the early 2000s, more than a dozen border clashes occurred due to the lack of arable land 
and pastures (Khamidov 2009).  
In terms of social relations, these Uzbekistani enclaves of Sokh and Shahimardan are 
considered to be most complex (Knyazev 2014). Their Tajik population has been perceived as 
“loyal to the Islamist movements and has remained in permanent conflict both with the central 
authorities in Uzbekistan and with the authorities of the surrounding Kyrgyzstani lands” (Knyazev 
2014). The peculiarity of the enclave’s location means that “any significant conflict may block all 
routes from Kyrgyzstan into Batken, which, therefore, can become isolated from the rest of the 
territory of Kyrgyzstan” (Knyazev 2012). The so-called loyalty of the population to the Islamists can 
be explained by the fact that that people have been left to organize their own social order. They 
do so based on the common memories from the pre-Soviet times, which was based on the mutual 
trust system, community lifestyles, and customary law. The Islamist movements which managed 
to create their settlements and befriend the local population during the 1999-2000 “invasions” 
help people financially, whilst reviving Islamic reasoning for doing so and justifying the new social 
order based on memories of customary law and partly Shariah. 
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Case 3. Vorukh (Tajikistan) 
 
 
 
Source: Maria Merkulova (2013)  
 
In Vorukh79, which has an ethnic Tajik population of approximately 40 000, people lack even basic 
amenities such as clean running water and are forced to drink it right from the aryk.80 In terms of 
their cultural loyalties, whilst the residents say they are Tajik, they qualify this by saying that they 
are not Tajik in the “same way as the central Tajiks, because… [the residents of Vorukh] have more 
social ties with Kyrgyzstani people, they watch Kyrgyzstani TV and prefer to buy Kyrgyzstani 
agricultural products on the other side of the road, which represents the border between the 
enclaves” (author’s interview with a head of a human rights NGO in Vorukh, August, 2012). This 
enclave is surrounded by the Kyrgyzstani lands and is only formally a part of the Isfara region of 
the Sogd province (Knyazev 2012). De facto power is exercised by an ishan, a religious leader. 
However, there are a significant number of people loyal to Islamist groups, based in Isfara. This 
                                                          
79
Where the author was based while travelling around the enclaves 
80
 A small-scale artificial river or irrigation channel 
 165 
 
area is commonly considered to be a hub of terrorist activity, due to the number of the networks 
established there by the IMU and a number of violent events reportedly conducted by the IMU 
(High-ranked law enforcement officer, a senior official of Mayoralty of Hujand town, and journalist 
based in Khujand, personal communications 2012).  
Vorukh, like Shahimardan, is poorly governed by the central authorities. Whether there are 
any representatives from the mainland and, if so, how permanent their presence usually is, has 
been a puzzle to the local respondents (field notes 2012). Statistics and media reports suggest that 
there are some customs officers, schools, medical facilities81, banks, but no courts (Merkulova 
2013). Local respondents and NGOs state that most people have to go to the territory of the 
neighboring Kyrgyzstan in order to receive medical help, buy cheaper food or watch TV at a 
neighbor’s house. Therefore, people turn to alternative sources to fill the informational void, such 
as davaatchy (Islamic propaganda) or some self-proclaimed mullahs (field notes 2012). Reports say 
that there were five cases of violence that were sent to court, but with no specification of the 
name or location of the actual court involved (Merkulova 2013). The need to organize leads to the 
creation of community-based initiatives, sometimes organized as an NGO. However, in effect 
these NGOs can be the living room of a private house of the NGO leader. Medical care is usually 
received in the bigger cities. However, one needs to be transported across borders, which is not 
easy for the locals (field notes). Water is used directly from the aryk (the pre-Soviet irrigation 
channel), directly dug into the soil and having no filters.  
Vorukh neighbors Aksai village in Kyrgyzstan. Residents of Vorukh can therefore only access 
mainland Tajikistan by travelling through Kyrgyzstan. Vorukh and Aksai both use the same 
irrigation system, provided mainly by the Karavshin river (which originates in the Turkestan range), 
which is the main tributary for the Isfara river (Bichsel 2009, 30). The water of the Isfara River is 
                                                          
81
 As personally experienced as suddenly becoming sick in Vorukh I had to be urgently transported to Khujand 
(northern Tajikistan), which was an about 4 hours’ trip by car.  
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divided between three countries, each being theoretically entitled to a third of the flow. In 
practice, it has been shown in Chapter 3 that distribution of water from the Isfara river is 
dependent on negotiations between communities at the grassroots level. For instance, in Vorukh, 
distribution is overseen by a joint - stock company and in Aksai by two farmers’ associations 
(Bichsel 2009, Ch.2). Both also have first to agree with the Department of Water Resources (DWR) 
about the amount of water; and “the pump station is operated by employees of the Batken district 
DWR” (Bichsel 2009, 30-31). Hence, there are overlapping authorities over the water here, the 
Vorukh joint-stock company (similar to kolkhoz), the Aksai farmers associations, and the Batken 
DWR.   
In sum, the aspects that appear to be common to the enclaves’ societies can be outlined as 
follows: 1) collectivist social organization; 2) reviving indigenous communities; and 3) 
disenchantment in the formal social order of the states (Liu 2012). Border fortification 
materialized the symbolic Soviet border delimitation and made collectivist social organization 
(resulted from collectivization) an important factor for the newly (re)emerging grassroots social 
orders. The devastation of the management frameworks that used to govern or direct the 
developments of the collectivist social organization pushed societies to look for management 
mechanisms in the collective memories, remaining within community lifestyles and Islam-related 
ideologies. As a result, people’s ethnic identities promoted by the states have become secondary 
to their collectivist and communal routines that composed their survival strategies. When borders 
were materialized largely by external pressure, the success of a universalist Islamist message—a 
call to unite under the banner of Islam rather than under a reductionist notion of ethnicity or 
nationalism—happened to best correspond to the collectivist social organization and the reviving 
indigenous communities left unattended in the isolated zones of enclaves.  
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4.2. Organizing Economies 
Introduction 
 
This section represents the second step towards the overall argument of this chapter that aims to 
show how external actors’ strategies limit the state’s authority over simultaneously isolated and 
trans-nationalizing societies in the Fergana Valley. Specifically, this section examines two 
economic management frameworks and their impact on the informal socio-economic relations 
across the borderlands (Fergana Valley, Xinjiang, FATA) – the Central Asian Regional Economic 
Cooperation (CAREC) and the Central Asia South Asia (CASA-1000) hydro-energy management 
project. These interrelated frameworks differ from a variety of other endeavors as their goals 
include developing “non-standard trade”82 across the borderlands, creating a shared resource pool 
and recreating the supply chains which were common in Central Asia as part of the ancient Silk 
Road trading route (Kaminski 2012).These goals blur the line between the formal and the informal 
in politics and support grassroots economic processes in order to foster development from the 
ground up. However, despite promising results at the state level, the societal consequences of 
these projects remain unaddressed and unknown due to the lack of research and data on 
indigenous communities and household farms (Kaminski 2012). The previous section showed how 
materialized borders isolated some enclaves and contributed to the sense of alienation and 
disenchantment with the state in parts of society. This section focuses on the social relations 
which result in these isolated areas regardless of border fortification. Specifically, these relations 
include the development of informal survival strategies, the largest part of which is informal or so-
called “non-standard” trade.  
This is an attempt to show what consequences the promotion of non-standard trade, 
under the conditions discussed in the previous chapters, may bring for societies of the Fergana 
                                                          
82
The term “non-standard trade” implies cross-border trade activities [that] are not reported in the foreign trade 
statistics and concerns mainly domestically produced goods and some re-export. Reportedly, the value of non-
standard trade is comparable to that of the standard trade in Central Asia (Kaminski 2012). 
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Valley. The issue is that the Fergana Valley represents a naturally informal (non-standardized) 
social and economic realm where both legal and illicit practices are often transmitted by the same 
types of institutions or social structures. For example, the institution of the bazaar, which is a core 
economic unit of a mahalla as described in Chapter 2, can be simultaneously the site of small-
scale, unregistered trade in the agricultural produce of local farmers, a network for drug barons, as 
well as sites of infiltration by radical Islamist movements. Furthermore, the states in focus do not 
have a viable official revenue collection system83, which can be a tool for distinguishing legal from 
illicit revenue. This is not to suggest that all farmers associate with drug barons or radical Islamists. 
This is to draw attention to their common institutional platform, i.e. the bazaar, in this case. 
Therefore, promoting cross-border non-standard trade may in practice facilitate the informal 
economies and their transnational connections by providing logistics and sponsorship. 
4.2.1. CAREC: promoting non-standard trade – supporing parallel survival strategies  
 
Established in 1997, Central Asian Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) is a project sponsored 
by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) with the goal of encouraging economic cooperation 
between Central Asian countries. The governments of ten countries supported this initiative, 
including: Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, the People’s Republic of China, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz 
Republic, Mongolia, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Six multilateral institutions 
also provided support: the Asian Development Bank (ADB), European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, International Monetary Fund, Islamic Development Bank, United Nations 
Development Program, and World Bank (ADB 2012, 30). According to the “CAREC Strategic 
Framework 2020”, its main goal is to “unlock the landlocked Central Asian economies” and foster 
development and poverty eradication by supporting non-standard trade (ADB 2012).  
                                                          
83
 Some authors consider “corruption” being the informal revenue collection system.  
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The CAREC institutional framework (Table 1) comprises three sets of actors: governments, 
multilateral institutions, and private actors. CAREC prioritizes four areas:  transport, trade 
facilitation, energy; and trade policy. Each of these priority areas comprises national and 
multilateral institution representatives (ADB 2012). Strategic direction and policy determinants are 
provided at the annual Ministerial Conference. ADB serves as the CAREC Secretariat. Options and 
overall guidance for CAREC from a regional perspective are provided by bi-annual Senior Officials’ 
Meetings, which report annually to the Ministerial Conference. Each CAREC country “has 
appointed a senior government official as CAREC national focal point to ensure effective 
coordination among all relevant agencies and other interested parties in matters related to 
regional economic cooperation” (ADB 2012). Due to its “pragmatism and result orientation”, the 
CAREC institutional framework represents a constellation of “time-bound” or ad-hoc structures, 
emerging only for certain concrete purposes (ADB 2012; Peyrouse 2012).  
In general terms, it is a platform for bringing together government, multilateral, and 
private actors. The private actors are responsible for creating new business ties between the 
regions, the multilateral institutions for facilitating cooperation, and the states for accommodating 
contradictory legislative frameworks. In other words, this institutional setting brings together 
three different types of management logic: those of the state, of the multilateral international 
organizations, and the private actors, each pursuing their own interests. The underlying principle 
which is meant to tie these three sets of actors together is “country ownership” (ADB 2012, 17). 
However, the effectiveness of this principle can be problematic, since most of these countries are 
in transition. Hence, they are often perceived as having no single “national interest”, but rather 
they represent vehicles for the interests of the local strong men and corporate elites (Colley 2013). 
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Source: ADB 2013http://www.carecprogram.org/index.php?page=governing-structure 
 
The triple logic of this framework, through diminishing the accountability mechanism of 
this type of global governance structure, reflects the “complex actorship” which is natural for the 
region and the wider globalized world, where it is difficult to identify a unitary actor with a 
concrete foreign or national interest (Kavalski 2010). In spite of this diminishing accountability 
mechanism, this framework does not aim to institutionalize itself in the formal sense, rather it 
relies on the “sub-regional or corridor-specific projects” and keeps its own institutional framework 
“flexible and informal” too (ADB 2012, 18). Whether the creation of an informal institution over 
the informal space would make this space more “legible” and transparent remains to be seen 
(Scott 1998).  
The process of “unlocking” the region is envisioned by establishing six transport corridors 
connecting the borderlands and opening their access to the Middle East, South Asia, and Europe 
(through Russia).84 These transport corridors are meant to expand trade routes. However, Central 
                                                          
84
CAREC 1: Europe–East Asia (Kazakhstan – Kyrgyzstan - Xinjiang);  
CAREC 2: Mediterranean–East Asia (Azerbaijan – Kazakhstan – Kyrgyzstan – Tajikistan – Uzbekistan – Xinjiang);  
 171 
 
Asian countries specialize in commodity goods, since their industrial sectors were obliterated 
economically after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Therefore, whether this type of trade would 
help the development of Central Asia, or instead revive the extractive demand chains similar to 
the Soviet ones is yet to be researched. However, the energy pillar of this project, perhaps, 
envisions Central Asia as the supplier of hydro-energy to the neighboring regions, which is 
commonly (and mistakenly) perceived as being an abundant resource in the region.85 
Besides improvements in logistics, the most remarkable feature of the CAREC project is its 
focus on the development of non-standard trade in the Fergana Valley borderlands (ADB 2012).  
This project covers the “cross-border trade activities [that] are not reported in the foreign trade 
statistics” (ADB 2012, 3).This unreported trade is operated through “non-standard” channels of 
the bazaars. This trade concerns mainly domestically produced goods and some which is re-
exported. According to World Bank surveys, bazaars “play a major role in the local chains of 
production and distribution” (Kaminski 2012, 8). The surveys also found that bazaars in Central 
Asia meet five key requisite of effective markets: “trusting most of the people most of the time, 
being secure from having your property expropriated, smooth flow of information about what is 
available where and at what quality, curtailment of side effects on third parties, and competition 
at work”(McMillan 2002).Furthermore, “trust in protecting property rights and among trading 
partners rests more on the informal device of reputation and special connections that on the 
formal application of the rule of law through public institutions” (Kaminski 2012, 10).  
                                                                                                                                                                                                
CAREC 3: Russian Federation–Middle East and South Asia (Afghanistan – Kazakhstan – Kyrgyzstan – Tajikistan – 
Uzbekistan);  
CAREC 4: Russian Federation–East Asia (Mongolia – Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region - Xinjiang); 
CAREC 5: East Asia–Middle East and South Asia (Afghanistan – Kyrgyzstan – Tajikistan – Xinjiang) 
CAREC 6: Europe –Middle East and South Asia (Afghanistan – Kazakhstan – Tajikistan – Uzbekistan) (ADB 2012, 25).  
85
This common perception is wrong. Even local population of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the upstream countries of the 
rivers Oxus (Amu-Dariya) and Jaxartus (Syr-Dariya), suffer from the lack of water and electricity and related to that 
annual risein tariffs. Soviet Union also managed to export tons of bread abroad, while its own population was starving 
to death. Similar situation is nowadays with the Russian gas, which is “cheap” for foreigners, and expensive for the 
locals.  
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Indeed, bazaars, as part of the social organization of communities, entail a great degree of 
intimate interaction between the local people. However, trust is based not on the information-
sharing related to protection of property rights. Rather, it emerges from common memories, 
sentiments, and moral duties dictated by a traditional hierarchy of social relations (Fukuyama 
1995). The inter-ethnic tensions in the Southern Kyrgyzstan in 2010 exemplify how one’s property 
can be burnt overnight if it conflicts with the social order that the politically active part of the 
population sees as desirable. These inter-ethnic tensions have influenced the distribution of 
property in such strategically important bazaars as Osh and Kara-Suu.  
The bazaars that were surveyed by the World Bank team do not quite represent the entire 
constellation of the Central Asian borderlands bazaars. The surveys covered the following bazaars: 
Afghanistan—Tajikistan (three BCPs in Ishkashim, Tem, Ruzvai on the Tajik side and Sher Khan 
Bandar on the Afghan side); Afghanistan—Uzbekistan (BCP at Hairatan on the Afghan side); 
China—Kazakhstan (Korgas); China—Kyrgyzstan (Irkeshtam); Kazakhstan—Kyrgyz Republic 
(Kordai); Kazakhstan—Uzbekistan (Jibek-Joli); Kyrgyz Republic—Tajikistan (two BCPs in Kulundu 
and Ovchi-Kalachi); Tajikistan--Uzbekistan (two BCPs at Dusti and Patar) (World Bank 2012). 
However, the most problematic bazaars in the Fergana Valley, in Xinjiang and close to the 
Pakistani Tribal Belt (toward which CAREC transport and energy logistics also aims to expand) have 
not been included within these surveys. Furthermore, Uzbekistan, a key part of the Fergana Valley, 
did not take part in the surveys. These bazaars are important since they exemplify the ambiguous 
role of bazaars in general. Historically, they have been a symbol of Islamic cultures, existing in all 
Muslim regions of the world. The controversial role of the bazaar as an institution has been noted 
by many Muslim governors. For example, the revolutionary Iranian Shah, Mohammad Reza 
Pahlavi, did not see economic modernization taking place without their elimination (Lenczowski 
1978).  
 173 
 
However, the rationale for the CAREC approach lies in the general idea of decentralization 
and bottom-up development, relying on grassroots institutions prone to market competition. In 
general terms, it is rooted in the neo-liberal economic agenda of the IMF and the World Bank, the 
leading actors involved in restructuring the post-Soviet states from the outset.  To dismantle the 
Soviet system, the Central Asian states were prescribed a path of liberalization by the IMF and the 
World Bank (Gleason 2003). Although liberalization took different modes in these three countries, 
the newly emerging national economies relied upon its core principles. In practice, these principles 
comprised the Washington Consensus templates for states “in transition to democracy” (Gore 
2005). The idea was to develop free market competition which would later result in the creation of 
democratic institutions. Development of the free market and political decentralization were two 
guiding principles of the process of liberalization. Hence, the rationale of neo-liberalism was the 
leading one during the first decade of independence. Market liberalization did not imply the 
organizing of economies in institutional terms, i.e. it did not allow for (re)institutionalization or 
(re)standardization of the economies that had been previously organized according to the 
centralized (Soviet) design (Gleason 2003). 
The CAREC project represents an example of an attempt at restructuring within this 
template. In a nutshell, it is a project of informal, decentralized management of informal trade in 
Central Asia. Political decentralization has diminished regional states’ infrastructural power, 
preventing them from permeating the grassroots social organization of their own societies. This is 
because the indigenous community-based social structures, which are seen to be substituting 
formal institutions, may foster a social order and framework of management which is efficient and 
viable, yet different from the one of the modern state. To date, the international community has 
failed to construct a workable institutional structure to govern societies with these underlying 
community-based types of social organization. Instead, international multilateral platforms 
themselves have become influenced by the non-standard processes (or the so-called informal 
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processes) and have become prone to informalization of their organizational settings. In other 
words, de-centralization worked as Michael Mann predicted, creating the system of “societal 
control” (that is, influence) on the formal management frameworks, rather than vice a versa 
(Mann 1993, 59).  
The neo-liberal idea of letting market competition and natural bottom-up economic 
processes define the outcome contribute to conditions which lead to unintended consequences. 
This is because there are no processes beyond social engineering; or at least without standardized 
institutions these unguided processes may result in the classical Hobbesian dilemma of 
“undermining the ends by the same means”, i.e. turning out to be anti-liberal. Even traditions and 
the notion of “indigenousness” are highly subverted and subject to manipulation. Furthermore, as 
the other pillars of this program include development to facilitate cross-border non-standard 
trade, such as establishing transport links and relaxing customs obstacles, social interactions can 
increase across borders, inviting more intervening variables to define the outcome of this 
“evolution” based on competition.  
Hence, in order to understand potential societal consequences of this project, it is useful to 
also consider the territories which are to be connected. For example, Central Asia will be more 
integrated into the Islamic space, i.e. more closely connected with Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the 
Middle East. Considering the socio-cultural context of these regions, Central Asia will be opened 
up to the area of complex and hardly controllable territories. This is not a warning of potential 
conflict. On the contrary, it is simply to draw attention to the fact that opening up potential new 
power networks to bypass those of the states may result in the outsourcing of the states’ 
ideological power. These areas have already demonstrably influenced the religious picture of 
Central Asian societies by exchanging davaatchy, the religious propagators and pilgrims whose 
activity has a clear transnational outreach to mention the least (Nasritdinov 2006). 
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In practical terms, non-standard trade draws into its orbit other types of cross-border 
social activities (to be shown in the subsequent section), which is why these policies indirectly 
contribute to the transnationalization of societies at the expense of the deteriorating 
infrastructural power of the state. In other words, such policies contribute to creating a type of 
social organization largely based on subsistence farming (or peasantry), organized as a network of 
communities, similar to the ones seen at the outset of state formation in India, China, and the 
Near East (Wolf 1966). The problem is that these types of social organization have not yet found a 
corresponding framework of management other than centralized political power (Tilly 1975; Wolf 
1966). Whether the symbiosis of political decentralization and the community-based informal 
social organization would result in the development of a system other than a constellation of tribal 
leadership over time is a challenging question to the modern theories of state formation. Whether 
political decentralization would allow the state to reach the grassroots of society would depend on 
whether the state is still a holder of the other types of power, such as ideological and political 
power, and whether it offers alternative institutions to compete with the informal structures of 
communities. Weber implied that decentralization, accompanied by creation of institutions of 
formal local governance, may increase the state’s despotic power over society. However, 
decentralization “may be a two-way street: It also enables civil society parties to control the state” 
(Mann 1993, 59).  
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4.2.2. CAREC’s societal consequences: integrating peasantry into the parallel realms 
of bazaar  
 
Since non-standard trade is that trade engaged in by local individual farmers (dekhans) or 
household farmers in the borderlands, and the main institution it relies upon is the institution of 
the bazaar, the traditional market which serves as the platform by which illicit and illegal activity 
intersects with the activity of local businesses, this can in practice lead to two societal 
consequences. Firstly, local farmers can become an integral part of the non-standard economy 
and, secondly, the framework for managing the economy (including the multilateral platforms 
involving international banks, organizations, and corporations) can become more informal. 
The institution of the bazaar, in the context of Central Asia, represents the operational 
realm for both legal and illicit activity. The line between them is difficult to draw when the state 
does not have a fully functional fiscal system which can unravel the operational complexity of the 
bazaar, since this is the institution which supports non-standard trade and is the forum for the 
agricultural activity of the local population. Firstly, as has been discussed in the Chapter 2, the 
bazaar is one of three main institutions (along with mosques and madrassahs) providing 
recruitment for Islamist movements and the dissemination of the Islamist social agenda. 
Furthermore, this is the space where religious activities intersect with drug-and human trafficking, 
small-scale entrepreneurship, mafia-like networks, and it is also where politicians try to engage 
with and expand their electoral base (Engvall 2011; Erica Marat 2006). For instance, Marat’s field 
research on the state-crime nexus demonstrates how the clashes between the mafia networks of 
key criminals occur “over the control of bazaars, gas stations, and supermarkets” (Marat 2006, 67). 
Bazaars are reported as one of the main venues of drug dissemination (Marat 2006, 54). Engvall, in 
his “State as investment market” (2011), shows how these networks are connected to formal 
politics by means of bribery. These networks “invest” in the protection of their businesses and 
access to control over drug trafficking and natural resources, such as gold and coal mines. 
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Additionally, there is, reportedly, competition over drug trafficking between the identifiable 
Russian, Afghan, Azeri, Tajik, Chechen and Kyrgyz drug mafias (Makarenko 1999). An example of 
this state of affairs is the situation in the southern Kyrgyzstan, in the provinces of Jalal-Abad and 
Osh, which were “the major transit points of *both drugs+ and human trafficking to the Middle 
Eastern countries, Europe, and Russia” (Marat 2006, 63). It is also widely reported that the 
individual who was most famous as “the most charismatic”86 mayor of Osh was, prior to his 
election to office as a mayor, part of one of the most powerful organized crime networks 
“covering”87 the Osh and Kara-Suu bazaars. These bazaars, among others, were also the bases of 
one of the most famous southern drug barons, Aibek “the Black” (“Chernyj Aibek”), who had a 
wide network of supporters in Jalal-Abad.88  
Traditionally, the bazaar is also an institution representing the structure for self-
governance of the community. According to World Bank studies, it operates mostly according to 
customary laws and traditional practices. As Chapter 2 has shown, the institution of the bazaar is a 
part of the social organization targeted by the Islamist infiltration. The merchants are more 
inclined to implement the Islamic economic principles rather than the norms of liberal markets. 
CAREC programs are indirectly integrating a large part of the agricultural sector into the informal 
economy by supporting non-standard trade without a goal to formalize, standardize, and 
institutionalize this trade.  
According to estimates of some international organizations (UN, World Bank, etc.), 
between 40 and 60% of the Central Asian economy is informal. This is explained by way of the 
multiplication of the bazaars, the number of which reached 400 in the 1990s alone (Spector 2006). 
In the 1990s, shuttle-trade and the bazaars provided employment for different social groups, of 
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 From the interviews with the random people in the streets and bazaars about “how do they like the mayor of their 
city”  
87
 Protecting by means of racketeering.  
88
 Author’s field notes. Jalal-Abad also has a district, with the most luxurious houses and gardens, called the “barons’ 
city”.  
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varying ages, genders, and professions, from medical doctors to musicians and engineers (de 
Tunguy 2004; Blacher 1996; Kaiser 1996). This informal trade has not only been integrated into 
international trade flows, but has also changed the structure of the trade system internationally 
(Thorez 2008). At the end of 1990, the World Bank and the IMF estimated that informal commerce 
represented 35% of the all exports from Uzbekistan (Barlett 2001). According to data, in that 
period of time, 90 million dollars entered the country officially, and 130 million unofficially (Thorez 
2008; Trofimov 2001). Approximately 400 000 traders passed Urumchi (Xinjiang) in 1993 and in 
the second half of the 1990s, about 50 000 Central Asian commercial tourists crossed borders into 
China, Iran, and Turkey (Trofimov 2001; Dorian et. al. 1997). As research shows, this phenomenon 
is typical not only for the 1990s. In 2006 there was, officially or unofficially, transfers of goods for 
10 billion dollars, regardless of the fortification of borders and the phenomenon of “enclavement” 
(Raballand and Andresy 2007; Thorez 2005). The large bazaars of the Fergana Valley, such as Osh, 
Aravan, Bazar-Kurgan, Naukat, Suzak, Kara-Suu and Uzgen have been the hubs through which 90% 
of the re-export from China have flowed. These have also historically been the main bazaars for 
local agricultural produce (Malabaev 2001). From the hub in Osh, produce would be redistributed 
to markets in Bishkek (especially the biggest one in Central Asia – “Dordoi” bazaar), from which it 
would go to Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, and beyond. There are a number of official and unofficial 
routes passing through the Fergana Valley, connecting the Osh hub with Khorog (Pamir province of 
Tajikistan, bordering with Afghanistan), and connecting China with Afghanistan, via Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan (Thorez 2008). 89 Reportedly, in late 2000 the routes connecting the Fergana Valley with 
heart in Afghanistan have become the busiest of these routes (Thorez 2008; Abdelkhan 2006).  
To explain the link between the merchants and the non-standard economy, it is important 
to illuminate their place in the state system. In simple terms, merchants are individual dekhhans 
                                                          
89
 For a detailed description of the routes, check-points, the number of vehicles passing each route in the 1990s and 
the 2000s, see Julien Thorez 2008 “Bazars et routes commerciales en Asie centrale – Transformation post-sovietique 
et “mondialisation par le bas”.  
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who sell their own agricultural products at the bazaars. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
the de-collectivization process, a large number of people previously involved in agricultural activity 
became unemployed. As the previous sections have shown, this de-collectivization has not yet 
been fully undertaken on the entire territory of the Fergana Valley. This does not mean, however, 
that collective farms still operate according to the principles of the command economy, as they 
had during the Soviet period. Nevertheless, the practices that stemmed from collectivization, such 
as collective sharing of water, lands, and the property rights, have not been formally redefined (Liu 
2012; Eriksson 2006).  Furthermore, those parts of lands which were privatized were often sold at 
steeply reduced prices to the most entrepreneurial politicians or people close to these powerful 
circles. The functioning of these lands and their part within the agricultural development of the 
country was not of much concern of the new land owners, a lot of whom were mere ‘dead souls’ 
(absentee landlords), rather than private farmers. In other words, de-collectivization has not 
presented a new way of managing lands or organizing the agricultural sector, which is why farmers 
organized themselves into households and fostered the revival of traditional communities or social 
structures to pursue common agricultural practices.  
As for the external actors and the formal states, in the 1990s they underestimated the role 
of agriculture for creating a new social order of the newly independent states and societies in the 
Fergana Valley. The following numbers convey the development of the agricultural sector since 
independence, but they rarely show that it has been to a large extent a matter of grassroots self-
governance, rather than centrally directed policies. Therefore, the states in the region have been 
left with a large societal sector which they failed to standardize. This sector today is part of the so-
called non-standard economy, supported by the World Bank. However, it has not yet been subject 
to comprehensive household research and therefore data on communities and the legal and illegal 
social ties across borders and economic areas is lacking. 
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Statistically speaking, since 1995 the quantity of farming lands has increased in Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, and especially in Uzbekistan, while the number of enterprises has decreased.90 
Specifically, it was the number of household farms organized around communities that have 
increased. The greatest number of household farms in Central Asia can be found in Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan. However, in Kyrgyzstan the number of household farms has been increasing 
continuously. This household farming has been also driving agricultural growth since 1997 (the 
aftermath of the civil war). In Kyrgyzstan, the role of household farming has remained stable and 
significant during this period. The latest World Bank statistics (2013) shows agriculture accounts 
for 18% of GDP in Kyrgyzstan, 28% in Tajikistan, and 19% in Uzbekistan. It was found that 
households outperform all farms in terms of productivity (2006-2010). The gaps between 
household farms and other types of farms have been significant (Lerman and Sedik 2014). 
Agricultural growth associated with “individualization of farming” (community-based farming) has 
become the cornerstone of post-Soviet structure, but a necessary market infrastructure for farm 
services has not been developed (Lerman and Sedik 2014). Since the market infrastructure for 
these developments has not been introduced, the individual farmers have become vulnerable to 
the non-state actors competing with the state. In other words, this emphasis on farmers as the 
driving force behind the development of a parallel social order through communal self-governance 
is not grounded in the classical idea of revolutionary theories that claim that the critical mass of 
peasantry [farmers] per se represents a risk for social mobilization and challenge the state 
(Berman 2003).  Rather, it is necessary to highlight that the integration of the reviving traditional 
modes of social organization into non-standard economic processes (bordering with illicit 
activities) could, under the conditions of the lack of formal institutionalization of the state’s 
                                                          
90
This trend has been accompanied by the growing unemployment in other sectors of economy, which were 
devastated after the collapse of the Soviet Union.  
 181 
 
infrastructural power (which could represent a competing alternative to the latter) at the 
grassroots level, poses a challenge for the modern state.  
This situation, where an important sector of the economy like agriculture uses the same 
social structures (read: institutional setting) as the illicit trafficking of goods, as well as using the 
same informal supply chains may be seen as creating conditions conducive for unintended 
consequences, to say the least. Specifically, if other factors are included, the peasantry may 
become the driving force behind a collective action that corresponds to its social structure and the 
ideology, two issues to be addressed in section 4.3. 
4.2.3. CASA-1000: the new Silk Road and the Soviet logistics 
 
CASA-1000 is part of a regionalization project implemented by the World Bank, which aims to 
change the land-locked status of the Central Asian countries and open up their economic space. 
Since water has been identified as an “abundant resource” or “comparative advantage” in Central 
Asia, CASA would help to develop exports of water from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to nearby 
water-deficit countries, such as Afghanistan and Pakistan.  The project aims to recreate 
interdependence along Silk Road, allegedly interrupted and suppressed by Soviet rule (USAID 
2014). Water-sharing is its first step, which implies the creation of a common resource pool 
between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, as water suppliers, and Afghanistan and Pakistan as recipient 
states.  
Specifically, its new water-sharing schemes suggest the connection of the power grids of 
southern Kyrgyzstan (Datka power grid) with northern Tajikistan91 (Khujand power station) in 
order to transmit hydro-energy generated by Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, and from there to the countries of South Asia (ADB 2012). In technical terms, the power 
grids to be connected are: (1) 500 kV AC line from Datka (in the Kyrgyz Republic) to Khudjand (477 
                                                          
91
 This is easier to do than to connect the power grids in southern Tajikistan with the northern Tajikistan, due to the 
enclaves and mined zones bordering Uzbekistan, in proximity of Isfara.  
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kilometers away, in Tajikistan), (2)1300 megawatt AC-DC Convertor Station at Sangtuda 
(Tajikistan); (3) 750 kilometer High Voltage DC line from Sangtuda to Kabul (Afghanistan) to 
Peshawar (Pakistan); (4) 300 megawatt Convertor Station at Kabul (with import and export 
capability); (5) 1300 megawatt DC-AC Convertor Station at Peshawar (See map below).  
 
 
 
In institutional terms, CASA-1000 is a multilateral framework, initiated by the governments of 
Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan and Pakistan, which puts in place an Inter-Governmental 
Council, supported by the World Bank Group, the Islamic Development Bank, the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID), the US State Department, the United Kingdom 
Department for International Development (DFID), the Australian Agency for International 
Development (AusAID), and other donor communities (CASA-1000). In other words, this 
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framework comprises international banks, governments, and business investors and, therefore, a 
constellation of conflicting interests and different rationale for being involved in this project.  
In practical terms, at its initial stages it will use power generated by stations such as Santguta 
I and Santguta II in Tajikistan, whose capacity is currently insufficient for long-term CASA-1000 
plans. For this reason, CASA also will also require construction of larger power stations, such as 
Rogun in Tajikistan and Kambarata (I and II) in Kyrgyzstan. However, Kyrgyzstan is less inclined to 
proceed with Kambarata at present, for it is the source of heated domestic debates and serves as 
a seed of discord among the Kyrgyzstani elites, as well as between the Kyrgyz government and 
Russian investors in 2010. This confrontation was partly responsible for the coup d’ètat and the 
dismissal of President Bakiev.   
Rogun, on the other hand, has been the Tajik government’s pet project regardless of the 
acute social and political tensions caused by this idea in the region. In brief, Rogun is located about 
110 km away from Dushanbe, on the river Vakhsh, which, after confluence with the river Pyanzh, 
flows further into Amu-Darya and makes up to 27% of its flow (World Bank 2014a, 7). The Rogun 
project was first designed during the Soviet period in the 1950-1960s. The construction was first 
initiated in 1982 with the aim to improve the regional shared-irrigation system. Within the CASA-
1000 framework, the goal of Rogun is to produce more hydro-energy for water export (Rossi and 
Khakimov 2014). Construction restarted in 2008, but has continually been interrupted since 2012 
for a number of reasons, such as the objections raised by Uzbekistan; the retreat of the Russian 
Aluminum company, RusAl, one of its main investors; and, finally, the resulting initiation of the 
World Bank investigation of the technical, economic, social, and other aspects of the project, at 
the request of the Tajik government.  
Uzbekistan’s objection to this project is largely on the basis of the risk of ecological disaster 
which might be caused by such a large construction project, as in the case of Aral Sea. 
Furthermore, it is concerned that people living in the lower parts of the Fergana Valley in 
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Uzbekistan would have a deficit of water supply. These concerns stem from that fact that the 
confluence of river Vakhsh and river Pyanzh flow into the Amu-Darya, making up to 27% of its 
flow. This is because the Amu-Darya is one of the two main rivers which create the unified Central 
Asian irrigation system. Hence, the construction of Rogun will have a serious impact on the 
amount of water flowing into the Amu-Darya and in the first-tier water distribution system, 
described in chapter 3. This will have a knock on effect in the amount of water in the other two 
tiers of water distribution and cause an even greater water deficit in the third tier, at community-
level, as illustrated in the case of Isfara river, in chapter 3. Considering that Tashkent has cut 
Tajikistan from the Unified Power System in 2009, the political tensions between the two 
countries might grow. For these reasons, the World Bank: 
[Recognising the serious that changes in Amu-Darya flows could have on the agricultural 
output, the WB] emphasized the need for close study and interrogation of the legal standing 
of the decades old Central Asian water sharing agreements, such as Protocol 566 of the Soviet 
era, and the provisions of the subsequent interstate agreements of 12 Oct 1961 (Tashkent), 18 
February 1992 (Alma-Ata) that created the ICWC and its leading role in the annual water-
sharing negotiations and especially 20 September 1995 (Nukus). Further agreements of 1993, 
1994, 1997 created institutional frameworks to implement the earlier agreements (Rastogi 
and Arvis 2014, 8). 
 
This assessment, however, does not consider issues within the ICWC framework that stem 
from privatization and liberalization policies from the first decade of independence, addressed in 
Chapter 3.  
Regardless of Rogun’s obvious political risks, Tajikistan insists on its construction for the 
following reasons. In political terms, Rogun is seen as a potential means to turn the tables 
between the three countries and would provide Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan with more bargaining 
power when it comes to Uzbekistani gas. Uzbekistan promotes construction of a net of smaller 
power plants rather than grand projects like Rogun in Tajikistan or Kambarata II in Kyrgyzstan. The 
problem is that these types of power plants would result in the higher electricity rates and less 
quantities of electricity being produced.  Since Rogun represents a chance for Tajikistan to 
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diminish its energy vulnerability vis-à-vis Uzbekistan, the Tajik government insists on constructing 
it, despite the fact that its partner and main investor in the scheme, RusAl, pulled out following a 
breakdown in negotiations. To make up the shortfall, the Tajikistani government has resorted to 
forcing its citizens to buy shares in the scheme92 (Laruelle 2013, 231). Rogun has been presented 
by the government as the only possible option to overcome the current energy crisis in Tajikistan, 
as well as in Pakistan and Afghanistan.93  
In September 2014, Tajikistan received the results of the World Bank’s techno-economic and 
environmental-social assessment94 proving that the risks of ecological disaster are minimal and 
could be managed by adopting certain parameters of the dam and the construction techniques 
(Coyne et Bellier 2014).95 Hence, on 27 March 2014, the project was finally approved with 
completion date set for 30 June 2020. The total cost is estimated at US$ 997.00 million. The 
agencies implementing the program include the National Transmission Companies of the 
stakeholder states (World Bank 2014).  
On 24 April 2015, in Istanbul, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan signed the IGC 
Resolution, the Master agreement, the bilateral power purchase agreements between these 
parties, as well as the Load Agreements. Specifically, the International Development Association 
(IDA) provided a grant of $45 million to Tajikistan for the realization of the Rogun project (Asia-
Plus 2015). This meeting confirmed that 70% of the electricity will be supplied by Tajikistan, and 
the remaining 30% by Kyrgyzstan. On the recipient side, Afghanistan will consume 300 MW and 
Pakistan 1000 MW. Furthermore, Pakistan and Tajikistan agreed to expand transmission lines to 
Chitral in northern areas of Pakistan in order to mitigate the energy crisis in Islamabad (Express 
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 The project needs more than 20 years of financing by its own budget. 
93
 Districts of the capital have electricity on the rotation basis. The rural areas suffer from the lack of electricity even 
more.  
94
 Expert investigation of the potential ecological risks was undertaken by the WB hired group of experts, including the 
French consortium Koyne et Bellier, Italian Electroconsult, the British company IPA, and the Swiss Poyry Energy Ltd.   
95
 For details see: Coyne et Bellier 2014 “Techno-economic assessment study for Rogun Hydroelectric Construction 
Project” (Vol 1, 2, 3), conducted for the World Bank.  
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Tribune 2015). On 13 June 2015, the Joint Working Group (JWG) of the CASA-1000 Project met in 
Almaty, Kazakhstan. Also in attendance were the main donors such as the World Bank, IsDB, 
USAID, IFC, DFID, and EBRD. On 9 July 2015, tender packages for the supply and installation of 
Multi Terminal HVDC Converter Stations in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan were opened 
(World Bank 2014b).  
4.2.4. CASA-1000 societal consequences: internal displacement and identity of 
resistance  
 
Proceeding with CASA-1000 means proceeding with Rogun. This project’s societal consequences 
promise to be dramatic, for it implies the resettlement of the population living in the areas 
surrounding the river Vakhsh, flooding most of the area: 42, 000 people will be internally displaced 
or “resettled” to other areas. Whilst the technical and economic assessment has been conducted, 
the data on the potential societal consequences of CASA-1000 have not been fully considered, due 
to the lack of data on the affected communities (Coyne et Bellier 2014). This displacement is 
reminiscent of the techniques of population displacement during Stalinist times and, therefore, 
can be seen as a similar social trauma, which will have a lasting effect on people’s consciousness 
and contribute to the development of the identity of resistance to the modern state.  
This social trauma is not a mere socio-psychological problem. It has several empirical 
implications. First, the areas of displacement include power domains of the elites opposed to the 
ruling elite, which is why the displacement can be seen as a means to destroy the elites’ social 
basis through the destruction of existing social networks and patterns of social interaction, habit, 
and routine. Secondly, this displacement implies the deprivation of the communities from their 
usual survival strategies. Thirdly, it re-engineers the sense of belonging, as holy sites or sites of 
cultural heritage, which collectively function as sites of belonging, would be flooded, even if these 
have been promised to be “resettled”, too. The World Bank neglects the connection between the 
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social and geographical realm, as well as physical objects signifying memories and capturing 
histories. These issues are addressed below.  
The Rogun dam is located in the Rasht Valley, which includes seven regions: Faizabad, 
Rogun, Rasht, Tavildara, Tajikabad and Djirgital. These are the main areas from which people will 
be displaced to other areas, such as Dangara, Tursunzade, and Rudaki. The three latter sites 
compose the domains of the ruling elite, where the Presidential power is under the least amount 
of risk.  
According to the World Bank Report: 
Several resettlement sites located in different areas of the country are being developed to 
allow self-construction of their replacement houses by resettled households. Cash 
compensation paid in respect of their current assets is used for this purpose. Resettlement 
sites are meant to provide affected households with different livelihood restoration options, 
including irrigated agriculture (Dangara), industrial employment (Tursunzade), and 
employment at Rogun HPP (several sites close to Rogun town) (World Bank 2014, 7).  
 
Resettlement measures will be implemented by the Directorate for the Inundation Zone of 
the Rogun HPP, a special unit set up by GoT for this purpose (World Bank 2014, 7). Out of 42 000 
people planned to be resettled, 2000 have already been resettled. World Bank (2014, 7) reports 
the conditions for resettlement as satisfactory, in terms of social services, such as schools and 
medicine. However, IMF data on the budget share of social services in Khatlon region (which 
includes Dangara) shows that it has been reduced to 5% in recent years (World Bank 2014a). 
Hence, with the increased amount of people, these social services might be provided using World 
Bank resettlement aid. It would go through the same channels as other foreign aid, i.e. the 
network of banks under the control of the ruling elite. At the local level, the problems of the 
displaced would be addressed by the leaders of hosting communities or the Jamoats (Rossi and 
Khakimov 2014). This breech of existing social networks has also been noted by the World Bank’s 
outsourced Poyry Consulting report, specifically the loss of land and the loss of access to 
communities located on different river banks. In particular, the villages on the left bank of Vakhsh 
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will be cut from access to bridges and roads (Zwahlen 2014a, 213). The reason is that most of 
these roads and bridges will be substituted with new ones, whose location would correspond to 
the new contours of the Valley after inundation (Zwahlen 2014a, 208).  
 This change of infrastructure will include the reconstruction of the M-41 route, one of the 
world’s most important drug trafficking routes (UNODC 2013). According to the Final Report: 
“overall, 36 farms, 62 km of roads, of which 3 km make up the National Road M 41 and 59 km of 
local district roads, will be submerged” (Zwahlen 2014a, 208). Since part of this route is located 
within the Garm domain, i.e. beyond the direct control of the ruling elite, its reconstruction may 
have an impact on restructuring control over drug trafficking, which has been ongoing since the 
time of the civil war. Finally, since this route connects two least governable [for the ruling elite] 
domains, Badakhshan and Garm, it may contribute to the extension of the power of the ruling 
elite to these rebellious areas. Initially, the reconstruction of this road started in 1980, together 
with the first stages of Rogun construction. According to the Planning and Design Institute, the 
entity in charge of road planning in the country, the completion of this road will repair the 
structures built during the Soviet period (Zwahlen 2014a, 208). 
 CASA and Rogun provide a useful legitimation framework for the ruling elite to destroy the 
social basis of these domains, through simple social and geographical re-engineering. The areas 
around the Vakhsh river, including the Rasht Valley (Garm), are associated with the power 
domains of President Akhmadov. It includes Kamarob Valley, where his rival, Mullo Abdullo, was 
killed in 2010. Chapter 5 shows how the rival elites of these domains have been eliminated. During 
the period of the “structural reforms” at the outset of independence, the World Bank provided 
conditions for the ruling elite to re-engineer the state elite, regardless of the power-sharing 
agreement. Today, the World Bank neglects how it provides the ruling elite with the tools to re-
engineer local societies, rationalizing this process through a narrative based on community needs.  
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The extent this project will correspond to the needs of communities can be seen from the 
following practical implications. According to the World Bank Final Report (2014a):  
The ESIA did not consider the role of intangible parameters – such as social harmony, 
avoidance of protest action, food security, diversion of budget from social programs, the 
cost of livelihood support for resettled people and the associated problem of identification 
of land and jobs for them, macro-economic risks, and the potential financial burden on the 
people of Tajikistan, riparian sensitivity to one of the world’s highest dams upstream – 
when assessing alternatives from an environmental and social perspective (World Bank 
2014a, 10).  
 
Furthermore:  
The Panel points out in particular to the cumulative effect of displacing, resettling, and 
rehabilitating 42, 000 people: while the direct cost of resettlement is more or less 
proportional to the number of the people displaced, the difficulty of finding suitable 
agricultural land and/or jobs for a larger number of people and the related 
impoverishment risks will increase more than proportionally (World Bank 2014a, 10).  
 
The main point here is the loss of agricultural land and the deprivation of the displaced people 
from the access to land. Instead of land, people would be compensated in cash. However, as 
addressed in Chapter 3, agriculture and small trade is one of the main pillars of the survival 
strategies of large parts of Central Asian society. The displaced people are deprived of the 
agricultural plots, and their access to trade depends on intra-communal social relations which are 
disrupted by population displacement.  
In trying to prove that there is no risk of inter-community conflict, the final assessment 
reports note that “host communities do not have to give up land which they cultivated so far and 
which will now be occupied by the new settlers *and thus+ land shortage is not an issue” (Zwahlen 
2014a, 214). The same assessment reports the loss of livestock, the lack of sites for livestock 
husbandry, along with the loss of agricultural land (Zwahlen 2014a, 217). It is not that the lack of 
land is an issue. It is the way that land and property rights have developed in the post-Soviet 
period (discussed in chapter 3) that may clash with new practices of land usage. Whilst addressing 
the land rights issue, the resettlement bodies make the reference to the Article 32 of the 
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Constitution of the Republic of Tajikistan which state in essence that every citizen has a right to 
land and no one is entitled to deprive them from private property; and Article 13 of the 
Constitution that land, water, air and other resources belong to the state and that the state 
guarantees their usage (Constitution of RT). As for compensation for the loss of land, the experts 
refer to the Land and the Civil Code of the Republic of Tajikistan, which simply states that the 
rights for the private property of the citizens are guaranteed and citizens therefore have to be 
compensated (Rossi and Khakimov 2014). There follows a set of legislation regulating the 
specificities of these potential situations. Cash compensation is envisioned. Whether cash can 
substitute the social meaning of land is debatable.  
Apart from being a part of their survival strategies, land can also connect people with their 
spiritual and cultural practices. For instance, the same WB assessment identifies the importance of 
the cultural heritage which is to be flooded by Rogun. The list of cultural heritage sites to be 
destroyed by Rogun includes graveyards, places of worship, fortresses, and other holy sites (see 
full list in Zwahlen 2014a, 227 – 229). Some of these places are rooted in Sufi traditions which are 
still very powerful in Central Asia. However, Sufi societies are quite closed. These holy sites have a 
special importance for the local populations. According to data from focus groups conducted by 
the Poyry Consulting (Zwahlen 2014) report, most people suggest that visiting holy sites has been 
a part of the daily routine of these communities. They believe that these places can heal and 
provide prosperity (Zwahlen 2014b, 117). Reportedly, while the government plans the 
resettlement of these places, the populations involved are not aware of this (Ibid.). As Gullette and 
Heathershaw (2015) have shown, Central Asian people have special relations with their 
predecessors and connect such ideas as statehood and sovereignty to a moral duty owed to 
previous generations. The appeal to spirituality and holy sites96 , as well as rationalizing behavior 
                                                          
96
 Tajik people use holy sites and graves for exercising magic that they largely believe in.  The scale of this belief can be 
illustrated by the fact that the Government of Tajikistan amended its Criminal Code on 23 September 2015, adding 
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and choices on this basis have been proven to be part of social interactions and daily routine. This 
is why they can be considered the means of providing the sense of belonging, which will be 
uprooted once people are displaced.  
The resettlement associated with CASA-1000 will not be limited to Tajikistan, but will also 
involve Pakistani and Afghanistani communities living along the new transmission lines. For 
instance, according to both the International Crisis Group (ICG) and the World Bank group, there 
are serious security risks associated with construction of the power transmission lines connecting 
Central Asia with South Asia. These lines would pass through the Salang Pass in Afghanistan, which 
represents one of the hardest territories in Afghanistan, both in environmental and social terms. 
There are also risks of landmines and sabotage, social unrest and protests against this construction 
have been identified as its main social consequences (ICG 2002, 96). 
As the World Bank research group itself notices, there is a huge gap in the data on the 
households and the communities in the Central Asian borderlands, which hinders prognosis of the 
concrete societal risks (Kaminski 2012). The main concern is that construction of the transmission 
lines along the indicated borderlands implies internal displacement of individuals, groups, and 
tribes. To ameliorate the risks of social unrest, the World Bank group offers compensation to the 
displaced people. However, with the revival and strengthening of community based social orders 
in the respective borderlands, the loss of property and land signifies more than a mere loss of 
material wealth. It is the loss of social position within the community, access to resources, 
legitimacy, and, subsequently, the loss of power that this displacement signifies.  
Community-based social order in the respective borderlands has embedded three types of 
tensions to be considered. Firstly, the clash between the central state (formal) legislation system 
and the (informal) system of Shariah law in the borderlands of Pakistan (especially within the tribal 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
criminal charge against practice of magic, with punishments such as incarceration up to 7 years for those who break 
this law. Previously, in 2008, fines for magic activity were imposed, with administrative fines of $180. Reportedly, 
there were about 5.000 magicians in the country, by 2008 (http://www.prezident.tj/ru/node/9977). 
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belt) and Afghanistan; in the Fergana Valley, there could be a clash between empowering 
customary law, the formal state legislation, and the community practices stemming from the 
social interdependence in the field of water-sharing. Secondly, the displacement of persons might 
influence the redistribution of power positions due to their deprivation from the access to land 
and other resources, which are often regulated by the unwritten customs to be confirmed by the 
witnesses who were alive at the point of redistribution of land back in the history of a respective 
community (Alden Wily 2012). Furthermore, the sedentary census is required for one to claim 
property rights over a piece of land, which is also to be confirmed by the witnesses from the 
respective community (Alden Wily 2012). Swapping communities would not imply swapping 
histories. Traditionally, even the most powerful person cannot bring his own rules to an alien 
manor. Thus, the clash between the community self-government systems and the central states 
would represent the main societal outcome provoked by this project.  
Even though the societal consequences of these projects are as yet difficult to identify, there 
are two parallel processes that are more or less obvious. First, it is the process of empowering 
community-based social organization by supporting traditional social and economic institutions 
without aiming at their formalization or standardization. Secondly, the process of intervening into 
the physical terrain of these communities through building an additional grand infrastructure, on 
one hand, provides more economic benefits to these people; on the other hand it risks infringing 
the natural state of power relations within these communities. Such disposition of things may 
contribute to the growing social resistance potential of the communities across borders.  
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4.3. Organizing Societies 
Introduction 
 
The process of organizing societies in Central Asia initially was the brainchild of Western sponsors 
such as the European Union, the United States, the World Bank, the IMF, and a number of 
foundations established by various Western governments. This task required first and foremost for 
democracy to be promoted and for liberalization to be fostered by an NGO sector, which was to be 
created by local actors with the sponsorship of the these same stakeholders. This enterprise was 
to create a “civil society”, a concept which, paradoxically, was not specifically named as such in the 
initial documents related to democracy promotion in the region. Civil society was designed as a 
mechanism of civil control over the state, operating “outside” or “beyond” the state. The rationale 
behind creating the NGO sector was the general philosophy of the World Bank and the IMF which 
promoted the development of a participatory civil society and the decentralization of governance 
(Mansuri & Rao 2013).   
Hence, this section argues that the formal civil society provided leverage for the creation of 
a parallel civil society, an alternative field of competition for defining the character of the state by 
championing societal processes. While this formal civil society failed to create a viable institutional 
infrastructure and gain legitimacy over the years, the parallel civil society, grounded within 
existing social organizations and structural legacies and inspired by the new ideological revival of 
Islamist thought, managed to promote its message through providing functions similar to those of 
the state as well as social benefits in a non-standard form. Specifically, it satisfies the needs of the 
disadvantaged part of the population with respect to education, cultural freedoms and rights, 
social benefits and employment. Most importantly, this parallel civil society demonstrated 
stronger commitment to the change of socio-political order. This argument is pursued in two 
steps. Section 4.3.1 aims to show how the formal civil society failed to organize beyond the 
patronage networks of the state. This contributed to feelings of distrust and alienation with regard 
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to the formal state by a large part of the population. It shows how formal civil society in three 
regional states came about, which actors supported their development, and the rationale they 
used. It highlights the weaknesses of the NGO sector, which led to the loss of legitimacy among a 
great part of the population in Central Asia. Finally, it shows what leverage it has afforded for the 
emergence of a parallel civil society.  
Section 4.3.2 argues that this parallel civil society became a platform to outsource the 
ideological power of the state to external power networks. To demonstrate this, there is a focus 
on the parallel civil society within both organized and non-organized civil society. The former is 
represented by the Islamic NGOs. The latter is composed of social movements operating on the 
basis of indigenous communities, and independent Muslim activists who are involved in public 
debates on private platforms. Both sections attempt to trace the external connections of these 
types of civil society by highlighting their financial resources and ideological preferences. The 
latter play an important role in mapping the parallel civil society, because while a lion’s share of 
influential, young, educated Muslim activists do not disclose membership within any 
organizations, many strongly identify themselves with the Islam of resistance, and create a lively 
public debate across known Islamic movements and their followers. These parallel identities act as 
a tool for the “cartography” of non-organized civil society. An analysis of the existing narratives is 
used to show how ideological preferences are distributed and which power networks gain social 
support by providing the identity resource most favored at the time.  
4.3.1. Formal civil society: institutionalization, patronage, and legitimacy  
 
The term formal civil society here refers to the NGO sector, which is aimed at promoting 
democracy, the rule of law, and market reforms. The main external actors promoting civil society 
in Central Asia are the U.S Congress, the European Commission and the UNDP. There are other 
developmental platforms supported bilaterally by the Western governments, mostly by those of 
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the UK, Norway, Switzerland, Sweden, France and Germany. The United States’ main instrument 
for implementing its programs is USAID. The EU relies mostly on the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights 
(EIDHR). Bilateral agencies established by the EU governments comprise the Deutsche Gesellschaft 
für Internazionale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), the German Development Bank (KfW), the UK 
Department for International Development (DfID), the Swedish International Development 
Program (SIDA), Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), French Agency for 
Development (FDA). International bank involved into this business are mainly European Bank of 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), European Investment Bank (EIB), and the World Bank.  
In the first decade of independence, the United States took the lead among Western 
countries in setting the agenda for involvement in the region, while the other agencies focused 
more on humanitarian aid issues. The achievement of structural change, through the promotion of 
a market economy, democratic governance and the rule of law through the support of political 
and institutional reforms were the main drivers behind allocating grants to the emerging NGOs. 
Reportedly, from 2002 to 2005, the US State Department supported more than 350 programs in 
the CIS countries with grants totalling $239 million, of which 28 per cent was allocated for 
establishing NGOs aimed at promoting democracy and freedom of the media, 33 per cent went 
toward economic reforms; 26 per cent to education, and 13 per cent to strengthening women’s 
leadership in these states (U.S. State Department data quoted in Laruelle 2013). The stated remits 
of these locally organized NGOs did not complement each other, but instead there was a degree of 
overlap and duplication. The result was that these NGOs wasted these investments without 
fostering any real improvements that would have led to structural change in their respective 
societies. Neither did they extend their own organizational frameworks beyond the patronage 
structures of the state they operated in.  
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Most of the focus on institution-building was provided by the EU through the Technical 
Assistance to the Commonwealth of the Independent States (TACIS) program, which came into 
being on the 21 January 2000 and terminated on the 31 December 2006 (EC/99/2000). This period 
coincided with the establishment of BOMCA. One of the main provisions of TACIS was cross-
border cooperation and institution-building (COM/1997/239). Later on, via EC Regulation 
(EC/1638/2006), this instrument was substituted by the European Neighborhood and Partnership 
Instrument. Later on, GIZ pursued similar aims to TACIS with the difference that it also had a 
component of community development (Megoran 2012). According to the new EU regional 
strategy, $ 931 million in aid has been allocated for the period of 2007-2013, most of which is 
earmarked for security issues, drug trafficking, border fortification, focus on energy, rehabilitation 
of pipelines and transport routes, and closer cooperation with the grand projects of CAREC, 
CARICC (on drugs), CASA-1000 and the like.97  The concept of “civil society” as such does not 
appear in the frameworks of these strategies.  
In terms of country results, Kyrgyzstan has been promoted as a “democracy island” in the 
region. The U.S. supported all actions of social protest and social resistance, organized by the so-
called ‘local’ NGOs. This resulted in the unintended but popular perception of the US as a 
hypocritical actor employing double-standards and promoting the idea that “a conjunction 
between the market economy and social chaos exist” (Laruelle and Peyrouse 2013, 45). The 
legitimacy of Western actors in the region has been undermined through various policy decisions 
they have made, such as support by the United States for the “color revolutions” and the choice of 
Uzbekistan as the main partner in the “war on terror” despite the dictatorial nature of its regime 
(Laruelle and Peyrouse 2013). The ‘infamous Western democracy’ has become the subject of 
popular jokes rather than idealistic aspirations. In Tajikistan, civil society initiatives were first 
                                                          
97
 It is important to keep in mind that this strategy was developed in the anticipation of the US withdrawal from 
Afghanistan. 
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promoted as part of the framework of Peace and Reconciliation which established power-sharing 
initiatives aimed at creating inclusive political platforms to encourage former combatants into 
formal politics. Unlike in Kyrgyzstan, the formal civil society in Tajikistan did not become the 
platform for protest, since peace was favored over justice.  
The prerequisites for the development of civil society are considered to be the free market, 
privatization, individual entrepreneurship and private ownership of land – the conditions under 
which civil society becomes a mediator between the state and “an elusive traditional society, 
perceived as a liability” (Roy 2004, 2). Even though this definition is the subject of intense debate 
within academic literature, it does influence the way that proponents of civil society in Central 
Asia perceive and foster its development. In other words, the formal civil society in Central Asia 
can be depicted as a set of NGOs, with overlapping agendas and a discourse on human rights and 
failed states as the common denominator. It is a project which has been imposed from the 
outside, rather than a phenomenon “indigenous to the region” (Starr 1999, 27).  
The organizational design of this civil society was largely detached from grassroots social 
organizations in the societies in the region (Roy 1999). As shown in the previous chapters, what 
Roy (1999) calls the “real societies of Central Asia” have been comprised of communities 
organized into collectives, due to the system of kolkhozes in the Soviet period, and remain largely 
rural in their mode of organizing labor and social order (Roy 1999). The kolkhoz as an 
administrative, economic and sociological entity does not have the same meaning as in the Soviet 
period, but the processes and interdependencies stemming from this social organization have 
remained. However, these conditions seem to be conducive to the development of the 
community-based participatory civil society as promoted by the World Bank and the IMF in the 
second decade of independence. Under these conditions, the focus on communities seems to be 
promising.   
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If we refer to the classic definitions of civil society, we will see that the main prerequisite or 
assumption for its viability is the presence of “collective interest”, justice and fairness defining the 
“collective action” (Habermas 1991a, b). However, what we observe in contemporary societies is 
the existence of parallel agendas of “collective interest”, not so much of development in terms of 
“poverty elimination”, but in terms of development as in creating a “new” socio-political order. 
Specifically, (re)emerging communities in Central Asia lie greatly at the intersection of the illicit 
and legal, formal and informal, as has been shown in previous sections. As communities are both 
isolated from their centers due to the materialized borders and prone to transnational flows 
beyond these centers, the empowerment of communities would not necessarily produce the type 
of civil society envisioned by the aforementioned external actors. The initial disposition of the 
NGO sector as not corresponding to the natural social organization of these societies exemplifies 
this.  
Additionally, the governments have perceived NGOs as the continuation of Western 
foreign policies. In order to survive, local NGOs established “greatly personalized relations” with 
their donors and local elites (Roy 2005, 1009). Furthermore, considering the high unemployment 
rate and changing patterns of the job market immediately following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, establishing an NGO became a promising entrepreneurial activity. Hence, NGO sector failed 
to organize itself as a mediating space between the grassroots societies and the states.  
The NGO establishment was flooded with foreign funds offering luxurious (at that time) 
employment conditions for the most educated parts of the population. The first NGO 
entrepreneurs were representatives of the state (read: political) elites. Relatives of the high level 
politicians were among the first civil entrepreneurs. Information about the allocation of funds and 
investments has been made available primarily to people close to these political circles. Unequal 
access to such information provided unequal chances for people to engage in such civil 
entrepreneurship. A vivid example of the close cooperation between the NGO sector and the elite 
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networks is the one of Uzbekistan, where most funding to be allocated to the NGOs had to go 
through the “Forum Foundation”98, led by Gulnara Karimova, daughter of President Karimov. In 
Kyrgyzstan, Aidar Akaev, the son of the first President, occupied a similar role, albeit in an informal 
sense. After 2005, this role passed to the son of the second President, Maksim Bakiev. Maksim 
even managed to establish an administrative structure (within the Apparatus of the President) 
called “Center for Investments, Innovation and Development” (TsARII99), the approval of which 
was required for all investment initiatives. However, this was more concerned with business 
sectors rather than that of NGOs, unless an NGO had an agenda of economic development. In 
Tajikistan, NGOs are tightly controlled by the family of President Rakhmonov. 
The expanded system of grant allocation through the UNDP most vividly exemplifies this 
situation. Currently, it is a large bureaucratic machine in Central Asia with little mechanism for 
accountability. The lack of accountability and the impossibility of controlling the flow of financial 
redistribution within the bureaucratic net of its subordinate institutions affect not only the 
popular programs praising human rights, but also the programs that aim at attaining a tangible 
goal of improving living conditions. Examples of these would be the programs on biodiversity, 
forestry, cleaning natural water reservoirs, fishery etc. 
A case from northern Kyrgyzstan illustrates how this system works, i.e. how resources leak 
and human conditions remain unaddressed. The system of grant allocation is a three-step-process. 
Firstly, the central office (UNDP) announces a thematic tender to be redistributed to the UNDP 
and related NGOs offices in the provinces. The managers of the provincial offices channel this 
information to the population. In order to apply for the tender, one has to establish a small 
foundation or an NGO to obtain the legal personality. Most of these people in the remote areas 
are rural farmers and workers, who possess neither language nor computer skills. In view of this, 
                                                          
98
Recently closed in relation to other big political scandals  
99
Which in Russian sounds like the plural of the word “Tsar’” (the King), the game of the words which was quickly 
picked up by the journalists and the opposition to criticize the structure, prior to the second revolution in 2010  
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they submit their projects to the provincial offices, the leaders of which sometimes deal with the 
applicants’ private correspondence themselves, having informally been authorized to do so.  
After the grant has been won, leaders of the provincial NGOs channel the money to their 
own bank accounts and their NGOs, which they own in parallel. The official provides the report 
with the intention of substituting their bank accounts for the bank accounts of the winning NGO 
(Founder of the NGO Oi-Tal-Eco, interviews 2014). When the grant has been won, they formalize 
all official documentation but insert details of their own NGOs. Even where they do not do this, 
they channel the money to their own bank accounts. However, when submitting official reports 
they omit details of their own bank account and instead provide accounts of an actual NGO 
(usually the initial applicant), to create the impression, in official documentation at least, that the 
transaction is legitimate. The leader of the applicant NGO may only find out about this a year later, 
from a newspaper or via local gossip alleging that they pocketed the grant monies themselves 
instead of aiding the community or fulfilling their initial project goals. Should the leader of such an 
NGO try to discover the truth and seek justice, they will come up against a tight-lipped network of 
interconnected individuals working for the respective banks, UNDP branches and the sponsoring 
Embassies, none of whom will cooperate with any investigation.100 
Analysis of media reports of alleged NGO corruption shows that such cases are typical 
throughout the region (Danilov 2010). The underlying issue is the lack of any accountability 
mechanisms for these NGO networks. Indeed, this type of corruption conducted through NGO 
                                                          
100
For example, in the case of a local NGO “Oi-Tal-Eco”, it seems impossible to break the connection between the 
EBRD and the UNDP provincial office, because such deals are done between “partners in crime”, who help each other 
out while laundering the documentation (author’s investigation of the case of the NGO in a remote Tyup region, 
northern Kyrgyzstan). The central UNDP office in its turn sends the complainants back to their provincial offices, where 
they have no voice whatsoever. The Embassies who actually sponsor one or another project also keep a diplomatic 
tone, promise to investigate the cases to provide an answer, which then never gets realized due to the constant 
change of cadres, i.e. the officers responsible for certain projects. When as a matter of last resort a complainant tries 
to appeal to the law enforcement bodies of the respective state, she is told that in order for the law enforcement to 
intervene into the financial affairs of such NGOs, they need the financial statement from the bank account of the 
complainant. Otherwise, the state has no right to get involved. And as described above, the bank provides false 
receipts and statements, since the respective officers are all mutually supportive in the matters like this. The vicious 
circle locks and the injustice continues. 
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networks and the related investment banks are very difficult to identify and/or disclose. For this 
reason, the Western-sponsored NGOs have developed a reputation for harboring organized crime 
or money laundering networks (Danilov 2010). Obviously, the more disadvantaged parts of 
population are disillusioned and do not perceive such networks as providers of inclusion, 
freedoms, rights, or justice.  
Formal civil society, therefore, failed to institutionalize itself beyond the patronage 
networks or become a platform for social inclusion or civil participation. In delegitimizing itself, it 
instead provided leverage for the parallel civil society to develop. Nevertheless, the formal civil 
society managed to boost three types of rhetoric: (i) human and women’s rights; (ii) the rule of 
law; (iii) criticism of the central state as a failed state. However, in view of its de-legitimized image, 
these three discourses were instead appropriated by the parallel civil society, as will be shown in 
the section 4.3.2.  
The rationale behind the creation of this formal civil society was the classic idea of 
democracy promotion and decentralization. Due to global events, it was divided in two stages: 
prior to 9/11 the focus was on decentralizing and weakening the state; and post 9/11 the focus 
was on security and strengthening the state (Starr 1999).  However, there was incoherence in the 
interpretation by the leading Western actors of these central concepts. The practical 
implementation of these concepts depended on the concrete sponsorship of an NGO. For 
example, decentralization, as implied by the EU, meant decentralization of formal state 
institutions and creating more local governance bodies in the remote areas of the states. This 
could explain why the external actors’ efforts to organize societies have been widely seen as 
empowering elites (Kreikemeyer et. al 2007). The EU, despite its popular image as a “soft power” 
interested only in human rights and harmonious coexistence, started its involvement into the 
region with the BOMCA and TACIS projects, which had goals of border fortification and 
decentralization of the state (in the sense of creating institutions of state governance in the 
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remote areas). In other words, the EU priority initially was a focus on strengthening the state. 
Education and community empowerment provided the focus for the GIZ programs in between 
2004 and 2007 (Bichsel 2009). The new EU-Central Asia (2007; 2013) strategy was greatly 
influenced by the fear of the uncertainty to come after the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, 
which is why security and state-building have returned as the main pillars of democracy 
promotion.  
The United States, on the other hand, promoted the empowerment of society, which in 
reality meant the “empowerment of an individual vis-à-vis society and the state”, i.e. private 
enterprise and market competition (Roy 1999). The World Bank’s definition of decentralization 
instead concerned local communities and the “focus on the most vulnerable” as the main agents 
of social participation (Mansuri and Rao 2013). It was the Amartya Sen (1999) idea of 
“Development and Equality” which was taken as the common denominator for the empowerment 
of communities and non-standard forms of economic activity (Mansuri and Rao 2013). The 
problem with the latter was that there has not been much research done101 on what “empowering 
communities” would be in practical terms, and what impact past legacies and the complex 
relationship of the elites—which has been neglected due to the perception of “Central Asia as 
tabula rasa”—would have on the content of the emerging civil society.  
As stated above, there was an overarching rationale for the promotion of the NGO sector 
prior to September 11. In the eyes of Western actors, civil society was the main component of 
restructuring the Soviet system and bringing about social change. Its main goals were the 
promotion of democracy and the rule of law, through networks of free citizens, such as 
associations, unions, and NGOs. Its instruments allowed for other elements of state (re)building to 
become possible, such as privatization and liberalization. This is the dominant view within the 
formal NGO sector in Central Asia (Kainazarov 2014).  
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Due to the “iron curtain”  
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After September 11, funds earmarked for democracy promotion were reallocated to 
security cooperation. EU development aid has been significantly refocused on Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan through the Food Security Program and the Non-State Actor/Local Authorities 
Program. After September 11, the U.S. shifted its support to project-based result-oriented 
initiatives, rather than to those aiming at long-term structural reforms (Blank 2012). Furthermore, 
this situation forced the civil society to respect the margins of the state, with little regard to its 
authoritarian nature. In the post 9/11 period long-term programs aiming at regime or structural 
change have become increasingly rare.  
In 2004, the doctrine of the “global war on terror” reintroduced and redefined the concept 
of civil society. Specifically, the G-8 summit accepted the “Greater Middle East” strategy, the main 
idea of which was to create similar types of civil society across Central Asia through Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, Turkey, and the Middle East (Roy 2005). This is a project which “reforms the neo-
conservative agenda of the exogenous regime change (by means of intervention), and promotes 
(“sustainability of”) social change “without confronting the existing regimes” (Roy 2005, 1005).  In 
parallel, as mentioned earlier, the World Bank adopted the new post-1999 focus on the “most 
vulnerable” rather than on elite-empowerment. Hence, the approach to the creation of civil 
society almost completely shifted to one of community-empowerment to promote local 
participation. Over the past decades the World Bank has allocated almost $85 billion to local 
participatory development in a belief that “involving communities in at least some aspects of 
project design and implementation creates a closer connection between development aid and its 
intended beneficiaries” (Mansuri & Rao 2013, 1).  
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4.3.2.  Parallel civil society: outsourcing ideological power  
 
Parallel civil society is defined here as the manifestations of grassroots social activism, which can 
be both organized through the NGO sector and can also be non-organized, relying on the 
indigenous social structures of a society.  It is “parallel” because it works at the intersection of 
illicit and legal and reflects the natural social organization of societies. It also develops the 
functions and the legitimacy of the formal civil society and operated in competition with it. Its 
resources might come both from formal and informal sources, such as official or unofficial donor 
money from abroad or informal trade as discussed in section 4.2. Finally, it organizes itself mostly 
according to revived memories of customary law, through trusted networks, and with an 
aspiration to build a social order based on Shariah law. Ideologically, it is attuned to Islamic ideas, 
not only rooted in the ancient Fergana Valley cultures, i.e. those primarily brought about by the 
transnational processes criss-crossing the Fergana Valley.  
If one may imagine a map of these processes, this would be an area connecting 
Chinese/Uighur Xinjiang, the Fergana Valley in Central Asia, through Afghanistan to the Pakistani 
Federally Administrated Tribal Area (FATA), and radiating out from there to the bigger players – 
Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iran, Qatar, and other Middle Eastern countries. 
Since Islam is seen as a “normative practice” in most of these areas, it is these actors that foster 
the main sense of belonging and identity for many independent Muslim activists in the region 
(Marsden 2005). This is what “community-empowerment” has become in practice.  
The nature of the parallel civil society is complex. Some of its agencies may intersect with 
the state, criminal, and business sectors. However, for the purposes of this text, I suggest 
organizing them into the following categories. Firstly, there are those sponsors from the Middle 
East, India, Pakistan, and Turkey who finance the establishment of Islamic NGOs, charity 
foundations, mosque building projects, religious schools. These also provide financial support to 
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Muslims on the ad-hoc basis based on other financial needs. Secondly, there are the power 
networks of the Islamist social movements, which support movements such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir and 
Tablighi Jamaat. They clearly have revisionist designs with respect to the state and social order, 
but they also claim to be non-violent. These social movements have largely infiltrated societies at 
the grassroots and their organizational structure relies on that of the communities. However, a 
large part of this parallel civil society comprise independent Muslim activists who do not formally 
belong to any movement. Their narratives exemplify how the sense of belonging and identity can 
shift beyond the geographic borders of a state. 
4.3.3. Islamic NGOs: the narratives of betrayal and their sponsors 
 
In Kyrgyzstan, the formal institutionalization of Islam coincided with the adoption of two laws: the 
Law on Banking Secrecy 2002 (amended in 2008, 2009) and the Law on Anti-Money Laundering 
and Anti-Terrorist Financing 2006 (amended in 2009, 2012). In 2006, Kyrgyzstan joined the 
international anti-money laundering system, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). The same year 
also marks the establishment of the Financial Investigation Unit under the National Security 
Service. Previously, these matters were overseen by the Ministry of Finance. During this same 
period a big scandal broke, involving officials of the State Registry Office, the body responsible for 
issuing national passports. A number of blank Kyrgyz passports had been issued in Bishkek and 
sold to a certain individuals. This was an important instance because among those individuals 
there are people involved in drug trafficking and extremist movements as discovered later (a 
former senior official of the Registry Office of the Kyrgyz Republic, interview 2014). 
After the 2002, NGOs with an Islamic agenda have mushroomed. According to the law on 
Bank Secrecy Law, banks were no longer entitled to share information about their operations with 
“third parties” (which comprise all state offices, except the Financial Investigation Unit of the NSS, 
KG). However, between 2002 and 2006, there was no separate Unit dealing with financial 
 206 
 
investigations, even though these were presumably handled by the NSS and the Ministry of 
Finance. However, none of these bodies was authorized to request disclosure of necessary 
information from the banks. In 2006, Kyrgyzstan created the Financial Investigation Unit, which 
became responsible for the investigation of financial crime and which was therefore authorized to 
obtain this information from the banks. However, they have to work within the framework of the 
international anti-money laundering system, FATF), i.e. the state structures may request the 
information on the origins of transactions only in cases where the amount of the transaction is 
higher than $10,000 (interview with a senior officer of the Financial Investigations Unit, Bishkek, 
2014). Furthermore, according to the Law on NGOs (1999), state authorities are not authorized to 
intervene in the internal affairs of these organizations. NGOs do not have to present any financial 
reports to the state. In other words, according to this law, all registered NGOs, regardless of their 
ideological agenda, possess legal protection similar to diplomatic immunity, especially in their 
financial matters.  
There are more than 30 officially registered Islamic NGOs (who meet the formal 
requirements of the State Commission on Religious Affairs and the Ministry of Justice) in 
Kyrgyzstan. Their stated aims can be categorized into the following: 1) charity; 2) education; 3) 
Muslim women’s rights; 4) Islamic medical research; 4) youth development; 5) Islamic 
international cooperation; 6) Islam and peace-building.  In addition to this there is one privately-
published newspaper “Shariah”. According to data published by the Financial Investigation Unit of 
the Kyrgyz Republic, the main activity supported by these NGOs is the building of mosques or 
namazkana (prayer rooms) by different communities (jamaats). These foundations receive support 
mostly from private sources in Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran 
and the other states in the Middle East (Interview with the senior FIU official, Bishkek, 2014). The 
peculiarity of namazkana is that their activity is not regulated or controlled by the state (SC/RA 
2014).  
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Recently, a trend has emerged where financial support from the local entrepreneurs is 
sought as well. Some criminals build mosques in their communities to display their religious 
commitment publicly. From informal talks with some leaders of these foundations, it was noted 
that those NGOs promoting ideas such as womens' rights and youth development programs do 
not seem to have stable donors. Hence, their leaders claim that “no stable donors, no external 
agenda, no conditionality attached” (Interview with the leader of Mutakalim). Those organizations 
which are education-oriented have particular sponsors and a particular agenda, approved by the 
states in which they operate. Considering the law, mentioned above, if an organization is 
registered as an NGO it is difficult for the state to control the resources related to the so-called 
internal affairs of that NGO. However, the last Conceptual Framework on State-Religion Affairs 
included a notion that requires reporting on financial inflows of these organizations, even if it is 
registered as an NGO (CSPR/KG 2014).  
 Legally, all registered Islamic organizations must get approval from the State Commission 
on Religious Affairs and function according to the fatwa (a legal act) of the Spiritual Directorate of 
Muslims of the Kyrgyz Republic (DUMK). However, this organization has been completely 
discredited in recent years due to its connection to corruption scandals related to hajj organizing 
procedures. In this way, Islamic NGOs are not significantly different from the liberal (or Western) 
NGO sector and are largely perceived as having “double standards” (Randomn interviews at the 
entrances to mosques, Bishkek 2014). In general terms, these organizations use three main 
themes in their rhetoric: human rights and women’s rights; the rule of law; and failed states. 
However, their idiosyncratic take on these can highlight the absurdity of mainstream public 
debates.  
For instance, Islamic women’s rights’ organizations are concerned with protection of 
women’s rights, but only insofar as these revive the long-suppressed Muslim identity. They also 
campaign for the rights of so-called “unofficial wives” (Interviews with women involved in Islamist 
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activism, Bishkek 2014). Surprisingly, participants within the most popular “Progressive Muslim 
Women NGO – Mutakalim” are proponents of polygamy, because, this would mean that senior 
wives can be in charge of any junior wives. So-called junior wives (or unofficial affairs) also strive 
for the promotion of their rights, specifically their right to financial benefits to which they are 
entitled from a man involved, according to the Shariah law (Aslanova 2014, interview). This 
seemingly small detail demonstrates the irony of “women’s rights” and how issues like family-
planning, patronage, justice, and social order in the region are perceived.  Most importantly, it 
demonstrates how the cause of human rights has metamorphosed within the local context.  
In a recent interview with the news agency “24kg”, Jamal Frontbek kyzy, the leader of the 
Mutakalim movement and Kadyr Malikov, the leading expert on Islam in Central Asia, openly 
stated that the time had come to create Shariah courts and implement Shariah law (Malikov, 
2014).102 Even though this idea now officially emanates from “moderate” proponents of the 
Islamization of the state, banned movements such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir, salafiya etc. promote the 
same ideas. One of the indicators officially used just two years ago103 by the State Commission on 
Religious Affairs to distinguish extremist propaganda from a religious rhetoric is whether the 
creation of an Islamic state based on the Shariah law was promoted (SC/RA/KG 2014; SC/RA/KG 
2012; SC/RA/TJK 2012).104 
In addition to those NGOs with concrete secular or religious agendas, there is an NGO 
which aims to create common ground for so-called secular-religious dialogue in Central Asia. This 
NGO is called “Search for Common Ground” (SCG), and is sponsored by the EU and the UNDP. Its 
aim is to conduct research on radicalization and Islamization in Central Asia. However, the main 
“experts” invited to conduct this research set the research agenda in such a way that it is 
sympathetic to the very idea of creating a state based on Shariah law. This is reflected in the 
                                                          
102
http://www.knews.kg/society/56073_v_kyirgyizstane_nazrela_neobhodimost_sozdaniya_shariatskih_sudov_schitaet_ekspert/ 
103
During the author’s fieldwork in 2012 
104
 For example, Dr. Kadyr Malikov has been working as a principal advisor to the Ministry of Interior, National Security 
Services, Drug Control Agency, and other state institutions on the matters of Islam and Islamic governance. 
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publications and seminars they produce. The Round Tables and conferences organized by this 
NGO have gathered mainly theologists and religious clerks who openly oppose secularism both 
within higher education and in secondary schools. Debates are held mainly in the national 
language and are organized around statements like the one below:  
Let us once and for all cease this Soviet occupation which is still going on by means of 
education. We do not need to study other cultures in our schools. We have seen that such 
education only disseminates ideas alien to the Kyrgyz people and the genuinely Kyrgyz 
traditions. We need to teach them Islam and its different forms. Islam only can save us from 
the evils of corruption and moral degradation which we face now.  
 
(A religious clerk teaching at a madrassah in Bishkek, Speech at the Round Table organized by the 
SCG, Bishkek, June 2014). 
 
In addition to mainstream narratives, some Islamic NGOs provide certain social benefits to the 
population. For example, the World Association of Youth, headed by Said Bayumi, an Egyptian 
businessman, has built 22 schools and 250 mosques in Kyrgyzstan (SC/RA/KG 2014). Another 
foundation, the Aga-Khan foundation, promotes a social agenda similar to that of the welfare 
state.  Its component aims are: 1) economic development (i.e. the building of Islamic financial 
institutions), 2) cultural development (the fulfillment of the spiritual needs if the people), 3) rural 
development (establishing civil society in rural areas), and 4) social development (education). This 
foundation has established a network of Universities, one of which is situated in Kyrgyzstan. The 
Central Asian University aims to conduct research and teaching on such areas of development as 
agriculture, rural development, and urban planning.  
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan exert severe control over any NGOs, especially those with an 
Islamist agenda. NGOs in these countries face many obstacles in registering their activity. 
Uzbekistani Islam is fully controlled by the national Spiritual Directorate of Muslims (DUMK). 
Furthermore, there is an elaborate surveillance system within mahallas and their internal 
gatherings. The state is developing a modern Islam which is state-sponsored and controlled, and 
bans non-state instances of Islamist activity. However, this does not prevent Islamists from 
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creating wide underground networks. In providing substitutes for the social functions of the 
states, they make themselves attractive to the common people. Additionally, they supply those 
activities which create a so-called sense of life or meaningful lifestyle, as opposed to the modern 
state. The Tajik government refuses to register such organizations. Their reasons for doing so are 
explained in terms of anti-terrorism and anti-extremism However, the threat is much more 
complex, since the religious landscape is itself complex.  
4.3.4. The civil “underground”: the narratives of resistance and their sponsors  
 
 “The new moon is the clock which shows when the Holy Ramadan is over. All Muslim people across 
the globe have oriented themselves by the moon, not by a phone call from Saudi Arabia.”  
(An interview excerpt) 
 
This seemingly metaphoric use of a Koranic verse triggered an open distrust between the salafis 
and the representatives of other Islamic movements in Bishkek in August 2014. The issue related 
to the fact that Kyrgyzstani Muslims were waiting for the new moon to appear which would signify 
the end of the Holy Ramadan. Due to the laws of nature, the moon reaches its different phases 
according to the geographic altitude and latitude of the land over which it is seen. For this reason 
Saudi Arabia finished Ramadan a day or two earlier than Kyrgyzstan. While most of the Kyrgyzstani 
Muslims kept on fasting, salafis openly boycotted the fast. Their reason for doing so was that they 
had received an important call to this effect from Saudi Arabia (Salafi movement member, 
interview, Bishkek 2014). Although this conflict did not result in serious public consequences, the 
adherents of different Islamic movements started discussing their differences more seriously. In 
addition to differences in rituals (which most of modern young believers do not believe to be 
crucial), most discussion centered on the socio-political order and the state as the epitome of that 
social order. Questions like “What should the state look like?” seem to be things that particularly 
unite and divide the educated, young105and observant Muslim in Central Asia.  
                                                          
105
Some of my interviewees possess Master degrees in Human Rights from France, Belgium, and Germany. 
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Change in the social and political order, the disenchantment toward the state and the myth 
of political Islam as willed by the Prophet Muhammed to the entire Islamic Ummah comprise the 
leitmotif of these narratives of resistance. Hence, the crucial feature of the civil “underground” is 
that it provides a platform for resistance, in this case the “Islam of resistance.”106 The term 
“resistance” itself is becoming largely reconsidered by the members of Islamic movements due to 
the influence of the Islamic State. Traditionally, resistance would be seen as something which 
opposes a concrete regime. Today, however, these movements “think bigger” and aim at changing 
the systems both within their native lands and beyond:107  “You might think, this is naïve and 
utopian, but is not it true that the state itself is nothing more than a myth; is it not true that all we 
achieve in life is a product of our fantasy and imagination?!” (An independent Muslim activist108, 
interview, Bishkek 2014).  
 Drawing a map of the civil underground is difficult due to the fact that there is heated 
debate about which movements are legal and which ones are illicit. I include here only those 
which, by most accounts, represent resistance movements. They are Salafiya, supported by Saudi 
Arabia and Syria, Hizb-ut-Tahrir (allegedly supported by Saudi Arabia) and Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan (connected to the Afghani Taliban). However, the debate on political order is joined by 
Tablighi Jamaat, Ahmadiya109 and Fethulla Gülen movement.110These are banned in the three 
countries, too, but they are perceived as elitist projects, rather than grassroots social movements. 
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 I owe this term to Maureen Pritchard. 
107
Interviews with members of the “underground” who do not belong to any movement, socialized in most of them, 
and prefer to organize the one of their own, Bishkek, September 2014. 
108
This interviewee holds an MA in Human Rights from a German University. 
109
 Rooted in the British Indian tradition, currently associated with Pakistan, and has its Headquarters in London. Due 
to that its members recognize MirzaGulam Ahmad, a Messiah or Mahdi, it is not very popular among the young 
people, because there cannot be any Prophet except Muhammad.Due to the same reasons, they are not permitted to 
perform hajj, by Saudi law.  
110
Fethula Gülen movement is associated with Turkish/Western elitist project, which is banned in Uzbekistan for its 
involvement into the support to Afghanistani Taliban and creating opposition to the Turkish President Erdogan, who 
banned this movement due to his conviction in its relation to the Western security services. Its method is establishing 
private schools and Universities to create alternative to the madrassahs education. This is not included into the 
grassroots “underground”, because it is a movement unsupported by the common people. Rather, it has followers 
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In terms of their tangible resources, two of the safest types of informal transactions are 
identified. The first is where payment goes from the external sponsors directly to the bank 
accounts of a recipient group or organization. The second is where cash is brought under the 
pretext of cash flow within a small business here and there, via flights through offshore zones, 
such as, for example, United Arab Emirates. This cash is distributed by reliable persons within 
“mutual trust networks” (described in the second chapter) to remote provinces and border areas. 
Examples of the first type of transaction were demonstrated by the cases of several madrassahs in 
Bishkek, were payments were made in small amounts (below the $10.000 legal quota to qualify 
for the Law on Banking Secrecy mentioned above) numerous times. This process involves using 
shadow (accounting) books by an accountant, who is not registered as an official employee. The 
accountant works remotely, from home (A “distant accountant” of a madrassah, interview, 
Bishkek 2014). In this way, the madrassahs, which are formally required to report to the State 
Commission on Religious Affairs, do not report this person. Furthermore, prior to the adoption of 
the new Concept on Religious Affairs (2014), these madrassahs were not obliged to provide any 
financial reports to the state. My interviewee works like this for a couple of madrassahs and 
confirms that large sums of money are being transacted, which is also reflected in this person’s 
salary. This person is also paid also for their discretion. The main donors include Turkey, the 
United Arab Emirates, and to a lesser extent Saudi Arabia. However, Saudi money is known for 
being transferred through the UAE, which is why the money coming from the UAE is usually 
suspected to be the Saudi money. Furthermore, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are 
two partners in business, both of which are perceived by the non-salafis groups as being tightly 
connected to the West (HuT member 4, interview, Bishkek, 2014).  
                                                                                                                                                                                                
among the graduates of its Universities and schools, as well as those involved into common business with the 
representatives of this movement. In Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, this movement has been also recently banned.  
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The second type of transaction involves bringing cash personally in flights from Dubai. Due 
to the fact that the UAE is an offshore zone, one is allowed to bring up to $1 million in cash (“Fly 
Dubai” officers, interview, Bishkek 2014). The persons, reported as those suspected in this 
business, fly to Dubai and back several times a year (“Fly Dubai” information, 2014). These money 
transactions are not therefore officially completed through mosques or formal NGOs, but rather 
through personal networks.  
 Another source of income, as reported by official sources, is one arising from actual 
participation in the Syrian civil war. For instance, the ICG (2015) reports that, according to the 
Western sources, between 2000 and 4000 persons from Central Asia went to Syria to take part in 
the war (ICG 2015, 3). According to figures provided by the Ministry of the Interior on the Kyrgyz 
Republic, these number between 60 and 100 (High ranked officer of the Ministry of Interior, 
interview 2014). The same report states that the IMU in Syria comprises a separate faction to the 
Islamic State. However, this is at odds with reports from independent Muslim activists, who report 
that the IMU fights on the side of the Islamic State. There are, therefore, two types of warrior in 
Syria: those fighting to overthrow Assad’s regime, whose main motivation is money; and those 
joining the IS to continue “living in a truly Islamic state” (Sympathizers of the IS, interview, Bishkek 
2014). This distinction between reasons people fight in Syria also provides an analytical distinction 
between the types of Jihads: the first of which is for regime change and the second of which is for 
building an Islamic state.  
 Comparing the ICG data with the data collected through interviews with members and 
sympathizers of these movements, a slightly different narrative emerges. The recruitment process, 
which the ICG depicts as one conducted through mosques and namazkana (prayer room), does not 
in reality happen in quite the way they describe. Even though the daily prayer mosques and 
namazkana are the places least controlled by the state authorities, there is a widening sense of 
distrust towards these places among young Muslim activists. They avoid involving themselves in 
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critical discussions in these places. “We only pray and go”, they say. The debates happen mostly in 
the closed gatherings and groupings outside of any institution. It happens through social media 
networks and mutual trust networks. According to many respondents, mosques have lost the trust 
of these activists. In relation to this, some of the interviewees quote the verse from Koran which 
says that: “The time will come when the demon will be everywhere, even in the mosques and that 
a believer should not trust anybody except his own heart” (an independent Muslim activist, 
interview, Bishkek 2014).111 
 It seems also that the most quoted (by the Muslim activists) flaw within the ICG report 
(2015) is that it does not draw a distinction between the sides those recruited to fight in Syria align 
themselves with, and this what Jihad they participate in.  
The reported people who went to Syria are in reality fighting for salafis against Assad 
government. This is the type of jihad which has been widespread among Muslims for all 
these decades of “global war on terror”. It uses the methods of partisan war and does not 
have a strong agenda to promote political Islam. The example of “Muslim Brotherhood 
shows that this jihad has been done merely against a particular regime, the fight which 
thereafter dissolved and did not bring any fruitful results for the Muslim Ummah. What 
distinguishes Islamic State from the other organizations previously proclaiming Jihad, 
including Al Qaeda is that the IS pursues the goal of changing the system and the political 
order of the respective states. In this light, Islamic State is the most successful type of 
Islamic movement since the time of the Ottoman Empire. It is a successful attempt to build 
a political order almost from scratch.  
                                                          
111
According to the latest quantitative studies on trust among population across Southern Kyrgyzstan, formal religious 
leaders score only 36 per cent among those figures or institutions people would turn to a piece of advice once faced a 
problem (M-Vector fieldwork data, 2012). The similar finding on shifting of trust from the formal institutions and 
formal leaders to the closer circles of friends and families is supported by the OSCE (2012) study on radicalization in 
Tajikistan and the Human Rights Council (2010) study in Tajikistan on the trust among the population (“Who do you 
trust more in the state?).  Secondary data from Uzbekistani scholars show the high degree of suspicion to the formal 
institutions, too. Additionally, in Kyrgyzstan, among the values that the government should address, 93 per cent of 
respondents name “upholding of religious values” and 73 per cent consider that different religious groups “get along 
in our country well somewhat well”; 23 per cent – for a party that represents moderate Islamic views; 23 per cent – 
part that represents jihadist form of Islam is somewhat inappropriate and 57 – very inappropriate; 84.3 per cent 
considers themselves Muslim (M-Vector, 2012).Quantitative research on Hizb-ut-Tahrir shows that among the reasons 
of support to this group, people enlist such as: “Positive view is explained by that this group: 1) promotes good values 
– 10.5 per cent; 2) promotes Muslim rights – 16.2 per cent; 3) performs charity work – 19 per cent; 4) provides social 
services and aid – 21.4 per cent; 5) helped a neighbor or a friend – 22.3 per cent; 6) helped them or their family 27.5 
per cent; 7) its leaders are legitimate religious authority – 27.8 per cent; 8) involved in government or professional 
groups – 28.6 per cent; 9) fights against non-Muslims – 46.1 per cent; 10) trying to establish a true Islamic state – 59.6 
per cent (M-Vector 2012).  Despite that many authors find that the influence of Hizb-ut-Tahrir has been diminishing, 
the population’s awareness of this organization and its cause is the highest in this region (Malikov 2010). The matter is 
that even if people do not officially enter the organization, they are being engaged through the popular activities that 
this organization has organized and the ideas that it disseminated.   
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(Notes of the talk of a “Keynote speaker” from a discussion in a gathering with other 
“independent Muslim activists”, Bishkek, 2014) 
 
These are the reasons why many believers can relate to the Islamic State. They want a change of 
social order, not merely the overthrow of Assad’s regime. As rightly noted by the ICG (2015), the 
followers do not fit a typical profile. It attracts people of different sociological characteristics. The 
Islamic State however, is already gaining respect among many independent believers, because it 
promises more than just a Jihad against a regime. It is an attempt to build a new state, the Islamic 
state, with an ambition to make it similar to the Ottoman Empire. IMU has already announced 
itself as joining the organization (Lemon 2015). The same happened with some part of the Afghan 
Taliban (ICG 2015). Hizb-ut-Tahrir members do not express any desire to join. However, its job in 
“preparing the societal ground for the political phase of Islamization” as prescribed by Nabhanni, 
has been done well. Hence, sympathizes of the Islamic State distinguish between the jihadists 
movements operating previously and the Jihad of the Islamic State, which aims at the third state 
of building the Islamic State, the political one. Or so the narrative goes.112 In other words, the 
frame of reference for “underground” believers is gradually changing from those of Hizb-ut-Tahrir, 
Tablighi Jamaat113, and even the IMU, because these movements “have proven their impotence to 
bring about change of political order” (Interviews with independent Muslim activists who used to 
be drawn to Islam through the Tablighi or Hizb-ut-Tahrir davaatchy, religious propagators, but 
then left the organization for reasons of their weak political position, Bishkek, September 2014).  
The other group involved in disseminating these ideas and organizing spontaneous or often 
systematic underground cells is the one comprised of returnees from graduate programs abroad. 
According to the field data, most people are aware of such graduate programs at the Al-Azhar 
University, Egypt, The Islamic University in Medina, Saudi Arabia and The Islamic School in Najaf, 
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 As described in the second section, there are three stages of creating an Islamic state: educational, social, political. 
Hizb-ut-Tahrir was aiming at the social stage.  
113
 The movement Tablighi Jamaat is banned in Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan (Esenamanova 2014). 
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Iraq. Some report that “sometimes these people come door-to-door and offer a free education 
abroad, which, under the conditions of severe unemployment, sounds like a good opportunity” (A 
returnee of a graduate program in Saudi Arabia, interview, Istaravshan 2012).   One such cell, the 
members of which were condemned for membership of the IMU by the state authorities in 2010 
in Istaravshan (Tajikistan), was organized by a graduate of the Islamic University in Medina. 
According to his prisoner’s notebooks, he was never a member of the IMU, but was disseminating 
ideas of “pure Islam”, which were close to those of the salafis, and his lectures were also attended 
by some IMU members, which is why the state made the connection (The prisoner’s notebooks, 
Istaravshan 2012). From the pictures attached to the notebook, one could conclude that the 
mashab he was a member of was salafi: in the picture he was dressed in the traditional salafi 
clothes and his wife was dressed in a burka, completely covering herself. This same person also 
gave lectures to other Muslims in Isfara and Hujand, where, at almost the same time, there was a 
terrorist attack on a police station, reportedly by 50 members of the IMU (A journalist, former 
UTO member, interview, Hujand 2012).  
 To sum up, this parallel civil society114demonstrates one common feature: its shared 
tendency toward political Islam, which would help in changing social and political order. However, 
this cannot be ascribed to concrete Islamic movements currently operating in the area, but rather 
reflects the general constellation of narratives. In practical terms, parallel civil society offers three 
important services that the state and the formal civil society attached to it failed to offer: 1) wider 
                                                          
114
The map of Islamic thoughts in Central Asia cannot be considered full without referring to the local religious 
influentials, such as imam Hindustani (1892-1989), who has inspired both political Islamic movements and those who 
strive against involvement of Islam into politics (Babadzhanov, Muminov, Olcott 2004). Hindustani was one of the first 
leaders, who even in the Soviet time was allowed to undertake diplomatic missions to Saudi Arabia, whose activity is 
defined by his strive with the salafis and djadidi movements (the reformist Islamist movements). Hindustani is 
arguably consideredthe inspirer of the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (Babadjanov et al. 2004). Other authors 
depict the religious picture of Central Asia through current Muslim influentials, such as Hoja Turajon-zoda in Tajikistan, 
who used to fight on the side of the United Tajik Oppositions, and whose cross-sectional ties – with business, state 
elites, and the former warlords – are used to describe the meaning of modern Islam in Tajikistan (See: Epkenhans 
2011). However, since these personalities have been closely related to the state elites and in many ways influenced 
the political situation in the respective states, seeing them as part of the “parallel civil society” would, perhaps, be 
inaccurate. Furthermore, young independent believers, as they call themselves, who are among most of my 
interviewees, rarely know the names of the presumably “genuinely Central Asian” Muslim figures. 
 217 
 
access to (religious) education; 2) the creation of a more just legal system, based on the Shariah 
law, and 3) the provision of cultural and social needs of the population with no ethnic or national 
discrimination.  
The goals of this civil society seem to be as coherent and ideologically grounded as the 
goals of formal civil society. The main difference, however, is that the parallel civil society aims to 
institutionalize its efforts around a center, which would be religion, its routine and legal practices. 
While the formal civil society tried at first to work within the framework of decentralization and, 
later, within the framework of security and the strengthening of the state; the informal, parallel 
civil society addresses the more immediate needs of the common people, grounding their 
institutions in the natural community networks. This is not to claim that the Islamic civil society 
has the potential to create necessarily the so-called global Khalifate115 (Friedrichs 2013). Rather, it 
is to say that the Islamic movements in Central Asia managed to institutionalize themselves by (i) 
infiltrating the traditional social structures, (ii) building modern NGOs and (iii) supporting 
themselves through a theoretically benign ideology of Islam which seems to provide the main 
good aspired – the change of socio-political order.  
Conclusion 
 
We have seen that post-Soviet state-building in Central Asia has largely been influenced by 
external actors’ models for (re)engineering security, economy, and society. The first step toward 
organizing security was the materialization of the arbitrary borders drawn during the Soviet 
period, as shown in chapter three. Conflicts over ethnicity and nationality that those borders 
implied, due to having created artificial ethnic constructs, did not materialize during the Soviet 
period. The reason is that in practice these borders were administrative internal borders, and 
resources were shared on the basis of actual necessities and practices within the region. 
                                                          
115
 The fear around which most of the public debates are organized  
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Consequently, the post-1991 border delimitation and fortification has in fact materialized conflicts 
created by these artificial constructs by preserving them and increasing their value vis-à-vis the 
real socio-economic practices of interdependence, which underpinned the rationale of the Soviet 
rule.  
In other words, post-Soviet border management appeared to be twofold. On the one hand, 
projects, such as BOMCA and CADAP can be seen as responses to IMU incursions and the mutual 
suspicions of regional states towards one another, as well as individual national sovereignty 
concerns. On the other hand, the fortification of borders—as seen in the increase of check-points, 
military personnel, and minefields—took no account of existing cross-border interdependence, 
and so backfired at the societal level. Specifically, the constellation of enclaves in the Fergana 
Valley, whose populations have been using pastures and water by moving freely across borders, 
now turned into a constellation of isolated land pockets, which hindered both the freedom of 
movement at the grassroots level, as well as the extension of the state authority over these land 
pockets. As a result, the projects resulted in: (1) materialization of the structural conditions of 
conflict embedded into the Soviet maps of border delimitation in the region and conserved this 
Soviet heritage; (2) an increase of the territorial fragmentation of the Fergana Valley and isolation 
of significant parts of the societies from their mainland states.  
However, the need to survive by means of cross-border activities was not tackled. Socio-
economic interdependence persisted. Moreover, it has been picked up and developed through 
two other projects, addressed in section 4.2, i.e. CAREC and CASA-1000. The goal of the former 
was to “unlock the land-locked” Central Asian economies across the borderlands, by supporting 
cross-border non-standard trade and relying on the institution of the bazaar as the region’s most 
natural economic institution. However, these projects did not consider that the realm of a bazaar 
is a site of intermingling between the informal and formal, legal and illegal processes and actors, 
interests and practices. Therefore, by supporting non-standard trade without thought to who the 
 219 
 
actors or their interests are, the CAREC program has indirectly supported the development of 
shadow and informal economies in the Fergana Valley, which, appropriately, perfectly 
corresponds to the rationale of liberalization which underpins these projects. Informal trade was 
already a part of the post-Soviet survival strategies of these populations, but investing in it would 
mean investing into processes that lie beyond the control of both the states and the formal 
international institutions.  
 CASA-1000 aims to connect Central Asia and South Asia as parts of a common socio-
economic space. Its benevolent aims to reduce the water deficit in Afghanistan and Pakistan imply 
grand constructions such as the Rogun dam and Transmission lines connecting Central Asian with 
South Asia. This will foster two important consequences: (1) “resettlement” or internal 
displacement of a large number of people, and (2) change in the water flows of Amu-Darya river, 
the main artery of the unified regional irrigation system, installed during the Soviet time. 
Considering the issues in this field at all three tiers of water distribution, especially in the third tier, 
this construction will contribute to the increase of cases like that of Isfara river, when water-
sharing at the community level becomes informally organized and self-governed. But most 
importantly, the displacement of the populations fosters a breach of existing social organization 
and the sense of belonging. Being compensated in cash for the loss of property, the displaced 
people will have perfect conditions for developing an identity of resistance to the state. This 
becomes especially acute when one thinks that in the case of Tajikistan, the displacement is from 
the Rasht Valley, which, along with Badakhshan, is one of the two least reachable sites for the 
ruling elites’ domains; as well as important stretch of the M-41 route. Additionally, displacements 
within Afghanistan and Pakistan will also be happening in societally complex areas, including the 
Salang pass. 
 Finally, the organizing of society was conducted through establishing the NGO 
sector. As shown in section 4.3 the liberal NGO sector has failed to organize itself outside of the 
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patronage structures of the states. Having succeeded in disseminating the discourse of human 
rights, gender equality, and the freedom of social choices, the liberal NGO sector provided tools 
for a parallel civil society sector to promote similar claims but to differing ends. For instance, 
officially registered Islamic NGOs use the same propaganda tools as the liberal sector, but they 
target a much more complex and vulnerable social audience, which is developing a strong identity 
of social resistance, mostly for reasons which are different from Islamic thought as such. However, 
in practice, considering the other sets of conditions, this resistance is directed against the state 
and is still in the search of its “Center”. In general, an implication of these strategies can be that 
formal civil society has become an instrument of the international security agenda and, 
simultaneously, a part of the elite patronage networks which guarantee political survival in these 
states. In other words, although the liberal means of formal civil society have undermined its own 
democratic goals, it has indirectly empowered a parallel civil society, i.e. the society grounded on 
(i) the legacy of collectivization and community-based practices (ii) culture of protest and, (iii) the 
ideology of the reformist Islam.  
 Therefore, the external actors’ strategies of organizing security, the economy, and society 
demonstrate a paradoxical result: on the one hand, they have contributed to the territorial 
fragmentation and isolation of parts of societies; on the other hand, they contributed to the trans-
nationalization of these societies by creating conditions for their inclusion into the cross-border 
informal economic processes and developing the “transcendent ideologies”. This means that the 
possibility of a trans-nationalization of the identity of resistance, just like the possibility of a trans-
nationalization of informal economic processes does not seem completely unrealistic, regardless 
of the fortified borders, walls, and fences.  
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CHAPTER 5. When elites meet: struggle for power and its social meaning   
Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the struggle between competing elites and its impact on social change and 
the organization of political authority over the entire territory of the fledgling central Asian states. 
It explores the extent to which and under what conditions the struggle for power among elites 
contributes to structuring the state as a neutral political authority and all-encompassing social 
system which accommodates the diversity of interests within Central Asian societies. Specifically, 
it compares elite struggles in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan, by examining the strategies 
used by ruling elites to handle rivals. These strategies include: elimination, accommodation, and 
intermingling, in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan, respectively. The aim is to understand why 
these three different strategies for balancing political power led to similar outcomes in the form of 
an incomplete state-building process; that is, failing to make the state a central social institution or 
establish its political authority over the entire territory.  
The chapter is divided into three sections, proceeding in three steps. Firstly, it maps 
competing elites and then it describes the identified strategies and their rationale. Finally, it 
suggests why none of these strategies led to the emergence of a dominant political authority, 
capable of extending its infrastructural power over the entire territory. Specifically, it entertains 
the hypothesis that, in the three cases, elites are striving for power over a specific group, which 
would then eliminate or accommodate others, or intermingle with them. Power is a relational 
concept, and so is the state. That is why the actions of the elites have been perceived to be those 
of a rival group rather than of the state. In other words, this chapter claims that competing elites 
see the state as a resource for the realization elite-specific goals, rather than a common collective 
interest. Elites have found it difficult to become dominant, often seeking out to control the state 
as a means to prop or cover up their illicit activity, such as drug trafficking, the re-export shuttle 
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trade, selling national resources such as water, illegal distribution of foreign aid, and other sources 
of illicit revenue for it provides quick money. This is what Tilly described as the “State as organized 
crime”.  
This chapter shows how the struggle for power among elites in the three cases contributed 
to the state’s fragmentation in terms of territoriality and, at the same time, its centralization in 
terms of functionality. This situation revives the medieval role of the state, as will become clearer 
below.  Tilly (1975) argues that historical state formation is a movement from largely fragmented 
societies to a centralized polity. An economy based on agriculture provided major landlords with 
the power to compete for political influence, resulting in the need for central authorities to 
engage in struggles, negotiations, and coalitions with regional groupings of landowners (Tilly 1975, 
28). Similarly, in Central Asia agriculture remains the main pillar of the economy. As Chapter 3 has 
shown, the peasantry had been organized into collectives during the Soviet period, and an 
alternative form of organization, which would address their resultant social interdependence, was 
not found in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s dissolution. Instead, efforts by external actors 
have facilitated a return to community-based agricultural management and informal trade, which 
results in greater societal fragmentation, as shown in chapter 3. Such societal fragmentation is not 
conducive for the development of stable elite networks that could spread their influence over 
concrete geographical domains, thereby remaining socially representative of a certain set of social 
interests. Thus, despite the fact that external actors promote liberalization and decentralization, 
their actions result in territorial decentralization and isolation, as shown in Chapter 4.  
Samuel Finer (in Tilly 1975, 87) identifies two types of decentralization: territorial and 
functional. He compares medieval and contemporary territoriality and functionality within the 
state. In the medieval state, territoriality is differentiated, and functionality is consolidated; while 
in contemporary states, territoriality is consolidated and functionality is differentiated. In Central 
Asia, we see that decentralization makes the state territoriality fragmented, as shown in Chapter 
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4, while functionality is consolidated, albeit by means of increasing despotic state power. Hence, 
the Chapter explores whether in reality, decentralization as sponsored by external actors revives 
feudal practices of land and water management, hindering the development any institutions of 
elite power balance that could serve as a link between grassroots societies and the state, as 
happened in European state formation.  
As discussed in Chapter 1, the infrastructural power of the state is about structuring the 
relations between the state and society and their mutual influence. According to Mann (1986), 
when this mutual influence is not present, state power becomes despotic and the state system 
does not work without violent coercion. But in the context of Central Asia, even coercion might 
not work. As in the case of Tajikistan, civil war did not create states, and none of the involved 
elites managed to extend their domination over the entire territory of the state, not even by 
“conquest”. In other words, when territorial fragmentation increases, especially in the form of 
extremely small subunits (such as community-based self-governance structures as shown in 
Chapters 3 and 4), the result may be that neither a centralized unitary system within a formal 
state, nor its military capacity, may influence the political outcomes. When societies are so 
fragmented, elites are too small to either conquer or negotiate. The process of “decentralization” 
in Central Asia may become a process of re-traditionalization. However, this is not a return to any 
“tradition” which would undermine the all-encompassing claims to political authority of the state. 
If there were a tradition perceived as socially and culturally universal, the process would be easier. 
Ironically, those elites who are in a position to respond to societal needs under these conditions 
are the newly incipient religious elites, who obtained their “symbolic capital” abroad and who 
have little to do with local traditions.  
The chapter focuses on each country and addresses the following three issues within each 
of them to conduct a structured and focused comparison: 1) mapping the competing elites and 
their role in governance in terms of territoriality and functionality; 2) the ruling elites’ strategies 
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for a balance of power; 3) their societal consequences or social meaning. The section on Tajikistan 
and their strategy of elimination highlights the deliberate marginalization of rival elites, as well as 
their sources of influence, such as drug trafficking, religious activity, and participation in the civil 
war. However, marginalization in practice implies securitization and elimination of rivals, with the 
goal of appropriating illicit sources of power, thereby grounding the state in illicit sources of 
statehood. This section shows how the regime uses the state as a tool for appropriating important 
economic resources for its own purposes, thereby hindering the extension of political authority 
over the entire territory and its societal development.  
The section on Uzbekistan and its strategy of accommodation shows how the state can 
involve itself in constant bargaining over the access to its institutional resources, vital for 
economic and social activities. By leaving room for maneuver to rival elites in exchange for their 
loyalty, the state elite monopolizes the military and law enforcement sector as its exclusive source 
of power. However, it shows that total surveillance organized through almost omnipresent 
military and security structures still does not penetrate large parts of society.  
The section on Kyrgyzstan and the process of intermingling of elites shows that an ad-hoc 
purposeful approach to politics does not lead to consolidation of political authority either. 
Kyrgyzstan went from strengthening the institutions of the state through a system of checks and 
balances, trying different types of social change such as elections, negotiations, and social 
protests. However, the elites, once swapped, have not pursued their agenda further to establish a 
general political authority.  
Some precision on the use of the term “elite” is necessary here. Classically, a power elite is 
defined as a group of individuals with the ability to affect change and transform environments. 
Since this chapter addresses the question—“why can’t the elites obtain control over the main 
political outcome, that is the state”—the definition of elites adopted here has to be more 
contingent and broad. In Central Asia, elites are neither “custodians of the state”, i.e. the products 
 225 
 
of a specific type of socialization that provides them with symbolic power and other relevant 
resources  (Eymeri 2001), nor are they political professionals, treating politics as a “vocation and 
profession” as Weber describes. Rather, they represent a “dominant class” or circle, which 
possesses logistics for domination of national decision-making. This circle cannot strictly be called 
a “class” in the Marxist sense of the term, as many of these people come from extremely diverse 
socio-economic backgrounds; nor can they be seen through the lens of the Bourdieu’s  concepts of 
“habitus” or “symbolic capital”, for the majority of them have either faked their symbolic capital 
(such as education, for example) or have acquired their economic resources in a dubious way, 
during the time of perestroika, when a strategically important economic asset could be obtained 
for a dollar and higher education diplomas could be bought. However, under certain conditions 
these groups can still mobilize parts of societies for mass social protests (Uzbekistan), coup d’état 
(Kyrgyzstan), or civil war (Tajikistan).  
For these reasons, the approach closest to describing the elites in Central Asia is that of 
Raymond Aron, whose “categories dirigeantes” provide an analytical lens to understand political 
developments in their contexts, rather than as a whole (Aron 1965). This approach implies 
attention being given to the social basis of the elites, not in Marxist terms, but rather in any terms 
relevant for a particular social context, as long as they reflect the functions of the dominant 
circles, the organization of power, and the relationship between power and society (Aron 1950). In 
other words, in the context of Central Asia, ruling elites are those with most control over the state 
institutions, and the “local” elites are those who can mobilize societies. In this light, the ruling elite 
will be used interchangeably with the state elite or the regime, and the concept “rival elites” will 
comprise the range of local elites and elites possessing other sources of power, such as cultural, 
religious, or financial, regardless of the geographical location.  
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5.1. Tajikistan: the strategy of elimination  
Introduction 
 
The post-Soviet history of the balance of power between elites in Tajikistan starts with the 
Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord, signed between Emomali 
Rakhmonov, the President of Tajikistan, and Said Abdullo Nuri, the leader of the United Tajik 
Opposition (UTO), on 27 June 1997 in Moscow under the auspices of the United Nations 
(A/52/219 1997). Concluding the civil war that had been waged between 1992 and 1997, the 
power-sharing agreement has erroneously been characterized as a compromise between 
democratic and Islamic political forces in Tajikistan’s state-building. Official discourse neglects the 
fact that that during the civil war both democratic and Islamic forces were embraced by the 
United Tajik Opposition, which had initially challenged the old Communist elite. A brief overview 
of the composition of these forces explains why. 
This section shows that the power-sharing agreement created a lasting map of the political 
elites of Tajikistan, defining their spheres of influence and structuring future conflicts between 
them. Since the Agreement, the political elite of Tajikistan has been associated with President 
Rahmonov, whereas the opposition is represented mainly by the Islamic Renaissance Party of 
Tajikistan (IRPT) headed by Muhiddin Kabiri (since 2006, after the death of Nuri). In general terms, 
due to the power-sharing agreement, former UTO commanders were appointed to positions in 
national security and law enforcement structures within the state, at both national and local 
levels. In other words, the UTO elite has gained significant control over the military sources of 
statehood, while the ruling elite control the economic resources. This situation hindered the 
state’s ability to centralize control over the legitimate use of violence. The two most important 
sources of state power, that is military and economic, were subjected to elites rather than the 
generalized political authority of the state. Attempts by the ruling elite to gain control over other 
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sources of power increased its despotic power but destroyed its infrastructural power. The 
fragmented territories were subject to influence only by means of military intervention.  
This claim is unfolded in three steps. First, a brief examination into the socio-political 
movements that comprised the UTO and the ruling elite shows that the confrontation was not 
between the secular and religious elites, since all these movements advocated modernization and 
development. Rather, it has been the struggle over the state per se, for the state had been seen as 
a resource that allowed for redistribution of the various sources of income and influence. 
Secondly, it shows that the power-sharing agreement structured relations between elites in such a 
way that the UTO has gained control over military resources and the ruling elite over economic 
resources. Hence, the conflict has become about two important sources of statehood that found 
themselves on different sides of the barricades: military and economic. However, as the logistics 
of power, i.e. the state, remained in the hands of the ruling elite, these were used by the ruling 
elite to start eliminating its rivals, both politically and physically, with the aim to monopolize all 
sources of statehood. This was done within the context of overlapping international narratives of 
fighting terrorism, structural/institutional reforms as conditions for the World Bank and the IMF 
loans. These allowed the ruling elite to infringe the power-sharing agreement without formally 
violating its obligations. These institutional reforms allowed the ruling elite to gain control over 
the main financial and economic revenues instead of restructuring their collection, purpose, or 
administration. Not only did this context allow the state to be turned into a vehicle for the 
interests of a small fraction of society, but it also precluded the development of conditions 
conducive for territorial consolidation and functional political differentiation.   
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5.1.1. The map of the competing elites and the power-sharing  
Democrats and Islamists as modernizers  
 
The United Tajik Opposition (the UTO) comprised a myriad of socio-political movements that all 
sought the democratization of Tajikistan, albeit through differing visions of what this would look 
like. The largest socio-political movements of the UTO were the following: the Islamic Revival 
Party, the Democratic Party of Tajikistan, the Rastokezh (Revival) movement, and La’li Badakhshan 
(HRW 1993, 20). The Democratic Party of Tajikistan and Rastokezh (21 June 1991) and La’li 
Badakhshan (30 May 1991) were officially registered by the Ministry of Justice of Tajikistan in 
1991. Both of them were composed predominantly of secular urban intellectuals (Nourzhanov 
2013; Kilavuz 2007; Olimova 2004). The Islamic Revival Party was refused registration on the 
grounds that it was considered to be a branch of the All-Union Party of the Islamic Revival.   
A brief look into the social movements extant at perestroika illustrates the democratic and 
modernizing motives of the movements which came to comprise the UTO. The four large 
movements mentioned previously themselves comprised a myriad of social protest movements 
which had started appearing since 1989. Specifically, in 1989 social movements such as the 
People’s Front “Vahdat” (the Unity) in Ura-Tyube province, an assisting group in Chkalovsk 
(Leninabad/currently Hujand province), “Oshkoro” (Openness) in Kulyab (Khatlon province) were 
established. These movements were considered illegal as they were refused registration by the 
then Communist elite. In the first half of September 1989 a people’s movement, “Ehei Hujand” 
(The Revival of Hujand), was established by the democratically inclined representatives of the city-
intelligentsia. The programs of all these movements included changes to the socio-political system 
as well as cultural and economic transformations in the country. In May 1990, another socio-
political movement, “Humanistic Union”, was established in Leninabad (Hujand), which comprised 
four socio-political movements and three national associations. This movement was chaired by a 
professor at the Polytechnic University of Hujand, Djumaboi Niyozov. On 10 August 1990, the 
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Democratic Party of Tajikistan was established, made up mostly of Hujandi intelligentsia and 
chaired by Shomdon Yusuf, professor of philosophy of the University of Hujand. The chairpersons 
were representatives of cultural elites, distinguished engineering scientists, etc. while the national 
composition of the Party was diverse. The Democratic Party established the first democratic 
newspaper “Adolat” (Justice), with Imomnazar Holnazarov as the Editor-in-Chief. In October 1990, 
the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan was established, initially as a regional affiliation of the 
All-Union Islamic Renaissance Party. The first chair was a religious and spiritual authority, 
Muhammadsharif Himmatzoda (Niyozov 2015).  
In the beginning of 1991, socio-political organizations such as La’li Badakhshan, Nosir 
Hisrav and Vatan were established. Most of them were led by representatives of cultural elites or 
intelligentsia from their respective regions. La’li Badakhshan was initially chaired by a professor 
from the Pedagodical Institute, Atabek Amirbekov (Niyozov 2015). Since most of these movements 
were denied official registration, they were considered illegal and were proscribed by the neo-
communist elite, which at the time was trying to preserve the power of the Communist Party. In 
order to gain some political force, some of these movements were reorganized under the 
umbrella of the four big movements comprising the UTO.  
During the civil war Emomali Rahmonov was brought to power as a neutral figure by 
Russian and Uzbek diplomacy. After the accession of President Rahmonov, the struggle between 
these elites started being characterized as a confrontation between a modernizing/democratizing 
elite, led by President Rahmonov, and a traditionalizing/Islamicizing elite, led by Nuri and his 
successor, Kabiri. In fact, both of these elites sought a secular and democratic Tajikistan, with the 
values of Islam as a unifying and socially bounding force (Kabiri, interview 2012). In this light, the 
power-sharing agreement appeared to be understood as being between secular and religious 
values, between democratic forces and political Islam. Mediated by the UN, the Agreement 
prescribed power-sharing between the parties and defined the new status-quo between them. 
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According to its formula, decision-making on key issues of the national government could not be 
unilateral or dominated by a single party or group (A/52/219 1997; S/1997/410 1997).  
The main protocols contained by the General Agreement were the Political and the Military 
protocols that outlined further details of the Agreement’s implementation. According to the 
Protocol on guarantees of implementation of the General Agreement on Establishment of Peace 
and National Accord in Tajikistan (signed in Tehran on 28 May 1997), 30 per cent of posts in the 
executive power structures and 25 per cent of seats in the Central Electoral Commission were 
reserved for the representatives of the Opposition (UTO) (S/1997/410 1997, para.1). According to 
the Military Protocol: “The reintegration, disarmament and disbandment of the armed units of the 
United Tajik Opposition as well as the reform of the governmental power structures of the 
Republic of Tajikistan shall be carried out” (S/1997/209 1997, Part I, Art.1).  
The national ratification of this Agreement was achieved through the Law on Amnesty for 
the Political Confrontation during the Civil War 1997, which established an amnesty for the civil 
war crimes, except for crimes established by the following articles of the Criminal Code of 
Tajikistan: Article 63 on terrorist activity; Article 74 on banditry; Article 76 on contraband; Art. 96 – 
stealing of the state and public property in especially grand quantities; Art. 104 and 105 – murder; 
Art. 121 – rape; Art. 240 – illegal creation, buying, keeping, transportation, sending, or selling of 
narcotics; Art. 240 – stealing drugs; Art. 241 – illegal sowing and growing of narcotic plants. These 
articles, especially those on terrorism and drug trafficking, retain a degree of room for maneuver 
for the ruling elite when dealing with political opponents (CCRT 1998).  
The UTO elite and military sources of power  
 
As a result of the power-sharing agreement, thirteen representatives of the UTO initially joined 
the government in 1998. The 30 per cent of positions reserved under the agreement included 
national security services, including border control and law-enforcement structures.  However, 
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according to the Report of the UN Secretary General on the situation in Tajikistan, this did not 
include positions at regional or local levels (S/1998/374 1998). Specifically, the main destinations 
of UTO appointments were the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Interior, and Tajik border forces. 
The initial appointees included: the first Deputy Leader of the UTO Khoji Akbar Turazhonzoda 
(appointed as the deputy Prime Minister); the Democratic Party’s Abdunabi Sattorzoda (appointed 
as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs); Davlat Usmonov, another prominent IRPT member 
(appointed as a Minister of the Economy) was disseminating the ideas of opposition, which is why 
was soon replaced; Khudoyberdi Kholiqnazarov (appointed Minister of Labour and Employment); 
Davlatbek Maqsudov, who was given the post of Minister of Land Reclamation and Water 
Resources (BBC 1998).  
Most former generals, however, were appointed to the offices within law enforcement and 
security structures in the years between 1998 and 2000. Rahim Karimov was appointed Chairman 
of the Customs Committee; and Ayub Aliyev was to chair the Government Committee on Safety in 
Industry and Mining. In 1999, Ghayrat Sarhadovich Adhamov was appointed the first deputy 
Minister of Defence of Tajikistan (BBC 1999a, BBC 1999b). Mirzo Ziyoev, a prominent member of 
the IRPT and a head of the UTO forces, who fought under the commandment of Juma Namangani 
(one of the later IMU founders) was appointed for the Ministry of Emergency Situations. The 
position of Defence Minister was to remain vacant (S/1998/1029 1998). Mirzo Ziyoev’s continued 
friendship with Namangani put the IRPT under suspicion of ties with the IMU, something they 
were later always accused of by the government (ICG 2001a, 6). According to the IRPT leader, 
Kabiri, this friendship could not be considered as proof that IRPT had further ties with the IMU, for 
the latter accused the IRPT of being too moderate in its approach to Islam, and they considered its 
political compromise with Rahmonov to be a betrayal (Kabiri, interview 2012). Some of the former 
generals, who were appointed to offices within the structures of the Ministry of Interior, in 
September 2015 were accused of taking part in the coup d’état, as for instance of General 
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Abduhallim Nazarzoda (Stanradar 2015). Other prominent UTO commanders appointed to the 
national security structures were the following: In 1999 - Saidsho Shamolov and Qurbon Cholov, 
appointed to the offices of the border defense committee; Sulaymanov Cholov (Qurbon’s brother) 
appointed deputy chairman of Dushanbe’s Customs Committee. By November 1999, there were 
14 UTO appointments to district and city level posts (S/1999/1127 1999).  
However, in general, the government was reluctant to appoint former UTO commanders to 
the local positions in their native domains. The regional or local positions given to some were 
mostly in Khatlon region or around Dushanbe, as these were easier for the ruling elite to control.  
However, some commanders took positions in the regional structures of the Ministry of 
Interior. Some examples of this were Shokh Iskandarov, from Khoit in Rasht district was appointed 
deputy chief of the Internal Affairs Directorate of the Rasht Valley,  in charge of a stretch of the 
Tajik-Kyrgyz border; Habib Sanginov - Deputy Minister of the Interior, and a member of National 
Reconciliation Commission; the influential UTO commander Akhmadov, who held the ruling elite 
at arm’s length and was appointed a colonel and head of the local department of the anti-
organised crime directorate (UBOP116) in the Rasht Valley. Also appointed to the regional Ministry 
of Interior were power-brokers from GBAO, Tolib Ayombekov, Imumnozar Imumnozarov and 
Mahmodbakir Mahmodbakirov.117  
 At the time of power-sharing, the IRPT power base has reportedly remained largely 
regional (ICG 2001a, 7). Its main electorate was in the provinces of Gharm and Karategin, while to 
date, the influence of the IRPT had grown in the North, in Soghd Province, in towns, such as Isfara, 
Istaravshan, Hujand, and the enclaves of Vorukh and Chorkhu, as well as in Pendjikent, Macha, and 
Ura-Tyube (Tajikistani part of the Fergana Valley) (IRPTdata 2012). This is a significant number of 
supporters, considering that Soghd province comprises about 30.5 % of the population, and 
                                                          
116
 A unit that in most former Soviet countries is viewed as an elite police organization  
117
 The level of control exerted by these figures meant that to visit Rasht for research purposes, for example, it was 
advisable to obtain the (informal) permission of Col. Akhmadov; to visit GBAO, formal visas are required (ICG 2011, 2-
5). 
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Khatlon in the South a further 35.1 %. In contrast, 9.2 % lives in Dushanbe and 3.4 % in GBAO 
(UNDP 2000, 17). Furthermore, most of the Tajik migrants in Russia are support the Opposition to 
the Rahmonov government (Kabiri, interview 2012).  
Though the power-sharing results seemed to be accommodating for the former UTO 
fighters, not all of them accepted the Accord. Some of the warlords returned to their domains, 
where they enjoy the support of local power structures, or to Afghanistan. Among those who did 
so were Mullo Abdullo (Gharm, Darband, Afghanistan), Ali Bedaki (Afghanistan), Rakhmon 
Sanginov (Tavildara), Mansur Muakkalov (Tavildara).  
The ruling elite and economic resources 
 
The ruling elite today is mainly composed of the so-called Southern or Kulyabi elite, as opposed to 
the Northern elite of Soghd province, centered on the main city of Hujand (former Leninabad). 
Hujand was designed during the Soviet period as an industrial city and is considered the site of the 
industrial elites and intelligentsia. Kulyabi elites were largely disadvantaged during the Soviet 
period, for the region mostly grew fruit and produced wine, forms of agriculture not strategically 
important to the Soviet state. This segregation of Tajikistani elites was also largely due to the 
Soviet subsidies plan, which distributed subsidies according to the Soviet goals, such as cotton 
cultivation and industrial capacity. For example, between 1937 and 1944, Soviet state funds were 
allocated as follows: Leninabad (Hujand) province received 7,838,400 rubles; GBAO – 680,000; 
Kurgan-Teppe – 525,900, Kulyab 64, 900, Gharm – 24,100 rubles (Markowitz 2013, 37). In 1988 the 
Kurgan-Teppe oblast’ and Kulyab oblast’ were merged into the Khatlon oblast’ with the center in 
Kurgan-Tyube. In 1991 these provinces were administratively separated again, but returned to the 
1988 status-quo in 1992. However, the Kulyabi elites were reportedly cooperating with the 
Hujandi elites in the North, providing their security, being hired for military functions (ICG 
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2001a).The sub-districts of Kulyab, Dangara and Farkhar are native to the President Rahmonov, 
which is why they are considered being under the special protection of the President.  
After the power-sharing agreement (post-2000), the Kulyabi elites have become largely 
responsible for financial control and property relations in the country. For example, the former 
chairman of the State Committee on Property (Goskomimushestvo), Matlub Davlatov was 
appointed as a chairman of the Financial Control Unit. One of his successors was another relative 
of the President, Sherali Gulov. Another prominent representative of the Kulyabi elite, Salim 
Yakubov, held different high positions in Dushanbe, including Minister of the Interior and the 
Chairman of the Tax Committee until he spoiled his relationships with the President (ICG 2001a, 
13).  
The main economic resources of the country are also in the hands of the ruling elite. This 
means that the ruling elite retains control over the cotton industry (cotton financing – 14 % of the 
GDP; cotton trade – 11 % of GDP), foreign aid, the energy sector, the aluminum export trade (40 – 
50 % of GDP), the drug trade. The drug trade’s share of the economy is approaching that of 
Afghanistan - 30 % of GDP – and is second main budget revenue, after migrants’ remittances 118 
(Nakaya 2009, 265; ICG 2009b, Paoli; et al. 2007). Usually, any attempt to monopolize access and 
consolidate the management of these resources is interpreted as part and parcel of the 
centralization of power (Dudoignon 2004).  
The cotton industry has been pivotal for the Tajik economy, as was planned during the 
Soviet period. After independence, countries in the region have chosen to stick to these Soviet 
economic dependencies, since they provided stability. Devastated at the outset of sovereignty, the 
cotton industry was revitalized in the aftermath of the civil war through World Bank loans (Meyer 
et al. 2004). Functioning within the framework of privatization, these loans targeted private Tajik 
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companies involved in the local-level cotton growing operations. These companies received World 
Bank aid through Tajikistan’s Agro Invest Bank, which redistributed funds alongside provincial and 
district governments (Meyer et al. 2004). However, the devastation of the cotton industry was 
only in formal terms. The shadow practice of selling cotton through the black market, through 
trans-border cooperation with similar groups in Uzbekistan and southern Kyrgyzstan, did not cease 
(a local businessman, involved in cotton and tobacco deals, interview 2012).  
By the end of the civil war, there were five major companies involved in cotton production 
in Tajikistan. Three-quarters of the industry was dominated by two companies – Khima and the 
Somoni 21st Century – owned by the head of the National Bank and President Rakhmonov’s 
brother-in-law, respectively (Nakaya 2009). Cotton financing comprised 90 % of all agricultural 
lending in Tajikistan (Meyer et al. 2004). Formally, these investments were guaranteed by the 
National Bank of Tajikistan (NBT) (Meyer et al. 2004). In 2007, the NBT’s accounts revealed that 
IMF funds and other foreign aid were leaked “to cover the losses incurred by Agro Invest Bank 
since 2001 – totaling $220 million - that have been linked to lending to cotton enterprises as far 
back as 1996” (Markowitz 2013, 85; Dzalaeva 2007). Two main links to note here: first, the lending 
which the Agro Invest Bank now has to recover is directly related to the lending which used for the 
shadow cotton trade which flourishing during perestroika and the civil war; secondly, the key 
institutions in the loans distribution chain were organized as part of the economic resources of the 
ruling elite. The management of the cotton industry and investment in this industry illustrate that 
not only has the cotton industry itself been monopolized by the ruling elite through the net of 
these banks, but also the foreign aid market linked to it.  
The energy sector comprises another economic resource of the ruling elite in Tajikistan. 
According to data compiled by the Asian Development Bank (2009), the energy sector accounted 
for 4.7% of GDP, as well as [electricity] providing input for two main exported goods of Tajikistan, 
cotton and aluminum. These two industries, in their turn, account for 80% of total export earnings 
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(ABD 2009). For example, the Tajik Aluminum Company (TALCO) runs the biggest aluminum plant 
in Central Asia, consuming about 40 % of the energy produced in the country (Melikyan and Slay 
2011; Cain 2011). In order to keep the prices of aluminum competitive on the world market, the 
government subsidizes the company’s energy expenses, that is TALCO pays for electricity at a price 
much lower than market rates. Despite the fact that the plant makes up one third of the GDP of 
the country, most of the profits from this company get offshored to the British Virgin Islands, and 
do not contribute to the budget of the company and the country (Yakobi 2013). The financial 
matters of the company remain opaque. TALCO relies on the financing from Orienbank, owned by 
Rahmonov’s son-in-law (Nakaya 2009, 259). Reportedly, its profits remain “the personal profits” of 
the ruling elite, for there were several changes in the company’s management, including the 
recent appointment of the President’s son-in-law, Hasan Assullozoda, as the Head of the company, 
and he is the main person responsible for the offshore operations of the company (Thrilling 2014).  
Due to the fact that a large percentage of its water is used for industry and irrigation-
intensive cotton cultivation, Tajikistan experiences water shortage.119 To address this water deficit, 
the government of Tajikistan is attempting to develop the Rogun project designed during the 
Soviet period, and addressed in detail in chapter 4. Management of Rogun is organized through 
the government-owned Barki Tochik Corporation (ABD 2009). Since the ruling elite wants to keep 
the control of this sector in its hands, it prevents foreign investments. The rationale is that 
attracting foreign investment into Rogun power-station would mean sharing energy sector 
decision-making with neighboring countries, especially Uzbekistan, for the Central Asian energy 
system is interdependent.  As addressed in chapter 3, the CA energy system, as designed by the 
Soviet planners, was managed by a regional transmission operator in Tashkent and referred to as 
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the Central Asian Power System (CAPS).120 Hence, opening up the energy sector to foreign capital 
would mean shared decision-making over grand projects like Rogun and Santguta. Apart from the 
fact that Uzbekistan would veto any construction of grand projects121 like Rogun, the government 
would lose the source of direct revenues from the people, collected for the construction of Rogun 
by obliging the population to (“voluntarily”) buy the shares of the project. The ruling elite sees 
Rogun as the solution to the water deficit both in Tajikistan and beyond, for example through 
trading water for oil with Iran (Pannier 2014).     
The next economic resource was the drug trade. As mentioned above, it was the main 
resource for financing warfare by the UTO. With the emergence of the state, this resource has 
been expropriated by the state elite in two seemingly mutually exclusive ways. On the one hand, 
the state declared war on drugs, thereby becoming a recipient of foreign investment in this field 
within the framework on the war against transnational threats. These investments have become a 
source of state revenue and a useful pretext for clamping down on Islam and warlords when 
needed. On the other hand, drug trafficking itself has become part of the ruling elites’ wealth. 
According to the ICG data (ICG 2009b), it was estimated that if the drug trade were to cease, the 
economy of Tajikistan would take three weeks to collapse. While these numbers show only that 
Tajikistan’s economy depends on drug trafficking, the economy, in its turn, is controlled by the 
ruling elite, which seems to use the state as a vehicle for laundering illicit finances. 
Reportedly, at the beginning of the 2000s, drugs comprised 30 to 50 % of the Tajik 
economy (ICG 2001a, 19). The UN has identified six drug routes from Afghanistan, two of which 
run through Tajikistan: one from Kunduz in northern Afghanistan to Khatlon province; the other 
from Badakhshan (Afghanistan) to GBAO (Tajikistan) (UNODC 2012). As mentioned above, Kulyab 
is part of the Khatlon province, hence it is easier for the Kulyabi elites to have control of these 
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drug routes. Badakhshan was a more complicated route for the ruling elite to control, for, as 
mentioned previously, some influential UTO commanders still remained informally in charge of 
their domains.  
The war on drugs as the source of foreign aid was at its peak in the aftermath of the civil 
war. In this context, in 1999, in cooperation with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, Tajikistan 
established the Drug Control Agency (DCA) (Markowitz 2013, 85). In 2003, of all drug seizures 
coming out of Afghanistan, approximately 90 per cent was seized by Tajikistan. Reportedly, this 
allowed the ruling elite to gain more external aid for drug trafficking, strengthen its position, and 
drop the level of drug seizure in the following years. Drug seizures declined from 5,600 kilograms 
in 2003 to 1,132 kilograms in 2009 (UNODC 2010). There has also been a decline in drug-related 
crimes, from 1,949 cases in 2001 to 631 cases in 2006 (UNODC 2009). The ruling elite monopolized 
the access to drug trafficking and maintained alternative smuggling routes (Markowitz 2013, 86; 
Lewis 2010).   
5.1.2. The strategy of elimination and its rationale   
 
By 1999-2000 the Power-sharing Agreement was reported as implemented as 54 UTO members 
were appointed to state offices, resulting in the National Reconciliation Commission monitoring 
the implementation of the power-sharing agreement being disbanded. Once President 
Rakhmonov won the elections, he started removing opposition members from the executive 
branch and from sectors providing most financial revenues (Nakaya 2009, 271). By 2006 the only 
UTO member in senior government position was Mirzo Ziyoev (Emergency situations minister), 
who was soon dismissed and killed in 2009.  
The strategy of elimination here is defined as a gradual dismissal of the UTO members from 
government positions and their subsequent assassination. This has been conducted in two stages: 
during the structural/institutional reforms which occurred between 2000 and 2006, and in the 
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following period to date, when the most influential commanders have been marginalized, 
outlawed and often killed under various circumstances.  
There were two main forms of legitimation for such actions by the ruling elite: World Bank 
conditionality on structural reform funds and the international narrative on the war against terror.  
At the national level, this strategy was outlined in Protocol 32-20 (Protocol 32-20 2011). Structural 
reform, as designed by the World Bank, the IMF and foreign contracted consultancies, implied a 
restructuring of the extensive “Soviet” bureaucratic system of the state. In 1999, for the purposes 
of the Institution Building Technical Assistance Project (IBTA-2), the World Bank offered the Tajik 
government a credit of US$6.7 million, in tandem with a US$50 million structural adjustment 
credit (SAC-2). The reform was aimed at restructuring public administration, budget management, 
and large-scale state enterprises (World Bank 1994; ADB 1999).  
Between 1999 and 2004 several ministries and committees were reorganized and 
downsized, primarily in 2001 and 2002. During this process, many quota-based UTO appointees 
were dismissed. For instance, “the Ministry of Labour and Employment and the Ministry of Social 
Security were combined into the Ministry of State Revenue and Tax collection in 2002, resulting in 
the dismissal of two UTO appointees (chair of customs committee and his deputy). For the newly 
created Ministry of State Revenues and Tax collection, Rahmon appointed his long-serving 
technocrat, Gulomjon Boboyev, who was formerly state advisor on economic policy (1990-1996) 
and first deputy minister of finance (1996-2001)” (Nakaya 2009, 264).  
The ruling elite secured the key positions controlling the main financial revenues of the 
country by pursuing this strategy of using structural adjustment programs as a way to marginalize 
rivals. Furthermore, some new overlapping agencies were created (World Bank 2005), like, for 
example, the Agency for Financial Control (AFC) in 2001, reporting directly to the president. Its 
purview included control over the administration of national and local budgets, loans and grants, 
and humanitarian aid received by the government. The AFC also had a monitoring and 
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investigating mandate with respect to the use of state property and enterprises of all kinds. As 
such, the creation of the AFC gave President Rahmon comprehensive control of both state and 
private finances at all levels (Nakaya 2009, 265). Matlub Davlatov, Rahmon’s relative and chair of 
the state property committee (responsible for privatization of national property) from 1994 to 
2001, became the chair of the AFC. As mentioned in the previous section, the President also 
appointed Sherali Gulov, his nephew-in-law and former chair of Dangara district (Rakhmon’s 
hometown) in Kulyab to succeed Davlatov as chair of the state property committee (Nakaya 2009, 
265). The body responsible for the appointments was the office of the presidential administration, 
and in particular, the state advisor on personnel policy (World Bank 2005). The negotiations on the 
structural reforms between the World Bank and the government of Tajikistan were tense and in 
the second round of reform revisions (2005), the World Bank linked SAC-2 conditionality with the 
completion of public administration and finance reform under IBTA-2. The linkage with SAC-2 
made the government endorse the public reform first, which in practice resulted in the dismissal 
of the UTO appointees.  
As mentioned in the previous section, not all UTO commanders agreed on the conditions of 
the Peace Agreement. Some of these commanders were reportedly involved in drug trafficking. 
The parallel international narrative on combating drugs and terrorism provided the pretext for the 
elimination of the former warlords (Lewis 2010; Gavrilis 2008). These figures, within the realities 
of their local domains, were considered the elites, personalities with charisma to follow and look 
up for security and help (Nourzhanov 2005). However, official state discourse labeled them as 
warlords, Islamists, drug barons, and so on.  
Hence, in the aftermath of the Presidential elections in 1999, several UTO appointees were 
arrested for drug trafficking.  For instance, in 1999 Saidsho Shamolov, Qurbon Cholov, who held 
the offices of the border defence committee, as well as Sulaymanov Cholov (Qurbon’s brother and 
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deputy chairman of Dushanbe’s Customs Committee) were incarcerated122 (ICG 2004, 2). Other 
influential warlords, on whose goodwill the President was dependent, Suhrob Qosymov and Mirzo 
Ziyoev, were dismissed in 2006 (Nourzhanov 2005).123 In 2007, the President dismissed Shokh 
Iskandarov, from Khoit in Rasht district, a colonel of the border guards, in charge of a stretch of 
the Tajik-Kyrgyz border (ICG 2011, 2). Senior government officials, such as Tajikistan’s ambassador 
and trade representative to Kazakhstan, a deputy minister of defense and the former minister of 
interior, Yakub Salimov, were arrested for their alleged involvement in the drug trade (Markowitz 
2013, 86). Likewise, border control officials reportedly were receiving rents from the drug trade 
(Markowitz 2013; Marat 2006; Lubin 2003). Some authors argue that profits from drug trafficking 
were the reason for the reluctance of the Tajikistan's government to implement stricter border 
controls that would prevent the flow of drugs (Gavrilis 2008). Habib Sanginov, former UTO 
commander, later Deputy Minister of the Interior, and a member of National Reconciliation 
Commission – was allegedly involved in drug trafficking (ICG 2001a, 19).  
The culmination of elimination, military interventions into the main regions in the drug 
trafficking chain, started with the infamous jail break and the subsequent intervention of 
government’s forces to the Rasht Valley (Gharm). As Jirgatal-Gharm has been considered one of 
the most important drug distributing areas and Gharm-Tavildara reportedly contained heroin-
producing laboratories, there was a military intervention into these regions in 2008  (ICG 2001b, 
4). The Rasht area had been under influence of Mirzo Akhmadov, who managed to keep the 
official government “at arm’s length” (ICG 2011, 2). The attempt to kill Ahmadov resulted in the 
death of the paramilitary police (OMON) national commander, Oleg Zakharchenko and 
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subsequent personal apologies for “not knowing anything about this initiative” by the President to 
Col. Akhmadov over the phone (ICG 2011, 2).124   
In 2009 the government organized an operation against narco-trafficking in response to the 
invasion of the IMU headed by Mullo Abdullo in the Rasht Valley, another influential warlord who 
did not believe in the power-sharing agreement and moved to Afghanistan. During that operation, 
Mirzo Ziyoev was killed (for his reported coperation with Mullo Abdullo) (ICG 2011, 4). On August 
10, 2010, 46 participants of the IMU invasion were sentenced to between 10 years and life in 
prison. Two days later, 25 prisoners staged a jailbreak (ICG 2011, 5). Later in 2011, Col. Akhmadov 
was closely involved in the destruction of the group led by Ali Bedaki and Mullo Abdullo (ICG 2011, 
8). As a result of his  cooperation with the government, Col. Akhmadov maintained his position as 
powerbroker in Rasht and Shokh Iskandarov was appointed deputy chief of the Internal Affairs 
Directorate of the Rasht Valley (Avesta 2011). 
The most remote domain has remained the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region 
(GBAO/Khorog), which alone comprises 40 percent of the territory of Tajikistan.125 The elimination 
of GBAO’s warlords was achieved by the government in military operations in 2012 and 2014. The 
pretext for these operations was based on rhetoric of the fight against transnational crime and 
drug trafficking. Whatever the actual rationale, the fact is that two influential warlords and former 
UTO commanders were killed: Tolib Ayombekov and Imumnozar Imumnozarov (Taarnby 2012; 
Ozodagon 2012). Furthermore, in 2014 some leaders of informal youth associations were 
detained, which resulted in popular protests, during which two persons were killed and six injured 
(FerganaNews 2015). This event was also followed by allegations against another influential 
warlord of GBAO – Mahmodbakir Mahmodbakirov (Ozodinews 2014). GBAO has always been a 
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region for which any tourist had to obtain a special visa but in spring 2015, the central government 
closed the access to GBAO for any foreign citizens.  
The international narrative of the fight against terrorism and drug trafficking was 
incorporated within national instruments for dealing with the rival elites, the most vivid example 
of which is Protocol 32-20 signed on 24 November 2011 by several representatives of the ruling 
elite. The main goal of the protocol was to strengthen control over religious institutions to prevent 
Islamist radicalization and extremism (Protocol 32-20, para.1). It also outlined tasks for 
representatives of the executive branch to allow fulfilling this goal. The officials responsible for 
exercising these tasks were from the “Dangara clan” or the ruling elite. Representatives of the 
Ministry of Interior were not invited to the meeting, as the Ministry was not considered to be loyal 
to the President. Within the framework of the fight against extremism, the Protocol assigns special 
attention to the IRPT, in that it specifically organizes a special monitoring of the IRPT’s activity, its 
financial resources, and its leaders. It also enlists all their members and creates incentives for 
them to leave the party (Protocol 32-20, para.2). In implementing this monitoring, local officials 
are required to use the resources of business circles. In other words, private entrepreneurs were 
supposed to contribute money and information to the fight against Islamism. This can be seen as a 
type of tax on businesses, a ‘tax for the fight against extremism’. Para.7 of the Protocol prescribes 
the constant military preparedness of special forces. The IRPT sees this protocol as an official 
attempt to marginalize the political party as part of the extremist network in Central Asia (Kabiri, 
interview 2012). After signing this protocol, the government’s actions against the former warlords 
and the leaders of the IRPT started being more obvious.  
It is important to note that by 2010, IRPT had secured only 2 seats in Parliament and was 
already under serious political pressure. International organizations such as International Alert 
attempted to create a platform for dialogue between the government and the opposition. 
However, representatives of the ruling elite did not show up to meetings organized by the NGO. 
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Further, the “dialogue” happened only among the IRPT members, independent experts, and the 
international organizations (Alert 2012). Since 2014, the pressure applied against the IRPT started 
being quite significant. The government has been using all measures, outlined in the Protocol 32-
20 to discredit them.  
On 4 September 2015, a clash took place between the government and the forces of the 
deputy minister of Defence, Abduhallim Nazarzoda, who, reportedly, with a group of 135 armed 
followers, attacked a number of state structures and then vanished in the mountains. A military 
operation to neutralize these rebels lasted about two weeks. The government reported the 
situation as a coup attempt and claims that Gen. Nazarzoda acted under the direct order of the 
IRPT leader, Kabiri. The alternative version of the events is that the situation was fabricated by the 
ruling elite itself, for these events coincided with the official meeting in Dushanbe of the Collective 
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), one of the goals of which is to defend the constitutional order 
of its members against such rebellions. The Secretary-General of the CSTO, Nikolai Borduzha, did 
not define these actions as an attempt of coup d’état, but rather as a clash between two different 
forces that emerged from the civil war and which are still in the process of sharing influence. He 
stated that it can be seen as activity of forces who did not admit the “loss of power in their 
country” after the civil war, meaning the UTO. He also used this context to mention the ISIS and its 
influence in Central Asia (Ozodinews 2015). However, as a result, since 4 September 2015, a new 
wave of political repression against the IRPT has started. Thirteen members of the IRPT’s political 
council were arrested, and its leader left the country.  
Another opposition movement, “Group 24”, has been denounced as being “extremist” and 
its members arrested. The leader of this movement, Umaralli Kuvvatov was killed on March 5, 
2015 in Istanbul, reportedly, by the security services of Tajiksitan. The leader of a youth movement 
“Youth for the Revival of Tajikistan”, Maksut Ibragimov, was extradited from Russia in January 
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2015 and incarcerated. Other opposition leaders in exile are now resisting extradition from Russia 
(Process 2015).  
The presumed presence of ISIS along the Afghanistani-Tajikistani border gives the 
government extra arguments in outlawing and harassing opposition leaders, specifically those 
within the IRPT. The reasons centered around memories of UTO connections with Afghanistani 
warlords and their popular support among the large Tajik communities in Afghanistan and the 
attempt to organize political Islam within the framework of a secular state.  
Thus, since 2000 to date the ruling elite managed to gain direct control over Tajikistan’s 
economic resources, her main financial revenues and marginalize its political rivals. Whether 
securitization let the ruling elite gain a monopoly over the legitimate use of force is debatable. The 
state increased its despotic power by weakening its infrastructural power. It managed to silence its 
people through hardship and memories of the civil war. Yet, this does not mean that the state 
extended its political authority over its entire territory. It tries to secure CSTO attention now by 
military means. Even though infrastructural power is “the ability to tax, maintain order, regulate 
society, and generally govern their societies” (Mann 1993), revenue collection has been conducted 
through the appropriation of the main sectors of the economy and directly controlling the 
business and banking sectors. Rather than creating a socio-political order, the ruling elite creates a 
manageable disorder, except in those sectors it directly controls. Furthermore, the link between 
revenue collection and the state budget is weak.  
There are other types of taxes which seemingly leave the provincial governments some 
room to maneuver, as these revenues can be administered and partially distributed locally. For 
instance, in 2009 the provincial governments’ sources of financing included taxes, such as 
enterprise profit tax, property tax on enterprises, personal income tax, land tax, tax on small 
businesses, a unified tax for producers of agricultural products, etc. (USAID 2009, 6). And still these 
functions are administered at the national level, but their implementation is shared with the sub-
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national governments. Juxtaposing this list with the list of direct revenue collection by the ruling 
elite and the structural embeddeddness of the economic control exercised by it, it is possible to 
see that the competences over these revenues do not provide the local level governments with 
enough economic powers to collect their revenues and compose their own local budgets. 
However, issues of acute social importance, such as social care, water and waste management 
remain the responsibility126 of the subnational governments (USAID 2009, 9). De facto functional 
centralization is added to by de jure centralization. For example, according to the Public Finance 
Management Strategy adopted by Decree 542 in September 2008, the role of central ministries in 
the budget process is increased (USAID 2009, 12). Considering that this sharing of responsibilities 
is conducted within an overarching system of direct revenue collection from the state’s major 
economic sectors by the ruling elite, there should be no doubt about the centralized functionality 
of the state.  
The link between these revenues and budget maintenance is not obvious. Revenues from 
strategic industries, such as aluminum/TALCO, cotton and energy sectors, are sent offshore. The 
agricultural sector is managed in a similar way by imposing the “Plan”, which benefits a small 
fraction of people. The energy sector lets the government tax its citizens for the construction of 
Rogun dam, a project that will not serve their interests, but rather the interests of the ruling elite 
to export more water to Iran and Afghanistan. And even the least materialistic fight, the one 
against Islamism, is conducted through de facto taxing entrepreneurs and directing money toward 
an obscure goal, with little relation to the state budget. Drug trafficking is another revenue-
collection source, one that also yields additional revenues in the form of foreign aid for fighting 
narco-trafficking. The foreign aid in this area, as well as IMF and the World Bank loans and grants 
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for structural reforms are channeled through the national banking system, which is again a vehicle 
of the ruling elite.  
For these reasons, the state has been failing to centralize its political authority over a given 
territory. Since most of the state management system seems to benefit the Dangara clan/Kulyabi 
elite, the military actions of 2012, 2014, and 2015 have been popularly perceived as an 
intervention of one elite into the domain of another, rather than the state trying to establish a 
socio-political order. In other words, the direct control over the financial and economic sectors of 
the country has little to do with channeling the economic sources of power to the state in order to 
further use it to extend its political authority. Instead of connecting Tajikistan’s fragmented 
territories through an organized fiscal system, as part of local and state budgets, control over the 
fragmented territories has been exercised by the extensive use of the military power from the 
start through to the present. The elimination of rival elites, the closure of the IRPT, as the last 
symbol of the former UTO influence, does not signify the end of social resistance. It signifies its 
shift abroad or extension beyond the territory of Tajikistan, especially when one thinks that 10% of 
the entire population already works abroad. Thus, the state is falling back into the medieval type 
of statehood, identified by Finer (1975), i.e. with centralized functionality and decentralized 
territoriality.  
5.2 Uzbekistan: the strategy of accommodation  
 
Introduction 
 
Historically, the map of elites in Uzbekistan corresponded to the geographical regions of the 
country itself: Fergana, Samarkand, Bukhara, Djizak, Kashkadar’ya, Surhandar’ya, Tashkent, and 
Khorezm.  Elites within these regions have been enmeshed within their regional societal histories. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Uzbekistan was the only case of the three being examined 
here that did not destroy the historical elites. Instead it involved them in the bargaining over state 
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formation. Schematically, this bargaining could be described as being between state and local 
elites. The ruling elite has monopolized the state’s military and institutional power, thereby 
guaranteeing its continuity and its grasp over the lion’s share of economy. In the post-Soviet 
history of Uzbekistan, the state or the ruling elite has been represented by the President and his 
supporters, while the local elites’ fabric is slightly more complex. The local elites or in this case 
regional elites are less intertwined with one another than in neighboring Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, 
due to greater state control. Often, the local elites are part of the “regional opposition” which 
includes a range of alternative agendas, from criminal to Islamic (Babajanov 2005).  
The strategy of accommodation, as adopted by President Karimov, is defined here as 
negotiating spheres of influence with regional elites to try accommodating their interests on a 
regional basis, as well as ensuring a constant rotation or personnel or cadres to prevent the 
interests of any rival elites from taking root within state institutions. However, we will explore 
whether the power over institutions is a necessary and sufficient conditions for consolidation of 
political authority. In practice, the outcome of the ruling elite strategies of managing rival elites in 
Uzbekistan is twofold. On the one hand, the state elite managed to centralize the existing 
patronage structures under the hierarchical structure of the state. On the other hand, the issues 
left to the free-will of local elites in exchange for their loyalty to the state are grounded in past 
legacies and in the present processes of privatization, which may happen beyond state control. It 
shows that these processes give farmers, which largely compose the rural elites some space for 
maneuvering by shifting their activities to the informal area. Specifically, the sponsors of the 
farming enterprises, which used to be the representatives of the local elites, are now de facto 
invisible, as they do not register their activity under their own name. Hence, by too much 
centralization, the state elite blinds itself, as it subordinates the spaces that are “legible”, and 
deprives itself from the capacity to see the spaces that are “illegible” by official standards (Scott 
1997). 
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5.2.1 The state as a bargain: elites and their spheres of influence  
The ruling elite’s power-logistics 
 
The state elites represented by Islam Karimov, can be described as originating from the 
Samarkand-Bukhara-Jizzak-Tashkent regions. Karimov is originally from Samarkand, but his initial 
legitimacy stems from his neutral position within the constellation of elites, rather than from his 
origins as such.127 Upon rising to power, he faced the strong patronage structures of local elites, 
created and strengthened during the period of Shafar Rashidov, the First Secretary of the 
Communist Party of Uzbekistan between 1959 and 1983. Rashidov was the first leader to 
institutionalize patronage and make it an inalienable element of the Soviet government in 
Uzbekistan (Ilkhamov 2004, 174). The central Soviet authorities had to rely on these local elites in 
order to keep the remote peripheries under control. In essence, the arrangement between the 
central Soviet authorities and the local elites implied little interference in the local selection of 
personnel in order to secure cadre stability and the distribution of resources within provinces 
(Rigby 1979). After gaining official control over local resources, the regional elites could strengthen 
their control of unofficial and illicit distribution channels, which they had previously established in 
various sectors, such as trade, communal services, and housing construction. It was at this time 
that shadow economic activities became a significant part of the political economy of the local 
elites. In practice, elite figures with unofficial influence in shadow structures relied on elite figures 
with official positions within the state for political and legal protection for the conversion of public 
economic resources into private ones (Ilkhamov 2004, 177). Karimov’s neutrality within these 
processes gained him the trust of different elite circles in 1989 in the middle of perestroika, when 
he was elected the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan (Fjæstad 2012).  
                                                          
127 During the Soviet period, Islam Karimov was not involved in the infamous “Cotton Scandal”. It was Shafar Rashidov, 
the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, who managed to organize the local patronage networks to 
falsify the cotton production in order to divert most Soviet subsidies to Uzbekistan.  
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Despite his personal detachment from the regional elites, Islam Karimov had to rely on 
them to secure his rise to power at the outset of independence. That was the point at which he 
applied the strategy of accommodation in order to both secure his rise to power and to 
consolidate it. The two main elite structures which he relied upon were the ones headed by Ismail 
Djurabekov, the minister of Water Management and, like President Karimov, a native of 
Samarkand province, and the Tashkent city elites, headed by Shukrullo Mirsaidov, the mayor of 
Tashkent. In return for his support, Mirsaidov and Djurabekov were appointed prime minister and 
deputy prime-minister, respectively, with the latter “controlling the agricultural and water 
management sector” (Ilkhamov 2004, 178). To prevent the alienation of the remainder of the 
Tashkent elite, in 1991, Karimov orchestrated a confrontation with the Mirsaidov-led elites. This 
strategy won him the support of the rest of the Tashkent elite. After winning the Presidential 
elections, Karimov pressured Mirsaidov from the political arena to strengthen his ties with the rest 
of the Tashkent elite, part of which was against Mirsaidov (Ilkhamov 2004, 179).  
The influence of Tashkent elite was later consolidated through key appointments to the 
Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations (MVES) and the National Bank for Foreign Economic 
Relations (NBU). These two institutions oversaw two large sources of revenue for the state: the 
control of export and import through the issuing of requisite licenses, and the distribution of 
international loans (Ilkhamov 2004). Considering that the key exports were cotton and fuel, the 
key strategic constituents of the country’s economy, the Tashkent elite was able to gain 
considerable control of economic resources. Over time, Islam Karimov continued to distance 
himself from the regional elites of Samarkand (Fjæstad 2012). He has sought to accommodate the 
local elites without letting them institutionalize their power within the state structures, at least 
not without his consent. Where there was a threat of interests that would oppose his vision of the 
state being institutionalized, he rotated the cadres. To date, President Karimov has been reelected 
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to office five times128 as a member of the People’s Democratic Party of Uzbekistan, which in 2008 
was transformed into the Liberal Democratic Party of Uzbekistan.  
The strategy of accommodation in Uzbekistan was conducted as follows. Firstly, the state 
elite monopolized the military sector. Secondly, it made the levers of coercive power one of the 
main pillars of the structure of patronage in the country, i.e. any patronage-based decisions would 
go through a figure related to the security or law-enforcement structures, which in their turn are 
directly connected to the President. If, in the minor areas of economy, state elites left some room 
for maneuver to the local elites, control over the strategically important resources, such as cotton 
and energy has remained in the hands of the state elites. This is because rent-seeking 
opportunities in these two fields would require the coercive power (Markowitz 2013). The military 
sector in Uzbekistan consists of the Ministry of Interior and the National Security Service. Their 
ministers are appointed directly by the President (Markowitz 2013). The former has been the 
cornerstone of the President’s power in Uzbekistan. Unlike other state ministries, the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs (MVD) has been immune129 to cadre rotations, due to the fact that they provided 
the backbone of Karimov’s power and secured the smooth transition from Communism (Faizi 
2003). For 14 years, until January 5, 2006, the office of the minister of internal affairs was 
occupied by a figure loyal to the President, Zakir Almanov.  
The main rival to the MVD institution is the SNB (the successor to the regional KGB), which, 
along with the Prosecutor’s Office and the military divisions deployed on Uzbek territory, used to 
be under the direct control of Moscow (Ilkhamov 2006). The influence of the Minister of Internal 
Affairs extended to the “control over Uzbek business structure and large-scale fund-raising 
activities (i.e. bribery) and, reportedly, drug trafficking” (Ilkhamov 2006). SNB also possessed tools 
of coercion and large economic resources (Ilkhamov 2006). Subsequently, both of these structures 
                                                          
128
 The latest Presidential elections were held on April 29, 2015.  
129 Karimov consider crime to be a form of civil dissent, not only a challenge to social tranquility (Ilkhamov 
2006).  
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have established themselves as decisive links in the chain of patronage structures which had a 
grasp over significant parts of economy and other powerful governmental structures (Markowitz 
2013). Specifically, “the MVD controlled the Customs Committee and some local governments, 
while SNB ruled over the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, the Border Guard, and, to a 
certain extent, the Uzbek Army” (Ilkhamov 2006). President Karimov has directly encouraged this 
competition “in order to create an internal system of checks-and-balances” (Ilkhamov 2006).   
Among the primary goals of these two agencies, authors highlight: 1) fighting the regime’s 
enemies and 2) guaranteeing their survival in the post-Karimov era, pursued by the MVD and the 
SNB, respectively. To achieve these goals, both agencies “sought their own constituencies within 
the country’s political opposition” (Ilkhamov 2006). The Minister of Internal Affairs, Bakhodir 
Matlyubov (the former chairman of the State’s Customs Committee), together with other key 
political figures composing the state elite (such as Prime Minister Shavkat Mirziyoev and Central 
Bank Chairman Fayzulla Mulladjanov) control the distribution of foreign investment going through 
the center (Fjæstad 2012; Ilkhamov 2006).  
The local elites and their room for maneuver  
 
Local elites can be depicted as including official regional authorities, appointed directly by the 
President, former chiefs of the collectives (kolkhoz bosses), and newly emergent regional 
strongmen who covertly invest in and control household farms despite not being the registered 
owners, so as to control cross-border trade (Trevisani 2007). In spite of the fact that these 
strongmen are not necessarily rooted in these regions’ societal histories, they possess the 
potential to bridge the formal and informal economies. In addition to these, there are religious 
leaders who, at the time of perestroika, would have represented the forces of opposition. For this 
reason they are treated as political rivals rather than as the spiritual leaders.  
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However, not all of these elites made it to organizing themselves as the legitimate 
opposition. The first organized opposition started developing at the beginning of the 1990s and 
was organized under the umbrella of the Birlik movement, which comprised semi-criminal groups 
and movements united on a regional basis. Such groups included “Surkarsh” (from Surhadar’ya 
and Kashkadar’ya provinces), “FAN”, from Fergana, Andijan, and Namangan provinces and the 
“Erk” party under the leadership of Muhammad Solih130, from Khorezm (Knyazev 2005). Some 
authors underscore the criminal element of the organized opposition, relying on the fact that 
Fergana, Andijan and Namandan are statistically among the regions demonstrating the highest 
rates of drug trafficking, along with Surhadar’ya and Kashkadar’ya (Knyazev 2005). Another wing 
of the opposition comprised radical movements and groups, such as “Adolat”, “Odamijli va 
insonparvarlik”, “Islom lashkarlari”, “Nur” and “Tovba”. Adherents of these groups took part in the 
Tajikistani civil war on the side of the United Tajik Opposition, training in the camps in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan, which made the core of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). A third facet of 
the opposition is composed of akramits (also called as “Ijmonchilar”, “Akramija”, “Halifatchilar”). 
The founder of Akramiya is Akrom Yuldashev, who was, at the same time, a member of one of the 
cells of Hizb-ut-Tahrir (Babajanov 2005).131 The social organization of the opposition is reported as 
being composed of a group of the old elite whose interests contradict those of the ruling elite and 
who rely on the “marginal parts” of the population.132  These groups have also had close 
connections with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which, as described in chapter 2, represent 
the most radical opposition to the government of Islam Karimov (Babadjanov 1999).  
                                                          
130 He gained his 12,4 percent, mainly due to the support of the electorate of the Khorezm province, where he, 
originally, is from (Knyazev, website).  
131
 Knyazev underlines the connections between the leaders of these parties with the military groups in Pakistan and 
Afghanistan. For example, the first deputy of Tohir Yuldash and his brother-in-law Dilshod Hojiev, who are controlling 
the financial issues, live in the town of Bannu. The leader of the military wing is Mohammah Ayub (whose original 
name is Ulugbek Hojiev). These figures are all originally coming from the Namangan province and other parts of the 
Fergana Valley of Uzbekistan.  
132
 Knyazev calls them “neofits”, because they share the above stated characteristics and the lack of the concrete 
political program that would address the current societal problems and the steps of their resolution.  
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The next wing of the opposition is represented by those elements of civil society concerned 
with human rights, such as the “Society of human rights in Uzbekistan”, chaired by Abdumannob 
Pulatov and supported by American sponsorship (Knyazev 2005). The opposition coalition 
“Serkuesh Uzbekistonim” (“Sun coalition”), with the support of this organization, was created 
before the Andijan events in 2005. Reportedly, the goal of this coalition is not to organize a color 
revolution, but to initiate a constructive dialogue with the ruling elite in order to work together 
towards economic and political reforms (Knyazev 2005).  
As a part of his accommodation strategy, Islam Karimov left the distribution of credit to 
local agricultural enterprises to the local elites at the beginning of his rule (Markowitz 2013). The 
control over cross-border trade, bazaars, household farms, and (autonomous) regional fiscal 
policies was also left to the local elites (Markowitz 2013; Trevisani 2007). This allowed regional (or 
rural) elites to gain control over the informal economic processes. This is different from Tajikistan, 
where ruling elite took control of economic resources, but left to the rival elites coercive power. 
The importance of regional elites and the necessity of incorporating their interests within 
the political debate was demonstrated by the Andijan protests in 2005, which resulted from the 
dismissal of an influential local leader, the general fatigue of the monopolization of the state 
institutions by the President, as well as the prohibition from choosing what to cultivate on 
household farms (Trevisani 2007; Markowitz 2013). The Andijan protest was a turning point. (A. 
Ilkhamov 2006). As a result, Islam Karimov implemented the establishment of a bi-cameral 
Parliament133, with the Senate comprised of the representatives of the regions (six from each 
region; with 16 appointed directly by the President), and the lower Chamber, to which the 
members would be elected through direct elections (UzParliament 2015).  
The opposition party “Erk” made it to the parliament and has become more visible due to 
its leader Absamad Mallaev, who has supported an alliance with the movement “Birlik halk 
                                                          
133
 The law about its establishment was  issued in 2001.  
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harakati” (new name of “Birlik”). However, this party has not yet achieved any influence vis-à-vis 
the ruling elite. After the creation of the bi-cameral Parliament in 2005, none of these parties is 
presently represented in Parliament. Reportedly, none of the parties included in the Parliament 
represent a viable alternative to the President’s power. The only significant opponent President 
Karimov has had to face was Muhammad Solih134, one of the founders of “Birlik” movement and 
the “Erk” party in 1989. In 1991 he gained 12% of the votes at the Presidential elections. The 
reported falsification of results provoked a students’ demonstration, the participants of which 
were executed (Fahritdinov 2002, Lansford 2015). In protest, Muhammad Solih gave up his 
mandate and went into exile in Turkey. Despite his exile, the activities of the Erk party are still 
continuing.135  
Today, there are five parties in the Parliament: pro-presidential Liberal-Democratic Party of 
Uzbekistan (52 posts), The “Milij Tiklanish” party (36 posts), Peoples Democratic Party of 
Uzbekistan (27 posts), Social-Democratic Party “Adolat” (20 posts), and Ecological Movement of 
Uzbekistan (15 posts) (MFA 2014). In anticipation of the Presidential elections to be held on 
March, 29, 2015, the social-democratic party “Adolat” and the NDPU proclaimed itself a 
parliamentary opposition. The Parliamentary majority or the so-called “Democratic Forces Bloc” is 
comprised of Milij Tiklanysh and the Liberal Democratic Party (UzParliament 2015). Thus the 
regional elites achieved political leverage for their interests. Considering that they have a better 
grasp on informal economic activities, this leverage could become a means to institutionalize that 
influence. The strategy of accommodation includes only those local elites who are not motivated 
                                                          
134
 Originating from one of the most famous aristocratic circles of Khorezm. His father was Muhammad Amin 
(Madamin-Bek) himself. Muhammad Salih, a prominent poet of Uzbekistan, whose poetry is based on the Rumi 
tradition and metaphysical and mystical thinking of Sufism. He was the first to translate Kafka and French poets of the 
20s century into Uzbek.   
135 For example, in 2009 by the initiative of Salih a coalition of the opposition forces of Uzbekistan has been 
established. It consists of “Union of the 13 of May”, Erk party, organization “Andijan: Justice and Renessaince” and 
“Tayanch” (Opora/the Basis). On 28 May, 2011, this platform transformed into the People’s Movement of Uzbekistan, 
which has comprised eight organizations, representing different social group, including moderate Muslim 
communities. Salih has been elected as the Chairman of the People’s Movement of Uzbekistan by the majority of the 
delegates. In 2012, the second meeting of the PMU proclaimed M.Solih as its leader, again.  
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by a strong Islamic cause. The idea of the secular Uzbekistan defines those elites which are 
permitted to remain in play and those which are banished from the levers of state power. As a 
result of the strategy of accommodation, coercive capacity has been monopolized by state elites 
and revenue collection placed in the hand of local elites.   
5.2.2. Surveillance: how to centralize power without destroying existing patronage 
structures 
 
Centralization of power in Uzbekistan has mainly been organized via an emphasis on military and 
economic sources of power. The ideological sphere has remained centralized, with any ideological 
debate limited within the boundaries of the central idea of the secular state and strict separation 
of religion from the state. The political sphere has remained the only arena for competition, albeit 
under conditions of overarching state surveillance. Economic power as such has been achieved, 
not so much through the monopolization of the strategic areas of the economy, but rather 
through shaping the economy in such way that its survival depends on the state. Specifically, the 
economy is primarily based on the twin pillars of cotton and energy as the main sources of 
revenue. Rent-seeking from these resources are impossible without the involvement of patronage 
structures, in which law enforcement agencies are heavily involved. Additional sources of revenue, 
such as foreign investment, had been captured by means of diffuse surveillance which permeates 
the banking system.  
In short, the centralization of power by the state elite could be depicted as follows: 1) the 
exclusion of any opposition with radically different ideas of the state beyond that which is 
conforms to a relatively homogenous field of bargaining (i.e. strict separation of religion from the 
state); 2) frequent rotation of cadres; 3) making the coercive apparatus part of the patronage 
structures, and so providing support for itself through military power; 4) surveillance of the 
banking system and money transactions as a means to divert investments to particular sectors of 
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economy; 5) regulating informal social structures, such as mahallas, thus partially controlling social 
life, private spaces, and social order. It is worth noting, however, that the underlying trend was not 
for the state elite to destroy the patronage structures of the local elites. Instead, it sought to turn 
the military or coercive power available to it into an integral part of its patronage. While the 
political and the societal spheres have been up for negotiation, the state has been monopolized 
from the outset. Support for this monopoly was provided by key law enforcement institutions: the 
Ministry of Interior and on the later stages, the National Security Services (the former KGB). 
Monopolization of the state allowed for continuity of the President’s power, while coercion 
allowed for surveillance of the existing patronage structures.  
In the course of his rule, President Karimov has sought to accommodate the interests of 
regional elites, without allowing them to build a power base within the state. To do so, he has 
ensured a constant turnover of personnel (Fjæstad 2012). In the remote regions, the institutional 
infrastructure of the state has not been developed, which makes recourse to the decision-making 
apparatus in Tashkent unavoidable in deals concerning strategic national economic resources. For 
example, deals involving cotton or energy, licensing for small businesses and investment gaining 
have to go through Tashkent. In this way, any accommodation must be conducted in such a way 
that representatives of regional elites would be directly or indirectly under state surveillance. The 
centralization of power in Uzbekistan has therefore led to the establishing of a degree of 
surveillance in strategic areas of state management.  
The exclusion of the opposition began in 1992, when President Karimov won the 
presidential elections, defeating the charismatic leader of the Birlik movement and Erk party, 
Muhammad Solih. Since 1991, Birlik, Erk and Akromiya provided the bulk of the Islamist opposition 
to President Karimov’s rise to power. As a result, President Karimov started controlling the activity 
of these parties. Specifically, Birlik and Erk were banned in Uzbekistan. In doing so, President 
Karimov defined the limits of political debate within the state. One could compete politically, but 
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only within certain ideological boundaries that would benefit the state elites. This limited the 
bargaining potential of the local elites.  
At the same time, President Karimov loosened economic controls, allowing for rent-seeking 
opportunities for the regional elites, as well as allowing them relative freedom to decide their 
fiscal policies, as these had remained relatively autonomous until 1997 (Ilkhamov 2004). However, 
in the late 1990s new economic reforms introduced more state control in the economy. For 
instance, a newly created Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations (in 1994) was assigned the task 
of import controls, which, by 1997, had overturned earlier concessions which had “granted de 
facto control over cross-border trade to provincial government” (Markowitz 2013, 104). 
Furthermore, where the distribution of foreign investment at the local level was previously 
executed by the local elites, since the late 1990s new credit schemes were introduced. The 
distribution of credit to local agricultural enterprises was now conducted through the Tashkent 
office, instead of through regional branches (Markowitz 2013, 104). Extending credit to small and 
medium-sized enterprises now has to go through the Uzbekistan’s Business-Foundation136 
(Markowitz 2013, 104). 
The most important aspects of the strategy of accommodation, such as autonomous fiscal 
policies were also reduced in 1997. However, when, in 1997, regional voices started raising 
concerns and the state elite feared resistance from regional elites, it was decided that the state’s 
subsidies to regional budgets would be cut to half of the amount of 1996137 (Markowitz 2013, 
105). These reforms reportedly led to two outcomes. Firstly, they ensured that the gatekeepers of 
any rent-seeking opportunities would centrally appointed governors, accountable directly to the 
President (Markowitz 2013, 105). A further, unintended outcome appeared to be that local elites 
were incentivized to seek out “alternative strategies of rent seeking” (Markowitz 2013, 104).  
                                                          
136
 “Averaging 130 projects per region and totaling an annual 4.68 billion so'm ($5 million) by 2003—was also 
centralized through central offices” (Markowitz 2013, 104). 
137
 It went from 26.6 percent in 1996 to 13 percent in 1997 and 1998. 
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The frequent rotation of cadres is another tool designed to make the regional elites more 
accountable to the center. For instance, between 1995 and 2003 there was a series of dismissals 
of provincial governors for mismanagement and corruption. These dismissals resulted from 
“investigations of the shortcomings in agricultural production in the regions” conducted by the 
First Deputy Prime Minister and the head of the country’s Agro-Industrial Complex, Ismail 
Jorobekov (Markowitz 2013, 105). 
Steps towards centralization have been undertaken on the organizational or institutional 
side. For example, prosecutors’ offices are usually the means for providing rent-seeking 
opportunities to the local elites. Prosecutors (Prokuratura) are one of several state bodies “directly 
under the president (as chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers), along with ministries of Interior, 
Defense, Justice, National Security, Foreign Affairs, and the Border Protection Committee. Second-
tier ministries and committees within the state are directly managed by the prime minister” 
(Markowitz 2013, 108). Thus, the center has been always concerned with balancing the growing 
powers of governors (Markowitz 2013, 109).  
As has been already highlighted in previous chapters, the de-collectivization process has 
not fully taken place in Central Asia. In part this allowed the state elite to maintain a type of 
economy that would need a centralized state to guarantee its survival. As described in chapter 3, 
although household farms had been created, they did not displace the collective farms. The 
peculiarity of management of these two types of farms138 in parallel has provided space for the 
development of shadow economies. The existing local elites, who received revenues from cotton, 
as well as wider agrarian sector, controlled the local distribution of subsidies, land and water in 
this sector. In this way, they profited from partially untangled collective farms (Pomfret 2000, 271; 
2000a).  The local elites controlling this at the beginning of the 1990s were represented mainly by 
the former kolkhoz chiefs who, regardless of their current official positions, maintained a large 
                                                          
138
 Chapter 3 provides numbers on how in practice increased after the de-collectivization process.  
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grasp over the kolkhoz lands. In order to control this situation, the state elite granted oversight of 
these issues to local governors appointed directly by the President. In theory, the local governors 
would represent a link between the state elite and the farmers (Tilly 1975). This link dissolves in 
the complex constellation of the variety of farms, which were not integrated into the overarching 
agricultural management system. As described in chapter 3, in the post-Soviet period the number 
of kolkhozes increased from 971 in 1991 to 1,374 in 1996.139 Furthermore, other economic forms 
of agricultural management, such as shirkats (cooperatives), private livestock farms, joint-stock 
companies, rental enterprises and agrfirms have been established. Hence, agricultural 
management comprised a variety of non-state organizations, the “political economical nature *of 
which seems] rather undefinable” (Ilkhamov 1998, 540). This situation provided room for 
maneuver under the seemingly overarching state surveillance, which is described in section 5.2.3 
as the space of contestation of the state. Since the new types of agricultural management foster 
new types of strongmen, who have a closer link to the farmers than either regional or state elites. 
Hence, despite making them a cornerstone of agriculture and economy, the link between the state 
and the local elites, and thus with the farmers, has not been established as it has in the Chinese 
case, which relied on the community and household farms in their agricultural management.  
However, the collectives still matter, since the household farms depend on them for the 
distribution of water, which has been a crucial means of leverage over leasehold farms in a region 
defined largely by water shortages. Furthermore, the decisions over what is to be produced, the 
distribution of subsidies, fertilizers, and marketing outputs remain at the discretion of collectives’ 
administrators who do not possess a direct connection to the newly organized leasehold or 
household farms (Pomfret 2000). This exemplifies why the regional governors, who hold the main 
competences over the farms, still do not possess a direct connection to the farmers, and thus do 
                                                          
139
 Due to the transformation of sovkhozes into kolkhozes; the different between them is that sovkhozes were funded 
directly from the state budget and their output had to entirely go to the state; kolkhozes were non-budgetary 
enterprises had the right to sell their output or at least its surplus at the local bazaars.  
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not always influence their survival strategies and informal economic practices. They do not 
therefore represent a viable link in state – society relations.  
The link between the state and the society exists, rather, in a classic top-down manner, 
through the “dependence on a major crop” (cotton), which the state pushes to be cultivated as it 
comprises its major export good (Pomfret 2000, 272). Cotton cultivation is the major area which 
demonstrates how tightly knit the state and regional elites, the central banks and law 
enforcement agencies are. Cotton is the so-called “unlootable resource”, since it is difficult to 
transfer into cash and rents in a way which bypasses the authority of the patronage structures 
(Markowitz 2013; Pomfret 2000). Specifically, the decision of what is going to be cultivated, in 
what amount and in which regions, comes from the state. Further, the state-controlled banking 
system acts as a monitor, since:  
By law purchases of seeds, fertilizer, machinery, fuel, and other inputs must be through 
bank transfer, and revenue from agricultural sales must be deposited in a bank and can 
only be used for approved purposes. Depositors’ right of withdrawal in cash is 
circumscribed by centrally determined limits and local practice. The banks do not serve their 
depositors, but serve the state in checking that funds are used appropriately. There is no 
confidentiality or security. Indeed, bank account information is routinely supplied to local 
officials seeking information about a farmer’s activities, and taxes may be deducted directly 
from bank accounts (Pomfret 2000, 272-273). 
 
The “dependency” of the state on this kind of economy is exemplified by the amount of revenues 
collected from the cotton sector. For example in 1993, the cotton sector provided a sixth of 
government revenue140 (World Bank 1996). In subsequent years, this percentage was even larger 
in 1994 and the first half of 1995 “when world cotton prices increased faster than domestic prices 
in dollar terms” (Pomfret 2000, 276). While the cotton price was sensitive to changes in exchange 
rates, and therefore went up and down, the resultant trend was the decline in the cotton farmers’ 
share of the world price, due to the “continuing increase in the black market premium on dollars 
in 1997 and 1998” (Pomfret 2000, 276).  However, in order to fill in this gap in revenues, the state 
                                                          
140
 “The net tax on farmers from the state-order-system-sum subsidies amounted to $367” (Pomfret 2000, 276). 
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elite adopted more punitive taxation and cut subsidies, which caused a long-run loss of sales and 
encouragement of illegal economic activities (Pomfret 2000, 277). Eventually, cotton revenue 
collection was organized through the Selkhozfond of the Ministry of Finance, a “non-transparent 
entity accountable only to the narrow circle within the leadership” (Muradov and Ilkhamov 2014, 
9). Reportedly, “in 2012 the government’s profit from the sale of cotton was almost $264 million, 
when calculated using the artificially-low official exchange rate; or over $641 million at the most 
realistic black market rate” (Muradov and Ilkhamov 2014, 9).  
In this way the omnipresent surveillance state proves its might when it comes to making 
sure that none of the stakeholders engaging with the state are able to implement their visions of 
the state, economy and society. The patronage structures are not destroyed, but are rather 
embraced in order to preserve the “human factor” of politics, making politics more submissive to 
the state elite. However, in structural terms, the “human factor” steps in and fosters processes 
that shift to the space of the informal. This shift to the field of informal may not necessarily be an 
elite-creating factor, but it is definitely a source of new processes which go beyond the links the 
state builds up with its societies. The weakness of the omnipresent surveillance state lies in the 
fact that it sees what it is able to see. The processes that develop in the shadows are beyond its 
sight and thus its control. 
5.2.3. What if the Panopticon had corners: emerging elites or the shift of resistance  
 
The snapshots of mass protests, the phenomenon of the “absentee landlordism”, and the 
diverting of survival strategies into the informal economic realm can be seen as the types of 
resistance to the centralization of power. The first snapshot of social mobilization against the state 
elite was registered in Andijan in 2005. This event was internationally condemned as “the Andijan 
massacre”. Subsequent interpretations thereof emphasize the ideological/religious component 
and condemn the non-democratic governance of one of those “stans’ dictators”. It exemplified the 
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influence the local elites possess in mobilizing societies (HRW 2005). Religious and democratic 
sentiments aside, Andijan demonstrated that the local elites are a multi-dimensional category, 
with a developing layer of the so-called “unruly elite”, the patrons or strongmen who are in 
practice businessmen, doing business out of agriculture through the cross-border trade.141 As 
Babadzhanov records, the protest was organized by the members of the Akromiya group, 
characterized by a mish-mash of quasi-Islamic radical rhetoric with pragmatic business and, at 
times, illicit interests (Babadjanov 2005). On the day of the protest, a group of protesters released 
prisoners and seized weapons belonging to police officers at the cost of the those officers’ lives142 
(Babadjanov 2005). The events had been preceded by month-long protests against the arrests of 
the twenty-three local businessmen for their connection to Akromiya.143 On May 12, the 
protesters took over several police stations, a military garrison, attacked the National Security 
Service Headquarters in Andijan, and stormed the prison releasing about five hundred prisoners 
(Markowitz 2013). Heavily armed themselves, the protesters moved to the Babur square with the 
slogans “Allah Akbar” in an attempt to attract public participation (Babadjanov 2005). At this 
point, the government used military force against the demonstrators.  
The Andijan events threw a spotlight on what has developing in the societal shadows. The 
economic and fiscal reforms and centralization of import and export control which shifted the 
bargaining framework was meant to shift the bargaining power to the side of the state elite. The 
latter attempted to extend control over the area of the informal economy as well. Specifically, 
restrictions concerning cross-border trade through the bazaars, which comprised the key sector of 
the informal economy were exercised in the following steps: 1) the government introduced the 
restrictions against shuttle trade and in May 2002 levied excessively high tariffs on consumer 
                                                          
141
 At the early 1990s it would be shuttle-traders or dealers of cotton smuggling across the borders. Today, these are 
the investors of the leasehold independent farms.  
142
 The fact silenced by the internationals, as “the servants of the dictator” might be less of a human being than those 
committing crimes behind the veil of religious slogans.  
143
 Extremist religious group, aiming to overthrow the state elite in order to implement the idea of the Islamic state. 
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imports (reached 90 percent); 2) in December 2002, smaller enterprises engaging in wholesale 
import trade were outlawed; 3) in 2003, stalls at major bazaars were auctioned at prohibitively 
high rates for small shuttle traders; and 4) in November 2004, a law was passed requiring traders 
to use cash registers and put their earnings in bank accounts (Markowitz 2013, 101; Radnitz 2010; 
Lewis 2008). As described above, the banking system is one of the cornerstones of surveillance, 
and so it was perceived by the public as an intrusion into the private sphere. These restrictive laws 
were the same across all provinces. Since these laws made all traders more vulnerable to tax 
officials, police, and state prosecutors, they generated popular discontent among local traders and 
prominent businessmen in the bazaars in every region of Uzbekistan (Markowitz 2013).  
Another explanation suggests that the lack of economic liberalization is the reason for the 
diversion of economic activity to the informal social structures and informal trade (Radnitz 2010; 
Lewis 2008). Others explain it in terms of the competition for power within the local 
administration itself and among the local clans and groups with diverse regional identities (Collins 
2006; McGlinchey 2005; Schatz 2004; Jones Luong 2002). Finally, some scholars see this event as 
the result of competition for access to state resources by different “government-linked business 
enterprises” (rather than broad-based societal support) or “unchecked rent seeking”, emphasizing 
that de facto control over cross-border trade belonged to the provincial governments at least until 
1996 (Markowitz 2013, 104; Lewis 2008).  Thus, before centralization took place by diverting 
control to the Ministry of Economic Relations, the system of rent-reeking (and the new strongmen 
that emerged as a result) and informal practices had already developed. And since the main 
function of the surveillance inbuilt into the state’s infrastructural power was the channeling of 
rent-seeking, it was this rent-seeking that became institutionalized, rather than the authority of 
the state as a political, ideological, and institutional entity. In societal terms, the informal 
strategies of survival have, de facto, become organized in parallel to the state. Hence, the rapid 
change of the governmental strategy has threatened the very bargaining powers of the regional 
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and local elites. To balance this, however, the state elite established the bi-cameral parliament, 
with a Senate consisting of the representatives of the regional elites (Ilkhamov 2004).  
What one can see is that in the early 1990s the state elite created favorable conditions for 
institutionalization of rent-seeking and for the creation of informal economic practices. Cross-
border trade through the bazaars became the principal domain of the local elites and the newly 
emerging strongmen, with their societies making the bazaar the main unit of their survival 
strategy, and cross-border trade their main practice. Starting in 1996, this dark corner was 
(partially) withdrawn from the purview of the regional and local elites, thus violating the relations 
established between their societal domains. This contributed to growing social resistance. 
However, this coincided with growing support for “non-standard cross-border trade” supported by 
the World Bank programs, as discussed in chapter 4. This meant that the informal sector gained 
additional sponsors, beyond the state elite or even the official regional elites, thus possibly 
constituting the space of societal resistance to the central state. Contrary to the authorized 
explanations of social protests in Uzbekistan, it is not “the lack of economic liberalization that 
caused the uprisings” (Radnitz 2010; Lewis 2008), but exactly the liberalization and the unruly local 
elites which mediate informal economic practices that contribute to the fragmentation of societies 
and therefore their unruliness by the central states.  
How exactly, under such strict surveillance, does the phenomenon of informal trade 
become such a significant part of local survival strategies as to define the relations between local 
elites and their domains? The answer lies in the nature of the farming system, the parallel 
existence of many forms of farming as mentioned above and the fact that the state has 
established a Panopticon to control the elites. However, in the process of doing so, the meanings 
and hidden forms of what can be seen through its lens has been changing. As a result, the state 
itself has become a hostage of its own panopticism. Specifically, the problem is that the state 
preserved the cotton-based economy to make the economy more controllable. It embedded 
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surveillance into all structures of patronage, missing the moment when it became 
counterproductive to do so.  
The complex constellation of agricultural management provides opportunities for the 
private sector to intrude into the sector of collective farms and proves that the existing patronage 
structures provide the opportunities for the development of the informal private sector do not fit 
into this system of surveillance (Ilkhamov 1998). The surplus sold at the local markets, the bazaars, 
made these units less controllable by the formal elites, at both state and regional level. Rather, 
they have been shifting into the domains of the entrepreneurs, due to the fact that the most 
amount of money resides in the pockets of those who control the bazaars, not in the local budget 
(direct and indirect taxes on products sold at the local markets) (Ilkhamov 1998, 553).  
In addition to these factors, the societal fabric of rural Uzbekistan is not homogenous. The 
independent farmers, in principle, have a right to define what they would like to cultivate if they 
do not use state subsidies. Trevisani (2007) identifies the phenomenon of hidden farm sponsoring, 
which is officially illegal. However, since the only way to use nationalized land (the form in which 
de-collectivization took place in Uzbekistan) was leasing the land from the state, any land 
transactions must be “officially channeled through the district heads” and the money transfers are 
monitored fully by the banks as described above (Trevisani 2007, 94). The process of hidden farm 
sponsoring, which allows farmers to circumvent these restrictions, therefore takes the following 
form. The subleasing and selling of land to a third person can be achieved via a sharecropping 
agreement or “sold unofficially to the tillers” on mutually profitable terms (Trevisani 2007, 94). In 
practice, “the farmer enterprises are officially registered by individuals but always run as joint 
enterprise of the extended family, involving several households” (Trevisani 2007, 94). This allows 
newcomers to agriculture who are rich with capital to invest their money through informal deals 
on profitable land cropping schemes (Trevisani 2007, 96). This “absentee landlordism” means that 
the investors who prefer to stay unregistered outsource the management of the farm to local 
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workers on the basis of the share-cropping agreement (Trevisani 2007, 96). This trend is seen as 
the intrusion of privatization into the complex agricultural system in Uzbekistan (Ilkhamov 2004). 
Hence, the farm management is replaced by an indirect control over the means of production 
through the “hidden farm sponsoring” (Trevisani 2007, 97).144  
This process is considered by some scholars as the one leading to emergence of the “new 
farmers” and the “new elites”, who coming from other sectors seeking to invest money, “through 
informal deals on profitable land cropping schemes” (Trevisani 2007, 96; Ilkhamov 2004). Since 
such deals are “officially registered by individuals but always run as joint enterprise of the 
extended family, involving several households” (Trevisani 2007, 94), this trend contributed to the 
general expansion of the parallel economy in the regions, and, therefore, the new local elites and 
the conditions conducive for the alternative sub-systems of governance.  
 In sum, Uzbekistani strategy of accommodation implied relying on patronage structures, 
rather than destroying them. However, marrying the military element with the political created 
the imbalance in the bargaining power and lead to silencing of the grassroots societal processes.  
5.3 Kyrgyzstan and intermingling of elites: from a state of enlightenment to the shadow 
state 
Introduction  
 
The ruling elite in Kyrgyzstan changed three times during the independence period: in the early 
1990s, in 2005, and in 2010. These events correspond to three changes of political power in the 
country, that is the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the coup d’état in 2005 that displaced 
President Askar Akaev, and the coup d’état in 2010 resulting in the displacement of President 
Kurmanbek Bakiev. All three ruling elites that emerged with these changes have adopted the 
strategy of intermingling, which is defined here as a pragmatic approach to politics, where elites 
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 For detailed analysis of the hidden farm sponsoring and influence through which on the farming strategies and 
planning, see Trevisani (2007) and his research on Khorezm and rice cultivation, when the ban of rice cultivation in 
favor of cotton cultivation resulted in the mass protests against the formal regional authorities. 
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gather on an ad-hoc basis to address the interests of a certain elite group and then reshuffle 
themselves for another ad-hoc goal; the goals may vary from business through to personal ones 
(Mirsaitov, interview 2014).  
Between 1991 and 2000, competition was between the two branches: the executive and 
the legislative, or between the Presidential vector of political development and Parliament. Due to 
the fact that the South was underrepresented in politics, this struggle was largely interpreted as 
the one between North and South. Viewed from this perspective, the Northern elite was seen as 
being represented by President Akaev whereas the Southern elite was represented by President 
Bakiev, even though on both sides there was no consensus among the constituent groupings of 
interests. An intermediate President, who ruled between 2010 and 2011, Rosa Otunbaeva, did not 
fit into this geographical interpretation since she was a symbol of the technocratic Soviet elite. For 
most of her career she served at the state diplomatic service. She was the only President who left 
office due to peaceful democratic elections in 2011, which resulted in the Presidency of Almazbek 
Atambaev. While Otunbaeva and Atambaev are the most recent presidents of the country, the 
struggle that primarily shaped the patterns of interaction among the competing elites was that of 
2005 and 2010.  
These patterns took the following forms. The division between the legal and the illegal 
power brokers blurred, and the criminals-in-law, defined as individuals commonly known for 
having conducted fraud, illicit trafficking, or murder, but who had managed to launder their assets 
or become useful for the elites in terms of access to these illicit revenues, can significantly 
influence politics; mass social protests were manipulated to put pressure on a particular President; 
places like prisons, squares, and bazaars have become as important in shaping politics as the 
Parliament and the Government; Courts retained little independence; and most importantly the 
state per se was treated as an “investment market” (Engvall 2011), sought as a resource to 
multiply the economic benefits of a particular group.  Yet, in Kyrgystan, the state has not been 
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subjected to a single elite group and a small fraction of a society it represents, for the elites 
behave in a “predatory way” (Radnitz 2010), almost abandoning their supporters after having 
mobilized them to achieve their specific goals.  
5.3.1. Price of multiculturalism in the age of nationalism: an Enlightened President and 
the Legendary Parliament 
 
“Patriotism is slavery. A patriot lives against Reason and Consciousness. Instead of following his free will 
and free spirit, he serves the rulers - power-seeking, corrupt, and self-interested. He does so, regardless of 
the direct link between patriotism and war. It is unreasonable to build the modern states on patriotism.” 
(Lev Tolstoj 1900)  
 
At the outset of independence, the map of the Kyrgyzstani elites was comprised of the political 
professionals from the Soviet era, who continued their political paths as the members of the so-
called Legendary Parliament145 (the Jorogku Kenesh or the Highest Council). The Parliament 
consisted of 350 members who were elected through direct elections and lasted from 1990 until 
1994. Legendary it is for it had to deal with creation of the legal and political order of a newly 
arranged state, draft the Constitution and the norms to live up to. The most prominent members 
of the Parliament included Tekebaev, Madumarov, Bakir-uulu, whose political parties146 had a 
great impact on the Kyrgyzstani politics to date, though in different ways (Nogoibaeva 2007 , 102). 
Whether the legendary parliament could be said to have included local elites is arguable. These 
were also political professionals, albeit mostly representing the interests of the Northern region of 
the country. The key point of contention was the balance between the three branches of power 
on the one hand and the powers of the President on the other.  
The parliamentarians claimed that the power of the executive branch was stronger than 
that of the legislature, whereas the judiciary was quite dependent on the President. The legendary 
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 The reason for this name is that the Parliament secured the transition from the Soviet to the democratic rule and 
has adopted the main laws and declarations of the sovereign state.  
146
 “Ata-Meken”, “Butun Kyrgyzstan”, “Erkin Kyrgyzstan”, respectively.  
 270 
 
parliament was relatively representative and therefore chaotic. Another issue was that the 
parliament, or Highest Council (Jogorku Kenesh), was, at the beginning, a continuation of the 
communist regime in Kyrgyzstan. Despite the democratic movements and the establishment of 
independence in the early 1990s, the political influence de facto still remained in the hands of the 
Communists and the First Secretary of the Communist Party, Absamat Masaliev. This is why 
President Akaev tried to consolidate political power mostly within the executive branch. The 
rationale was that this would also allow direct accountability of this branch to the president, as 
well as provide the President more bargaining powers vis-à-vis thee Parliament (ICG 2004). The 
formalization of these powers was achieved through several referendums that were held in the 
1990s.  
The social organization of the democratic movement which brought Askar Akaev to power 
included various interest groups gathered in Parliament, all of whom sought to change the old 
communist elites. Askar Akaev, the then President of the National Academy of Science had neither 
belonged to the political elite, nor was a member of the Communist Party, which made him an 
attractive neutral figure for the presidential office. The Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan, 
which comprised all opposition movements and groups which emerged between 1988 and 1990, 
supported Akaev’s candidacy. The social organization of this movement comprised students and 
youth in general, as well as informal societies of workers, academics and artistic intelligentsia from 
the major cities147 of Kyrgyzstan.  
The Parliament’s neo-communist or nationalist rationale concerning new societal 
development was balanced by the President’s program on cultural diversity. The program included 
ideas aiming at societal consolidation of multi-ethnic Kyrgyzstani society, such as the ideas of 
“Kyrgyzstan – our common home”, “Kyrgyzstan – the country of national diversity”, and 
“Kyrgyzstan – an island of democracy”. The context against which these ideas were tested 
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 Bishkek, Karakol (North) and Osh (South)  
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included the inter-ethnic conflict between Uzbek and Kyrgyz in Osh and Jalal-Abad in 1991, the 
sporadic conflicts in Bishkek aiming at expropriation of lands around the capital city, and 
(re)appropriation of natural resources. These events took place before the first presidential 
elections in 1991.  
This violence was not so much about any kind of inter-ethnic hatred, but rather recognition 
that the momentum of change provided an opportunity to redistribute property, lands, water and 
access to small trade in the bazaars. Since the latter was mostly dominated by the Uzbek 
communities, and Kyrgyz small entrepreneurs had little access to trading at the bazaars without 
paying tributes to local strongmen, this was seen as a chance to restore justice. Furthermore, in 
both the north and south of the country there was a popular desire for land for on which to build 
housing. The proclamations relating to privatization and de-collectivization of lands made people 
think that the time for land expropriation had come. Since kolkhozes were proclaimed as closed, a 
mass movement towards urbanization started. In Osh, the Uzbek movement “Adolat” and the 
Kyrgyz “Osh Aimagy” were organized (McGlinchey 2011, 76). On both sides, there was fear of 
losing their land. For the Uzbeks, it was land they historically had been working. For the Kyrgyz 
moving from the rural to the urban areas, it was the chance to finally regain the right to land from 
which they felt being deprived. But in the urban areas, the land was claimed mainly for purposes 
of housing construction. This laid the ground for the ongoing “Uzbek problem”, presented 
essentially as a risk of separation of the Fergana Valley, since the “Adolat” movement sought 
autonomous status for the province of Osh within the Kyrgyz Republic, which at that time included 
also Jalal-Abad (McGlinchey 2011). In Bishkek, similar land claims were organized into the “Ashar” 
movement, under the leadership of Zheksheev Zhypar, who tried to pursue similar goals. 
However, this movement allegedly sought land expropriation for “social housing” rather than 
individual purposes (Fergananews 2010). These are just snapshots of the complexity of the social 
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organization of the opposition Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan, which supported the 
candidacy of Askar Akaev, having seen his program as most inclusive.  
Once in office in 1991, President Akaev had to face the parliament, which was considered 
to be truly representative of the people (Nogoibaeva 2007).  However, the first parliament of the 
new republic was filled with groups pursuing goals that would violate the rights of other groups 
within a multicultural society, which Kyrgyzstan was at that time. Strengthening the parliament 
would mean making those social issues more acute and result in politics being organized around 
those issues. The specter of civil war, such as in neighboring Tajikistan, was also a strong factor 
behind the political choices of the ruling elite. Thus, contrary to the prevalent view of blaming a 
“dictator”, the consolidation of political power under the executive branch was in practice a 
shifting of political priorities from the matters of land expropriation to more civil issues of the rule 
of law, education and the creation of the civil rather than ethnicity based culture. These 
disagreements reached their peak after the referendum, which approved the presidential version 
of the new Constitution on 5 May 1993 and in 1994 the Parliament dissolved. The Constitution 
strengthened the accountability of local governments to the executive branch. It was the 
prerogative of the president and the prime-minister to appoint governors, albeit with the consent 
or at the request of the parliament. However, the last word remained with the President.  
The method of consolidation of political power by the executive pursued by President 
Akaev had structural consequences for the economy, institutional setting and society. At the later 
stages, the strengthening of ruling elite role in the economy was recreated through the arrests of 
leading businessmen and expropriation of their businesses (ICG 2004, 28).148 The institutions of 
the state, both at the national and local levels were under the President’s control through the 
direct appointments of officials to almost all positions of influence, “from regional governor to the 
university rector” (ICG 2004, 28).  
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 Example: Daniyar Usenov 
 273 
 
The security sector at that time was not well developed. However, it was a useful tool for 
pursuing the infamous “war of compromising evidence”, a favorite tool of the Kyrgyzstani 
politicians. Furthermore, the police themselves were perceived not as a part of the state, but as a 
part of the criminal world (ICG 2004, 29). The Western-sponsored NGO sector was balanced by the 
pro-government Association of NGOs, led by Toktaiym Umetalieva, created, reportedly, as a 
“government spoiler in relation to civil society” (ICG 2004, 31). The media sector and the Central 
Election Committee have also been reported as “dependent” on the President (ICG 2004, 29). 
Reportedly, all political appointees were chosen from the Northern elite, which traditionally 
dominated political affairs in the country, for these were mostly industrial and highly educated 
elites. In the South, elites were mostly those related to trade and agriculture. For this reason, a 
participatory framework has been missing (ICG 2004).  
As evidence for this take on the situation, analysts point to the protests in Aksy (part of 
Jalal-Abad province), which stemmed from the sentencing of a supposedly popular representative 
of the southern elite, Azimbek Beknazarov, and the closing of a few opposition newspapers in 
January 2002 (Abenova 2011).149 The Aksy events resulted in shots being fired, with people falling 
victim to gunshot wounds, and romanticizing the participants of the protest as well as deputy 
Beknazarov. However, there is little reference within international analyses to the fact that he was 
one of the few nationalists who did not abstain from publicly proclaimed hatred towards the large 
minorities living in the south. His constituency would be elements of the Kyrgyz majority, 
predominantly from the rural areas, who felt unfairly ‘deprived of their native lands’ by the 
Uzbeks. This propaganda was based on the widespread view that “the Uzbeks are better off” and 
that they “abused the hospitality of the Kyrgyz land” by monopolizing trade and agriculture, a 
myth proven wrong statistically (Steiner and Esenaliev 2011).150 What started from perestroika 
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 ICG 2004, Page 3 – description of the protest dynamics (st. from Kerben and shooting)   
150
 As for the second large minority, the Russians: those should merely “go to Russia”.  
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was used by Beknazarov and his followers for their electoral campaigns. It was during his time in 
the prosecutor’s office that corruption in the judiciary reached its peak (ICG 2002).  
Since perestroika there was an accompanying process of internal migration from the 
mountainous areas to the urban areas. This resulted in land seizures fueled by rhetoric of hate 
towards the “colonizers and monopolizers”. President Akaev faced the difficult choice of whether 
to prioritize a more centralized power system within which he could set the agenda, or let the 
situation flow with the new societal demands, which were often expressions of nationalist hatred. 
While the nationalist rhetoric151 was advanced under the guise of patriotism, Akaev based his 
politics on ideas such as multiculturalism, democratic security, societally, and multi-
vector152policy, internationally. However, these ideas did not seem to be ingrained within the 
multiple realities of Kyrgyzstani society, part of which was highly educated, and part of which was 
poor but aspirational, moving from the remote mountainous regions to the cities and towns for 
better access to education and jobs.  
The “heroism” of Azimbek Beknazarov and the deaths of several protesters resonated 
within the media and human rights NGOs, and radicalized the opposition (ICG 2002). As a result, 
President Akaev dismissed his then Prime Minister, Kurmanbek Bakiev, the Minister of Interior, 
who were accused of escalating the violence in the Aksy protests, which led to resignation of the 
whole government. Azimbek Beknazarov, a popular deputy, was arrested (ICG 2002). A political 
crisis ensued. Bakiev joined the opposition as a leader of the People’s Movement of Kyrgyzstan. 
President Akaev was forced into a new coalition government which would also include opposition 
members. On the one hand, President Akaev was harshly criticized for not allowing 
representatives of the southern elite to be in the government (even though the Prime Minister 
was a southerner). On the other hand, the same critics leveled the accusation that, in most cases, 
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 Since, during the Soviet period, the composition of the ruling circles disproportionately disfavored the native 
Kyrgyz, which is why in the post-Soviet period nationalist rhetoric of some of the local elites became popular. 
152
 Multi-vector foreign policy implied developing foreign affairs with both along the NATO-vector and the CIS/Russia 
vector, as well as the Muslim world.  
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political parties were “vehicles of individual political figures”, representing their personal interests, 
rather than those of their regions or societal groups (ICG 2002, 14; Nogoibaeva 2007).  
As a compromise, the new post-Aksy strategy devised in 2002 was based on the idea of 
human rights. A new slogan was devised: “Kyrgyzstan is a country of human rights”. Four new laws 
submitted to the parliament by the President aimed to promote human rights and freedoms (ICG 
2002, 22). These laws comprised the new Democratic Code requiring the establishment of a 
Council of Democratic Security, on a par with the Security Council, the office of ombudsman, the 
Law on the Fight Against Extremism, and the Law on Amnesty of the People Involved in the Aksy 
Event (ICG 2002).  
In the meantime, as shown in chapter 4, the years between 1998 and 2000 were marked 
by the formation of the HuT movement and the IMU invasion of Kyrgyzstan, the restructuring of 
law enforcement, and border discussions between the three states. In this light, the leaked 
information on secret border agreements with China (in 1996-1999), in which 10,000 hectares of 
land were transferred to China, contributed to public discontent. The sensitivity of the border 
issue was also reflected in the fact that in 2001 the parliament voted down a memorandum signed 
between the Uzbek and Kyrgyz prime ministers on the exchange of lands (ICG 2001, iv).  
In the final stages of his presidency, President Akaev issued several laws which would 
decentralize governance by creating laws favoring communities and citizens’ associations.153 At 
the same time, there was an attempt to subject the legislative branch to the state elite.154 Once 
the parliamentary elections resulted in the victory of the pro-presidential party “Alga, Kyrgyzstan”, 
the popular uprisings swept the country, from one province to the next. On March 24 all these 
                                                          
153
 The Law on Jamoats, which allowed people to create free associations on the cause of their choice, as well as 
compromises with the opposition and parliament, exemplify this tendency. 
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 This was achieved by conducting a referendum which changed the election system from majoritarian to the 
proportional with a high registration threshold. In this way, only parties with significant number of members have 
more chances to gain places in the parliament. This new system allowed the pro-presidential party “Alga, Kyrgyzstan!” 
to win the elections in 2005. Since the daughter of the President, Bermet Akaeva, acted as a consultant to the party, 
this situation was presented as Akaev’s way to spread influence within parliament. Whether these were fraudulent 
elections (ICG 2005a) or simply a matter of gerrymandering is arguable.  
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groups, each supporting their own parliamentarians, joined together on Ala-Too square in Bishkek 
and deposed President Akaev. Kurmanbek Bakiev was elected as the new President in July 2005 
(ICG 2005a). This sequence of misunderstandings turned the tables: the southern elite became the 
ruling elite. Most of the Northern elites, especially intelligentsia, chose to either form an 
opposition or leave the country.  
5.3.2. A Revolutionary: “Southern” elite without the South  
 
The new ruling elite, as well as the new government, was comprised of the members of the 
People’s Movement of Kyrgyzstan. Kurmanbek Bakiev was elected  President, Felix Kulov acted as 
the Prime Minister, Boljurova and Madumarov – as deputy prime ministers, Roza Otunbaeva as 
foreign minister, Pronenko – as minister of labor and social security, and Beknazarov as prosecutor 
general (ICG 2005a, 10). Since the Northern intelligentsia was largely in exile, it is difficult to map 
who, at that point, made up the local elite with the exception of those businessmen and criminals 
who used this opportunity to legalize their status and shift to mass politics, as will be seen. 
Interestingly, the sites of competition locally again turned out to be bazaars (including those 
described in chapters 2 and 4), natural resources and unused land, which had not completely 
undergone the de-collectivization process (see chapter 3). A new power structure emerged from 
the cooperation agreement between the two significant parties in Parliament, the People’s 
Movement of Kyrgyzstan, headed by Bakiev, and the Ata-Jurt Party, established in 2004 by Roza 
Otunbaeva together with deputies Dooronbek Sadyrbaev, Adahan Madumarov, and Omurbek 
Tekebaev (ICG 2005a, 2). The political agendas of the two groups remained different.  
In practice, democratic change manifested itself in the form of property expropriation. 
Besides the Cabinet, the new ruling elite comprised both politicians and those who aspired to the 
political stage, for example the criminals-in-law. Being aware of this intermingling and the fact that 
parliament was the gate for these aspirational criminals to enter mass politics, President Akaev 
 277 
 
sought to keep state decision-making more or less unitary by keeping power within the executive. 
Bakiev took the risky step of bringing this intermingling to state institutions. His presidency, which 
lasted until 2010, followed two main patterns: the (re)establishment of property expropriation as 
justice and further centralization of power through redesigning state institutions. The former 
involved the redistribution of ownership of bazaars, natural resources, and land seizure; the latter 
involved the strengthening presidential apparatus and its direct control over all revenue-collection 
and the government at all levels.   
The integration of both legal and illegal power-brokers into state politics guaranteed 
neither social support, nor the resolution of the structural problems that hindered Akaev’s rule, 
and this continues to undermine government even now. Rather, his rule redistributed wealth 
between the elites and then tried to restructure the state’s institutions to maintain this wealth 
distribution, at the expense of basic social needs. This is when the South was lost, and that is why 
President Bakiev did not find much social support in the South once he moved there after the coup 
d’etat and tried to mobilize society for a “counter-revolution.” 
Sites of intermingling 
Site 1: Bazaars and national resources  
 
The property which was addressed was mainly that of President Akaev’s family. The then 
Prosecutor General, Azimbek Beknazarov, was responsible for the “return to the people” of 
property acquired illegally (ICG 2005a, 4). A commission formed to investigate those cases, chaired 
by Deputy Prime Minister Daniyar Usenov, identified over 100 enterprises of which Akaev’s family 
had some control (ICG 2005a, 4). Reportedly, this was the way in which the new ruling elite 
attempted to dismantle the old patronage structures (ICG 2005a, 4). “Righting past wrongs”, 
paradoxically, did not address the structural issues of privatization. However, the property cases 
that were addressed first included that of the Karasuu bazaar, the Karakeche Coal Mines and land 
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seizure in the Bishkek suburbs. At first glance, the first case was related to the traders in the 
Fergana Valley, and so had a potential to improve their lives as trade constituted people’s survival 
strategies as shown in chapter 4. The case of the Karakeche Coal Mines had the potential to 
simplify the distribution of coal in nearby communities that depended on that resource.155 Instead 
of doing so, the new owner, Nurlan Motuev, redistributed coal in such a way that provoked inter-
communal conflict with the neighboring communities. Finally, the redistribution of land was 
presented as an attempt to right the wrongs of de-collectivization, as described in chapter 3. 
However this turned into a land grab, often of private property belonging to people living in the 
suburbs of Bishkek. Hence, the practice somehow always reversed the logic of poetics legitimizing 
the manifestations of fairness. The businesses in the country run by former President Akaev’s 
family or friends simply shifted to Maksim Bakiev156.  
The Karasuu market, described in chapter 4 as one of the biggest wholesale markets in the 
Fergana Valley, one of the main redistribution hubs of the Chinese goods by the shuttle traders, 
became the target of redistribution between the criminals-in-law. The societal impact of this 
market has been addressed in the section on societal consequences of the chapter 4. Its meaning 
at the national level has to do with the re-export chain, within which Kyrgyzstan is a key link. The 
issue of re-export has become one of the arguments against the Eurasian Union initiative. If the 
Eurasian Union succeeds, Kyrgyzstan will lose its competitive advantage for the re-exporting of 
Chinese goods. The consequences for those who “cover” the market would be very serious. The 
struggle for influence over the management of the market in September 2005 involved Azimbek 
Beknazarov, allegedly a supporter of Bayaman Erkinbaev, a businessmen and parliamentarian 
from Jalalabad. He is also alleged to be a prominent drug baron and criminal-in-law (ICG 2005a, 5). 
The conflict as such was between Ekrinbaev and a rival businessman, Abdalim Junusov, who 
                                                          
155
 Bearing in mind that the problem with the supplies of the Uzbek gas has been unresolved, coal remained almost 
the only way for people to warm their houses in the winter, in the southern Kyrgyzstan.  
156
 The favored son of President Bakiev. 
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challenged Erkinbaev’s control of the Kara-suu bazaar with the support of popular protests by the 
traders.157 They complained about the high rents and poor management of the market by 
Erkinbaev.158 Tensions between the two groups resulted in the assassination of Junusov. For 
obvious reasons, suspicions fell on Erkinbaev, and the same protesters demanded the resignation 
of Beknazarov for his negligent handling of the situation and failure to bring criminal charges 
against Erkinbaev (ICG 2005a, 5). Shortly after, on 21 September, Bayaman Erkinbaev was also 
shot and killed. This was one of a series of parliamentary assassinations.159 Fearing assassination, 
parliamentarians passed a law allowing MPs to carry arms. They also initiated the establishment of 
a commission, headed by Felix Kulov, to fight organized crime.160 The state seems to have become 
the platform for resolution of disputes between organized criminals, as the latter comprised part 
of the local elites. Organized crime gained a degree of access to the parliament through such 
figures.  
The third means by which the injustices of Akaev’s regime were to be addressed was the 
expropriation of the Karakeche Coal Mines161, which provides over half of the all coal mined in 
Kyrgyzstan (ICG 2005a, 7). After the revolution of 2005, the largest mine (Beshsary)162 was 
expropriated by Nurlan Motuev, a journalist, human rights activist and a strong supporter of the 
revolution (ICG 2005a, 7). Reportedly, after expropriating the Beshsary mine, Motuev proclaimed 
                                                          
157 9 June, 200-300 traders were protesting against the high rents and demanding Erkinbaev to give up control of the 
market. This situation resulted in violence between the traders, the supporters of Junusov and the supporters of 
Erkinbaev on June 13. In July, another part of traders organized support for Erkinbaev and asked the self-dismissal of 
Junusov instead. On 5 September, before the courts hearings of this matter, Junusov was shot dead at his home in 
Karasuu (ICG 2005, 5).  
158
 Bayaman Erkinbaev acquired control over the bazaars through the Kyrgyz Trade Association (Kyrgyz sooda 
birimdigi), which his sister was a director of. The Kyrgyz Trade Association bought the shares of the bazaar from the 
Consumer Union of Osh province. The Consumer Unions (potrebsuyuz) are holdovers from the Soviet time, serving as 
“intermediary organization between the production and sale of the consumer goods” (ICG 2005, 5). In the end, the 
state “nationalized” the Bayaman’s share in the Kara-Suu market (the rest of the shares has remained private).  
159
 Even though it is fashionable to blame President Bakiev for the assassination of parliamentarians, the complex 
relations between the local elites themselves, a part of which are criminals-in-law/parliamentarians, might provide 
compelling evidence to doubt the allegations. 
160
 The commission has then never taken place considering the past imprisonment of Felix Kulov and the 
interconnections of the prison’s world with the world of politics in Kyrgyzstan, such body may have become an 
instrument of vengeance in the hands of an influential and respected figure in the criminal world.  
161
 Four of five mines are privately owned, and one Akulak is largely owned by the state-run Kyrgyzkomur company.  
162
 Formerly owned by a businessman and an MP (reportedly Akaev’s ally) Kamchybek Joldyshbaev  
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himself a director, gained control over the access roads to all five mines, and soon after requested 
that all five mines be organized under one company under his control (ICG 2005a, 7-8). 
Unsurprisingly, he started favoring Jumgal province (of which he is a native) with a better quality 
coal for free, while selling low quality coal to the neighboring community of Kochkor for high 
prices (ICG 2005a, 8). None of the government’s attempts to normalise the situation in Kara-Keche 
have been successful: the efforts of both Prime Minister Kulov and an old friend of Motuev, 
Tursunbek Akun, the Head of the Presidential Commission on Human Rights have failed (ICG 
2005a, 8).    
Site 2: Camp 31 and the Parliament  
 
 Finally, the biggest site of intermingling of elite is the prison system, which has strong links to the 
parliament. It has become a common knowledge in Kyrgyzstan that incarceration does not mean 
deprivation of political influence. On the contrary, prison networks may be an effective means to 
increase one’s political influence. A vivid example of this is the connection revealed by the 
situation in the Camp 31163 between the five following figures: a parliamentarian and the chair of 
the Committee of Defence, Security, Law Enforcement and Information Policy, Tynychbek 
Akmatbaev; his brother, a criminal-in-law Rysbek Akmatbaev; the prosecutor general Azimbek 
Beknazarov, Prime Minister Felix Kulov, and the Chechen164 criminal figure Aziz Batukaev, a rival of 
Rysbek Akmatbaev.  
The March revolution allowed all the “oppressed and humiliated” to speak up. Prisoners 
took the opportunity to do so. The so-called prison crisis led to a number of prison uprisings, 
during which a parliamentarian, Tynychbek Akmatbaev, was murdered during his negotiations 
with the rebellious prisoners in Camp 31. This prison was notable for hosting the infamous Aziz 
                                                          
163
 A prison in the Moldovanovka village, famous for its prominent inmates, situated 20 kilometers from Bishkek  
164
 When the police officers discuss the figure of Rysbek, they express respect for that he did not allow the Chechen, 
Russian, and Kazakh mafias to take over the country.   
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Batukaev165 (ICG 2005b, 13). Whether it was caused by “deteriorating prisons’ conditions”, as was 
reported, or was an orchestrated act to help the new state elites to remove figures who were too 
influential and unpredictable from its sphere of influence is arguable (ICG 2005b). However, what 
is known is that Mr. Akmatbaev, Mr. Rysbek’s proxy in parliament, was eliminated. In the end, the 
uprising was settled after negotiations between the prisoners and Prime Minister Kulov at the 
request of Aziz Batukaev (ICG 2005b).166  
Prior to this event, Rysbek Akmatbaev167 was temporary pardoned to meet the prosecutor 
general, Beknazarov168 (ICG 2005b, 13). Inspired by this possible amnesty, Rysbek used the time to 
“improve his image and cultivate links with the new elite” by organizing a festival of traditional 
games at the Issyk-Kul lake (ICG 2005b, 13). The event was attended by President Bakiev, some of 
his ministers, including deputy Prime Minister Madumarov and a few parliamentarians. Since the 
events at Camp 31 happened just as Rysbek was seeking to be pardoned, he took the murder of 
his brother as a personal offense, orchestrated by Kulov himself. This resulted in another protest 
in Ala-Too square on October 22, in support of Rysbek, demanding the resignation of the Prime 
Minister. To oppose Rysbek, a protest in support of Kulov was organized and the parliament, 
which was asked to consider Kulov’s resignation, did not gather a quorum on the appointed dates, 
October 23-24. Parliament did not find enough political will to face the problem. Reactions from 
the parliamentarians and ministers were sympathetic to Rysbek, as he had just lost his brother. 
The police kept a low profile. President Bakiev maintained a silence on the issue. On the other 
hand, the NGO sector and U.S. ambassador asked the President to support the Prime Minister to 
prevent organized crime imposing their will upon the state (ICG 2005b, 14).  
                                                          
165
 This happened on 20 October  
166
 The prison was surrounded by the security forces to prevent the escapes, as the regular personnel went on a strike 
and refused entering the prison.  
167
 Who had been on the run as the lead suspect in a triple murder 
168
 Rysbek was under a trial schedule for 20 October, which the prosecutor general could not undertake due to his 
dismissal in September for his alleged support to the criminal-in-law, Erkinbaev during the uprisings at the Karasuu 
bazaar, described above 
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Ala-Too Square again became the place of politics, uniting protesters’ with various, often 
private, agendas. The protests were joined by groups from the provinces, organized by Nurlan 
Motuev, the hero of Karakeche coal mines and Topchubek Turgunaliev, a relative of Akmatbaev 
and human rights activist calling for the disbanding of parliament. Other voices, unrelated to the 
Camp 31 issue, used the chance to protest, such as the nationalists calling for the development of 
the Kyrgyz language organized by Marat Imanaliev and March revolutionaries demanding land as a 
reward (ICG 2005b, 15). The NGO sector attempted to persuade the President to take action 
against organized crime. The President established a parliamentary commission investigating the 
murder of T. Akmatbaev, led by an influential Osh parliamentarian, Alisher Sobirov. The 
commission found that the murder was due to a private tension between Rysbek and Aziz 
Batukaev. Tensions slowly dissipated. Rysbek restated his belief in that the murder was arranged 
between the Prime Minister and Batukaev. He gave up the public protest, but promised to 
exercise vengeance (ICG 2005b). Prime Minster Kulov, in his speech to Parliament, noted that the 
underlying problem was that the law enforcement agencies were intertwined with the criminals. 
Felix Kulov resigned from the office of Prime Minister in 2006.  
In light of the events described above, the disadvantaged parliamentarians started forming 
new opposition movements and arrangements. Former enemies allied against the growing power 
of President Bakiev. In the meantime, Rysbek, was murdered shortly after, as he exited a mosque 
after the prayer (ICG 2005b). The criminal element of the competition for places within the new 
ruling elite shifted back into the shadows.  
Until the presidential elections in 2009, President Bakiev chose to keep a low profile. He 
engaged in several struggles with Parliament over the powers of the various branches of state. He 
organized peoples’ Kurultai, an analogy of the Greek Agora, being considered today a traditional 
democratic mechanism that gathers both the formal and informal local leaders. The struggles with 
Parliament included three changes of the Constitution and ongoing arguments over constitutional 
 283 
 
and judicial reform. However, most politics happened behind the scenes. The true centralization of 
power by President Bakiev can be defined as a submission of the key state institutions to the 
presidential clique. While parliament and other bodies apparently maintained their powers, the 
plan was that in practice the gate keepers would be figures loyal to the president. The security 
services were controlled by the brother of the President. However, the controversial and 
ambitious figure of Maxim Bakiev, the son of the President, disunited both the family and the 
country. Despite this, Maxim was the ideological driver of all the subsequent institutional changes, 
leading to a specific mode of centralization of power, i.e. extreme and direct control of most 
sectors of the state.  
Institutions: a legitimation tool for the monopoly over military and economic resources 
 
There were two main pillars to Bakiev’s elite logic. First, he who owns economy owns the state. 
Second, the presidency should be protected by the military, in order to avoid Akaev’s mistake of 
not being able to disperse the crowd in 2005 (ICG 2010).  
With his accession to power, President Bakiev focused on economic reforms, which in 
practice turned into the appropriation of the main national economic assets by the ruling elite. 
The scheme was crafted by Maxim Bakiev, the President’s son, whom he considered an 
entrepreneurial genius. The scheme was simple: total control of all business projects in the 
country, by covering them through the setting up of a puppet owner, who would formally head a 
company, while it would de facto belong to Maxim. The apogee of this privatization of economic 
assets was in 2010, after the Presidential elections. Puppet companies controlled by Maxim took 
control of the privatized and most profitable part of the energy distribution system, Severelektro 
(which serves Bishkek and most parts of Northern Kyrgyzstan) and Kyrgyz-telecom (ICG 2010). 
Severelektro was officially bought by a small company called Chakan, run by Alexei Shirshov, who 
was also Chairman of the board of Dastan, a torpedo plant in Northern Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyz-telecom 
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was privatized through the MNG Group, discussed below. Having privatized the areas of 
communication and electricity supply, the ruling elite then increased tariffs for electricity and cell 
phones, resulting in the mass reaction we witnessed in April 2010.   
In terms of military power, Bakiev’s regime sought to monopolize this sector, too. It was 
achieved in two steps: appointing figures loyal to the President in key positions, and restructuring 
the military forces. For instance, the State Security Service (SNB) was headed by Janysh Bakiev, 
one of the President’s brothers, and the Ministry of Interior was headed by Moldomusa 
Kongantiev, a representative of the Southern elite, loyal to the President. The restructuring 
process started with two key bodies. Firstly, the National Guard, “Kyrgyzstan’s elite military force 
has been merged with Janysh’s State Security Service to form a new and significantly larger 
presidential guard known as Arstan "The Tiger” (RFE/RL 2010). Special force Alfa, usually 
conducting counter-terrorism and other extreme operations, also reported in to the SNB. Finally, 
one of the most important bodies for drug control, which possessed a high degree of integrity and 
independence, the Drug Control Agency, was abolished. The result was that “drug interdiction was 
handed to the Ministry of Interior” (ICG 2010, 8). Reportedly, this decision “followed some serious 
drug seizures *i.e. DCA was getting too close to the ruling elite’s sources of income+ (ICG 2010, 8).  
Hence, unlike the cases of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, the Kyrgyz case, under Bakiev’s 
regime, represents an attempt to monopolize all power resources in the hand of the ruling elite.  
To legitimate the total control of the key sources of income and influence in the country, Maxim 
Bakiev suggested new institutional reforms, which resulted in the connection of the ruling elite to 
the class of global financial intermediaries. 
In other words, as the previous section demonstrated, while the public was busy 
demanding constitutional reforms, a much more significant (re)institutionalization happened 
informally at the heart of the presidential apparatus. The institutional reform was meant to turn 
Kyrgyzstan into a so-called consultative democracy. In general, it resulted in the direct 
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subordination of all state institutions to the Presidential Administration. Parliament would remain 
separate, with a status of a consultative body. This idea began to be implemented after the 
presidential elections in 2009, which put President Bakiev into office for his second term.  
In essence, the idea was to consolidate money, politics and military force within the 
presidential cliques. The implementation of this idea comprised three major steps. First, it 
restructured the presidential administration and made the ministers themselves dependent on the 
will of an obscure clique comprised of a Secretariat and a new Central Agency for Development, 
Investment and Innovation (TsARII).169 The former was responsible for the elaboration of political 
strategy and monitoring the implementation of presidential decisions at all levels. The latter was 
responsible for managing all major financial flows, including aid.  
The public perception was that this step was intended to prepare the ground for Maxim as 
a successor to his father. As for “the social organization” of the aforementioned institutions, the 
key figures are figures loyal to the President’s son, Maxim Bakiev, who himself was appointed a 
director of TsARII in November 2009. The TsARII monopolized access to privatized industries and 
foreign investment projects.  
The Secretariat gained the power to be involved, at least as observer, in all decision-making 
processes, including the appointments of officials of all branches power at different levels. State 
bodies had to submit reports to the head of the Secretariat, an organ which had no professional 
stuff to deal with these reports. The head of the Secretariat was Oksana Malevannaya.170 
Considering her limited professional qualifications, her immense influence over decision-making 
concerning the re-institutionalization of the executive branch has been almost inexplicable.171 The 
Secretariat and TsARII worked on a par. Staff for the Secretariat were selected by Malevannaya 
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 In Russian, TsARII is co-sounded with the word “Tsari” as plural form of the word “Tsar’” (i.e. the monarch) . 
170
 A journalist, with no dignified except her infamous love story with Medet Sadyrkulov, who is by popular perception 
was one of the country’s strongest strategist, and whose written drafts, plans, and ideas she inherited. 
171 Rumor has it that she had access to all strategies of her partner written for Kyrgyzstan for many years ahead, which 
she later used in her career moves. President Bakiev himself has never expressed much admiration towards 
Malevannaya, explaining his trust as “if my son trusts her, I can trust her too”.  
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herself, from people loyal to her, former colleagues and employees from the journalistic field 
(Lojnikov, 5th Channel Editor-in-Chief, interview 2014).172  
The key figure behind Maxim was his consultant, Evgeny Gurevich, a U.S. citizen. Gurevich 
acted as a management consultant for a number of international financial institutions. He was a 
suspect in one of the biggest frauds in Italian national history, related to money laundering with 
several Italian companies involved, such as Fastweb and Telecom Italia (Knyazev 2010). 
Reportedly, Gurevich established and managed several companies in different countries 
throughout the world, including such companies as Planetarium Srl and Global Phone Network Srl, 
through which he was successful in helping a number of Western firms to launder money. Among 
the banks involved in these schemes there were Bank Austria Creditanstalt (currently, UniCredit 
Bank Austria), Raiffeisen Zentralbank, as well as Austrian division of the Anglo Irish Bank (Le 
Monde 2007).173 With Gurevich’s guidance, Maxim created a number of similar phantom 
companies in Kyrgyzstan. The biggest vehicle for Maxim’s personal ambitions was MGN Asset 
Management, which “in September 2009 had won tender to manage the government’s 
Development Fund” with Evgeny Gurevitch at its head (ICG 2010, 7). Gurevitch is a vivid 
representative of what Folkman (2007) defines as the “financial intermediary elite”. He has even 
been permitted access by Oksana Malevannaya to those meetings within the presidential 
apparatus which are usually open to natives only after a security check by the SNB (Officials of the 
Administration of the President Bakiev, interview 2009). This evidence suggests that TsARII may be 
just another machine for money-laundering in Kyrgyzstan (Knyazev 2010).  
All these changes fostered mass discontent against the state elite. The trigger for the new 
uprising was the raising of household electricity, heating and cell phone charges from 1 January 
                                                          
172
 Oksana Malevannaya used to work briefly as a director of the pro-presidential Fifth Channel by Maxim’s 
appointment.  The mission of the Channel was creation of the positive image of the President.  
173
 Among his other posts are: President of the Virage Consulting Ltd in the U.S. between 2001 and 2007; Director of 
the “AsiaUniversalBank” (2006-2009), a commercial bank, located in the Kyrgyz Republic.  Other managerial roles 
were: Vice President of the Investment Bank of Africa, Executive Director of New York’s “Gamma Square Partners” and 
Director of the “GSN Tech LLC” (for details see: Knyazev 2010 “Kyrgyz Zeitnote with an Italian flavor”)  
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2010. According to the government Decree of 12 November 2009, the tariffs on electricity were to 
double, and those for heating were to increase 5 to 10 times starting from 1 July 2010.  The cell 
phone charges were to significantly increase starting from 1 February 2010. As all cell phone 
companies were monopolized by Maxim, the peoples’ patience reached its limits. The raising of 
tariffs happened within the context of a wider energy and food crisis. The country experienced a 
very cold winter with electricity shortages174 and the consequent lack of heating. It was widely 
held that the energy crisis was caused by the fact that electricity from the Toktogul reservoir, the 
key water reservoir in the country, was sold for market prices above the export norm to its 
neighbors, which caused the water level in Toktogul to fall below the norm. As such, popular 
dissatisfaction increased.175 In other words, this institutional “reform” marginalized not only the 
rival elites, but also the ruling elites themselves, who were beyond the close circle of Maxim 
Bakiev. It aimed at creating a strong power-vertical, which is impossible to build by destroying the 
state’s main pillars. At the same time, it made the state revenues become part of the fraudulent 
global financial schemes. This illustrates how elements of revenue collection which is are not 
linked to the state budget and state expenditures do not help to extend the infrastructural 
capacity of the state.  
The rude violation of the basic Weberian principles has demonstrated its effect.  Two viable 
parts of the state’s infrastructural power have been destroyed: the state institutions and the elite 
structures that could connect the state with its societies. Opposition in the meantime created a 
Central Executive Committee (CEC) of the People’s Kurultai (assembly) to coordinate protests. The 
opposition members of CEC would later become the next ruling elite.  
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 Electricity was given to different districts in once in a row, according to a schedule 
175
 Additional factor was that Bakiev tried to play the U.S. and Russia against each other, promising the Russians to 
close the U.S. base in exchange for Russian aid. Meanwhile, securing Russian aid package was a way to manipulate the 
U.S. into more favorable leasing conditions for the Manas Airbase. Since the Russians “never formally linked the 
financial package with Manas’s closure”, the Kyrgyz neither returned the Russian money, nor closed the U.S. base (for 
details, see ICG KG 2010)  
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The covert economic schemes of Maxim led to the situation where after 2010 it was 
difficult to redistribute those assets which were so-called “Bakiev’s assets”, for the legal owners 
were various companies and entrepreneurs, most of whom maintained their assets and, allegedly, 
remained connected to Maxim. This situation suggests that the intermingling of elites continues, 
and that this includes those who were dismissed previously. At least, clarity on Bakiev’s wealth 
redistribution is not yet before the general public.  
5.3.3. All-representant: a ragtag Parliament as a move towards a shadow state   
 
The term elite “became one of the most general – and, therefore, one of the most meaningless – terms” in 
social sciences 
(John Scott 2008, 27) 
 
A third period of state consolidation in Kyrgyzstan started on 7 April 2010 as a provisional 
government, with Roza Otunbaeva taking office as its head. President Bakiev flew to his native 
south at this point. This was the third period of chaos that politicians were faced with. A decisive 
factor in the direction of power consolidation was fear. Fearful that President Bakiev could 
mobilize southern elites against the North and provoke civil war, the government had to come up 
with a new image of the “Other” that would unite the Kyrgyz nation (Mirsaitov, interview 2014). 
The usual scapegoat for this exercise was “the Uzbek question”, which the country had faced in 
1991. Clashes between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz broke out between 11 and 14 June 2010. “Uzbeks”, as 
an image of threat, epitomized another other threat developing in the country, such as the 
Islamist threat176 or separatism.177 However, the evidence collected by the International Inquiry 
Commission (KIC), headed by Kimu Kiljunen, suggests that the attacks on the Uzbek population 
during those events were well organized and planned. The military observed the violence and did 
not intervene if the victims were on the Uzbek side (KIC 2010). The violence stopped suspiciously 
                                                          
176
 As allegedly, “all Islamists are Uzbeks”.  
177
 Even though Uzbeks never expressed the wish to be separated into an independent state or join Uzbekistan. To the 
contrary, Kyrgyzstani Uzbeks underline the big difference between them and the Uzbeks in Uzbekistan.  
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quickly, in just three days, and only, surprisingly, through the actions of the local administration. 
When, in 1991, the south faced a similar situation, the central Soviet authorities had to intervene 
and remain there for six months. This evidence also suggests that the event was well-orchestrated 
(KIC 2010). The International Inquiry Commission put the responsibility on the provisional 
government. As a result of this conclusion, Kimu Kiljunen was denounced as a persona non grata, 
as this finding contradicted the results of the parliamentary inquiry, which put the blame on the 
Uzbek communities, former President Bakiev, and other unidentifiable “third forces” or the “fifth 
column” (ICG 2010).  
Besides the human losses, this situation seemed to put more pressure on former President 
Bakiev to leave the country. Russian media sources started suggesting that Kyrgyzstan was on the 
verge of civil war and Kurmanbek Bakiev would be to blame. Since the departure of the former 
president, the provisional government gained more freedom in pursuing its policies. Human rights 
and other activists started developing new projects for national consolidation, peace and unity. 
Indeed, the perception of threat helped raise the level of national pride and shift attention from 
other political issues. The desire for stability overtook the desire for justice. National 
consolidation, to a certain extent, and the provisional government was accepted.  
At the same time, the violence showed who is who and in which domain. The mayor of Osh, 
Melis Myrzakmatov was hailed as a national hero for being capable of appeasing the population 
within three days. Talks with local Kyrgyz people showed that they were almost euphoric in their 
admiration of the mayor, who finally “showed these blunt Uzbeks their place” (Adaev, 5th Channel 
Editor-in-Chief, Southern division, interview 2012). Even the most dispassionate analysis of the 
events by the Kyrgyz people would go along the lines: “We admit that it was us who started the 
physical violence this time. However, we have been conditioned to do so, because these Uzbeks 
have grown too blunt in our own land. They took our jobs, monopolized trade and agriculture” 
(Adaev, interview 2012). The link between sovereignty and national identity was also visible in 
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official narratives of sovereignty (Gullete and Heathershaw 2015). Mayor Myrzakmatov published 
a book where he made the case for Kyrgyz being “the state-forming national grouping” and that 
with the help of “patriotic youth,” Kyrgyzstan has a chance to survive (ICG 2012, 6).  
While the local southern elites were gaining support through nationalist sentiments, the 
provisional government was disunited and unable to influence the situation. The ICG (2012) found 
that the responsibility for the bloodshed was mostly due to the local leader, Melis Myrzakmatov. 
To diminish his power, the provisional government tried to persuade the mayor to resign. This 
attempt, however, resulted in the street demonstrations in Osh, supporting the mayor and 
demanding the resignation of the provisional government’s president, Roza Otunbaeva. The result 
was that the mayor remained in place. As has been shown in the other chapters, the mayor of Osh 
is the key political link in the network of racketeers who evolved into the criminals-in-law, involved 
in cross-border trade and control of bazaars. These networks duly supported the Mayor, as did 
Kyrgyz from the Alay region, where they consider themselves the best warriors among all other 
Kyrgyz tribes. These Kyrgyz started coming down to the cities and demanding land and shelter. The 
violence against Uzbeks was a convenient pretext for the creation of internal displacement, 
shaking the traditional networks of influence in the bazaars and justifying the new urbanization 
project. As part of this, Uzbeks were to be displaced to remote areas in the suburbs of Osh or 
“compensated” for any damage by apartments in newly built blocks in Osh, which were Chinese 
direct investments. In the meantime, in Bishkek, the government conducted a referendum178 and 
adopted a new Constitution which turned Kyrgyzstan into a parliamentary democracy. Hence, 
Kyrgyzstan has witnessed a degree of state fragmentation, with strengthened local elites, both in 
their criminal and semi-criminal manifestations. Under these conditions, the country turned into a 
parliamentary republic, with proportional representation. The symbol of past revolutions, the 
White House, was swapped with the building of the Parliament (Jogorku Kenesh). 
                                                          
178
 27 June 2010  
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As one can see, the struggle among competing elites was not so much about different 
visions of structuring the state, but simply about appropriation of economic resources. Attempts 
at restructuring the state, based on the Washington Consensus and implemented during the 
period of President Akaev, contributed to territorial fragmentation rather than the functional 
decentralization. The Legal framework inspired by the Washington Consensus inspired the 
National Strategy on Decentralization approved by the Presidential Decree No 381 of December 
17, 2001 (INTRAC 2011). It included several laws such as the Law on Local Self-Government and 
Local State Adminstration (2002), the Law on Financial and Economic Basis of Local Self-
Government (2003), and the Law on Jamaats (2005), Law on Municipal Property (2002), Law on 
Municipal Service (2004) (INTRAC 2011). This legislation sought to regulate relationships between 
the central government and local governments, even though local governments remained directly 
accountable to the President. President Bakiev’s state restructuring abolished provincial 
governments, making the city governments report directly to the Presidential administration 
(Maxim/Malevannaya tandem). Consequently, the functionality of the state, in this case, has been 
largely centralized, not to a fraction of society as represented by the ruling elite, but to a fraction 
of the Presidential adinistration, responsible for revenue collection in a broader sense. At present, 
the 2010 Constitution restored the initial status-quo, but subjected the local governments to the 
Prime Minister, to lessen the powers of the President. Additionaly, the post-2010 period promises 
to be a period of serious structural reforms of all spheres of the state. The results are yet to be 
seen.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Having addressed three different strategies of the emergence of a single political authority from 
complex elite struggles, this chapter has discovered certain patterns. The ruling elites in all three 
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cases have focused on military and economic sources of power, seeing the state as the dominant 
institutional resource to channel these two sources of power in their direction. In other words, the 
relations that have been organized by means of the state were in one way or another related to 
the economic or security sectors. Each state has done it in a different way, but each of them had a 
similar focus.  
Tajikistan, at first, was forced to conduct power-sharing, with the result that the ruling elite 
captured the economic resources of the state, and the opposition gained access to the security 
and law enforcement apparatus. While initially striking a balance between the economic and 
military poles for a short time, the ruling elite was able to use conditions created by the IMF and 
the World Bank requirements to implement rapid reform of the public sector to dismiss UTO 
appointees from key positions. A short time later, the international discourse of threat with 
regards to terrorism, Islamism, and drug trafficking provided a pretext for the government to 
eliminate some of their rivals using the processes of military intervention in domains associated 
with the UTO elites and the drug trade, such as Rasht and Badakhshan. Consequently, while the 
ruling elite in Tajikistan technically managed to capture economic, military, and institutional (i.e. 
formal state structures) power of the state, this did not allow it establish political authority over 
the entire territory. The state did not function to meet societal needs. It functioned to meet the 
needs of a small fraction of this society, that is the Kulyabi elite. In response, societal resistance 
shifted abroad. The opposition elites are in exile and the 10 per cent of the Tajik population which 
works abroad has hard feelings towards President Rahmonov’s government.  
 Uzbekistan, and its strategy of accommodation, was different in certain regards. First, the 
state elite tried to accommodate the interests of the regional elites. Secondly, President Karimov 
focused more on military sources of power. However, he organized this in such way that it 
provided the cover needed to retain the necessary degree of control over strategic sites of 
economic power, mainly cotton. Finally, the government loosened conditions to allow for rent-
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seeking by local elites, but prevented them from being significantly represented in state 
institutions, especially in the center. In this case, the larger space for maneuvering for the regions 
contributed to territorial fragmentation, which also prevented the extension of political authority 
over the entire territory. The strategy of accommodation did not destroy the historical patronage 
structures, but brought them under surveillance from security personnel installed across of layers 
of government. This made the elites look for other ways of conducting their activity. A 
phenomenon of “proxy landlordism”—that is, de facto owning the land without legally registering 
as an owner—has contributed to the extension of the informal economy or unregulated shadow 
areas. These create conditions conducive for the development of the new elites or the shift of 
societal resistance to the sector of informal economy.  
 In Kyrgyzstan the elites focused mostly on the state as a power resource, specifically on the 
chair of the President. Business, criminal, rent-seeking, and other private interests made the elites 
cooperate and intermingle with these interests on an ad-hoc basis until a goal of a given interest 
group is achieved, whereupon the tables turn. The intermingling of competing elites in Kyrgyzstan 
has not proven useful for state formation, in either functional or territorial terms. Kyrgyz 
politicians seem to be the greatest Weberians of Central Asia, as they put all their hope in the 
bureaucratic apparatus and tried to redesign the state institutions mainly to fit their own interests, 
rather than solve structural problems. Despite the fact that the Kyrgyz case initially exposed a 
much clear division into two main regions, the South and the North (that are also geographically 
divided by a mountain range), it has been shown that once an elite becomes the ruling elite, it 
abandons the interests of its social basis, even if that could have been its main link to the societies. 
Only in the case of Tajikistan the ruling elite has remained strongly connected to its clan. Both 
President Karimov and the Kyrgyzstani Presidents, once in power, tried to focus on the state as 
their main power-basis, rather than their regional roots.  
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 This complex picture of the diverse ways to organize the state exposes one real danger. 
The common variable this chapter has found is that in all three cases, the state has been perceived 
as an empowering institution, as the resource of power per se rather that a system or a space 
accommodating the diversity of interests. Yet, the failure to compete the state-building process 
suggests that formal institutions are not a sufficient condition for state-building, even if one links 
them to their social basis, such as clan and region as in the case of Tajikistan.  Monopolizing the 
state as an institution does not mean creating a political authority over a given territory, 
channeling the directions of social change, shaping ideological preferences of the people or 
possessing much influence over political outcome in the long term. In other words, possessing the 
state does not mean knowing how the state would look like in ten years.  
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CONCLUSION: Keeping it social    
The Puzzle: practice and concepts  
 
This study has focused comparatively on modern state-building in three Central Asian states: 
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. The puzzle that motivated this thesis was rooted both in 
practices and theories of the state. Empirically, it was puzzling why three cases that were initially 
different institutionally, politically, and economically faced a similar problem: an incomplete state. 
At the outset of independence, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, these three countries 
chose three different forms of state transformation. Uzbekistan opted for centralization and 
economic self-sufficiency, Kyrgyzstan chose market liberalization, decentralization and 
democratization, and Tajikistan had a conflict over power and resources from 1992 through to 
1997. In the first decade of independence, Uzbekistan experienced the so-called Uzbek miracle, 
i.e. economic growth without market liberalization; it was the most politically strong and stable 
country in Central Asia, aiming at regional leadership alongside Kazakhstan. Tajikistan managed to 
end the civil war with a Peace Accord, which created a precedent for power sharing between the 
secular and Islamic political forces. Kyrgyzstan was the first country which liberalized its economy, 
earning an international reputation for being “an island of democracy” in Central Asia. Its first 
revolution in 2005 was perceived internationally as a sign of democracy (Laruelle & Peyrouse 
2012). However, the post-9/11 war on terror resulted in a change of international interpretation 
of the events happening in Central Asia. The Kyrgyz revolutions (2005 and 2010) became indicators 
of state failure; Uzbekistan’s direction towards political stability was interpreted as violations of 
human rights and security. The same was true for Tajikistan as the structural reforms led to the 
government to start persecuting and eliminating the Islamic opposition. Looking for the reasons 
why this came to be, we appealed to theoretical literature, which complicated the puzzle.  
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In conceptual terms, the state in Central Asia has conventionally been interpreted through the 
lens of the Heartland theory, originating in Mackinder’s writings on geopolitics and geo-strategy. 
The categories of tabula rasa, the great chessboard, and the Greater Middle East have 
characterized thoughts and deeds towards Central Asia (Brzezinski 1998). This interpretation was 
rooted in the history of imperial competition over India and access to it between the British and 
the Russian Empires. Later, during the Cold War, Central Asia was the gateway to Afghanistan, one 
of the theaters of Soviet-American competition. The puzzle that arises from theories based on 
MacKinder is how one explains the variation between the Central Asian countries if they were a 
mere tabula rasa, constructed fully by the Great Powers? 
An answer seemed to emerge in the post-Cold War period, when scholars started looking for a 
new understanding of Central Asia by shifting the focus to the local context, indigenous identities, 
and democratic development. Based on the assumption that the state represented the linear 
rationalization of social relations, the transitology approach explained state failure via the colonial 
legacy, the “homo sovieticus” mentality, informal, or patrimonial, structures of governance, and 
the revival of radical Islam. The impact of civilization and state formation which flows from Central 
Asia’s multi-layered history, as well as that of intervening Empires and the incapacity of tribal 
elites to (de)mobilize tribal societies, not to mention the mysterious elevation of Islam as the 
indigenous identity of this diverse region, have all been neglected.  
Instead, this thesis has shown that there can be no dominating culture in such a diverse social 
reality; Islamic civil society was as much an object of social engineering as liberal civil society, and 
there are significant variations in the neo-patrimonial structures of the three states. Additionally, 
these factors would not matter unless they are connected to economic resources and promoted 
by politics. Finally, the thesis has shown that the formal end of the Soviet History was not the end 
of its story, for social relations created under the Soviet statehood continued. The onset of 
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democracy did not coincide with the onset of liberation, for when given freedom people often 
chose another type of prison.  
The Argument: three sets of factors and state-society relations 
 
Central Asia has presented a challenge to the dominant interpretations of the state, both in 
practical and conceptual terms. The post-Cold War fashion to condemn the Soviet past made the 
dominant interpretations of Central Asia societally-blind. The fashion to “return to the real 
tradition”, paradoxically, made them historically-blind, for there is no history of Central Asia 
without the history of Empires. We were told that tribes, clans, religion, and other types of prisons 
constitute the true past: the unique, the indigenous, the Central Asian. On the contrary, this thesis 
has emphasized that Central Asia has been first and foremost about diversity, subtlety and a 
blurring of the usual borders between the internal and external, private and public, legitimate and 
illegitimate, formal and informal. Consolidation of state authority or creation of an encompassing 
social institution providing a sense of belonging and the common good does not seem to be 
possible without embracing this diversity and interdependence.  
This thesis has pursued this premise by shifting the focus to a simple proposition: state-
society relations matter. The state cannot be complete without a viable, functioning, and 
organized bond between it and society, for it is society where change originates. And it is micro-
processes that may foster macro-results. It brings the reader back to the basics of what the state 
means as a social institution in a diverse region with a multi-layered, non-linear history. 
Furthermore, it is not only the presence of conditions conducive to a viable state that matter, but 
also how these conditions transform when mutually conflated, whether they supplement one 
another or undermine each other’s efforts, whether they promote a meaning of power and 
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collective good which resonates with that of grassroots societal actors, and these narratives shape 
their material expressions.  
Specifically, this thesis has argued that the incomplete state is a result of three sets of 
factors, generated by three dimensions of state creation: historical, external and international, 
and that of the local struggles for power. These dimensions were operationalized here as legacy of 
the Soviet statehood, External actors’ strategies, and Local elites games, with the first defined as 
social interdependence; the second – as the projects or strategies of organizing security, economy, 
and society in the region; and the third – as the struggle among rival elites, the ruling elite and the 
regional elites. The thesis has showed that each of these sets of factors produced processes which, 
in conjunction with the other two, produced a counter-productive and self-undermining effect, 
resulting in the incomplete state. Specifically, each of these sets led to two main unintended 
consequences: (1) the destruction of the state’s infrastructural power, i.e. the capacity to engage 
in mutually constitutive relations with their societies; (2) the creation of sites of social resistance 
and isolating parts of territories, i.e. exacerbating territorial fragmentation. This claim was 
unfolded in three steps.  
The first set of factors, called herein the Soviet legacy, has challenged the institutional take 
on the Soviet state and demonstrated that this Soviet legacy is about societal interdependence 
due to three reasons: (1) the modes of organization of land, water, and peoples in the Soviet state; 
(2) the peculiarities of nation creation and collectivization in Central Asia during the Soviet period;  
and (3) the subsequent privatization following the Soviet dissolution which, contrary to 
international reports praising “successful privatization”, has shown that land assets have been 
partially restructured and non-land assets have remained largely unchanged. Due to these factors, 
social interdependence at the grassroots and across borders has persisted to the present. Cross-
border societal interdependence has fit poorly into post-Soviet nation-building. It was like fitting a 
square peg in a round hole (Chapter 3).  
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The second set of factors, called external actors, has examined their three main vectors: 
firstly, the projects to organize security, which was achieved mainly through establishing borders 
and their justification through ideas of transnational threat; secondly, the projects that aimed to 
(re)organize economies and create bottom-up conditions for the neo-liberal reforms; thirdly, the 
projects aiming to (re)organize societies and create an NGO sector which was equated with the 
participatory civil society and empowerment of communities. Together, all of this aimed to create 
bottom-up conditions to promote neo-liberal democracy. However, remaining oblivious to 
historical contingencies, power constellations, and the blurring between the criminal and legal, 
and public and private sectors, not to mention the social organization of the communities, these 
projects resulted in unintended consequences, such as isolated land pockets, increased informal 
socio-economic practices, and the development of a parallel civil society, which represents sites of 
social resistance (Chapter 4).  
The third set of factors stems from the struggles between the ruling and the local elites. 
Comparative analysis of these struggles in three different cases highlighted the differences of 
these three cases and identified common features that contribute to understanding of the 
incomplete state. This set of factors is also not completely discrete from the previous set, for the 
ruling elites have been largely empowered by the external actors. This set has shown that it is not 
that the elite struggles hinder the completeness of the state, but rather it is the destruction of the 
local elites as an institution which may have connected state elites to grassroots societies is what 
hinders the completeness of the state. As Tilly (1975) and Mann (1986) suggest, the institution of 
landlords (in the case of Western Europe) or local elites can be made part of the state’s 
infrastructural power, for they are closer to the grassroots societal organization. In other words, 
the institution of local elites may have provided the state’s societal embeddeddness (Chapter 5).  
All these sets of factors taken together paint the following picture: (1) communities have 
been isolated, empowered to develop self-governance structures and reliant on their own 
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alternative non-standard (read: informal) survival strategies, due to the external actors’ efforts to 
create bottom-up conditions for neo-liberal democracy; (2) the ruling elites have been 
empowered through grants tied to structural reforms from external actors, such reforms and 
grants being manipulated in a way which allowed the ruling elites justify the marginalization of the 
local elites; (3) having fostered the development of an unintended parallel civil society and having 
destroyed the institution of the local elites, the state-builders contributed to the development of 
sites of social resistance and an identity of resistance across borders, around which the walls of 
empty “nation-states” were built. What lies at the bottom of these walls cannot really be seen 
while sitting on top.  
Key findings and synopsis  
 
The key propositions of this thesis can be outlined as follows.  
1. The dominant indices on failed states provide useful toolkits for taking a snapshot and capturing 
the symptoms of state weakness, such as capacity, legitimacy, and authority, as measured by 
economic growth, good governance, and political violence. However, these indexes, as well as the 
conceptual accounts reliant on them, measure states according to four main dichotomies: formal 
vs. informal; strong vs. weak; rational vs. irrational, and historical vs. institutional understandings 
of statehoods. As Chapters  1 (from the conceptual point of view) and  Chapter 2 (from the 
practical point of view) have shown, the states in Central Asia have proven to be both strong and 
weak, omnipotent and absent, formal and informal, rational and irrational, historical and 
institutional creatures in different sectors of governance.  
2. This thesis offered to simplify the complexity of the shadow areas through three indicators: 
transnationality, cross-sectionality, entrysm. Chapter 2 provided examples to each of these 
indicators, such as cross-border trade, Islamist movements and organized crime networks, and the 
grassroots social structures or communities of trust, such as the mahalla (as a social unit) and the 
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bazaar (as an economic unit). These three examples showed how the formal and informal, public 
and private, legal and illegal, national and transnational intersect and do not fit into the four 
conventional dichotomies, creating the problem of the incomplete state.  
While the central theme of the argument is outlined in the previous section, the key findings in 
terms of the processes of interstitial emergence are as follows.  
In terms of history or the legacy of the Soviet statehood  
 
Two key findings were crystallized as characterizing features of the post-Soviet state-building: 1) 
community-empowerment and 2) the community-centered institution of “private” property, 
underlined by the single pattern of societal interdependence. The Great Break, the Structural 
Reforms and Shock Therapy are all big terms, based on the assumption that change has actually 
taken place. However, they misunderstand its form and social meaning, which this thesis reveals 
by following the water, a phenomenon crucial for social order, survival, and the sense of belonging 
in the Fergana Valley. In following the water, we identified historical patterns that shed a different 
light on the conventional understanding of change and continuity in the post-Soviet Central Asia. 
These patterns can be roughly summarized as follows.  
Firstly, pre-Soviet societal organization was based on semi-nomadic and nomadic lifestyles, 
where water and land had economic, social, and spiritual meaning. Their management was based 
on custom. Societies were fragmented and showed no coherent collective identities, such as 
ethnicity or nation. Secondly, nation-building in its modern sense, i.e. connecting the categories of 
ethnicity, economic and political resources, was undertaken by the Soviet state, utilizing tactics of 
national-territorial delimitation. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, the national-territorial 
delimitation had a unifying rather than “divide-and-rule” effect, thereby altering previous patterns 
of social relations. Thirdly, the new nations were integrated into the Soviet state by means of 
creating a collective interest through the process of collectivization. Cross-border usage of pastoral 
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lands and water were regulated by the notion of the actual use of land. It implied cross-border 
social interactions, regardless of administrative borders. The Soviet system of water-sharing was a 
three-tier distribution system: regional, national, collectives’ based. Water to communities was 
distributed by collective farms. Hence, communities were not destroyed, but neither were they 
the main units of distribution of the collective good. This basic observation, and its consequent 
impact on post-Soviet state-building, has been largely neglected).  
The conventional interpretation is that the great change came with the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union and the process of de-collectivization and privatization. However, the thesis has 
found that structural change has not happened in the form that was envisioned. Specifically, the 
de-collectivization process that implies the shift from collective to private property has taken on 
an interesting twist by creating the conditions for an institution of community-property by means 
of restructuring both tangible and non-tangible farms’ assets (has not been yet fully undertaken. 
Non-land assets, such as water and the infrastructure related to it, as well as the social welfare 
functions exercised previously by the authority of the collective farms, have remained neglected. 
The third-tier distribution networks that were managed behind the gates of the collective farms 
have been left intact. This forced communities to revive and re-organize their self-governance 
structures. Being in line with the neo-liberal spirit of empowering grassroots participation, these 
communities have started receiving help from the World Bank group and related NGOs.  
In empowering communities, the neo-liberal programs have fostered two processes: firstly, 
hindering the development of the institution of private property and reviving memories of 
custom-based self-governance structures. Something that was thought of as the institution of 
private property has been in reality the property of a community, a household, or a composition of 
households, with the land certificates granted to the head of the household, i.e. a man. The 
relations around this property would then further be regulated by the community or a fraction of 
it, rather than as an individually-centered institution of private property. The problem is that there 
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is a gap between a conceptual and legal persona of a community and that of private property 
rights. Hence, it would not be a stretch to say that community-empowerment in terms of self-
governance and grassroots water management and community-empowerment in terms of 
institutionalization of private property rights can produce interesting legal twists which would 
undermine both the neo-liberal goals of privatization and the goals of consolidating the state as 
the center of politics in a given polity.  
In other words, the result was the continuation and intensification of societal interdependence 
in terms of water, reviving traditional memories and practices, thereby re-traditionalizing 
communities. The only innovation is the institutional dismantling of the collective farms, without 
providing an equally efficient alternative to manage societal interdependence.  
In terms of external actors  
 
The organization of security in Central Asia started with a line in the sand, a border, which was 
arbitrary during the Soviet period and which became material, expressed in the form of border 
check points, visa regimes, and minefields in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 
This line produced adversarial relations at the inter-state level, isolated certain enclaves in the 
Fergana Valley, but, paradoxically, has not hindered interdependence, for water cannot be walled. 
Borders crystallised narratives of threat, which then flowed smoothly from the into the security 
infrastructures of the newly sovereign states. While, in principle, borders are institutions that can 
shape territory and sovereignty, they created hindrances to sovereignty, for they hindered the 
extension of the political authority of the state over its entire territory by creating isolated land 
pockets. Such land pockets are illustrated in this thesis by three case studies of enclave zones 
Vorukh and Chorkhu (Tajikistan), Sokh and Shahimardan (Uzbekistan), Batken zone (Kyrgyzstan), 
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which turn the state into empty shells or walls around the isolated land pockets of fragmented 
societies and territories .  
The next pillar of the external dimension is that of organizing economies. Justified by the 
creation of conditions for the bottom-up development of neo-liberalism, the World Bank group 
provided financial and logistical support for cross-border non-standard trade through its CAREC 
program, by supporting the informal/traditional market institution, the bazaar.  While realizing 
the potential of the bazaar as part of people’s survival strategies, the World Bank neglected the 
integration of this unit into other societal processes taking place in Central Asia. Having 
highlighted other processes which go through the bazaars as one of the sites for the processes of 
interstitial emergence, this thesis has shown how this external influence can increase the potential 
of social resistance.  
The CAREC project aligns closely with the CASA-1000 project, which has similar goals as 
CAREC in terms of development of trade and infrastructure, but which is also complimented by the 
idea of creating a common resource pool between Central Asia and South Asia. Justified through 
narratives of linking the land-locked region of Central Asia to the sea, this project contributes to 
the increase of social resistance for two reasons. It implies construction of grand power-stations 
such as Rogun, which will result in the internal displacement of a large part of the population of 
Tajikistan. Coincidentally, the areas of displacement are those regions where the local strongmen 
or opposition leaders still retain a degree of influence. Having displaced their populations, the 
government will destroy their social organization and power constellations, thereby increasing 
identities of resistance. The World Bank and its liberalization rhetoric is de-facto justifying this.  
In organizing society, external actors aimed to establish a formal NGO sector. Due to 
ongoing parallel processes of destroying societal organization through internal displacement while 
promoting the ideas of the NGO sector, that is freedom, human rights, and emancipation, this 
rhetoric in practice has empowered the same rhetoric on the side of Islamic NGOs and 
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(underground) radical civil activists whose views on the state and society are very different from 
the views of the external actors. Narratives of emancipation, in practice, became narratives of 
betrayal and the narratives of resistance, contributing to the outsourcing of state ideological 
power and creating different kinds of civil society. 
Considering the societal consequences of each of these pillars, the possibility of a trans-
nationalization of the identity of resistance, just like the possibility of a trans-nationalization of 
informal economic processes, does not seem completely unrealistic, regardless of the fortified 
borders, walls, and fences. Hence, external actors only intensified the legacies of the past, 
sponsoring the revival of the alternative social structures and ideologies, increasing the power of 
the societal, and yet for state failure, they blamed it conventionally on the wrong institutional 
design as seen in Chapter 2. Having crystallized the power of the societal, it was necessary to 
understand “who rules”, what agency, institutions or mechanisms of channeling those societal 
processes, whether such agency exists and in what form. For this reason, Chapter 5 has focused on 
the struggle between the competing elites.  
In terms of local struggles among the competing elites  
 
A comparative study of the struggles for power between the ruling elite and the local elites--
defined as those groups sufficiently powerful to mobilize parts of societies regardless of their 
sources of legitimacy or geographical location—has shown that, despite differences, the common 
aspect was that the ruling elites have perceived the state itself as a resource of power. Their 
struggles were not so much about sources of social power, but rather for the state as a vehicle for 
pursuing private interests by public means. Further narratives on authoritarianism have confused 
societies who also became enmeshed in condemnation of state elites for usurpation of national 
economic assets, while the problem appeared to be much more trivial: the struggle for economic 
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resources was limited only to those resources that provided the “mad money”, rather than 
keeping the tools of government in the hands of the ruling elite, such as fiscal policy. Revenue-
collection a la Central Asia appeared to be collection of revenues from drug trafficking, 
privatization, remnants of Soviet-time industries, rather than generation of wealth or creation of a 
fiscal policy that could connect the state and societies. None of the ruling elites focused on the 
taxation system as the system of creating and sharing of the common good. This implies that the 
economic resources of the state were narrowed to the mad money, often from illicit activities.  
For these reasons, the redistribution of wealth that had its origins in illicit economic 
sources has neither changed the socio-economic situation for the better, nor contributed to the 
legitimacy of the new elites. It was not necessarily the elite that was perceived as illegitimate, it 
was its sources of power, the origins of which are not a mystery for the public. The most 
illustrative case for this observation was Kyrgyzstan and its revolutionary experience. The ruling 
elites have deprived themselves from the sources of power which could bring about legitimacy, 
capacity, and authority. Instead, they have chosen to fight for resources through marginalization, 
surveillance, or purposeful usage of rival elites, thereby strengthening rival fiefdoms, towards 
which their authority would not extend.  
Hence, the state as a gradual process of consolidation and centralization of power (Tilly 
1975) has not been developing. Rather, it was the centralization of economic resources which do 
not contribute to the creation of infrastructural capacity of the state. This happened in 
conjunction with territorial fragmentation due to the marginalization of rival elites and their 
domains of power, fueling sites of social resistance in different ways: in Tajikistan – it was the 
shifting of social resistance to exile; in Uzbekistan – it is the cherishing of an invisible or absentee 
landlordism which creates the new “invisible” strongmen; and in Kyrgyzstan, it is the intermingling 
of strongmen of both criminal and legal background, thereby making the state an instrument for 
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achieving personal goals which are far from common, societal or political. It is turning the 
countries into fragmented polities without politics.    
Finally, having started as a study of the securitization of Islam and having shifted to state-
society focus. Due to this shift, the thesis arrived at findings which have shown the idea that 
Islamic radicalization and ethnic tensions are just one of many examples of larger processes and 
structures constituting social resistance. Although the so-called Islamic revival has been 
conventionally conceptualized as one of the threats to the state, one could see that Islam has 
been present in all three cases to differing extents and in such diverse forms that considering Islam 
as a cause of the incomplete state would require serious theological research in order to reflect its 
full social, political, economic, and human meaning.  
Social resistance has little to do with Islam as such. It concerns the basic organization of 
social relations and social order. For several reasons, this thesis has focused on three different 
case studies – Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Despite their differences, these three 
countries have trisected the infamous Fergana Valley, a region framed as a potential “Balkans of 
Central Asia.” Conventional wisdom will immediately identify the Fergana Valley as one of the 
“obvious causes” of the incomplete state due to its “dangerous diversity.” Having emphasized the 
premise that Central Asia is essentially about diversity, this thesis has challenged the view, 
embedded in the Fragile States Indexes, which conceives of ethnic and religious diversity as 
preconditions for violence resulting in state failure.  
Additionally, the Fergana Valley has commonly been considered the citadel of Islamic 
culture in Central Asia. However, this thesis found more important processes occurring in three 
main dimensions: local (grassroots/community-level), national (states), and transnational (across 
borders and borderlands). The common factor of the Fergana Valley has allowed a focus on the 
most basic patterns of social interaction and their simplest human meaning. The patterns found 
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challenge the main assumptions of transitology theory, both the institutions-based variant on 
measuring the state and the crisis-based assessment of state-building.  
Therefore, arguably, yet confidently enough, one of the broader implications of this thesis is 
that neither Islam-based nor ethnicity-based explanations of the incomplete state can provide a 
comprehensive vision of the state and society relations in the present era. This highlights the 
paradoxical dualism of trans-nationalization and re-traditionalization. Hence, the ever provocative 
question of “bringing the state back in” is still waiting for counter-intuitive solutions.  
So what? Broader implications and concluding thoughts   
 
I was always embarrassed by the words sacred, glorious, and sacrifice and the expression in vain. We had 
heard them ... and had read them ... now for a long time. There were many words that you could not stand 
to hear and finally only the names of places had dignity. Abstract words such as glory, honor, courage or 
hallow were obscene beside the concrete names of villages, the numbers of roads, the names of rivers, the 
numbers of regiments and the dates.   
(Ernest Hemingway)  
 
The thesis wanted you to follow the water and return to the basics of the social conflict which is 
called the state, in order to understand what factors and (mis)perceptions prevent a clear vision of 
state-society relations. It has examined the social and human meaning of the categories and 
concepts fashioned to make sense of the state in Central Asia and found that the same 
institutional settings can foster diametrically opposite outcomes under different societal contexts. 
In general, it arrived at the classical Hobbesian dilemma where the liberal means undermine 
liberal ends.  
In particular, its findings may suggest reconsidering the following rules of thumb for 
engineering bottom-up conditions for the development of the neo-liberal state:  
1) Creating neutral bureaucracies and institutions 
2) Decentralization of the state  
3) Creation of civil society through the NGO sector  
4) Privatization and development of non-standard trade  
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On bureaucracies and institutions  
 
Institutions that are societally and historically-blind can make the state empty and turn it into a 
tool for pursuing private interests, rather than a social institution channeling the directions of 
processes of interstitial emergence. In Central Asia, state institutions have been interpreted and 
constructed as neutral bureaucracies, which turned them into the means for acquisition of 
economic resources and illicit financial revenues. Neutral bureaucracies that do not reflect societal 
organization pose a risk of usurpation of the state by a small fraction of a society, through the 
ruling elite. Normative considerations apart, this creates the risk that when the ruling elite tries to 
extend state authority to other territorial domains, it fails to do so, regardless of whether it uses 
institutional or coercive means. People in the domains different from those under the control of 
the ruling elite perceive such interventions as those of the rival elite, rather than as those of the 
state authorities. Hence, modern state engineering confuses neutral bureaucracy with state 
autonomy. The neutral state in societal terms—that is accommodating the diversity of social 
conflicts and interests—can be seen as possessing the state autonomy; but the state which is 
neutral due to being bureaucratic and is detached from the process of mutually constituting the 
state and social conflicts is an empty shell state.  
On decentralization of the state  
  
Tilly (1975) argues that historical state formation is a movement from largely fragmented societies 
to a centralized polity. Modern state engineering, on the contrary, promotes decentralization. As 
the case of Central Asia suggests, decentralization may often result in re-traditionalization, 
criminalization, and territorial fragmentation. Strengthening communities may have two opposite 
results: the empowerment of participatory civil society or the empowerment of social resistance 
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or, at least, identities of resistance. For example, community-based practices in Central Asia are 
rooted in memories which have little to do with the state. It may have more to do with the 
practices of sharing, decision-making, and ideologies during the nomadic and semi-nomadic 
periods. Once revived, they may undermine the goals of the modern state. Tilly (1975) suggests 
that such societies may lead to a type of the state different from that of the modern state. Yet, the 
exact type of state would remain unforeseen and therefore, unmanageable. Under such 
circumstances, talking about the state as a result of the rationalization of social relations, as well 
as measuring state’s failure in terms of informal economies, levels of crime or radicalization 
becomes meaningless. Furthermore, in reviving communities we revive memories of religious 
practices that have regulated social relations, but memories have a tendency to become twisted 
and mutate over time. It is difficult to say now which tradition represents a true Central Asian 
tradition and has thus to be revived. As a result, communities become vulnerable to transcendent 
ideologies of Islam which resonate with the general spirit of social resistance and memories of 
customary-based types of social relations.  
Finally, as we have seen, empowering communities in Central Asia would mean 
empowering isolated pockets of territories that do not have a sense of belonging to the central 
state they formally belong to. Therefore, this kind of decentralization, in practice, turns into 
territorial fragmentation, while in terms of functions the state remains centralized. As Tilly (1975) 
warned us, territorial fragmentation and functional centralization are attributes of the medieval, 
rather than the modern state. These findings suggest that decentralization may again lead to the 
re-traditionalization of social relations in diverse regions with multi-layered histories. It is an 
engineered re-traditionalization, not a natural one, for a tradition is never autonomous from the 
“modern” institutions or social interactions, within which it is found. 
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On civil society and the NGO sector  
 
In conjunction with these conditions, the NGO sector or the formal civil society which has been 
shaped by the external actors’ projects may be seen as possessing more the qualities of a market 
than a social or cultural space. Grassroots civil activists developed a parallel civil society in their 
turn, demonstrating transformations that lie beyond the types of civil society imagined by neo-
liberal state-building, but they emphasized an ideological and educational component, i.e. Islam 
and Islamic education. Being perceived as less “corrupt” than the formal education, Islamic 
education has attracted many followers.  
As the main processes which influenced the creation of formal civil society was the process 
of market liberalization and the supporting of informal trade, it is legitimate to recall the 
Hegelian/Marxian vision of civil society (Poggi 2001). In practice, both the NGO sector and 
communal civil society have been supported by external actors not as cultural, ideational, or social 
phenomena, but rather as units of a market. Considering the parts of these units which received 
more finance, one can say that it was these societies’ utilitarian value which was promoted, which 
is an economic view. However, since utility was derived from communities, the market becomes 
connected to localized systems of self-governance and developed into a type of civil society, 
classically called  “Ständestaat“ or, in later versions, - “ständische Gesellschaft“ (Poggi 2001), 
literally - the state of the estates. Considering the findings of Chapter 5, when the struggle among 
rival elites fostered the creation of local elite “Fiefdoms“, one could see formal civil society as a 
factor contributing to the ständische Gesellschaft. Again, this represents an addition to societal 
and territorial fragmentation, which is not conducive to the completeness of the state.  
It is not news that neo-liberal narratives may give rise to a conservative civil society. In 
Central Asia, the parallel civil society which has been developing emphasizes categories of justice, 
education, and spiritual needs, by means of an Islamic cause. This method appeals to the general 
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level of social resistance developing within society. In theory, a transcendent ideology may 
influence the direction of processes of interstitial emergence (Mann 1993). This may imply that 
through this method, an emergent parallel civil society managed to disseminate the ideology of 
Islam, which possesses features of the transcendent ideology. Furthermore, since this ideology is 
transnational, it would not be a stretch to imply that this process can increase the potential for 
transnational collective action and give birth to a new collective interest or a transnational 
collective actor. Although debatable, the idea of a transnational collective actor based on these 
sets of factors may be worth further inquiries. 
On privatization and the non-standard trade  
 
It is wrong to say that privatization or liberalization has failed in Central Asia. On the contrary, it 
succeeded, albeit in a different form. The implementation of privatization in Central Asia created 
communal rather than individual private property. It is a form of corporate private property, based 
on re-traditionalized communities and patriarchal systems, since the head of the household (read: 
a man) has primary rights. Secondly, the pursuit of liberalization through supporting non-standard 
trade in Central Asia simply strengthened the dependency on non-standard trade in Fergana Valley 
populations. This represents a survival strategy, in the absence of better alternatives, rather than a 
choice based on a luxury dilemma.  
Since cross-border non-standard trade is more developed in the Fergana Valley, the neo-
liberal policies which support it condition local populations to use this type of economic activity 
and therefore create a political economy, which will always be balanced between criminal and 
legal. In practice, supporting non-standard trade means supporting a division of labor between 
north and south, thereby exacerbating the inequality of conditions between these people.  
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This factor, together with the “functional” centralization addressed above leads in practice 
to a tyranny of private (corporate) interest over both state and individual. Hence, this kind of 
liberalization strengthens neither the state, nor the free man.  Finally, the highlighted constellation 
of factors juxtaposed with the existing historically preconditioned societal interdependence, as 
underlined in Chapter 3, may, contrary to the conventional wisdom, foster not inter-communal or 
inter-state conflicts, but rather a form of “informal regionalization” or regionalization par la bas. 
Necessary factors for that kind of regionalization, such as informal survival strategies resulting in 
parallel economies, re-traditionalizing social structures, transcendent ideologies, and parallel civil 
activism (read: social mobilization potential) are present. Once hearts and minds are ready, an 
emergence of a new, not fully foreseen social order would only need to organize its logistics and 
find a political trigger.   
Questions for Further Research  
Think polity with politics: questioning capacity, legitimacy, and authority  
 
If society matters, we have to map it correctly. The first steps in doing so could be reconsidering 
the outcome of the state-building process. The state is complete when it is a polity making politics, 
not when it is a group doing business. We have seen here that thinking in terms of the state as an 
institution may lead to the state turning into a vehicle for the ruling elites or into a massive, 
bureaucratic money-laundering machine. We need to explore whether thinking in terms of 
political authority may help to design better polities and a state as a social experience. If so, then 
we have to reconsider capacity, legitimacy, and authority as the three pillars of the state. It is the 
interplay between capacity and legitimacy that will create a certain type of political authority. 
Instances where capacity and legitimacy appear to be mutually exclusive, due to the conditions, 
factors, or attributes that scholars attach to them, is something which is to be explored more 
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deeply. For instance, inspired by Michal Mann, this thesis found that societal embeddedness 
rather than state functional capacity can provide state legitimacy.  
At the same time, if society is permeated by patrimonial government structures, one may 
need to consider the balance between state autonomy and state embeddeddness. We suggest 
that revisiting the notion of capacity may cast some light on this balance. For example, capacity-
building may in practice turn into increasing the state’s despotic power. However, we need a 
democratic, i.e. inclusive polity with a prospering society and free people. To accommodate the 
rich variety of the meanings of democracy across cultures, the research needs to focus on the 
striking, practical difference between sources of power and sources of capacity, for they are not 
the same.  
Sources of power: why economic resources do not equal economic power?  
 
As Chapter 5 has shown, elites have sequestered most if not all of the available economic 
resources. While this may have provided them with extra income and some influence, it has not 
provided them with economic power. No matter how the elites tend to think in Machiavellian 
terms, politics in itself is not a dirty business. It may be if we make it so. Neither vast riches nor 
access to the state has provided the elites with political authority. The missing element is simple: 
better fiscal policies and context-based mechanisms of infrastructural power. The Roman or 
Ottoman Empires were not ruled by money. Once their leaders thought they were, their polities 
collapsed. It is the infrastructural power that kept things together. Whether this should be 
achieved through empowering of civil society, community-based governance, institutions of local 
elites, or of a culture of negotiation among the social actors is a question to be answered for each 
particular context, with the aid of broad ethnographic data.  
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Society is diverse: so what with the Nation-state then? 
 
However, in imagining a polity which has been created through an inclusive state-building process, 
the question arises whether the category of nation-state may provide enough room for it. 
Communitarian political theory would insist on that the nation-state is inclusive by definition, for it 
is based on the notion of citizenship, rather than ethnicity. However, for empirical reasons the 
nation-state does imply dominance of a titular nationality, since for the nation-state to function - 
economic and political resources must be bound to a given ethnic group. Whether a non-nation 
based membership in a polity is utopian or the road toward a self-eroding corporate culture is 
another question to be addressed.  
Westphalian Sovereignty: what will we make of it without the Nation-state?  
 
Finally, revisiting the notion of the nation-state while finding the way to organize political 
authority at home may have implications for how we think about international relations. Nation-
states still constitute the main units of international relations, as well as preserving the notion of 
anarchy as the international order. Westphalian sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention 
would seem to be shaken without this unit. But would they really? Does non-intervention really 
need the nation-state? Or it would the peculiarities of international law and actorship in the 
international community need to be reconsidered, as well as the nature of anarchy and, certainly, 
what we make of it? 
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